Israel and Palestine

Liam Byrne Excerpts

Monday 16th December 2024 Westminster Hall

[Liam Byrne (Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate, Mrs Harris. First things first: I utterly condemn the attacks on 7 October. I utterly condemn the kidnap, torture and murder of hostages by Hamas. I also utterly deplore and condemn the destruction of Palestine and Palestinian life that has ensued. That destruction is now so complete that Israel is at risk of turning Gaza into a desert and calling it peace. The prosecution of the war is now so brutal that the Foreign Secretary himself said on 2 September that any exports of weapons from here lead to

“a clear risk that they might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law.”—[Official Report, 2 September 2024; Vol. 753, c. 42.]

[Kim Johnson (Liverpool Riverside) (Lab)]

On arms sales, does my right hon. Friend agree that the UK Government need to make a different decision about F-35 parts, think about employing an immediate ceasefire, cease selling arms to Israel and impose sanctions to bring about peace?

[Liam Byrne]

Let me come to exactly that argument. The Foreign Secretary was followed by the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, who said that there were now “significant doubts” about Israel’s “record of compliance”. In court, His Majesty’s Government said bluntly, in their opening statement on 12 November 2024, that Israel is

“not committed to complying with international humanitarian law”.

Yet the Government have not cancelled all licences; they have cancelled some, but not all, and they have kept open the licences for F-35 parts.

[Carla Denyer (Bristol Central) (Green)]

Will the right hon. Member give way?

[Liam Byrne]

I will not, because time is so short.

Last week, in front of the Business and Trade Committee, a Defence Minister said that although it is technically possible to track the parts, it is contractually impossible. Indeed, Lockheed Martin has supplied me with a letter that states that, if I want to know anything about the parts, I need to address my queries to the Department of Defence in the United States.

The Government defend their case by pointing to the 28 words that allow them to make it up as they go along when it comes to weapons exports. Those words were written by the last Government and were published in the House on 8 December 2021. They state:

“The application of these Criteria”—

the selective licensing criteria—

“will be without prejudice to the application to specific cases of specific measures as may be announced to Parliament from time to time.”

There we have it. However, what Ministers have not explained is the part of criterion 1 that states:

“The Government will not grant a licence if to do so would be inconsistent with…the UK’s obligations under the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty”.

Of course, the UN arms trade treaty is very clear. Article 7 requires this Government, as a signatory, to assess any items that we may seek to export. If there is an overriding risk of the use of those weapons to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law,

“the exporting State Party shall not authorize the export.”

Now, if there was any question, doubt or dispute about whether F-35 parts that we supply could be used in such a way, perhaps the Government would have a case for keeping the licences open. But there is nodoubt, dispute or question about the Government’s analysis of F-35 parts, because in their opening statement to the High Court on 12 November 2024, they said:

“The F-35 carve-out accepts that there is clear risk that F-35 components might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of IHL”.

We now have the advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, the arrest warrants and the Government’s own assessment. I cannot see how this Government can now legally defend a position of keeping these arms export licences open.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Falconer]

I want to be clear to my hon. Friend and to everybody here that the direct selling of F-35 parts to Israel has now been suspended; it is indirectly that we are not in a position to determine the end user. Members are saying that we could determine the end user. I reiterate the Government’s position that the global supply chain is critical to the operation of the F-35 programme and that we cannot suspend licences to end users in the way that my hon. Friend would like without imperilling that.

[Liam Byrne]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; he is being characteristically generous. As I understand it, we cannot track F-35 parts because we have signed a contract that basically renders us blind when they leave our borders. Technically, it is possible; the Ministry of Defence has said that. The issue the Minister has to address is that article 7 of the arms trade treaty is very clear that if there is an overriding risk of a breach of IHL, exports should not be made. His Government’s own submission to the courts is that that risk exists. We cannot have it both ways.

[Mr Falconer]

My right hon. Friend is making two distinct arguments. One is that we know who the end user is but cannot practically stop it, but we can also maintain the F-35 programme. The Government’s position is that we cannot take action on the global spares pool without bringing the F-35 programme into peril, which would have implications for international peace and security. That is the position of the Government. On the article of the arms trade treaty to which he refers, it is clear that consideration needs to be given to international peace and security. It is on that basis that we have set out our position.

Another Member asked me about the legal advice. We have set out the legal position as clearly as we possibly can—more clearly than any previous Government has on such a decision. It is being tested in the courts. We are proceeding with the utmost transparency on these questions.