Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 20th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I applaud the motivations behind the Bill, which are to address vexatious claims and repetitive investigations, yet, along with other noble Lords, I have difficulty in seeing how either objective is furthered by what is described as the presumption against prosecution in Part 1 of the Bill. It is common ground, I think, that there is no problem of vexation prosecutions of service personnel; indeed, prosecutions have been conspicuous by their rarity. Nor does Part 1 have anything to do with civil claims or the Human Rights Act. Its effect would be to prevent prosecutions after five years for even the most serious criminal offences, save in exceptional circumstances and with the permission of the Attorney-General. Its specific purpose is to prevent the prosecution of cases that would currently be brought to trial after an independent prosecutor had judged the exacting evidential and public interest tests to be satisfied.

The Brereton report of last November illustrates what this would mean in practice. It found evidence of 39 murders of civilians and prisoners of war in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2013 involving 25 Australian service personnel: crimes committed on overseas operations, but not in the heat of battle. If Australia had a similar law to Part 1 of this Bill, who is to say that any of those people would be prosecuted? The matters to be given particular weight under Clause 3 are all factors that militate against prosecution. Nor would the severity of the crime establish exceptionality, given what will rightly be said to be Parliament’s clear intention, if we pass the Bill unamended, that even torture, war crimes and genocide should be subject to the presumption against prosecution.

Part 1 is indeed particularly problematic in its application to crimes which fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It is not just the obvious injustice of a law which would allow a soldier to be prosecuted for the sexual assault of a civilian but not, despite equally strong evidence, for her murder; nor is it just the risk that the Bill would violate our obligations to prosecute under the treaties listed at paragraph 57 of the Joint Committee’s report, including, but not limited to, the torture convention; it is also what Judge Advocate-General Blackett described to the Defence Secretary in a leaked letter, since echoed by the ICC prosecutor’s office, as the increased likelihood of UK service personnel being brought before the ICC.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, said in this House on 15 January 2001, during debate on what became the International Criminal Court Act:

“If there should ever be any allegation that a British citizen or member of the British Armed Forces has committed one of these crimes we shall be able to launch our own investigation. Any such accusations will be tried in British courts.”—[Official Report, 15/1/01; col. 927.]


If the Judge Advocate-General is correct, Part 1 of the Bill dilutes that promise. How counterproductive it would be, and how shaming, if, by reducing the scope for prosecutions in this country, we were to increase the scope for prosecutions in The Hague.

The timely prosecutions of those at the appropriate level of command and the nipping in the bud of vexatious civil claims would both be made easier if investigators got it right first time around, undefeated by the “wall of silence” or by attempts at cover-up. As Mark Goodwin-Hudson, NATO civilian casualty and mitigation team lead in Afghanistan, told the Bill Committee, the best way to stop what he called the “spiralling of reinvestigation” would be

“the ability to conduct accurate and timely investigations in theatre”.

I therefore welcome the Government’s announcement last October of a review led by Sir Richard Henriques, which

“will consider options for strengthening internal investigation processes and skills”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/11/20; col. 17.]

I shall welcome it even more if the Minister can confirm that the remit of the Henriques review extends to the independent element of the investigation, and to recommending any statutory changes that might be needed to reinforce the powers and independence of the service police.