Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Laura Farris Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lammy]

The right hon. Gentleman makes his point very well. He is absolutely right. In each of the cases that I mentioned, judicial review was able to correct a wrong decision by the upper tribunal and enable fundamental injustices to be prevented, as he indicates. If the Government were successful in abolishing Cart, that crucial safeguard would be lost. That would not affect anyone in this Chamber, but it would affect very vulnerable people. Again, one must ask why the Government are attempting to make this change, and why they are using legislative time now to do it.

When the panel that the Government set up to look at these issues first recommended abolishing Cart judicial reviews, it did so on the basis that only 0.22% of them were successful and that public money could be better spent elsewhere. We know now that that figure was based on wholly inaccurate data. Even the Government now accept that the success rate is likely to be at least 15 times as high as previously thought. It is indefensible for the Government to base decisions that could make the difference between life and death on evidence that is so hopelessly flawed.

[Laura Farris (Newbury) (Con)]

I hear what the right hon. Gentleman says about Cart judicial reviews, but can he explain why Lord Hope, the retired Supreme Court Justice who sat in the Cart case at the Supreme Court, spoke in the House of Lords on 22 March in favour of abolishing Cart-type judicial reviews? He said:

“We set the bar as high as we could when we were defining the test that should be applied, but experience has shown that our decision has not worked”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 March 2021; Vol. 811, c. 710.]

[Mr Lammy]

That is one reflection among many who sit on the other side of the debate, including those who have looked into this matter in great detail.

Why are the Government still pushing ahead with this reform? If we accept the Secretary of State’s reasoning, it comes down to cost and

“a disproportionate use of valuable judicial resource”.

In reality, however, the cost of Cart reviews is no more than £400,000 a year. That is a drop in the ocean compared with the Ministry of Justice’s overall budget. It is less than the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport spent on its art collection last year. Put another way, the Government Legal Department’s total administrative costs for the last year were £226.7 million, more than 500 times the upper estimate for yearly Cart judicial review costs.

As with clause 1, there could be another, murkier reason that the Government are so keen to abolish Cart judicial reviews. In its press release, the Ministry of Justice said that

“it is expected that the legal text that removes the Cart judgment will serve as a framework that can be replicated in other legislation.”

With those words, the Government let their mask slip. If that is indeed their intention—I look forward to the Lord Chancellor confirming that it is not—that would allow them to insulate whole sections of Government decision making from challenge by members of the public. I am sure that Members on both sides of the House would agree that that would be a truly chilling development. Governments have to be challenged. Governments suffer defeats in the courts. Why would we start to oust Government decisions in other areas, beyond this small but important area of immigration law?

Beyond judicial review, there are several provisions dealing with a shift towards greater use of online procedures and technology. While Labour supports measures that would make the justice system more efficient, we must ensure that no one is left behind and that adequate safeguards are in place to prevent serious injustices. As the Bill currently stands, there is only a vague duty for the Lord Chancellor to provide digital support

“for those who require it”.

Labour feels that a specific commitment to assist digitally excluded individuals would offer better protection. While the creation of an online procedure rule committee is a positive step, the Bill currently puts too much power in the hands of the Lord Chancellor. As it stands, the Lord Chancellor could amend, repeal or revoke any law he feels necessary to create the online procedure rules, and he would only have to consult the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals before making amendments to them.

The last area I want to address is the coroners court. As with provisions on criminal procedure, any efforts to reduce “unnecessary procedures” or allow for greater online participation must be accompanied with robust protections for those who could be excluded. More fundamentally, there is nothing in the Bill to address the inequality in the inquest system that sees bereaved families denied the legal aid that my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Vicky Foxcroft) mentioned earlier, while the state has the benefit of the finest Government lawyers that taxpayers’ money can buy.

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[Laura Farris (Newbury) (Con)]

I, too, will focus my comments on the first part of the Bill, which concerns judicial review. I support the exclusion of upper-tribunal permission decisions from the ambit of judicial review—the so-called Cart decisions. That is a merit-based argument. Briefing notes I received state that removing the option of recourse to judicial review in immigration risks injustice, and I hope Members will not mind if I set out briefly why I do not think that is the case.

It is important to note what clause 2 on Cart decisions does not do. It does not mean that difficult immigration or asylum cases will not end up in the appeal courts. It is the case now, and will remain the case, that the most difficult cases concerning article 3 rights on freedom from torture, and article 2 rights on the right to life, are nearly always adjudicated in the Court of Appeal. That is because they have made a natural progression from the first tier to the upper tier and the Court of Appeal. All the clause does is deal with permission to appeal. The clause gives the applicant first the opportunity to go to the first-tier tribunal and seek permission to appeal, with the threshold being whether the case is reasonably arguable. They fail that. They go to the upper-tier tribunal and again say that they have a case that is reasonably arguable. That is refused. They then go to the High Court and seek judicial review. It is only that upper layer that is being removed.

In no other area of law, in either the private or the public realm, does the applicant have three bites of the cherry—not in employment law, not in family law, not in education law, community care, or local government. You cannot leapfrog a decision of the upper court or tribunal to seek recourse through another means. I have listened carefully to the arguments made by those on the Opposition Benches, and no one has yet defined why immigration, and immigration alone, should belong in a special category where people have an extra bite of the cherry.

The hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse), who is no longer in her place, suggested that it goes against every fair-minded decision of a Government to exclude Cart-type judicial reviews, but that overlooks the difficulty that the Supreme Court had when it determined this issue. Indeed, I say respectfully that it is rare to find such a nuanced decision in the Supreme Court. In the course of that judgment, at paragraph 91, Lord Phillips said:

“My initial inclination was to treat the new two tier tribunal system as wholly self-sufficient… Can it not be left to the Senior President…to ensure that the tribunal judiciary is so deployed as to ensure the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny of decisions of the lower tier?”

Even Baroness Hale, who was the primary proponent, said:

“There must be a limit to the resources”

that we

“devote to the task of trying to get the decision right in any individual case.”

We on the Government Benches respectfully say that it must be right that, if the Supreme Court were faced with that decision again, it would answer in a different way. We know that because of Lord Hope’s remark in the Lords on 22 March that

“experience has shown that our decision has not worked”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 March 2021; Vol. 811, c. 710.]

The other reason I support clause 2 is to do with the overriding objective that lies at the heart of all civil procedure and the issue of proportionality. I know that there has been some disagreement among Members about how many Cart judicial reviews succeed. The independent review of administrative law report put it as low as less than 1%, the Government say it is 3%, and Liberty, which argues strongly in favour, says it may be nearer 5%. However, we have to be realistic. On any reading, we have a system where over 95% of these judicial review cases go nowhere, yet we know that that is the most common form of judicial review.

That is exactly what Lord Dyson warned against when permission was given in Cart. He said that “resources are limited” and that we do not want

“a return to the pre-2002 Act days in immigration and asylum cases when the courts were overwhelmed with unmeritorious judicial review claims.”

[Anne McLaughlin]

I am a bit confused. The hon. Lady said that taking away Cart judicial reviews would not stop somebody going to the Court of Appeal from the tribunal system, so I just wonder what the route is. Perhaps I have misunderstood.

[Laura Farris]

For an applicant to end up in the Court of Appeal, they would win or lose at first instance and either appeal or be appealed by the Home Office, the upper-tier tribunal would give permission for that appeal, and it would be heard in the upper-tier tribunal. The applicant would either win or lose again, and then they would find themselves appealed to the Court of Appeal. That will not change where difficult areas of human rights law are engaged.

The issue here is where the upper-tier tribunal says, “No, we won’t give permission to hear your appeal,” and then the applicant goes to the High Court and seeks a judicial review application. It is that narrow aspect that is excluded by the Bill. It is important to clarify that, because I think there is some uncertainty about whether human rights are being excluded, and I am glad that the hon. Lady asked me.

[Anne McLaughlin]

rose—

[Laura Farris]

I will make a little progress, because I know that time is limited.

The Opposition frequently push Government Members on the issue of backlog and delay. In the early days of the pandemic, they were right to do so, but I do not think that they can sustain an argument where they simultaneously criticise delays that have arisen because of the pandemic and advocate a disproportionality in an area of litigation where over 95% of claims are unsuccessful, clearly clogging up court time.

The second issue that I would like to address is the new flexibility in quashing orders, and particularly the issue of suspended quashing orders. I read the IRAL report very carefully. It reached its conclusion by reviewing the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Hurley and Moore. When it found that there had been a breach of the public sector equality duty, the Court made a declaration of illegality rather than a quashing order because it wanted to give the Secretary of State room to comply. As I see it, clause 1 is in keeping with that.

A number of organisations have written to me to say that, while they perhaps understand the basis of the decision, they are generally opposed to suspended quashing orders where the provisions of a clause will be void. Respectfully, I think that fails to properly engage with what is at stake. The public sector equality duty is a really helpful starting point here. Let us look at the way those cases were litigated through the appeal courts in the early days. We had the library closure cases, with Somerset County Council, Gloucestershire County Council and Surrey County Council all losing public sector equality duty cases. We then had the care home cases, such as South West Care Homes v. Devon County Council, and the mental health cases. All of them were in 2011, 2012 or 2013.

What is most striking about public sector equality duty cases now is that they almost never succeed; actually, I could not find an example of one that had succeeded since 2015. It occurred to me that it is at least possible that the reason the courts will not engage with those cases is that they think it is too onerous to quash. I think that the Bill provides more scope, not less, for some of the progressive principles that can be advanced for a judicial review to succeed if it is not immediately the subject of a quashing order.

I also listened to observations made on the Opposition Benches about retrospective decisions and retrospective effect; what that would have meant in the Unison case and whether the Supreme Court would or would not have ordered the Ministry of Justice to repay the fees paid by litigants who were bringing claims during that period. I just do not think it is possible to read Lord Reed’s comments in that judgment and not find it was absolutely guaranteed that the Supreme Court would order the fees to be repaid. Let us look at clause 1(8) and (9), which set the criteria. The Supreme Court effectively applied them all and found that the repayment of fees was necessary, so I do not think it is a good example.

It is, however, worth recalling the case of HM Treasury v. Ahmed, which the Secretary of State mentioned in his opening remarks. That was a critical case, one of the first cases the Supreme Court heard, because it dealt with important issues of constitutional consequence and public interest. The Labour Government had done what any right-minded member of the public would think was sensible. They found three people who they suspected, but were not convicted, of terrorism offences. As a precautionary measure, they froze their assets. They believed they were entitled to do so under the United Nations Act 1946. They were, in fact, not entitled to do so and the Supreme Court found them to have acted ultra vires and quashed. We know that at least one Supreme Court Justice was nervous about that. Lord Hope said:

“I would however suspend the operation of the orders that I would make for a period of one month from the date of the judgment to give the Treasury time to consider what steps, if any, they should now take.”

What if they had had the power to suspend the order? We know the judgment was handed down on 27 January 2010. By 5 February, Alistair Darling had introduced the Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010. By 10 February, two weeks later, that had received Royal Assent. It was manifestly in the public interest for Parliament to have the opportunity to legislate on that. How much better if the Court had had the opportunity not to make a quashing order, but to suspend.

That brings me to my final point, which is something I do not think anyone on the Opposition Benches has engaged with at all: what the doctrine of nullity is really about. In private law, the Court has the opportunity to consider and to decide that something is unlawful, but in public law it does not just decide that; it quashes altogether. I am of the view that allowing some discretion, where the effect of a quashing order would potentially run contrary to the public interest or conflict with what might be the will of Parliament, offers a more constructive opportunity to resolve public law problems.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I thank the hon. Lady for again letting me in. Surely this is ordering judges to have a presumption in favour of prospective, rather than retrospective, quashing orders? We are not giving them the opportunity to use it—we are saying, “You will use it as a default position.” That is the problem.

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[Laura Farris]

I am not sure I entirely agree with that. I do agree that clause 1 sets out the criteria they need to apply, but in reality they are common sense principles and I do not agree that the Court’s discretion is being fettered in the way the hon. Lady suggests.