Gurkha Veterans

Lauren Edwards Excerpts

Thursday 26th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Lauren Edwards (Rochester and Strood) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. and gallant Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) and the Backbench Business Committee for facilitating this really important debate.

My constituency of Rochester and Strood has a long and proud history and association with the Gurkha community and Nepal. There are over 100 Gurkhas living in the Medway towns, representing a sizeable community of former military personnel who have served this country, along with a significant wider community of Nepalese heritage. Along with many Members here today, I have written to the Minister for Veterans and People, particularly on behalf of the Gurkha Nepalese community in Medway and Kent, and I thank her for her responses and engagement.

Given the time constraints, I will not repeat the points about the case that Gurkha veterans who retired before 1997 have for justice in their pension arrangements, which I think are generally well known in this House. I understand the Government’s position, shared by previous Governments, that they are unable to make retrospective changes to such pension arrangements for this cohort of veterans. While the legal position is clear, the reality is that it was not anticipated that so many who are in receipt of pre-1997 pension arrangements would be living in this country.

It is widely understood that the pensions of those whose service ended before 1 July 1997 are not adequate to sustain a decent standard of living in the UK. Many veterans living in this country receive about one third of the pension paid to a British soldier of equivalent rank. As my constituent Sumendra Rai has told me:

“This division is profoundly unjust. It institutionalises inequality among soldiers who wore the same uniform, followed the same orders, and risked their lives in the same conflicts”.

If it is not possible to provide an uplift for their pensions, I strongly urge the Minister to work with Treasury Ministers to consider the introduction of a fund from which this relatively small cohort of veterans experiencing hardship can access additional financial support. The cost to the Government would likely not be significant, given the numbers, but the impact of such a fund on the quality of life of these veterans would be huge.

This would also be very beneficial to bilateral relations between the UK and Nepal. Although I appreciate the steps being taken to work with the Government of Nepal to increase support for the veterans living there, it is right for the Government to look to alleviate the poverty and hardship of those who have served this country and now live here in the UK. I would of course appreciate an opportunity to meet the Minister to discuss this further, as I am sure other Members would.

To conclude, supporting our Gurkha veterans who are currently experiencing hardship is about preserving a partnership that has been built over centuries. It is a relationship founded on trust, mutual respect and shared sacrifice, and it is important that we acknowledge the loyalty that the Gurkhas have shown to this country, and do our best to ensure that they do not experience poverty and hardship in their well-earned retirement.

Ministry of Defence

Lauren Edwards Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dhesi]

I thank the hon. Lady for that excellent point. The Defence Committee has raised those concerns—the relationship between force size and expanding commitments—and we are pressing the Government to explain clearly how personnel levels align with strategic ambitions.

I want to move on from the context in which we must judge our defence posture and spending. The United Kingdom remains, by any measure, one of the largest contributors in NATO. We should rightly be proud of that. Historically, we have always achieved the alliance’s core benchmark of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence, but that benchmark no longer meets the threat. Pride must not blind us to reality: 2%, or even 2.5%, is no longer enough. The Prime Minister said last month, and has reiterated, that Britain needs to go faster on defence spending. I agree, and cold, hard reality dictates that we must. Going faster means just that—we do not have the luxury of time. If we need to be ready for a significant confrontation with a peer adversary in as little as three years, we cannot wait until the end of this Parliament to begin moving towards just 3% of GDP. We need a profiled increase.

[Lauren Edwards (Rochester and Strood) (Lab)]

I thank the Chair of the Defence Committee for securing this debate. There was a lot of focus in the House on the percentage of GDP that we spend on defence, and it is important to meet our NATO obligations. I welcome the Prime Minister’s statement that the Government will reach at least 4.1% of GDP being spent on defence in 2027, on the way to 5% by 2035. That is an indicator of our commitment to defence, but it is not the whole story. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need a more nuanced debate that considers whether we are spending the defence budget on the right things, with the appropriate lead times, for those short, medium and long-term strategic defence challenges that we face? The events of the last week make it even more important that we see the defence investment plan that the Government have promised as soon as possible.

[Mr Dhesi]

My hon. Friend is right that we need to increase defence spending to the agreed NATO target of 5% in total—3.5% on conventional military spend and 1.5% extra on defence and security-related matters. However, as she rightly points out—and she has made similar points in discussions before—we must ensure that we get full bang for our buck, and we must also ensure that we have sovereign capability, and not just in the medium term, but in the long term.

Everything in deterrence theory tells us that waiting makes conflict more likely, not less. Russia is running a war economy now, and China has indicated that it wants to be ready to seize Taiwan by next year. As the Defence Committee heard last month, it does not make sense to say that we think we will be ready by about 2030. We also need to be honest about how much we should abuse the debt of peacetime to allow our armed forces to become hollowed out. We need to stop pretending that we can still operate as if we were a global power with historic reach. Our Committee has heard repeatedly that the gap between political ambition and real-world capability is widening, and that that gap risks undermining operational readiness, long-term planning and industrial confidence.