Register of Hereditary Peers

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Monday 9th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

I agree with both parts of the noble Lord’s proposition.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Earl has said that my noble friend Lord Grocott’s proposal is best advanced through a change in Standing Orders—presumably not through legislation. What are the implications of that? Will the noble Earl and the Government give my noble friend an opportunity to test the opinion of the House?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, it is open to any noble Lord to approach the Procedure Committee or indeed the Lord Speaker with a proposal for consideration. If a proposition then comes before the House, we will of course look at it on its merits.

Brexit: Armed Forces and Diplomatic Service

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 8th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, we have had a sterling opening speech and a well-reasoned maiden speech. My starting point is this. On 23 June, the people spoke. It is uncertain what they said but the Prime Minister has given the helpful steer that “Brexit means Brexit”. At least in the fields of domestic policy, the economy and border control there was quite a substantial pre-referendum debate and areas of concern were revealed.

However, foreign affairs and defence figured much less. I recall, for example, Mr Farage saying that he was a “Commonwealth man”, although all the Commonwealth countries were against leaving, and indeed the only Commonwealth country with a vote—Gibraltar—voted very much to remain. Miss Mordaunt, who is still a government Minister, told us that Turkey, with a teeming population, was about to join the EU. That was not true then and is still less true today. I therefore conclude from this lack of pre-referendum debate that in the areas covered today the Government have a much freer hand in making deals which are clearly in our national interest, and similarly in seeking co-operation in fields such as migration and counterterrorism—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown.

I make the following reflections. First, for over 40 years we have worked with the EU at every level—from the European Council to constant co-ordination at post level. This has led to harmonisation of policy, which has not prevented divergence, such as we saw at the UN General Assembly in respect of recognition of Palestine, with the EU splitting three ways. This habit of working together has given us more clout—for example, on Iran—and the question is whether we now face the danger of being excluded from a lead position on such issues. With our departure and the likely policies of the Trump Administration, will we not see an increasing fraying, for example—even abandonment—of the sanctions against Russia because of its occupation of Crimea?

My second reflection is that Brexit should give an enhanced role to our embassies in EU countries and perhaps even to institutions such as the Council of Europe. There will be staff implications. I note that the total FCO budget is only twice the sum of our development aid to Ethiopia, where there is an alarming deterioration in human rights. Presumably our secondees to the EEAS will return. Do we accept any obligations to our other UK nationals in the service?

My third observation is that the FCO is, of course, only a part of our representation overseas. On cultural diplomacy, the British Council has shown its concern. Will Erasmus be continued for the UK? On DfID, the 2016 statistics show that we paid 30% of our multilateral ODA to the Commission’s development budget and the European Development Fund. Will these contributions come to an end or be reduced? What new mechanisms will be devised for co-ordination with the European Union, even if we are almost certainly outside the room when priorities are decided?

Fourthly, there is the security aspect. In the Times of 11 June Sir John Scarlett wrote, concerning Brexit, that,

“we risk losing automatic access to counter-terrorist data”,

and,

“exchanges of information becoming less expertly targeted”.

How will the Government prevent this?

But have no fear: Boris Johnson told Chatham House on 2 December that the referendum was a country “taking back control”, a country “galvanised by new possibilities”. History will show whether this is again pure Johnson bluster. His claim of a greater global reach begs the question: what are the constraints now that prevent us, with our allies, having a global reach?

Similar considerations arise on the defence side. There will be calls, of course, for a new European defence organisation, most stridently from those European countries that make the least credible contribution to defence, such as Belgium, at 0.9% of GDP, and Luxembourg, at 0.4%. What are the prospects for our joining future CSDP operations such as Sophia and Atalante? How will we influence their mandate from outside? Will we continue our relationship with the European Defence Agency? How will Berlin Plus be affected by the change?

My conclusion is simple. We travel in hope. If there is good will on all sides, and given our flexibility in this field, we may be able to preserve much of the present co-operation—unless the hard-line Brexiteers prevail. What assurances can the Minister give us on these points?

Royal Yacht

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend underestimates his pulling power. If private enterprise, however defined, believed that there was a business case for a new royal yacht, we would of course look at it, but we would still be left with the question of who would pay for the vessel. Given that no government department has a need for a royal yacht, it is hard to see how any public funding could be justified.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, a number of Conservative Members in the other place have made the interesting suggestion that the costs of a new royal yacht should come out of the aid budget. Will the Minister reject that immediately?

[Earl Howe]

Yes, my Lords. No government funding has been proposed by any government department.

Iraq Inquiry

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, at last—at long, long last—Chilcot has reported, and it makes bleak reading. I had a ringside seat at the events described, but was never in the position of taking decisions. I am comforted by the fact that neither were members of the inquiry. Although I accept that their conclusions are broadly justified, their judgments are not infallible, and need rigorous questioning.

From 1997 to 2005 I chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee. Once or twice a year over that period we visited Washington and New York, where we met many of the key players in the White House, the State Department, the Department of Defense and the CIA, and, of course, our excellent then ambassador in New York, Sir Jeremy Greenstock. In London, after I had argued for containment, the Prime Minister invited me to meet him one to one at No. 10, and thereafter arranged for me to meet Sir John Scarlett, who had briefed him, in both September 2002 and February 2003.

I shall now make some reflections, matching my own experiences with the conclusions of the report. Yes, in 2003 I voted for the war. Would I have done so now, in the light of current knowledge? No. Would I have voted yes, knowing only what I did in 2003? Yes. Why? Hindsight is a wonderful thing. It gives 20:20 vision. Of course, Chilcot had access to contemporaneous documents, but the memories of participants have been coloured by the consequences, and the confident tone of many of the report’s conclusions was matched only by the vaulting confidence of the Prime Minister and his senior advisers, cheered on by the Daily Mail, the Sun and the Daily Express.

We now know that the consequences were overwhelmingly negative. But what would have happened if we had not intervened? Almost certainly Saddam Hussein, or one of his nasty sons, would be ruling Iraq and threatening the region. As the ISG reported in the following year, he might have had to be tackled later, as he would have had the intent and then the capability of acquiring WMD. Increased oil resources would have allowed him to buy kit from AQ Khan, or from North Korea, the arch-proliferator.

Questions remain. Is there sufficient contextual analysis in the report? Did its authors seek to put themselves in the shoes of policymakers at the time? Remember that there was enormous frustration at the dissembling and obstruction by Saddam Hussein. Remember, too, that there was a realisation that sanctions were fraying fast and containment increasingly less credible. Remember also the post-9/11 atmosphere of the terrorist threat.

The Prime Minister made a strategic judgment to stand alongside the US to influence it—a judgment that was only partially realised, but which was at least honest. When briefed by the Prime Minister, I was surprised by an almost starry-eyed admiration for President Bush. When I was briefed by Sir John Scarlett he told me, essentially, what was relayed in the much-criticised dossier of September 2002, drafted by the JIC.

Thus the Prime Minister accepted the advice of our intelligence chiefs. They were wrong, but he honestly conveyed their advice—intelligence that was also accepted by France and Germany, and by our own military. I believe—if my memory is correct—that our soldiers were offered anti-CW kit at the time. Even Saddam Hussein may have believed that he still had WMD. It is difficult for politicians to disregard the advice of intelligence experts, but there should have been more rigorous and sceptical questioning. The establishment of the new security adviser to the Prime Minister should help.

There was a lack of HUMINT, and our sources—such as the Iraqi exile in the US, Chalabi, other exiles, and the BW fraudster—were certainly very suspect and had their own agendas. The report might have covered the position in Washington more thoroughly. I met Richard Perle, the grey eminence of the neocons, on several occasions. He spoke enthusiastically of the likely welcome of liberating forces in Baghdad and the promised democratic renaissance in the Middle East—unaware of the sort of complexities that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has mentioned. Colin Powell was angered by the briefing behind his speech to the UN. Richard Armitage, his No. 2, spoke to us of the military expertise at the top of the State Department compared with the comparative weakness at the top of the DOD, led by the management experts Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.

The inquiry concluded that the post-conflict plan was “wholly insufficient”, but probably failed adequately to reflect the fact that it was not us but the Department of Defense that was in the driving seat—overriding the advice and the plans of the State Department. In retrospect, perhaps, the failure of the Prime Minister was not to make his support more conditional. In Baghdad, visiting the CPA, I saw that the operatives under Bremer were overwhelmingly American. I also visited our rather isolated outpost in Basra. We had little or no influence over the twin disastrous decisions on de-Baathification and the disbandment of the army. Colin Powell—perhaps after visiting a supermarket—said, “If you break it, you own it”, and liberation soon morphed into occupation and intolerant Shia domination under al-Maliki.

My conclusion is this. I confess I have changed my mind following the publication of the report. I had assumed that the delay, and the likely pulling of punches in the report, would lead to great anger among the families of the victims and that, 13 years after the events described, it was likely to be viewed as a historical document, mainly of interest to academic researchers into the processes of British government. It is not holy writ; its own judgments need to be questioned, yet overall it is a massive contribution to our understanding of the events leading to the Iraq war and, of course, the processes of government, and a salutary highlighting of what went wrong and the lessons to be learned. If interventions are contemplated, they should take place only according to just war principles and if the objectives are clear, and after thorough preparation, risk analysis and the provision of sufficient resources. All were lacking in the case of Iraq. Perhaps the Prime Minister—any Prime Minister—should not have on his desk the phrase, “The buck stops here”, but rather the Cromwellian words, “Think, ye may be mistaken”.

Syria

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we have noted with deep concern and condemnation the actions to which the noble Lord refers. We have also noted the resolution that he mentioned. As he knows, however, it has been the consistent position of the Government, and that of Governments before us, that any resolution declaring genocide is a matter for the judicial system rather than the Government. But that does not alter the facts on the ground, which are truly dire. We are very concerned that these matters should be given the due weight and prominence that they undoubtedly deserve in the negotiations.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, it is early days yet, but what is the Government’s best analysis of the fact that there was no consultation, which hardly suggests that the Russians are prepared to play the team game in respect of the peace process? Is there not a danger that the Russians’ withdrawal, and possibly political differences with the Assad regime, might embolden ISIL and push back Assad’s forces?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is quite right that there are a number of possible explanations for the Russians’ decision. We cannot yet read the correct one. All we can do at the moment is to say publicly, as we have, that if President Putin means what he says and Russia truly puts its weight behind holding the Assad regime and its allies to the terms of the cessation of hostilities, and to participating in the peace negotiations in good faith, then we hope that rapid progress towards a peaceful resolution can be achieved. I am afraid that it is too early for us to diagnose the precise trigger for the Russian actions; we can only monitor.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 3rd December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the four maiden speakers and wish to make three brief reflections.

First, there is a consensus that this SDSR is valuable and welcome. It is certainly an improvement on its 2010 cost-cutting-exercise predecessor. However, I question whether the pace of change has been fully taken into account. There must be concern about the timeframe given the many uncertainties—the play of the “contingent and the unforeseen”, the “unknown unknowns”, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, 9/11, the Arab spring and mass migration to Europe—all of which stand as a corrective to long-term planning.

There is a need, of course, for flexibility and agility in doctrine and procurement, where the lead times—such as for the maritime patrol capability and the new strike brigades—are long. Again, the Vanguard replacement seems to have been stretched incredibly from 2024 to 2028, and now to the early 2030s. Surely the case for adaptable platforms capable of modification as the nature of the threat changes has been made.

The history of the Upholder class submarine is instructive—planned in the early 1980s, abandoned in the early 1990s and eventually sold cheaply to Canada. I concede that part of the reason was cost-cutting, but the key consideration was that its role as a barrier to Soviet incursions into the North Sea had become redundant. Thus, even five-year projections can be swiftly undermined by events. For example, had Scotland become independent with an anti-Trident Government, we would need a massive rethink of strategy and bases.

We need to learn from overseas examples. From his previous knowledge of the health brief, I ask the noble Earl whether he is confident that there is, for example, sufficient spare capacity in our London hospitals to cope with a major terror attack as the Paris hospitals appear to have coped. Is the planning for this contingency adequate?

My second reflection is that the SDSR has a welcome emphasis on inter-departmentalism at home and co-operation with our alliances abroad—certainly compared with its predecessor—but are the boundaries between the MoD, DfID and the FCO still too stark, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said? Should the departments not be seen as three legs of a tripod? Yet two of the three legs have a guaranteed budget, so the FCO has to take the strain. Is the balance correct? Are the boundaries of these budgets sufficiently flexible? For example, our military contribution to tackling Ebola was properly charged to the defence budget.

I come to my third and final reflection. The Oracle at Delphi advised those who sought its wisdom to “know yourself”. Yes, we are pre-eminent in soft power, but have we reached a true understanding of our role in the world? Did I detect a certain bravado in the tone of the review? The Prime Minister said exultantly, “Britain is back”. Have we made a root-and-branch examination of our role and capabilities? The Falklands, the last of our unilateral campaigns, could not now be repeated. The review should be read in parallel with the LSE review already cited. Thus, have we fully adjusted to our proper role in the alliances with increased specialisation in procurement and in regional market share? Is there now a case for a new St Malo treaty to add Germany to the Franco-UK alliance? Must we in the UK continue to have the full spectrum of capability? I am not confident that these and other questions have been adequately answered in the review.

Syria: UK Military Involvement

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 21st July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, it is the Cross Benches next.