Defence Reform Bill

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Monday 24th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, for raising and giving an airing to this subject. I can only hope that this will not be the end of the discussion of this important matter. The point was made as to whether this amendment was within the remit of the Bill. I like to think that this is going to be not one that we will necessarily vote on today, but one that we will come back to in greater detail bearing in mind the reply from my noble friend the Minister.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, went into great detail, and I certainly do not intend to repeat his comments, but I share many of his concerns about the assurances that he seeks. Do my noble friend the Minister and the Ministry of Defence believe that, with our reduced Army, Navy and Air Force, we are more vulnerable without such interception? No one likes the breaking of privacy and no one likes secrecy, but with our Army being reduced by 20,000, our Navy by 5,000 and our RAF by 5,000 personnel, and with the increase in the Reserve Forces, which we will deal with later in the Bill, rising very slowly to reach the 30,000 level, how important is that interception, and how important is it that it is reported and transparent, as my noble friend Lady Miller asked?

That is brought very much to the forefront of our minds with the problems in Ukraine. What help or hindrance does such interception cause in the present climate of hostilities? Overall, how should such transparency be effected on forces such as those of the United States operating on UK soil?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 1 deals with the issue of interception of communications and follows on from the amendment on the issue that we considered in Grand Committee.

As I am sure that my noble friend appreciates, the issues that she has raised this afternoon, although important and interesting, are not entirely related to the Defence Reform Bill. In fact, the Interception of Communication Commissioner’s Office—the role and powers of which are covered by the amendment—is the responsibility of the Home Office, rather than the Ministry of Defence. I hope that she will therefore understand if I do not respond to all the points that she raised. In particular, as the Prime Minister recently made clear in the House of Commons, intelligence-sharing between the UK and its allies will not be discussed in public. I will, however, try to cover those aspects of the amendment that deal with defence matters and to touch upon the wider points where I am able to do so.

I can give my noble friend and other noble Lords an unequivocal assurance that the Government are fully aware of the activities at US bases in this country and that interception activity in this country is subject to the full rigour of oversight provided under RIPA. We all know that there is intelligence co-operation between the UK and US Government and that that is a key component of our relationship with them. I will not be drawn into commenting on the specifics of that co-operation, but I can confirm that operations at the base that my noble friend mentioned are carried out in accordance with United Kingdom law.

The amendment is in two parts. The first would require the Interception Commissioner to report on the use or proposed use, subject to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, of services or systems procured for defence purposes. However, the Interception of Communications Commissioner is already required by Section 57 of RIPA 2000 to keep under review the issue of RIPA 2000 interception warrants. Therefore, the additional legal effect of this part of the amendment would be to impose a requirement on the commissioner potentially to be involved twice for the same interception. He would be required to comment once in reviewing the use and proposed use of equipment to intercept communications, and then again when reviewing the actual issue of any subsequent interception warrant. Therefore, this part of the amendment is unnecessary; it provides no additional scrutiny, and could, in some circumstances, introduce uncertainty and lack of clarity. This would be an unhelpful extension of the commissioner’s remit, which, as it stands, is clear and distinct.