Adviser on Ministerial Interests

Lloyd Russell-Moyle Excerpts

Tuesday 21st June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

In a moment; I will just make some progress.

Let me move on to the detail of the motion, which is constitutionally rather important. It is predicated on a misplaced worry about the Government’s intentions, and that anxiety has created a jumble of misguided ideas. First, the creation of the new specialist adviser position stands directly at odds with the principle of separation of powers and the necessary distinction between Members and Ministers of the Crown. It would be an extraordinary shift of power from the Executive to the legislature, which would upset the long-established balance in that aspect of the United Kingdom’s constitution. It would be a reckless change that has not been thought through.

Her Majesty’s Government would not dream of appointing advisers to this House—that is for the House to do, and Mr Speaker would rightly protect the legislature’s independence—but the Opposition want the legislature to interfere with the independence of the Executive by appointing one of its own advisers. Effectively, that is a recipe for gridlock and confusion.

It is a fundamental constitutional principle that the Prime Minister of the day, as head of Her Majesty’s Government and the sovereign’s principal adviser, has sole responsibility for the overall organisation of the Executive and for recommending the appointment of Ministers. The Prime Minister, not Parliament, advises Her Majesty on the appointment of her Ministers. In turn, the Government of the day are accountable to the Commons and must command its confidence. That is our system. The ultimate responsibility for decisions on matters of ministerial conduct is therefore, quite properly, the Prime Minister’s alone, who draws his authority from the elected House of Commons. As an elected politician, those are matters for which he or she is accountable to Parliament and, ultimately, the electorate.

Flowing from those arrangements, the ministerial code is the Prime Minister’s document. It belongs to the Prime Minister and sets out the standards of behaviour that he expects from his Ministers. Likewise, the appointment of others to advise on the ministerial code is a matter for the Prime Minister. It would be similar to me appointing an adviser to the Leader of the Opposition, which would, of course, be absolute nonsense and would not be accepted by the Opposition.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)]

As a member of PACAC, I would of course welcome being able to have further advice, but the Minister seems to have misinterpreted that issue. The motion proposes to appoint an adviser not to the Prime Minister, but to a Committee that can make independent judgments on the conduct of different areas of the Executive. The International Development Committee has an independent auditor who reports to it on the functions of the Department. Other Committees have independent people who report to them on the functions of the Executive. There is no suggestion in the motion that it would be an adviser to the Prime Minister, or that it would take away from the Prime Minister’s responsibility to do the hiring and firing. The Minister has misread the motion, has he not?

[Michael Ellis]

The intent of the motion, as the hon. Gentleman well knows, is to stymie the Prime Minister’s power to have his own Ministers. [Interruption.] He knows full well that that is the intention behind this reckless motion, which seeks by proxy to turn those constitutional principles on their head, and would surely be a recipe for constitutional gridlock and confrontation. Hon. Members should perhaps consider for a moment what would happen under this new regime when the Prime Minister of the day disagrees with the parliamentary adviser. If the Prime Minister were to disagree with that adviser, he would be put under pressure to not have one of his own Ministers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

Is it not the case that a number of Select Committees already conduct pre-appointment hearings for people directly appointed by the Prime Minister? Those Select Committees can already say whether they recommend or do not recommend appointment. The Prime Minister can go against a Committee’s recommendation if he wishes, but it will be on the public record. There will be a paper trail so everyone knows what has happened, and light and fresh air will be let in to abolish the darkness of corruption. Would this proposal not do that if it were implemented?

[Michael Ellis]

No.

The creation of an adviser with the power to initiate consideration of a potential breach of the ministerial code is different, and we can safely predict it would open the door to a wave of frivolous and vexatious complaints. We have to think about that and the reputation of this House because, now and across all future Administrations, there would be no downside in political opponents throwing in complaints like confetti. The Opposition of the day would not face tit-for-tat complaints, because they are not Ministers.

As we saw with the failed Standards Board for England in local government, a culture of petty complaint would undermine not strengthen confidence in democracy, which is precisely why such arrangements need to be thought through, to consider and avoid the unintended consequences that will ultimately afflict both sides of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)]

We have heard a good discussion today and a good speech by the hon. Member for South Leicestershire (Alberto Costa), although I do worry that he was dancing on the head of a pin in some of his constitutional reflections.

It is as simple as this: the public have lost trust in the Prime Minister, and 140-plus of his own Members of Parliament have lost trust in him on these matters. Add that to the number of Opposition Members, and a majority of Members do not trust him. This House therefore has a duty to act. That is the constitutional reality, and all the other academic waffle is for the birds. What is important is good behaviour—the system relies on that. The Prime Minister has not behaved as well as he should have done, and his colleagues know that.

It might well be that some actions are excusable, and that they are not all sackable—I mean breaches of the ministerial code rather than the Prime Minister’s behaviour —and that is why we need a fair and just system to make that determination. At the moment, the danger is that the public just damn us for everything. Small, vexatious issues are brought up about a Member delaying the registration of an interest here or there, and of course those administrative matters require slaps on the wrist, but they are not resigning issues. The public conflate those issues with serious misbehaviour, whether it be corruption such as trying to appoint friends or family, law breaking or sexual assault.

This place realised that marking our own homework on sexual assault was not good enough—the public will not accept that, however much we dance on the head of a pin about it as a constitutional issue. We therefore had to come up with a hybrid system. Members could have an input and act as a reality check, but the independence of the system had to be guaranteed, complaints had to be investigated and outcomes had to be public. That is what we need in this situation. More importantly, we need a commitment that independent advisers will be appointed and listened to.

The fact Lord Geidt had to clarify his resignation letter because the Government manipulated his words to try to condemn him for resigning over steel tariffs, which he said was not the case, shows the depths to which this Government will go. In that clarification letter, he agreed that

“When the Prime Minister is asking his own adviser to advise on the Prime Minister’s conduct it really doesn’t work.”

How do we, as a Parliament and as the people who fundamentally decide on the Prime Minister’s conduct, get our advice? How do we get the information we need, bearing in mind that the Prime Minister’s consideration is behind closed doors? We know about this only because Lord Geidt felt he had to resign.

The motion is probably imperfectly worded, and it could probably be improved and tweaked. Our constitution is evolving, and it can always be improved and tweaked. Not only should the Prime Minister have an adviser—I would welcome it if he appointed one—but Parliament should have an adviser and a watchdog so we can decide whether we continue to have trust in the Prime Minister and the Ministers he appoints. That is perfectly constitutional, and those who are trying to make out it is not are misguided. It might not be useful politically, it might be a distraction and it might be unnecessary if we improved the whole system—

[Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

With a new Prime Minister.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

Yes, if we had a new Prime Minister who obeyed the rules and if trust returned because people believed there is good behaviour, I could buy the political argument that Parliament having an adviser might be unnecessary, but we currently have a situation in which a Minister was sacked because of Islamophobia, a breach of the ministerial code. There is meant to be an investigation, but we are none the wiser. The Prime Minister is one of the main witnesses in that investigation, and he will determine how his own witness evidence is balanced against other witness evidence. Surely everyone can see there needs to be independence in the process.

The witness evidence should be balanced and released to the public, even if the Prime Minister still makes the final decision. Surely we can all agree that one of these stages should be made public. As much as people want to talk about the separation of powers, the separation of legislation, law enforcement and deliberation on whether the law has been broken is a fundamental principle of justice in this country.

We currently have a situation in which the Prime Minister writes the rules, the Prime Minister or his proxy starts the investigative process and the Prime Minister determines whether the rules have been broken. That is a fundamental breach of any sort of natural justice, and it is not fair on Ministers who are stitched up for technical breaches, not fundamental breaches, and are sacked for no good reason, while other Ministers who have done the same thing are not sacked because it is politically expedient. That is not fair or natural justice for Ministers, either. It does not protect them.

I am not saying the motion is a perfect solution, but there needs to be a process. Having a process in which a parliamentary Committee can make recommendations is not new. We currently have a system in which certain appointments made purely by the Prime Minister go through Select Committee appointment hearings. I sit on the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, which is being offered the opportunity to have greater responsibility, and it already does that in a number of areas, and other Committees do it, too. Our recommendations can be ignored, but at least they are made in public. The motion would make no change to that constitutional provision, but it would make ministerial appointments and abidance by the code open and fair. The motion makes no change to that constitutional provision, but it would make ministerial appointments and abidance by the code open and fair. I do not think that it is unreasonable. I do not think that it is unreasonable to support the motion, but more fundamentally, it is not constitutional and is only necessary because the Prime Minister has acted badly.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[John Penrose]

I take my hon. Friend’s point. All I am saying is that it should not be axiomatic and automatic that the adviser should feel they have to resign every time their advice is not followed. Their advice is made public and is clear, and therefore it should not be automatic that they have to stand down.

Equally—this is also crucial—Lord Geidt said that he did not feel he could offer an independent set of advice on the behaviour of the Prime Minister, alone among all Ministers. Lord Geidt would have felt able to, and did, offer advice independently to the Prime Minister about other Ministers’ behaviour, but he felt he could not do so when the Prime Minister’s behaviour was in question. That is clearly wrong: there should be no free passes for any Minister, up to and including the Prime Minister, and in the same way that the adviser should not feel duty-bound to resign if their advice is not always followed, they should feel able to offer public advice on whether or not the Prime Minister has erred and strayed. If the adviser’s role is improved in those two ways, I believe that finding a successor to Lord Geidt will be a great deal easier, because the role will be a great deal clearer and more practical to fill.

I will just add one further point about the motion. It seems to me that it does not actually confer any extra powers on PACAC, and the Chairman of that Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove (Mr Wragg), has already said that he is delighted and honoured to be offered these opportunities, but would politely decline them anyway. He does not want this set of powers, and is politely declining the offer that is being made. Because the motion does not offer any extra powers, it would be perfectly acceptable, constitutional, and within the rules of this House for PACAC itself to launch an inquiry into the ongoing discussions and investigations, should it wish to do so. If it felt the position was not being filled fast enough, it could fill that gap.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

rose—

[John Penrose]

I will happily give way to a member of PACAC.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

PACAC has requested a number of times that Sue Gray come in front of our Committee, and we have been declined that opportunity through being blocked by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. Is that not a problem of parliamentary scrutiny that this motion might help to prevent?

[John Penrose]

As I read the motion, it does not confer any fresh powers on the Committee, and therefore it would not solve the problem that the hon. Gentleman has rightly pointed out. There may be a broader question about whether some people can be compelled to come in front of Select Committees—not just PACAC, but others as well—but this motion does not solve that problem either and therefore, I am afraid, will not move the ball down the pitch at all.

None the less, Madam Deputy Speaker—with apologies for my phone misbehaving throughout—there is an essential point here that I think everybody agrees on. A successor to Lord Geidt must be appointed. I think we have heard that one will be appointed; I hope we will have that reconfirmed in words of one syllable, and while we can allow the Government a little bit of time to decide precisely how and in what form that successor will be appointed, it must be a proper replacement, ideally with the additional powers I have described.