(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Lady for that excellent point. The Defence Committee has raised those concerns—the relationship between force size and expanding commitments—and we are pressing the Government to explain clearly how personnel levels align with strategic ambitions.
I want to move on from the context in which we must judge our defence posture and spending. The United Kingdom remains, by any measure, one of the largest contributors in NATO. We should rightly be proud of that. Historically, we have always achieved the alliance’s core benchmark of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence, but that benchmark no longer meets the threat. Pride must not blind us to reality: 2%, or even 2.5%, is no longer enough. The Prime Minister said last month, and has reiterated, that Britain needs to go faster on defence spending. I agree, and cold, hard reality dictates that we must. Going faster means just that—we do not have the luxury of time. If we need to be ready for a significant confrontation with a peer adversary in as little as three years, we cannot wait until the end of this Parliament to begin moving towards just 3% of GDP. We need a profiled increase.
Lauren Edwards (Rochester and Strood) (Lab)
I thank the Chair of the Defence Committee for securing this debate. There was a lot of focus in the House on the percentage of GDP that we spend on defence, and it is important to meet our NATO obligations. I welcome the Prime Minister’s statement that the Government will reach at least 4.1% of GDP being spent on defence in 2027, on the way to 5% by 2035. That is an indicator of our commitment to defence, but it is not the whole story. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need a more nuanced debate that considers whether we are spending the defence budget on the right things, with the appropriate lead times, for those short, medium and long-term strategic defence challenges that we face? The events of the last week make it even more important that we see the defence investment plan that the Government have promised as soon as possible.
My hon. Friend is right that we need to increase defence spending to the agreed NATO target of 5% in total—3.5% on conventional military spend and 1.5% extra on defence and security-related matters. However, as she rightly points out—and she has made similar points in discussions before—we must ensure that we get full bang for our buck, and we must also ensure that we have sovereign capability, and not just in the medium term, but in the long term.
Everything in deterrence theory tells us that waiting makes conflict more likely, not less. Russia is running a war economy now, and China has indicated that it wants to be ready to seize Taiwan by next year. As the Defence Committee heard last month, it does not make sense to say that we think we will be ready by about 2030. We also need to be honest about how much we should abuse the debt of peacetime to allow our armed forces to become hollowed out. We need to stop pretending that we can still operate as if we were a global power with historic reach. Our Committee has heard repeatedly that the gap between political ambition and real-world capability is widening, and that that gap risks undermining operational readiness, long-term planning and industrial confidence.