Russian Interference in UK Politics Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLiam Byrne
Main Page: Liam Byrne (Labour - Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North)Department Debates - View all Liam Byrne's debates with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs the hon. Gentleman probably expects, I will discuss Facebook shortly, including some negative and positive things about its activities.
I should say that I am not attacking the Russians here; I am attacking the Russian Government. Of course, some things that the Russian Government or people associated with them might have been involved with may, indeed, be also activities that other state actors are conducting, so this is not just about Russia, although that is clearly the subject of the debate.
The United States has a gaping vulnerability to disinformation operations carried out by Russia and other malicious actors across the social media environment. In the USA, just one account from the troll factory in St Petersburg managed to amass more than 120,000 followers, interacted with the Trump campaign leaders, and was quoted in newspapers such as the Washington Post as a voice of the American right. Is the Minister happy that the UK has adequate defences against such interference here?
The simple truth is that although Arron Banks and Nigel Farage may be Putin fans, President Putin is certainly not a friend of this country. Russia would only have interfered in the EU referendum or any other elections here in order to damage the security of the UK and, indeed, the EU.
The right hon. Gentleman is making a brilliant point, but has he noticed that the American national security strategy—published this week—explicitly recognises this threat, whereas our national security strategy does not?
I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. I do not know whether she has, but I have engaged in exchanges with David Jones—clearly, I will not continue to do so—because whoever he or she is was a very prolific tweeter during that campaign. So, yes, we need to be aware of those issues.
According to Facebook, neither the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, nor No. 10, nor the intelligence services have given it any advice about what it should be looking for. If that is correct, it concerns me, and I hope the Minister will respond to that point.
I think the Americans looked at 47 accounts, which were all provided to the Mueller inquiry by intelligence agencies, but—the right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right—our agencies have offered, I think, only one. The other risk we have to be careful of, though, is that money was transferred onshore—the Electoral Commission is now investigating that—so some of the illicit money may have come from UK onshore accounts.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention. That is another aspect of this issue that I am not going to be able to dwell on at great length in the few minutes that remain.
Facebook is doing work on ad transparency, and I welcome that. Personally, I would be comfortable with having the equivalent of a “printed and published” on the political ads that I place on Facebook. Such measures would help people to understand who was actually promoting themselves. I wonder whether the Minister would support that suggestion.
There is also the issue of authentication. I and, I suspect, every Member here have a blue tick on Twitter, so we have been confirmed as being real people. Maybe Facebook should do something similar to authenticate people with Facebook accounts so that we know that everyone is a genuine person, rather than someone sitting in an office block on the outskirts of Moscow preparing fake accounts. I hope the Minister will agree with that point as well.
We need to resource our response appropriately, and I have concerns—I certainly had concerns when I was a Minister and had dealings with it—that the Electoral Commission does not, in fact, have the resources to deal with this issue. Dealing with activity abroad is clearly not within its remit, and it would not have any expertise to do that, so we need to hear how it can access that expertise. The Minister is nodding, so hopefully he will be able to clarify that issue. I hope he is confident that the Electoral Commission has the necessary resources and expertise, or can at least access them.
My hon. Friend is exactly right. It must be able to understand how to target users with information based on what it thinks they are interested in and where that information is coming from. It could conduct its own preliminary research to look for the characteristics of fake accounts and disinformation accounts linked to Russian agencies that are based on its platform. At the moment, it is refusing to do that.
Facebook’s last quarterly profits were nearly $4 billion. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it could afford to conduct the research if the will were there to do so?
I absolutely agree. I noticed on a recent investor call that Mark Zuckerberg warned Facebook investors that dealing with these issues would have a direct impact on the bottom line. I am glad that he said that, but I would like to see him using that money. I do not see any evidence of the company putting resource into trying to tackle this issue.
At the moment, Facebook’s position in the UK is that it was only responding to questions put to it by the Electoral Commission. That has a much narrower focus because of the Electoral Commission’s exact remit. Facebook is not answering questions put to it by the Select Committee asking for more evidence of Russian-linked activity across the site, including in pages, group accounts and profiles, not just restricted to paid-for advertising. We have a right to receive information from Facebook, and it could conduct such research. It proactively conducted its own research looking at the activity of fake accounts during the French presidential election. That led to the deletion of more than 30,000 accounts, pages and profiles. Facebook did that itself. If it can do it in France, it can do it in the UK too, but currently it will not.
If Facebook’s position is that it will respond only to official intelligence directing it towards fake activity, then we need to be working to do that too. Our intelligence services need to be on the lookout, if that is the only trigger open to us to get Facebook to act.
I congratulate the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) on securing this important debate.
The argument I want to make is that, unlike our agencies, the Government have been tragically late in waking up to the new world-view that President Putin set out with such clarity and force after his re-election as President in 2012. I also want to set out the opportunity, the means and the motive which have driven Russia to intervene in our democracy, and then to propose to the Minister a number of areas where I think we can work together on reform over the year to come.
Let me start with the motive, however. We have heard a lot, in particular from my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes), about the history of this, and that motive is important to underline. After Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, he offered a very different view about the possibilities of co-operation with the west from those he harboured during his first term. That world-view was not a secret. He set it out with great clarity in his 2013 state of the nation address, where he gave us the theory to match the fury he offered the world in his Munich security conference speech of 2007. He attacked what he called the “post-Christian” west of “genderless and infertile liberalism”, he attacked the Europeans who he said embraced an “equality of good and evil”, and he attacked what he said was a west trapped in moral relativism, lost in a vague sense of identity. Europeans, argued President Putin, had begun
“renouncing their roots, including Christian values, which underlie Western civilization.”
The Kremlin-backed Centre for Strategic Communications had a headline for this story. It described the pitch as “Putin: world conservatism’s new leader”. But of course, this world view has nothing to do with traditional conservatism. It has a great deal to do with the new trends of the alt-right. It has nothing to do with the party of Disraeli.
If Mr Putin were content to confine his philosophy to the limits of his own borders, we would not be having this debate. However, the reality is that he has set out systematically to wreck the vision, the legacy and the record of President Gorbachev, who set out, between 1987 and 1989, a very different view of the way in which Russia and Europe could work together to create what he called “an all-European home”, subject to a common legal space and governed by the European convention on human rights. That is not a view that President Putin shares. There is no all-European home for President Putin. Instead, we see a systematic effort to divide, rule, confound and confuse.
That brings us to the means of Russia’s new strategy. The right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) did us a favour by sketching out the history of active measures. They have a long history in Russian warfare techniques. Major Kalugin, who was the KGB’s highest-ranking defector to the west, described the approach as
“the heart and soul of Soviet intelligence”.
Since 2012, under General Gerasimov, this doctrine has now been renewed. Some call it a doctrine, and some call it a philosophy, but the idea is that
“the very rules of war have changed”,
and that the role of non-military means of intervention behind an opponent’s lines is now very different.
As Anne Applebaum and Peter Pomerantsev of the London School of Economics have set out, these new tactics are characterised by opportunism and involve an unregulated network of propagandists whose material is distributed online. They point out that Russia is now operating in a post-truth environment, and there is no attempt to win people over to a Russian view of the world. There is simply an attempt to confuse and confound.
The way in which this goes to market in the west, however, is through an unholy alliance with extreme leftist groups and extreme right groups. Its aim is to polarise and divide, and to tear down the words on the coat of arms here in the Chamber, which state that we have “more in common” than sets us apart. If we look at the 45 new parties that have been created in Europe over the past 10 to 20 years, we see a clear majority that have some sympathy with Russia. They include Germany’s AFD, Austria’s FPO, the Golden Dawn in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, the Front National in France, the Northern League in Italy and, indeed, the United Kingdom Independence party.
All those parties have taken a pro-Russia position on matters of huge international interest. The Front National, for example, was given significant loans by Kremlin-backed banks. If we look at the AFD’s relationship with Russia, we see how broadcasters such as Sputnik and Russia-linked accounts systematically intervened to attack Chancellor Merkel and to support the AFD. If we look at the relationship with UKIP, we can see very close links. Nigel Farage famously said that President Putin was the leader that he most admired, back in 2014. In the European Parliament, UKIP has taken consistent positions in favour of the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Atlantic Council has analysed a number of policy positions and concluded that UKIP MEPs
“made similar statements blaming the EU for the Ukraine crisis and asserting Russia’s right to intervene in the ‘near abroad’.”
Looking at all this in the round, the US intelligence community concluded that Russia was intervening systematically abroad in the west, and it would be naive of us to think that Russia was not trying to intervene here in this country.
I will not give way, because of the lack of time.
That takes us to the heart of the reform agenda that we need to look at. It has now become clear that there is a dark social playbook that is being used to great effect. We have hackers such as Cozy Bear hacking emails, and they work in partnership with useful idiots such as Wikileaks. Alongside them, we have what are politely called alternative news sites. These include Sputnik, Russia Today and, frankly, Leave.EU, Westmonster and Breitbart. They work hard to circulate news that will create a row on Twitter, then the troll farms kick in. The material is then sucked into private Facebook groups, at which point dark money is switched behind those ads to circulate them widely.
The study that I have commissioned for today’s debate from the data science firm Signify will be of interest to Conservative Members. It looked at the terrible front page in The Daily Telegraph attacking Conservative Members for being “Brexit mutineers”. Leave.EU and Westmonster probably picked up that story. Westmonster published the original content. Leave.EU then amplified the story on Twitter and Facebook channels, calling Conservative Members “a cancer” and “Tory Traitors”. Standard social listening tools show that the Twitter account attracted about 1,300 interactions. On the original post, there were only 44 interactions, yet the post on Facebook secured more than 23,000 interactions. The difference is explained by the fact that money, run in this case by Voter Consultancy Ltd, was being switched behind the story in order to attack, influence and attempt to suborn Conservative Members in the debates that we have had over the past week or two. Interestingly, Voter Consultancy Ltd is a dormant company, so we do not know quite where the money was coming from. It has, however, just set up an interesting subsidiary called Disruptive Communications, together with a man called John Douglas Wilson Carswell, formerly of this parish.
My point is that we now have a well-established playbook involving a method of creating rows on Twitter and sucking their content into Facebook using dark money. The ads are not going to everybody. Firms such as Cambridge Analytica or Aggregate IQ are very effectively targeting the ads at a particular demographic.
I will not give way.
There is now a motive, a means and a method for Russia to intervene in democracy that we must be aware of. The challenge that we face is that our legislation is completely out of date. The chairman of the Electoral Commission, Sir John Holmes, has openly warned that a perfect storm is putting
“our democratic processes in peril”
and called for urgent steps to deliver transparency in political advertising. We have regulation for social media firms under the European e-commerce directive of 2000, but that was written before social media firms grew to their present size and scale. Because they are treated as platforms, rather than publishers, Ofcom will not regulate them as broadcasters.
The Electoral Commission has confirmed to me that it cannot use civil sanctioning power on non-UK based individuals, or on conduct that takes place outside the UK. That is significant because—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), who is not in his place, said—there is a risk that money came in from abroad to support campaigns. The Advertising Standards Authority has expressed to me its grave disquiet that it can ban broadcast political advertising but it cannot ban political advertising in targeted social media platforms.
There are five key steps that we need to take. First, it is ludicrous that the national security strategy does not include a specific objective to defend the integrity of our democracy. Secondly, we need to review the e-commerce directive, as Lord Bew has recommended, and if the Government do not bring forward consultation on such a change, we on this side of the House will do so. Thirdly, it is time to look again at the Communications Act 2003. In particular, we want to know why the Electoral Commission is not using its power to investigate collusion between Aggregate IQ and Cambridge Analytica. Fourthly, the Electoral Commission obviously needs new powers. Fifthly, we need to pick up on what the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr Seely) said about a different generation of responses, like the active measures working group. I shall finish with a line from Abraham Lincoln, who said that
“the price of freedom is constant vigilance.”
We cannot let a new cyber-curtain disguise what our opponents are up to. It is time that this Government opened their eyes and started acting.
I will come on to that important point in relation to the cyber-attacks.
As the Prime Minister made clear in her speech at the Guildhall in November, we want to build a more productive relationship with Russia, but we also want to see Russia play its full and proper role in the rules-based international order. We will therefore not hesitate in calling out behaviour that undermines that order or threatens our interests at home and overseas.
If there was no evidence of successful intervention, was there evidence of unsuccessful intervention? If so, what was it?
Some evidence has already been declared, such as Facebook’s declaration that there had been some paid-for advertising by organisations that were also involved in US democratic processes. However, as we know, the scale of the activity that has been declared by Facebook is extremely small, amounting to $0.97. I will get on to the point about the transparency of information, because we do not think that that amount credibly represents the whole gamut of activity.
We have identified Russia as responsible for a sustained campaign of cyber-espionage and disruption around the world. When we have seen the Kremlin deploy disinformation in an attempt to sow division and meddle in overseas elections, and to deflect attention away from international incidents, such as the downing of MH17 or the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, we have rightly raised those concerns on the international stage. However challenging our relationship might sometimes be, it is also essential that we keep the channels of communication open to the Kremlin and the Russian people. To that end, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will be in Moscow tomorrow. While there, he will firmly and clearly raise our concerns over the use of disinformation and cyber, and he will reaffirm the Prime Minister’s message, given at the Guildhall, about wanting to see a more productive relationship, built on mutual trust.