Middle East

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Friday 16th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I welcome this long-awaited debate and congratulate the Minister as usual on his tour d’horizon. My only concern is the short time for the debate, which meant that even the Minister could mention only Israel/Palestine and the Iranian crisis at the very end of his speech.

In the Middle East, all things are connected; all things are distinct. As democrats, we must and should support the Arab awakening which affects the whole of the Arab world, but it is perhaps only the monarchies that appear to survive well at the moment. I heard what the Minister said about the key countries involved. In regard to some, there was, with respect, a touch of Pangloss in what he said. I agree that Tunisia is the pioneer and model of transition, but Egypt is far more problematic. The Minister might perhaps say whether it is his judgment that the Muslim Brotherhood will continue to steer a moderate path. Will the Salafists gain influence? Can the expectations of the great mass of young people be satisfied in Egypt? Most difficult of all is Libya, where there now is chaos. The militias seem to control much of the country and there is a real danger of Cyrenaica separating from Tripolitania.

It is in Syria, of course, that there is the most serious of problems. The real problem is this: can one envisage a more reasonable, moderate, safe and bloodless transition from this time on? Surely not, because the Assad regime, having watched what has happened in Libya, realised that its own future is at stake. It is fighting for survival, knowing what will happen to it if it loses. Ultimately, will the Assad regime, which observers now conclude is doomed, continue to inflict yet further bloodshed on its people? As it appears that there is obviously and rightly no prospect of western military intervention, what are the prospects of some form of regional intervention? What are the limits of what the West can do to help? Where do we draw the lines in terms of medical and non-lethal equipment? I wholly concur with the Minister that the caution of the West is surely justified.

Turning quickly to Israel/Palestine: it is surely a very bleak picture. If I were to ask the Minister to spell out where the signs of hope are, he could probably tell me only to look at certain of the economic and security developments on the West Bank. The rest is gloom. Premier Netanyahu knows that, whatever isolation there is for Israel and whatever defeats there are at the UN, he can rely on the US Congress for unqualified support. Certainly, there is no possibility of movement before the presidential election and there can only be movement at the point where the US decides to engage. The hopes raised by the Cairo speech of President Obama and by Premier Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan University speech have become a part of history. Does the Minister see any signs of hope at all?

I shall end by dealing with Iran, which is clearly the most difficult problem on the Israeli agenda and the great headache for US policy makers. I very much understand the Israeli concern about a second Holocaust from the Holocaust denier Ahmadinejad. However, there remains, in relation to the nuclear threat, the question of capability— even if it stops at the threshold—and the question of intention. I hope that President Obama has made it clear to Premier Netanyahu that the red lines of the US and its allies do not necessarily coincide with those of Israel. It is clearly a formidably difficult problem to destroy the installations. It rests on the agreement of the US; it relies on overflying and refuelling; there must be very accurate intelligence and there must be precision bombing. Iran has the recipe and perhaps such a strike could lead only to a delay of two years or so.

What are the malign effects of Iran gaining such a capability? Clearly, there would be a major shift in the power balance in the region, a major blow to US and western influence and a great effect on nuclear proliferation in the region. Iran might be emboldened to commit further acts of subversion and there would be an increased threat to Israel. It may well be that its proxy, Hezbollah, already can reach most, if not all, of Israel with its weaponry.

What would be the effect of such an attack on nuclear installations? It would further convince Iran that it needs a nuclear capability; it would destroy the Sunni front; there would be a vast increase in the oil price—there is already an Iran premium on the price of Brent crude—it would rally the Iranian population and it possibly would stifle out the green movement for some time.

For Israel, it would perhaps be rather like Samson pulling down the pillars of the Temple upon itself. All evidence suggests that Iran is moving inexorably to a military nuclear capability, even if it were to stop at the threshold. The question, therefore, is surely this: what if? I hope that western planners are now posing this what-if question as Iran, as is likely, obtains such a capability? We should not neglect the carrots but be ready to make clear the sticks that would be involved. Containment is difficult and possibly ineffective. A nuclear-armed Iran is an awful prospect, but there is a strong case that a military strike on the nuclear installations in Iran would be even worse with even more unpredictable consequences, both in the region and globally.