Public Office (Accountability) Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Lizzi Collinge and Anneliese Midgley

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Lizzi Collinge]

Q So there is no easy way to show corporate collective actions, which are obviously the sum of a number of individual actions.

Pete Weatherby: The Bill creates some individual duties, so you can prove them against the individual, but on the corporate duty, the simple way of dealing with it is the one that we put forward. It is really simple: it is a couple of lines, as you can see from the amendments we have put forward. You make the head of the organisation responsible for the discharge of the corporate duty. There is no problem with that.

[Anneliese Midgley (Knowsley) (Lab)]

Q Thank you very much, Pete, for coming to give evidence. Going back to the stuff that has been raised about the intelligence services, will you state plainly whether you think clause 6 strikes the right balance between candour and national security, and what is the problem that the Hillsborough Law Now briefing raises with regard to schedule 1?

Pete Weatherby: We have had very detailed discussions with the Government about this over the last year, and clause 6 was the culmination of those. The clause baldly states that the provisions apply to the intelligence services, but with a caveat. That caveat in clause 6 is fine. The Government came up with a slight issue, which was that intelligence officers might inadvertently, without realising it, notify things that affect national security. The caveat in clause 6 deals with that, and that is fine. What it does not deal with is the clause 2(4) duty to provide the evidence subject to the notification. I am sorry if this is a bit legalistic, but there is a clear difference there.

What would happen is that the intelligence service would notify the inquiry or investigation of the fact that it had relevant information or evidence to give, but then the individuals within the intelligence service would be required to provide the material. Because the intelligence service is sighted on that, the material from the individual intelligence officers goes through the intelligence services before it goes to the investigation, so the national security aspect is dealt with—no problem.

We thought that was what the Government had agreed to, but when we look at a rather obscure part of schedule 1, clause 2(4) still applies, except that you cannot make it apply, because it stops the issuing of a compliance notice, which is what kick-starts the application of clause 2(4). So that device disapplies it, and that is the problem. If you just changed the schedule 1 thing, clause 6 would be fine. That is what we thought we had agreed to, to deal with the legitimate national security aspect.

It is important that the individual responsibilities apply to intelligence officers as well, subject to the national security checks. We do not think that is a problem at all. We challenged the intelligence services to tell us how it is a problem, and they have not. If they do not apply, you end up in the Manchester Arena situation, where the evidence was corporate and was wrong. It was not until the chair, who was extremely good, called the intelligence officers themselves—on oath, in closed proceedings—that the false narrative that had been put forward corporately was unpicked.

I am sorry if that is a bit complicated, but that is the problem. It is easily solved, and there would be no effect on national security. It would make our intelligence services better, in the same way as the rest of the Bill makes local authorities, police forces and everybody else better.