Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Main Page: Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 35, 45, 46 and 47. These amendments would broadly remove the restriction of deferred prosecution agreements—DPAs—to corporate bodies, partnerships and unincorporated associations by permitting DPAs to be entered into with individuals and would instead restrict DPAs to cases where a sentence of imprisonment would not be likely on a guilty plea. The later amendments in my name, along with the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, would widen the offences for which DPAs might in future be permitted beyond the range of financial or economic crimes.
To put these amendments in context, I welcome the innovation represented by the introduction of DPAs into this country by this Bill for two principal reasons. First, they are an effective device to ensure that criminal behaviour—sometimes very complex criminal behaviour—is met by a sanction. The compulsory imposition of a financial penalty, which is the subject of an amendment in my name in the next group, would ensure that that was the case. They bring about a saving of trials which in this country are, and have been, notoriously uncertain of outcome, as well as extremely expensive, so that they have used up a very large part of the criminal justice system’s overall budget. Secondly, they offer an opportunity for prosecutors to agree a programme of compliance requirements with offenders, and thus offer a chance to change behaviour, so they are part of the toolkit of the rehabilitation revolution, about which we have heard so much in the context of the Bill.
DPAs are for use only in suitable cases. It is important to avoid the worst excesses of such arrangements in the United States where it has been said that they have been used as the rich man’s route to plea bargaining. I suggest that they can and should be used to achieve voluntary compliance in the future with the requirements of the law across a range of fields. The limit on that is that it should not be acceptable for DPAs to be agreed where otherwise a sentence of imprisonment would be appropriate.
It follows that Amendment 23 removes the requirement that a DPA may not be agreed with an individual. In support of that amendment, I ask rhetorically the question, why the distinction? Why should it be that a criminal offence by a corporation, a partnership or an unincorporated association should be treatable by a DPA, but not an offence by an individual? As I suggested in the Second Reading debate we had in Committee, the question is not whether an offender is an organisation or an individual but whether the nature of the offence is suitable for a DPA. The distinction has been drawn that an individual can be imprisoned and an organisation cannot. But I suggest that that distinction is artificial because it is of course possible to provide that DPAs will be entered into only in cases where imprisonment would be unlikely in the case of an individual.
At Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury suggested to me that nothing in the Bill explicitly stated that DPAs were not appropriate for an offence warranting imprisonment. The answer is that in the Bill as it stands such a provision would be unnecessary because it applies only to corporations, partnerships and unincorporated associations. But if it were extended to individuals, I suggest that it would be necessary to make it clear that it was not to be seen as an alternative to imprisonment.
I quite take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, at Second Reading, that, because of the behaviour-changing arrangements that can be made in DPAs, they might in some circumstances be suitable for drugs offences and the like which would otherwise warrant a sentence of imprisonment. At this stage at any rate, with this very new procedure, I would be wary of introducing a system that could be seen as allowing offenders effectively to buy their way out of a sentence of imprisonment.
Hence, under Amendment 35, we confine DPAs to offences not warranting such a sentence even if the limit to individuals were to be lifted. That would happen at the preliminary hearing where, on the application by a prosecutor for a declaration that a DPA might be appropriate, that would not be able to be granted were a sentence for imprisonment to be appropriate.
Amendments 45, 46 and 47 in my name and Amendment 44 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, concern the types of offences that might be made the subject of DPAs. The noble and learned Lord’s amendment would effectively allow the addition of any offence by removing the restriction to economic and financial crime. I should make it clear that my amendments are sample amendments only. They are not intended at all to be exhaustive and I have not attempted to conduct a trawl through the statute book to look for appropriate offences. They are intended to be probing and to give examples only of the way in which categories of offences might be usefully made broader.
Amendment 45 suggests that,
“a breach of regulations which is not punishable by imprisonment”,
taken at its broadest, might be an appropriate amendment. Amendment 46 deals with environmental offences under the Protection of the Environment Act. Some of those are punishable by imprisonment as well as by fines but, were the restriction to be only to those offences which would not be likely to warrant a sentence of imprisonment, that would be appropriate.
Similarly, health and safety offences seem to me—as indeed they seemed to be to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, at Second Reading—to be an appropriate area for such broadening of the offences. I have some experience from practice of the way in which the Environment Agency operates in respect of cases of environmental pollution. In fact, it has been operating for some time on the basis that it will agree not to prosecute offenders in circumstances where the offenders agree to pay compensation to clean up pollution and to put in place with the Environment Agency programmes of compliance with legal requirements for the future. That system works well and I suggest that it could be extended on a formal basis, as is suggested in the schedule, far more widely.
I ask noble Lords to support these amendments, and for the Minister to consider taking them back and doing something with them.
I am not getting at my noble friend because he referred to my intervention last time, but I hope that he will forgive me if I am misunderstanding this. Perhaps other noble Lords are also unsure as to the impact of the removal of the words, in paragraph 4 on page 261, line 32,
“but may not be an individual”.
Does that not mean that the only persons who may enter into a DPA with a prosecutor are the ones mentioned, namely,
“a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association”,
so the removal of the words in his amendment will not actually make any change?
I see that my noble friend has tabled Amendment 24, which does refer to individuals. However, I wonder whether that is not, so to speak, negatived by the removal of those words; but, as I said, I may well have got this wrong.
My Lords, my noble friend is, as always, entirely on the ball. My amendment is wrong in exactly the way that he mentioned. It should be “or an individual” rather than,
“but may not be an individual”.
So the words that ought to go are, “but may not be”, to be replaced by the word, “or”. For that, I apologise, and I hope that I will be allowed to alter my amendment accordingly. I am not proposing to press it in any event, but we can bring it back on Report if necessary, in a better form.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 44 standing in my name, but I want to speak to Amendment 23 as well. Before I do that, and so that I do not have to repeat this on later groupings, I want to repeat the declaration of interest that I made on 30 October at col. 575. I also want to repeat my belief that this is a very useful addition to what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has described as the armoury for prosecutors and for law enforcement agents. I think that that is absolutely right. On 30 October, I explained how I had been thinking about this when I was in office and, indeed, I introduced at the other end of the scale of offending something that was equivalent: conditional cautions. I believe that this is worth while and I think that the former Solicitor-General, Sir Edward Garnier, deserves credit for having pushed this forward. I had the benefit of talking to him about this before these amendments came forward into this Bill. So I do support them in principle. The few amendments that I have put down are designed to try to make it as workable as possible, given that the principle is there—others may take a different view about the principle—and to make it as useful as possible.
There are some technical amendments but also one or two that relate to the scope of DPAs. I want to underline the fact that I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, who has made this point. The important issue about a DPA is that it is not just punishment. It can become punishment, but it is about changing behaviour and about compliance. It is a carrot and stick approach.
On the point raised by Amendment 23 about whether this should be capable of being extended to individuals, I repeat what I told the Committee on the previous occasion, that it was actually in the context of individuals that I first saw the benefit of arrangements of this sort. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has referred to drug offences, and he is quite right. I saw in operation in the United States deferred prosecution agreements being used as a powerful tool to change the behaviour of people who were drug offenders and who seemed incapable of holding down a job and therefore living a life beneficial to themselves, their family and the general public. This was achieved by the combination of a strong statement that if they did not comply in particular ways—taking drug tests regularly, staying clean, following the advice of probation officers or the equivalent—they would suffer serious imprisonment, and the inducement that if they did comply, not only would they not go to prison but they would not have a conviction either. That could be very important to them in terms of getting jobs in the future. On more than one occasion, I watched judges who were speaking on a very direct basis to offenders, reminding them of their obligations and saying, “This is what you have got to go through. This is how you have to comply if you want to get the benefit of this arrangement”. So I think that this is potentially very valuable for individuals, and I ask the Government to think again.
The noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, is of course right about the technical issues on the amendment, but I think that the purpose behind it is very clear and, if the principle were accepted, I am sure that the Government would sort out the precise wording to make it work. I do not think that the noble Lord can change the amendment while on his feet.
In the same context, I turn to Amendment 44 in my name.
I thank my noble friend for his intervention. As I said in my opening comments, it is not something that the Government are entirely ruling out, but it is the Government’s view at this stage that because this is something new to our justice system, the provision would be focused on organisations. However, I hear very clearly and my ears have not been closed to the points made by the noble and learned Lord. It is a matter that we will examine at some future point in time when this particular DPA scheme is reviewed, as I am sure it will be.
Generally speaking, the law on corporate criminal liability is such that, in order to achieve a conviction, a prosecutor must show that the “directing mind and will” of the organisation satisfies the necessary fault element for the offence. This is often difficult to show, especially in increasingly large, globalised and more sophisticated organisations. Cases can often involve lengthy and protracted investigation, with associated high financial and resourcing costs, with no guarantee of success.
Our proposals will not change the law on corporate criminal liability. However, they will offer an additional route for holding to account organisations that are willing to engage in the process and might otherwise face prosecution. These issues are not present to the same extent in relation to prosecuting individuals. However, I have noted with great interest what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has said about his personal experience and the experience of the United States in this regard.
Furthermore, one of the elements that the Government considered as regards prosecuting economic crime committed by organisations is perhaps not the same as that which applies to other areas such as health and safety. Therefore, an extension of the proposals to other forms of offending does not appear necessary at this time. In particular, we are not persuaded that a DPA would be the appropriate response where direct physical harm has been caused to an individual by the organisation’s wrongdoing.
As this process is new to our criminal justice system, the Government would like to tread carefully. Our view is that a narrow, targeted approach is the best course of action to begin with. As I have already assured the House, I shall keep the points raised by my noble friend and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, under review. At a future time, should a case be made for applying deferred prosecution agreements to individuals, or for applying them to a broader range of offences, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has mentioned, it is right that we come back to Parliament with the necessary primary legislation to extend the scope of the scheme rather than seeking to do it through secondary legislation.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, spoke to Amendment 48. The Government’s view is that that amendment is unnecessary. We have already provided an undertaking that we will review the operation of the scheme following its introduction, which is of course essential given the novelty of DPAs in our criminal justice system. Returning to a point that was raised by my noble friend, the Government are in any event committed to reviewing all new primary legislation within five years of Royal Assent. That was the previous Government’s policy on post-legislative scrutiny. We do not need to put such a review on a statutory footing or to sunset the scheme provided for in the Bill. If, following the review, changes to the scheme are necessary or desirable, we can of course bring forward further primary legislation at that stage.
The noble Lord, Lord McNally, and I have listened very closely to the compelling arguments that have been made. With the assurances that have been given to ensure that the matter is reviewed, I would be grateful if my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would agree to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I hear the assurances that the Government are listening and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 24, 25, 26 and 27. That suite of amendments has one purpose which is to make a financial penalty compulsory as a requirement of a DPA.
I suggest that there is an anomaly in the Bill as drafted. There is no compulsion to agree a financial penalty. It is one of a series of optional requirements. However, if a DPA contains a financial penalty, that penalty has to be broadly comparable to the fine that a court would impose on a plea of guilty. Therefore, the DPA has to have either no financial penalty at all or a full financial penalty comparable to the penalty that would be imposed by a court. The reason why I suggest that a financial penalty should be compulsory is to maintain public confidence in the new system and to prevent DPAs being seen as a soft option. That is particularly important if they are to be used only for economic and financial crime by corporations rather than more widely. At the moment, if a DPA can be agreed between an offender and a prosecutor without being subjected to the penalty that a court would impose, the innovation runs the risk of being tainted by the allegation that it amounts to no more than plea bargaining, the sort of suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury.
I entirely accept that there might have to be an exception allowed for cases of genuine inability to pay, either at the agreement stage or at the stage when a breach or possible variation is considered under paragraphs 9 and 10, or at both stages. Subject to that qualification, I suggest that a financial penalty comparable to a court fine in lieu of prosecution should be at the heart of the new arrangements. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will make some observations about the noble Lord’s amendments in this group. I shall speak also to Amendments 28 and 29 in my name. It is worth reminding ourselves what the requirements of a DPA may be, as set out in paragraph 5(3). We have spoken as if the only requirement is likely to be a financial penalty. We talked about paying the price and buying one’s way out of trouble. However, a number of requirements may be included, not just the payment of a financial penalty. The words “financial penalty” appear in paragraph 5(3)(a). Paragraph 5(3)(b) refers to a requirement,
“to compensate victims of the alleged offence”.
Paragraph 5(3)(c) refers to a requirement,
“to donate money to a charity or other third party”.
Paragraph 5(3)(d) refers to a requirement,
“to disgorge any profits made by P from the alleged offence”—
no doubt to the person from whom they have been made, not to the prosecutor.
Paragraph 5(3)(e) refers to a requirement,
“to implement a compliance programme or make changes to an existing compliance programme relating to P’s policies or to the training of P’s employees or both”.
I wish to underline that that can be a very powerful tool for changing behaviour, but also an onerous tool. Frequently in cases where such a system exists, a monitor is required. The company then has to pay for an individual—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was such a person—who will have full access to what it is doing and whose job it will be, from inside, to see that it is complying with the programme. That can be a very powerful tool for making sure that it changes its behaviour—but, as I said, also an onerous one.
Paragraph 5(3)(f) refers to a requirement,
“to co-operate in any investigation related to the alleged offence”,
and paragraph 5(3)(g) to a requirement,
“to pay any reasonable costs”.
I invite the Government to reconsider even their proposal, whether or not they accept the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Possibly this is one of the more important amendments being considered tonight. I looked back at the Government’s response to the consultation on this offence. I noted from page 28 of the paper that more than half the respondents to the consultation did not agree that there should be a fixed minimum payment for a financial penalty. I wish to understand why, given that the majority of respondents took a different view, the Government have committed to this.
I am concerned about several things. First, if we impose this restriction, the DPA may be used in fewer cases, because it will become unattractive to agree to it. I recall that in a previous debate, in answer to a question from me, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, confirmed that the Government saw DPAs being used even in cases where the defendant did not admit guilt. In those circumstances, it becomes surreal to start talking about the financial penalty that would have been imposed on a defendant if they had pleaded guilty when they have not.
Secondly, the cost of the compliance programme—in terms not just of money but of obligation—can be sufficiently significant that it justifies saying, “No, you do not have to pay the same financial penalty”. I will also ask a question about financial penalties. That is why I read out the list. “Financial penalty” is only one requirement on it. I fear that by imposing this obligation, we may create a distorted view. For example, somebody may say: “What about the victims?” The answer may be: “I am afraid that I cannot afford to compensate them because you are making me pay a financial penalty which is commensurate with what I would have been fined, so there is no more money, or at least I am not giving you any more”. That is quite contrary to the principle in the criminal law that where financial measures are made, you treat the fine as the second thing, and if there is money for compensation, you try to get that paid first. I am concerned that this will have a counterintuitive and unsatisfactory effect.
I would avoid this sort of perverse incentive. I would avoid putting on the straitjacket. Of course I take the point about public confidence—although the more in this debate we invite the public not to have confidence, perhaps the more they will not have confidence. Perhaps we should start looking at this in a different way. My answer to this—as it was to the previous amendment—is that there is a double lock on a DPA in the form of the most senior prosecutors and the court. That is sufficient to ensure that what comes out of the DPA is satisfactory. I therefore do not support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. My Amendment 28 is designed to have the effect that the financial penalty should not be more than the fine would have been, which is obviously perfectly reasonable.
Amendment 29 deals with a somewhat different but equally important point. It seeks to change the provision in sub-paragraph (5) that a,
“DPA may include a term setting out the consequences of a failure by P to comply with any of its terms”,
and convert it to an obligation not a permission. This is on the basis that the DPA should state what will happen to you if you do not meet its terms—that is what this is all about—in the interests of both the public and the person who is on the receiving end of the DPA. It is an amendment of a different order but I invite the Government to consider it.
My Lords, I broadly sympathise with the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, on this part of the Bill. In particular, it is important to recognise that there needs to be some incentive—this is the American experience—for potential defendants to come to terms, and the noble and learned Lord’s formulation is in line with that. However, given that the Bill refers to the penalty being broadly comparable to a sum that might be levied by way of a fine on conviction for an alleged offence following a guilty plea, there is an implicit assumption that there will be a one-third discount from what would be the fine after a conviction. That is the way in which the system appears to work, so we are perhaps not terribly far apart in any event.
I am less clear about the attraction of Amendment 26. I do not quite follow why the payment to the prosecutor of a financial penalty should be taken out of the Bill. The prosecutor is not personally going to pocket the money, I assume.
Perhaps I may help. Amendment 26 is part of a suite of amendments. Amendment 24 provides for the compulsory imposition of a requirement to pay the prosecutor a financial penalty broadly comparable to the fine a court would have imposed. The amendments can only be read together. If you have Amendment 24, you do not need paragraph (3)(a).
I will not take the time to check that. I shall accept the noble Lord’s remarks and leave it to the Minister to respond.
On this occasion I am certain that I have got the drafting right.
That is extremely helpful. With my advisers, I will look at the points that the noble and learned Lord has made. We do not go behind the Chair in this House, but he knows what I mean. I shall see if we can match up. I have found his remarks very helpful.
In relation to my amendments, I understand what the Minister has said. The only point I would make is that it is possible to take the middle position, which is really the position that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has put and which my noble friend has said he will look at. As the noble and learned Lord suggests, the anomaly is where you can have an all-or-nothing financial penalty that still exists, so it must be sensible to have a variable penalty if the noble Lord does not accept my Amendment 24.
I must advise your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 34 and 35 by reason of pre-emption.
I shall speak briefly to Amendments 38 and 41. Amendment 38 is about public final hearings. Just as there are absolutely sound reasons for the preliminary hearing considering a DPA to be in private to avoid prejudicing any subsequent prosecution, if no DPA is entered into, and to avoid prejudicing negotiations for a DPA, so the final hearing should generally be in public unless there is still at that stage a substantial risk of prejudice. I suggest that that is essential for the public administration of justice and to build and maintain public confidence in these new arrangements. That is the point of Amendment 38.
Amendment 41 is on a similar theme. Under paragraph 12, the court may postpone publication of the terms of a DPA or of a decision on a breach, variation or discontinuance of a DPA if it appears to the court that postponement is necessary to avoid a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in any legal proceedings. This amendment limits any such postponement to the period of such continuing risk, so that as soon as the risk disappeared, publication would follow. Again, I suggest that that must be in the interests of the public administration of justice.
I have a good deal of sympathy with the amendments in this group tabled by my noble and learned friend and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I will be interested to hear the Government’s response. Both aspects seem to be matters that they should consider before Report.