Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate

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Department: Ministry of Justice
Lizzi Collinge Portrait Lizzi Collinge (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Lab)
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I thank Members on both sides of the House for the care and consideration that they have given to this debate. If the Bill is given a Second Reading today, there will be further lengthy scrutiny, but I want to address what I think is a bit of a misconception about it, namely the ideas that patients taking the decision to die and doctors assessing capacity, coercion and consent are somehow new. We have heard the word “Rubicon”. There seems to be an idea that this is a completely new sort of decision, and that this is something unusual and outlying in medical practice. I want to challenge that, because, actually, patients, doctors and indeed High Court judges are already making life-and-death decisions every day. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket (Peter Prinsley) said, in this case we are actually talking about death-or-death decisions.

Let us take the example of withdrawal of treatment. One of my close family members who would not be covered by the Bill’s eligibility criteria starved herself to death through withdrawal of treatment. She had been unwell for many decades with a condition that would have eventually killed her. At one point she became unable to swallow. For many years she had relied on artificial nutrition, and when the type of artificial nutrition she needed changed to a more invasive process, she said, “Enough’s enough.” As a mentally competent adult under the current law, she was able to take that decision. People are already legally able to die early through withdrawal of treatment. I emphasise that she would not have been eligible under the criteria of the Bill, and I have no idea what she would have chosen if she had had a choice, but the fact remains that her capacity was assessed by a doctor and she was allowed under the current law to die early.

The BMA has told us that it regularly assesses for capacity, coercion and consent in, for example, abortion care and—as in the example of my relative—dying through withdrawal of treatment. The Bill and the safeguards it would put in place would give a stronger framework of protection than the existing law.

Under the Bill, two doctors would have to test for capacity, coercion and consent. That would have to be reviewed by a High Court judge and pauses for reflection are built into the process. If it does get to the point of an assisted death, the patient themselves must administer the approved substance.

Let us be clear about who the Bill is for. The eligibility criteria are extremely narrow—some have argued that they are too narrow. The Bill is for mentally competent adults who are nearing the end of their lives. They are dying, and they are dying soon.

Many people with a terminal illness will have a perfectly ordinary death managed perfectly well by palliative care. But we have heard in recent weeks—over many years, in fact—about the people who do need the Bill: the people for whom even the best palliative care simply does not work; those for whom merely the option of an assisted death gives them peace and comfort and a chance to enjoy the rest of their lives without fearing the manner of their death. With the safeguards contained in the Bill, who are we to deny them that peace? Who are we to decide what they must bear as they die?

We have the power through a robust legislative process to prevent human suffering. Good palliative care and assisted dying are not at odds. They are not in conflict. They both aim for the same thing: a good death, surrounded by people you love, with minimal pain and without fear. Today, we can vote for that in the sure knowledge that if the Bill passes its Second Reading, it will undergo further intense scrutiny to ensure that it is a good law that works as it is intended to do. This is the start of a legislative process, not the end. I urge colleagues across the House to vote yes.