Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts
Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
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I join other noble Lords in welcoming the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord McLoughlin, to their place. I do so with open arms, if the Minister will forgive a reference to that delightful Dirleton hostelry.

The Bill, like the litigation which forced it into being, is welcome. I have a wish list, but time requires me to come straight to the nub: the linked questions of immunity, authorisation and oversight. The Bill would give power to police superintendents to confer immunity on members of the public, and of their own organisations, for the commission of crimes. That proposition is startling, and the potential for abuse obvious. There are three central ways in which that potential might be mitigated. The first way is to remove the immunity and retain the existing discretion of the CPS to prosecute for a criminal offence within the scope of the authorisation. I have two questions for those who promote this option. Is it fair for a CHIS who does no more than he is asked by the police to be at risk of prosecution? With that in mind, how often has the CPS considered it to be in the public interest to prosecute a CHIS who has not exceeded his authority? The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, with all his experience, suggested seldom or never. I keep an open mind but wonder whether removing immunity would be a safeguard more apparent than real.

The second way is to provide for prior approval of authorisations by the judicial commissioners of IPCO. I recommended this approach for some other covert powers in my report A Question of Trust, and was glad to see it followed in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. However, context is everything and I will make three comments. Deciding how to task a CHIS, against a nuanced and rapidly changing background of personal relationships and group dynamics, is less obviously within the competence of a judge, or indeed any external person, than a decision to intercept a line or hack a device. Internal, not external, authorisation is provided for by Section 20.1(12) of Canada’s CSIS Act, of which the House has heard mention today, although it is fair to say that some form of external approval for CHIS criminality, whether by judges or lawyers, is required in some circumstances in Australia and the US. Finally, and without being defeatist, it is right to acknowledge that an amendment to require prior judicial approval was heavily defeated in the other place.

That leaves the third way: beefing up oversight by requiring a judicial commissioner to be informed every time a CCA is issued. That solution was adopted in SI 2013/2788, when the spycops revelations first surfaced, to deal with undercover police deployments of less than 12 months.

Having worked intensively with IPCO’s chief inspector for CHIS in the Channel Islands, where I was Investigatory Powers Commissioner until this summer, I have the highest praise for IPCO’s inspection work. Much of it is below the waterline in the form of inspections, oral feedback, classified detailed reports, observations and recommendations requiring speedy action. A sense of it is given publicly at paragraph 5.19 and onwards of IPCO’s March 2020 annual report.

The real-time notification of CCAs to a judicial commissioner would have three further advantages. First, the knowledge that their decision would go straight to the desk of a High Court judge or equivalent would concentrate the minds of authorising officers. Secondly, it would eliminate the gap of up to a year between authorisation and annual inspection, potentially assisting in the termination of any ill-advised authorisations, difficult though that will always be. Thirdly, it would help to promote a culture in which informal advice is sought before an authorisation was issued—something that happens a good deal in practice and is particularly valuable for authorities that do not make much use of CHIS. This third approach is no panacea and will not be strong enough for some, but it deserves at least to be debated and I will table an amendment for that purpose.