Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Monday 14th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

Of course I will take advice on this, but as I have said already—and the noble Lord knows this as well as I do—representations are made in any form of government. I will of course endeavour to write to the noble Baroness. I will share with the Committee the details of that letter and place a copy in the Library.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, a great deal of what my noble friend has said in response to these amendments is entirely uncontentious. As I hope I have made clear, I have no objection to discretionary electronic monitoring of prisoners on licence, and no objection to improved tracking, technical improvements or effectiveness. I quite understand everything he said in that score.

My concern was with the element of compulsion added by new subsection (3). I regret that I simply did not understand my noble friend’s response on its drafting. He said that there was somehow a discretion in the order-making power under new subsection (3) that would enable the Secretary of State to take into account cases where it would be difficult, inappropriate or not sensible to impose electronic monitoring. It may be that we are talking about a matter of drafting. In that case, I urge my noble friends to look at the drafting.

New Section 62A provides:

“The Secretary of State may by order provide that the power under section 62 to impose an electronic monitoring condition must be exercised”.

The description of the order-making power states:

“An order under this section”—

which is an order that the monitoring condition power “must be exercised”—

“may … require an electronic monitoring condition to be included for so long as the person’s release is required to be, or may be, subject to conditions or for a shorter period”,

and may,

“make provision generally or in relation to a case described in the order”.

It may be that my noble friend is referring to the entitlement to make provision generally as imposing a discretion. If he is saying that, I would suggest that that no longer complies with the description under new subsection (1) of an order imposing “an electronic monitoring condition” which “must be exercised”. Furthermore, even if he were right that that would somehow allow electronic monitoring conditions not to be mandatory, I would respectfully suggest to him that that is a clunky way of providing for particular cases to be dealt with in accordance with the discretion, which is what I suggest ought to be maintained. However, on the basis that my noble friend will consider the drafting, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Legal Aid

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Thursday 11th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I add my congratulations to those of noble Lords who have already spoken to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, on securing the debate and the way in which she opened it. I also declare an interest as a practising barrister. My noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury, who is unfortunately unable to be here, asked me to say that, as one who has fought for legal aid all his professional life, he wishes that he had been able to contribute to this debate.

In the debate on the gracious Speech, I suggested that there was a need for a fresh settlement between the Government and the professions over legal aid. I am bound to say that the past few weeks have more than ever convinced me of that. The Government and the professions appear at times to be in a hostile stand-off. It is bad for both the Government and the professions, but it is also bad for justice and bad for the public’s confidence in our system of justice.

The starting points are that we recognise the need to save money in this area and that the professions must recognise that the Government do not owe them a living. However, the Government must accept that the professions are not simply special pleading but have genuine and justified concerns about access to justice for the many who need, but who cannot afford to pay, lawyers. Of course, they include the most vulnerable in our society, but we should not forget that they also include millions of ordinary people who can meet their day-to-day expenses but cannot afford the sudden demands of expensive legal costs for them or their families.

A new settlement can be achieved only by dialogue, and it is therefore welcome that the Government have already been responsive to the consultation, particularly over the issue of choice of lawyer. For myself, I regard the right of a defendant to choose his lawyer as fundamental for three reasons. First, it is wrong for the state which prosecutes a case to choose the lawyer on the other side. Secondly, it is essential for a defendant to have confidence in his lawyer. That brings practical benefits in sensible and early guilty pleas where appropriate. Thirdly, choice in this area is a simple matter of liberty.

I confine myself in this short speech to making a handful of points about the Government’s proposals. Much of the controversy has of course centred on PCT. I suggest that there is much force in the argument that competition based on price rather than quality risks lowering standards. If we set only a minimum standard, we will get advocacy of a minimum standard—the so-called race to the bottom. Tendering should be based on quality as much as on price, and that should be made explicit in the application process. A precedent for that is to be found in the Health and Social Care Act, where, on persuasion, substituting competition on quality against a tariff for the original proposal for competition on price significantly improved the Government’s proposals.

The Government have invited the Bar Council to help to design a system of tendering based on quality. It is a matter of regret that the Bar Council has not accepted that invitation. Exactly that kind of dialogue is what I consider to be important. When the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, next sees the Bar Council she might consider taking that back to suggest a change of view in that area.

A further area of concern is the number of providers and their distribution. I believe that a reduction from 1,600 to only 400 providers is far too great. It will badly affect smaller firms and reduce the possibility of both choice and competition.

Attention has been drawn to the problems in multi-handed cases, where a number of defendants may need separate representation. However, I suggest that those problems could be addressed in part if we reconsidered how far the existing professional rules on conflicts of interest are working in accordance with the public interest. Should it not be possible for solicitors in the same firm to act for defendants in legally aided criminal cases where there are conflicts between the defendants’ accounts but no financial conflicts of interest for the firms concerned? Of course, there would have to be safeguards in such a system to ensure that confidentiality was maintained, but barristers in the same chambers have always appeared against each other and the distinction between self-employed barristers and partners in the firm is not, in my view, an overwhelming obstacle.

However, the present proposals risk creating advice and representation deserts where no appropriate legal advice or representation is available. This the Government have recognised, but the proposals also risk creating specialism deserts. The danger of advice deserts could be addressed by increasing the number of providers in more sparsely populated areas. The specialism issue is more difficult. I fear it may become impossible to find solicitors specialising in particular areas of crime—for example, fraud or sex offences—throughout large areas of the country. Correspondingly, specialist lawyers may find that work in their fields is not financially supportable, so specific measures are needed to allow specialists to practise.

I turn briefly to civil legal aid. The proposals on judicial review are claimed by the Government to assist in ensuring that applicants’ lawyers will be paid only for cases in which they get permission, which will filter out weak cases. However, in practice many of the strongest cases are settled at the pre-permission stage where the body, often a local authority, admits fault and settles. Why should we not fund cases such as those, especially since the Government are rightly committed to encouraging early and economical settlement of litigation? The proposal to deny an oral permission hearing in all cases deemed to be totally without merit, while it may be acceptable in cases where there is legal representation, is entirely unacceptable in cases where a judge is needed to tease out the applicant’s case on an oral hearing.

Finally, in the time available, I shall say a word or two about the residency test. I suppose it is possible to conceive of arguments about why the residency test may be at least a relevant consideration in some cases, but given the examples set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine, it is very difficult to see that it can be imposed justly in a blanket way. If the Government are not prepared to reverse this proposal, I urge them at least to preserve a discretion. There are other areas for consideration, but I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, before the next speaker, I remind noble Lords that this is a time-limited debate, and the limit for speeches from the Back Benches is six minutes.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Tuesday 11th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords who have taken part in the debate, in particularly my noble friend Lord Marks for highlighting in his contribution the importance of both family matters and, of course, sensitive issues of faith, which is also relevant to a fair percentage of our prison population.

This group of amendments would place an additional duty on responsible officers instructing offenders under the new rehabilitation activity requirement created by Clause 13, and would also place a new duty on the courts when imposing community orders and suspended orders more generally. To address first the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about organisations’ or providers’ commercial interests right away, it would be wrong and totally inappropriate for those to supersede any other offender requirements. The whole point of rehabilitation is putting the offender at the centre.

I do not agree with the noble Lord’s three cohorts—the groups he put together. Even the no-hopers are worth a try. We need to ensure, in all the reforms we put forward, that anyone—even people whom society at large perceives as no-hopers—is worth a try. We should seek to assist them to become productive citizens of society.

Noble Lords may also find it helpful if I briefly explain what Clause 13 provides. It creates a new rehabilitation activity requirement that will combine key elements of the existing supervision and activity requirements available under community orders and suspended sentence orders. At present Section 213 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides for a supervision requirement that may be imposed as part of either order. The requirement involves attending appointments during the period of the order with either the responsible officer or another person determined by the responsible officer. Section 201 of the 2003 Act provides for an activity requirement as part of either order. Under an activity requirement, an offender must first, present himself to a person specified in the order for a specified number of days, and secondly, participate in activities specified in the order for a specified number of days.

Clause 13 repeals both those requirements and merges them into a single rehabilitation activity requirement. Under the new requirement, offenders must comply with any instructions given by their responsible officer to attend appointments, participate in activities, or both. These instructions must be given with a view to promoting the offender’s rehabilitation, although they can serve other purposes as well. The effect of the clause is to allow the probation provider who is the responsible officer, rather than the court, to decide the exact details of what appointments or activities the offender should take part in to maximise their chances of turning away from crime.

Amendment 26 would require a responsible officer who is instructing an offender to attend appointments or participate in activities under this new requirement to take account of the offender’s family circumstances and, of course, any caring responsibilities that the offender might have. That would mean ensuring that appointments were suitable, that activities were compatible with the offender’s family circumstances, and that any place to which the offender was sent to take part in activities was suitable if the offender needed to take a child with them.

Amendment 30, although inserted into the clause about programme requirements, would apply to all requirements under any community order or suspended sentence order. It adds to the provision in Section 217 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that already requires a court to avoid, as far as possible, any conflict with the offender’s religious beliefs and any interference with his or her work or education. The amendment would add to Section 217 a new duty requiring the court to avoid—again as far as is practicable—any interference with the offender’s ability to carry out any caring responsibilities that he or she might have.

As I am sure that noble Lords will appreciate, the criminal justice system at all points endeavours to accommodate the personal circumstances of an offender. Courts will always sentence an offender in the light of their individual circumstances, together with the circumstances of the offence. Indeed, the law requires, where a court imposes a community order, that the requirements chosen must be, in the court’s opinion, the most suitable for the offender.

In addition to these general requirements, I can assure all noble Lords that there are already important safeguards in place to address childcare and other caring responsibilities where an offender is sentenced by the courts. These issues are covered in the assessments carried out when compiling pre-sentence and other reports that are considered by the courts before sentencing.

Probation staff will also respond to requests by the courts for specific information about family circumstances and courts will sometimes adjourn briefly so that such issues can be considered. If an offender is reluctant to divulge information about their children for fear that they may be taken into care, a post-sentence interview will often elicit the necessary information or the offender might tell their lawyer. If necessary, liaison will take place with local authority safeguarding authorities, or social security emergency duty teams, to safeguard the child or vulnerable person in question. In addition, the Sentencing Council has made it clear in its guidelines that:

“Where the offender is the sole or primary carer of the victim or other dependants, this potentially should be taken into account for sentencing purposes, regardless of whether the offender is male or female”.

Both courts and responsible officers are public authorities within the terms of the Human Rights Act 1998. This means that they are required to balance the need for the offender to attend appointments and take part in activities in order to secure his rehabilitation against his right under the Human Rights Act to respect for his private and family life. This point was well made by my noble friend Lord Marks.

What this adds up to is a clear indication that the courts already take all possible steps to avoid, as far as is practicable, any interference with the offender’s ability to discharge any caring responsibilities that he or she may have. For this reason, I argue that Amendment 30 is unnecessary. With these assurances and clarifications, I hope that my noble friend will be minded to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am again grateful for that helpful explanation of the Government’s position. The difficulty, as I see it, is something that I hope that we can consider between now and Report. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, pointed out, we are entering an entirely new era in the provision of probation services. The Minister is entirely right to say that best practice and sentencing guidelines require the courts and responsible officers—who are now in the public sector probation service—to have regard to caring responsibilities. However, there is a risk that in the new regime, which is a new world for probation provision, there will be a departure from best practice or, at any rate, a temptation to depart from it. I hope that, by amending the Bill in a similar way to our amendments, we could send out the message that family commitments have to be taken into account just as faith and education commitments are. In those circumstances, I invite the Government to consider these amendments carefully and sympathetically before we come back. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Judicial Review

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Tuesday 23rd April 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord always comes to these matters with great wisdom and experience, which I fully acknowledge. Various groups, including the judiciary, were fully consulted in putting forward the response. The senior judiciary who were consulted included the president of the Queen’s Bench Division, the Master of the Rolls, the vice-president of the Court of Appeal, the Civil Division and Lord Justice Richards, the deputy head of Civil Justice. As I said earlier, in the case of such appeals the judge is there to decide if an extension is required to the time period. The noble Lord may have an opinion that this may extend the period, which his quote highlighted, but it is important that the right thing is done. If the judge decides to extend the time, so be it.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I declare a similar interest. The Government propose withdrawing the right to an oral hearing in cases deemed on paper to be totally without merit. Does my noble friend accept that unrepresented applicants often find it very difficult to express their cases adequately on paper, and that it is only at oral permission hearings that judges can sometimes discern from such applicants an arguable case which was not apparent on paper? Will the Government consider limiting the restriction of the right to an oral permission hearing to legally represented applicants?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend for raising this concern, but I believe that the risk is somewhat limited. I am sure that many members of the judiciary both in here and those practising outside will agree that the test of “totally without merit” is something that is well understood by the profession and is, indeed, applied by judges. This reform applies only to the weakest cases, and as I said in a previous response, if there is still an issue, the right to apply to the Court of Appeal remains for the individual.

Park Homes: County Court Judgments

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Monday 18th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, as the noble Lord has acknowledged, the Government are taking steps in this regard. Again, I highlight some of the methods we have looked at. The civil courts offer several enforcement methods, including warrants of execution, attachment of earnings, third-party debt orders, charging orders and orders for sale. We have also looked at the ways by which debtors should be providing means. For example, people can apply for orders to obtain information. As I have already said, the Government recognise that effective enforcement is crucial to ensuring a successful civil justice system. However, we are not planning a return to imposing prison sentences for debtors who do not pay their debts.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, does not the Question highlight the need for effective enforcement in many areas—of sanctions against directors of companies of dubious commercial legitimacy and, in particular, a more determined use of directors’ disqualification proceedings against directors who trade fraudulently or while insolvent?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend. There are more than 85,000 park homes across 2,000 sites and such instances occur. That is why the Government are taking steps to tackle site owners who take advantage of tenants and then reregister themselves as another company. Through the changes we are bringing forward, we are ensuring that local authorities will issue licences to directors who apply to set up other companies, therefore giving them greater control over the issuing of such licences to people who have been found to be neglectful of their responsibility to their tenants.

Defamation Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Thursday 17th January 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I support the principle of Amendment 44A moved by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. The single publication rule in this Bill is an important reform for avoiding multiplicity of actions and is thoroughly welcome, but its impact is markedly diminished by restricting its application to republication by the same publisher. I can see no justification in principle for restricting a claimant suing on a second publication by the original publisher but permitting him to sue on a publication at a later date by a second publisher.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

In terms of audibility for all noble Lords, please could noble Lords make sure that their mobile phones are kept well away from the microphone because they cause issues with listening and difficulties for all concerned.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I rather hope it was not mine, but it might have been. At any rate, it has been moved now.

The proviso of republication in a different manner as the application of the rule in my view provides sufficient protection. That was the unanimous and strongly held view of the Joint Committee, and it is one which I urge the Government to reconsider. I would add one caveat which is that, while I support the principle of this amendment, I can see the need for its qualification to ensure that this situation is addressed. It is possible to envisage a first publication by an insolvent publisher and then a second publication by a publisher who is worth suing. It would be perfectly reasonable for a claimant to take the view that he did not propose to sue the first publisher, but that he did wish to sue a publisher at a later date when the original limitation period might have expired because that publisher was worth suing and was likely to be good for the costs and the damages. It does not seem to me to be beyond the wit of draftsmen to cater for that position and to allow suing a second publisher in those circumstances. Subject to that caveat I support the amendment.

Justice: Interpreting Services

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Monday 14th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord makes important points in relation to immigration and women. In general terms, service volumes are in excess of 72,000 and involve 163 languages. I will write to the noble Lord specifically about immigration matters but it is important to note that complaints for this particular service have also decreased quite significantly, showing the growing competence of Capita. In criminal courts, for example, complaints declined from 9.9% in February to 1.4% in August. In civil and family courts, complaints declined from 5.8% to 0.6% and in tribunals from 17.1% to 5.2%. I am sure your Lordships would agree that booking success rates have increased, costs have come down and complaints are down, and that that is good news.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, given the difficulties and unhappiness that there has been with the contract with Capita, what lessons have been learnt for the future about tests for outsourcing professional services of this type before contracts are placed on other occasions?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank the noble Lord for his question. I think life is for learning and such matters apply to the granting of contracts. Reference has been made to the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office. As I have alluded, their recommendations are being looked at with a view to improving service. I again assure the House that the Government have taken on board the issues that were raised, and the statistics and the reviews are showing positive progress towards achieving the given targets.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 18 and 19 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

Amendment 18 concerns information disclosed to a court, under the same paragraph—paragraph 27 of Schedule 16—as my noble friend’s earlier amendment; it relates to social security information and information to be disclosed by HMRC relating to a defendant’s finances. In both cases, the information is disclosed to assist the court in inquiring into the defendant’s financial circumstances. Sub-paragraphs (3) and (5) of paragraph 27 limit the purposes for which the disclosure is to be made and used—broadly for the purpose of assisting the court in dealing with the offender, with a general prohibition on further and wider disclosure. So far, that all seems entirely appropriate, but sub-paragraph (7)(b) appears to allow such information to be disclosed much more widely and outside the ambit of the proceedings before the court concerning the defendant, provided only that the information is summarised—what is sometimes called “gisted”—and anonymised by framing it in such a way that the defendant is not identified. That allows disclosure of social security and HMRC information relating to the finances of the offender for purposes other than his sentencing which was the purpose for which the information was originally obtained from the government bodies concerned.

What is the point of sub-paragraph (7)(b)? If there is a point to this collection of information, is this Bill and is this Schedule the place for its introduction? If we are to widen powers to obtain and use information in this gisted and anonymised form, then provisions authorising that should form part of a Bill concerning the collection of such information and not be added by a side wind in this way to a schedule which concerns sentencing and information required to assist the court with that sentencing.

Amendment 19 would ensure that, where social security or financial information about a defendant is obtained from the relevant government departments, the defendant must be shown that information and be told to whom it has been disclosed. It is fundamental that a defendant, about whom confidential financial information is obtained from government in connection with proceedings against him, should be entitled, as of right, to see that information to enable him to challenge and explain it, to know the information upon which the court is asked to act and also to know the identity of anyone to whom it has been disclosed. The paragraph, as drafted, permits such disclosure to him, or at least it does not prohibit it, by sub-paragraph (7)(a), but it does not require it and it should.

Will the Minister consider accepting the amendments or at least take them away and come back with amendments to the same effect?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, this group of amendments relates to provisions in Part 6 of Schedule 16 that enable the sharing of data between government departments for the purpose of setting fines and other financial penalties. My noble friend referred to definitions and what is where I will attempt in my response to Amendment 17 to make clear that, at each stage of the process, access to the data we refer to will be limited to only those with appropriate authority and a genuine need to see the data for the purposes of assisting a court that may wish to see it for sentencing purposes.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee referred to the use of the word “wants” in paragraph 27 of Schedule 16. This is intended to ensure consistency with subsections (1), (2) and (3)(a) of Clause 22. We have not used such words as “requires” or “needs” in the Bill because, technically, the court neither requires nor needs access to information held by the Department for Work and Pensions or HMRC. The information in question could be obtained by other means; for example, by requiring the defendant to provide details of their own financial circumstances. The relevant person “wants” the information because it comes directly from the Department for Work and Pensions and HMRC and this is the most reliable way of giving the court the accurate information about the defendant’s financial circumstances. It may arise that financial circumstances have changed. There will always be provisions within such proceedings to allow someone in such a situation to be allowed to present an up-to-date position of their financial circumstances.

Turning to Amendment 18, tabled by my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, I can confirm that Part 6 of Schedule 16 allows for the disclosure of financial information obtained under these provisions in a summary format. Nevertheless, paragraph 27(7)(b) only allows for the publication of financial information if it is in anonymised form. I remind the Committee that under paragraph 28, the publication of any financial information without lawful authority is a criminal offence, punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment.

The purpose of allowing the publication of summarised financial information obtained under this provision is to allow anonymised financial information to be shared for the purposes of research and statistical analysis. This information will be invaluable in helping to identify trends in the criminal justice system and the financial circumstances of offenders.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, of course I will not press my amendments. Nevertheless, I am not sure that the Minister has answered the point about the defendant’s entitlement to see the information. I accept my noble friend’s assurances that it is the intention of the Government that the information will be disclosed, but there is absolutely no reason why such a provision should not be in the legislation, rather than the current, rather negative, lack of a provision that exists at the moment.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, again, I assure my noble friend that the defendant would know of any such use of data. If any legal representative of the defendant wished to access that data, they would also be made available. I hope that we can clarify any other outstanding issues either before or on Report.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend for his intervention. As I said in my opening comments, it is not something that the Government are entirely ruling out, but it is the Government’s view at this stage that because this is something new to our justice system, the provision would be focused on organisations. However, I hear very clearly and my ears have not been closed to the points made by the noble and learned Lord. It is a matter that we will examine at some future point in time when this particular DPA scheme is reviewed, as I am sure it will be.

Generally speaking, the law on corporate criminal liability is such that, in order to achieve a conviction, a prosecutor must show that the “directing mind and will” of the organisation satisfies the necessary fault element for the offence. This is often difficult to show, especially in increasingly large, globalised and more sophisticated organisations. Cases can often involve lengthy and protracted investigation, with associated high financial and resourcing costs, with no guarantee of success.

Our proposals will not change the law on corporate criminal liability. However, they will offer an additional route for holding to account organisations that are willing to engage in the process and might otherwise face prosecution. These issues are not present to the same extent in relation to prosecuting individuals. However, I have noted with great interest what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has said about his personal experience and the experience of the United States in this regard.

Furthermore, one of the elements that the Government considered as regards prosecuting economic crime committed by organisations is perhaps not the same as that which applies to other areas such as health and safety. Therefore, an extension of the proposals to other forms of offending does not appear necessary at this time. In particular, we are not persuaded that a DPA would be the appropriate response where direct physical harm has been caused to an individual by the organisation’s wrongdoing.

As this process is new to our criminal justice system, the Government would like to tread carefully. Our view is that a narrow, targeted approach is the best course of action to begin with. As I have already assured the House, I shall keep the points raised by my noble friend and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, under review. At a future time, should a case be made for applying deferred prosecution agreements to individuals, or for applying them to a broader range of offences, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has mentioned, it is right that we come back to Parliament with the necessary primary legislation to extend the scope of the scheme rather than seeking to do it through secondary legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, spoke to Amendment 48. The Government’s view is that that amendment is unnecessary. We have already provided an undertaking that we will review the operation of the scheme following its introduction, which is of course essential given the novelty of DPAs in our criminal justice system. Returning to a point that was raised by my noble friend, the Government are in any event committed to reviewing all new primary legislation within five years of Royal Assent. That was the previous Government’s policy on post-legislative scrutiny. We do not need to put such a review on a statutory footing or to sunset the scheme provided for in the Bill. If, following the review, changes to the scheme are necessary or desirable, we can of course bring forward further primary legislation at that stage.

The noble Lord, Lord McNally, and I have listened very closely to the compelling arguments that have been made. With the assurances that have been given to ensure that the matter is reviewed, I would be grateful if my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would agree to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I hear the assurances that the Government are listening and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.