(6 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am afraid the right hon. Gentleman is a member of the same club. I hate to share this with the House, but exports to China were up by 30% last year.
Many of our small and medium-sized enterprises are involved in premium manufacturing and other forms of high-value production. Will the Minister ensure that, in discussions with the EU, those things are taken into account when negotiators are discussing origin and the calculation of origin?
All such issues are taken into account. Of course, the Department for Exiting the European Union leads on the negotiations on our exit from the EU.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesFurther to that point of order, Mrs Main. In addition to the other thanks, I think this has been a very good debate and we have spoken in a lot of detail about a huge variety of issues, because the Bill covers a number of different things. The amount of knowledge expressed in the room has been a good display of what Parliament can do when it is doing something in the right way.
In particular, I say a huge amount of thanks to the Clerks, who have been absolutely invaluable in their support to me. I could not have done this without them—they have been fantastic, so I thank them so much.
Further to that point of order, Mrs Main. I will not repeat all the thanks that my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary so eloquently made. I agreed with every word he said. Obviously, as the new boy on the block I thank him for his support, and I thank the Committee for being indulgent of me. In fact, the astonishing amiability and amicability of Opposition colleagues even in the face of my tetchiness is something on which I shall have to reflect over the weekend.
I thank all the Department for International Trade staff who supported me in work on the Bill. With HMT, we are bringing forward a piece of legislation that has been subject to good humoured but forensic scrutiny, not only from witnesses but from members of the Committee. I thank all the staff, Clerks and others for their support.
Bill to be reported, without amendment.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThank you for the opportunity to speak and for chairing the meeting, Ms Buck. I would like to speak briefly around the amendments. One of my earliest questions about the Bill was: what is a public notice and how does one justify that it has been made sufficiently public? The Opposition raised that case clearly. On the definition of public notice and the fact that the person making the public notice has to make that judgment call, particularly in relation to clause 13, which concerns the dumping of goods, foreign subsidies and increases in imports, and given that the UK has not had provision to make regulations and rules, it seems sensible to say that a public notice is not the best way. Parliament should have some say. We have raised concerns previously that, although Brexit is apparently about taking back control, it appears that control is being taken back to the Executive rather than to Parliament as a whole. I will therefore support amendments 137 to 139 if they are pushed to a vote.
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Ms Buck, and to welcome back the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde. This group of amendments would require trade remedies measures to be imposed and given legal effect by regulations. I appreciate the concerns in relation to the use of public notices, which were raised by both Her Majesty’s Opposition and the Scottish nationalist party representative. I am grateful for the opportunity to set out why this is an entirely appropriate procedure for imposing trade remedies measures.
If you were cynical, Ms Buck, you might think that, because the Opposition have decided to make parliamentary scrutiny the central theme of their critique of the Bill, they are leveraging that into every single argument at every single stage. I am not a cynic, and take the concerns at face value, as the genuine ones that I am sure they are.
The imperative is to act quickly once the Trade Remedies Authority has identified the need to tackle injury to UK industry. I would have hoped that Members on both sides of the Committee would recognise that the imperative is to act quickly when injury to UK producers has been identified, and to move as swiftly as possible to put that right. Measures will be calculated and recommended by a fully expert and independent body, following an extensive investigation that is governed by strict World Trade Organisation rules. Our priority has to be to ensure that those recommended measures are imposed quickly, to provide relief to industries suffering injury.
The additional proposed process would delay our ability to apply measures precisely at a time when UK industry is suffering injury, and when it has been independently established that that is so. It would run counter to the calls we have heard from industry for a swift process. The use of public notices to implement trade remedies measures is consistent with the approach taken in comparable WTO countries such as New Zealand and Australia, and is therefore in line with international good practice.
Therefore I say to the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde that, to suggest that this use of public notice is untoward and could lead to further government by proclamation, even outwith the Bill, is disproportionate. The reality is that this set of amendments, as with so many put forward by the Opposition, would in fact undermine the very principles that they say they are interested in: namely, to protect UK industry to ensure that we have a proportionate and speedy response to unfair dumping or use of subsidy and make sure that injury to British industry is put right. It is a shame that, collectively, the Opposition’s amendments suggest that their priorities are somewhere else.
The hon. Gentleman has been in the House for some time. I would have thought he would be familiar with the calendar of the parliamentary year, with long periods of recess when Parliament does not sit. Why on earth would Her Majesty’s Opposition, so often accused, doubtlessly unfairly, of being in hock to the producer interest and blind to wider society and the interests of the consumer and the ordinary citizen—though I decry that attitude—because of their links to the trade union movement, wish to put delays in place?
The hon. Gentleman knows full well the delays that can come with secondary legislation. To have that at the end of that extensive, independent and exhaustive expert assessment that has established injury, why on earth would the Labour party, or indeed the Scottish nationalist party, want to get in the way of swift, effective and proper defence of British jobs, British workers and British business?
I am pleased that the Government are now concerned with ensuring that such things are put in place incredibly quickly if there is injury to UK industry. In that case, will the Government bring forward amendments to speed up other parts of the process, given that they will now be taking longer than the EU’s similar processes?
I apologise for getting the name of the hon. Lady’s party wrong—it is the Scottish National party. We have put forward a proportionate and swift system, and hope that we would be able to deliver a speedier, more proportionate and balanced response than that of the EU. That is certainly our aim. I note again that amendments tabled by the hon. Lady’s party and Her Majesty’s Opposition suggest that their priority is entirely different.
The Government have asked for an awful lot of trust. They are asking us to trust them to make the right decision. Given that they do not have a track record of making such decisions over a very long number of years, it is very difficult for us to trust the Government on that. There is also the fact that the Government said that they would table amendments to clause 11 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, and then they did not.
I do not think that the Conservative Government have quite recognised what they are doing with all their decisions to hold power in the Executive over any number of things. When the Conservatives are inevitably no longer in government there will be another Government in place, and they will be in opposition saying, “Why are so many decisions being made by the Executive without parliamentary scrutiny?”
The UK is at a point where we are choosing how our future looks in relation to Brexit. We are choosing how things will go in this Parliament, and into the future. We are choosing how much say we will have over trade policy, so it is vital how we decide to go about this. The way that the Government are setting this up is absolutely wrong. There should be parliamentary scrutiny of such things, and democratically elected Members should have the opportunity to look at them, to have an input and not just have them done by public notice.
The Opposition parties protest too much. As we all know, the point of a trade remedies system is to be balanced, proportionate and move swiftly to protect British industry. That is why we are setting up, through the Trade Bill, the specialist body to do that: the Trade Remedies Authority. We are talking about the implementation of the Trade Remedies Authority’s recommendations. Why on earth, after that exhaustive effort, with the appropriate, balanced tests in place, would anyone want to create burdensome, parliamentary oversight? It does not make any sense.
The TRA makes the decision. If the Secretary of State disagrees with it, they will have to come to Parliament and make a statement, so there will be the opportunity to deal with that. When the TRA has made an assessment and wants to help British industry, why on earth would the Opposition parties want to make a wider political point about lack of scrutiny, just for the sake of it, when it is totally inappropriate for this measure? I leave outsiders to judge whether that is for political interests or for the interests of either British consumers or producers.
If the Trade Remedies Authority will be so good at making decisions, why will the Government simply have to make a written statement to the House if they disagree with it, rather than go through some kind of regulation procedure? If the Trade Remedies Authority is set up in such a great way that it will always make the best decisions, why will the Minister be allowed to disagree with it simply by written statement, and not by any sort of parliamentary procedure?
The legislation makes it clear that the Secretary of State should look at it, and various people who have commented on the structure have said that it is right that, although the main body of work should be conducted by experts, ultimately it should be a politician accountable to Parliament, part of a democratic process, who should make that decision. Were they in any way to disagree, they would have to come to Parliament to make a statement. That is appropriate and proportionate, and why on earth the Opposition parties would want to go to such lengths to try to stop us bringing in effective remedy to protect British producers, I cannot imagine.
Absolutely, and conversely they are the ones that have been getting the most European funding, so the choice they thought they had to make because of the inequality and uneven economic growth in the United Kingdom will make them lose out in more than one way.
On the issue of new good and fledgling industries, we cannot predict what the world will look like in 20 years’ time. Who could have predicted the rise in the need for electric vehicle charging points, for example? If something suddenly becomes a thing, the effects cannot be predicted. For example, companies making paper straws in the UK are probably seeing their shares going through the roof. We cannot predict the market share of those companies and how quickly it will grow as a result of changes in the culture of the country. I do not think the market share test is appropriate. It is strange to have it in the Bill, and the Government need to rethink it.
I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I hope I can reassure them about the issues they raised. Perhaps there has been some misunderstanding, which I can clear up.
Amendment 32 and its consequential amendments 34 to 38 seek to eliminate a market share threshold that we have designed to make sure businesses have a transparent benchmark for judging whether their complaint is likely to be successful. On the question of why we have the threshold, an independent evaluation of the EU system suggested that the system should focus on producers’ market share as a way of informing inquiries.
I was also asked which other countries have the threshold. We understand that other countries consider whether cases are likely to result in measures at the point of applications, but they tend to use rather opaque systems. The market share threshold is intended to give industry greater certainty in a more transparent way about how the system will operate in this country. We are learning from experiences in other countries and are seeking to improve on them to the betterment of our system.
The provisions for the market share threshold fit with the industry’s calls for the TRA to focus on the cases that matter most. For instance, the British Ceramic Confederation said in its response to our White Paper that the TRA
“should not spend its time investigating vexatious complaints and needs to focus on cases where there is a real UK manufacturing interest.”
The market share threshold will be part of providing that.
I thank the hon. Lady for that comprehensive intervention. As I said in reply to the hon. Member for Bootle, our aim is to make improvements. We want a better system that provides greater certainty for UK industry, and one that makes the TRA focus, as the industry has requested, on the cases of greatest import, not an opaque system as in other countries. The TRA may quickly respond to someone with a de minimis market share who comes forward with no real case and tell them that they have no chance, but what we are doing is creating a system that is much easier to understand and more transparent.
I hope the secondary legislation we implement will include other world firsts, too. So long as what we do is based on a proportionate, balanced approach that is fully compliant with the WTO and better tailored to the needs of British industry, I shall be proud to see us innovate. I am not afraid to innovate if it is in the interests of British industry and a better system. We should aspire to doing that.
The Minister argues that, in the case of a producer with a small market share in the UK, there may be a disproportionate effect on UK consumers. Given that an economic interest test takes into account the impact on consumers, is the market share test necessary?
For the reasons I have set out, I think the market share test is an eminently sensible part of our regime. I hope the Committee will agree.
New paragraphs 12A and 11A, introduced by amendments 39 and 70, would require the recommendations made by the TRA under schedule 4 to be made available to relevant Select Committees of the House of Commons, along with an account for the evidence base of those recommendations. Let me begin by stating that transparency is one of the four design principles set out by the Government for the trade remedies framework. The inherent assumption of a lack of scrutiny implied by the amendments is simply untrue.
To protect the TRA’s status as an independent public body, its recommendations to the Secretary of State should not be subject to political influence before a decision to accept or reject them has even been taken. Those recommendations will be made on the basis of the framework set out in this legislation and underpinned by technical and procedural details to be set out in secondary legislation. Giving the Select Committee a role in that process will undermine the impartiality of the process—an impartiality which is supported by industry. Publishing the recommendation in advance of the decision by the Secretary of State could also further undermine impartiality by increasing lobbying of Ministers by the affected parties, and could also lead to unnecessary disruption of the markets affected.
The Bill provides for public scrutiny of both the TRA and the Secretary of State’s decisions. Whether the Secretary of State accepts or rejects the recommendation, the evidence base for the TRA’s recommendation will be made available to the public, as is required under the terms of the WTO agreements. Furthermore, if the Secretary of State rejects the TRA’s recommendation to apply measures, he or she must lay a statement before Parliament setting out the reasons for that decision. Parliament will then be able to hold the Secretary of State to account if it considers the reasons to be unsound.
It would be lovely if the Minister could explain how parliamentarians can hold Ministers to account if they make a written statement.
The hon. Lady has been a Member of this House for some time and will know that there is a series of means by which that can be pursued. Making a statement to the House provides the initial spur to start that scrutiny, if that is what the Select Committee or others decide. There are urgent questions, Adjournment debates, Backbench Business Committee debates—I will not list them all, as the hon. Lady is probably rather better on parliamentary process than I am. She will know that there is a huge number and they can all be used. Her Majesty’s Opposition or the SNP and their spokesmen have other means by which to raise the issue.
On that basis, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThree groups of amendments need a response. I will start with amendments 45 and 54, which seek to impose a two-week time limit on the Secretary of State’s decision to accept or reject the TRA recommendation. I will then turn to amendment 47, which seeks to create a presumption of five years as the normal, rather than the maximum, duration of definitive measures. Finally, I will address amendments 48 and 53, which seek to ensure that the duration of definitive measures is not affected by the length of any provisional measures that might have been applied against the same imports.
On amendments 45 and 54, on receipt of the TRA recommendation, it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to respond in a timely manner, while ensuring that the public interest aspect of their role is given due weight. We fully recognise that a swift response is crucial to UK industry, as the hon. Gentleman said, so that the injury being caused by unfair trade practices can be halted. However, in some cases there will inevitably be difficult matters that the Secretary of State will need to reflect on. Although we expect that such matters will be rare, it is important that he has full opportunity thoroughly to consider the issues in making his decision. That might lengthen the process, but it is important to do the job well rather than quickly. To place an arbitrary two–week time limit on the Secretary of State is, therefore, not appropriate. Even though that duration might be sufficient in most cases, the legislation must provide flexibility for cases in which complex considerations must be made in the public interest.
As the hon. Gentleman is aware, once the investigation has been concluded and measures have been proposed by the TRA, the pressure on the Secretary of State quickly to come forward with the adoption of the measures to protect British industry will be great. I perhaps lack the hon. Gentleman’s imagination, but I find it hard to imagine a situation in which the pressure on the Secretary of State to get on with it would not be much greater than a pressure to delay and put it into the long grass, as the hon. Gentleman said. I think we can be confident that any Secretary of State under any Government would wish to make the decision as quickly as reasonably possible.
For those reasons, I do not agree with an arbitrary two-week limit. I understand why the hon. Gentleman has tabled the amendment and I hope it is a probing one. I understand what lies behind it, but I hope I have reassured him.
On amendment 47, it is important to note that the WTO agreements set out that measures may remain in force for up to five years. They do not provide that five years is the default. In fact, they specifically set out that measures should remain in force only for as long as, and to the extent, necessary to counteract the dumping or subsidisation that is causing injury. The TRA analysis may suggest that a period shorter than five years will be sufficient to counteract injury, and in such cases the TRA should set an appropriate duration accordingly.
On request, the TRA will initiate an expiry review before the termination of any measures, provided that UK industry can demonstrate that injury would continue or recur if the measures were to expire. If the review finds that continued application of measures is required to maintain sufficient protection for UK industry, the measures will be continued. I assure the hon. Gentleman that industry is adequately protected without the need for the amendment and I ask him to consider withdrawing it.
Finally, on amendments 48 and 53, I understand the hon. Gentleman’s concerns, but I have to reassure him that that which he fears is not the intention of the provisions. The WTO agreements allow in certain circumstances for trade remedies to be applied from a date prior to the date of the application of definitive measures. The purpose of the provisions is to allow us to reflect that in secondary legislation, not to shorten the duration of definitive measures. We are not seeking to shorten the duration of definitive measures, but are seeking to allow trade remedies to be applied from a date prior to the date of those measures.
The unintended consequence of the Opposition amendments would be to prevent the TRA from collecting duties for a period before the date of the section 13 notice, even though this is permissible under the WTO agreements in limited circumstances. I entirely understand why the hon. Gentleman tabled the amendment and what he was seeking to probe. I hope my explanation has been sufficient to make him see that that which he desires will not be delivered by the amendments.
We believe that this is a necessary provision. We have been clear that we want to incorporate all of the protections permitted under WTO rules into the UK’s trade remedies framework. Removing the ability to do that could be detrimental to the protections available to UK industry. It is on that basis that I ask him to consider withdrawing the amendment.
I express the Scottish National party’s support for the Opposition amendments. It is sensible that we are asking the Secretary of State to make a decision within a relatively short time period because, as has been stated, we do not want that to be dragged out for any significant length of time. It is reasonable that, after a significant investigation has taken place—and the TRA’s investigations will be significant—the Minister will quickly review the evidence presented and make a decision in the shortest possible time.
On amendment 47 and the five-year period, I have the Department for International Trade call for evidence on the current EU trade remedy measures. I can see possibly one that is in place for less than five years. In fact, many have been place for over a decade because they have been renewed. It is very unusual in that document, which lists all the trade remedy measures currently in place, for any of them to have a review date of less than five years. It is completely reasonable that the Opposition are asking for the starting period default to be five years, and for the TRA to decide on a lesser period in compelling circumstances. Given the number of these measures that have been extended and how few of them have fallen at the five year period, I suggest that five years is likely to be a reasonably short period for trade remedies to be in place, and that it is sensible for them to extended as a result.
We are talking about the trade remedies body doing substantive investigations and coming up with a huge amount of evidence. Asking it to do so on more than a five-yearly basis would probably be adding to their workload unnecessarily. The Opposition’s suggestion is incredibly sensible in that regard. The presumption should be five years, and the TRA should make decisions for it to be less if it believes that that would be appropriate.
Schedule 5 sets out the provisions that will apply in cases where UK industry finds itself being harmed by unforeseen surges in imports. The WTO agreement on safeguards set outs the requirements that must be met for the UK, as for other members, to be able to impose safeguard measures. Through this schedule, we are adopting the key principles into UK law and setting out the broad elements of the safeguard process that will be operated by the TRA.
As we have already discussed, there will be a need for more detail. This will, rightly, be set out in secondary legislation. The schedule also provides the necessary powers for the Secretary of State to make regulations to do this, including, for example, to define what is meant by “increased quantities”, “UK producers” and “like goods”. Paragraph 19 of schedule 5 provides that regulations can be made to set out the process for reviewing safeguard measures. The regulations will set out, among other things, the circumstances in which measures can be continued.
Amendment 74 seeks to require UK producers to provide evidence that they are adjusting to increased imports before a safeguard measure can be extended beyond four years. It also aims to add into primary legislation that safeguard remedies may only be in place for a maximum of eight years. As I explained earlier, once we leave the EU, the UK clearly needs to be able to take action where our industry is being harmed by unfair trade from other countries, whether that is by dumped or subsidised goods, or as a result of fairly traded but unforeseen surges in imports. The safeguard provisions set out in schedule 5 achieve this. Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing measures, safeguards relate to fair trade and apply globally. Therefore, it is especially important that these measures balance the interests of producers and downstream consumer industries by facilitating adjustment.
We have already discussed adjustment plans when considering the previous group of amendments. As I said, these are a vital tool in ensuring that safeguard measures not only provide protection, but allow those affected the opportunity to make necessary adjustments. It is not appropriate to introduce a requirement for producers to provide evidence of adjustment when seeking to extend measures beyond four years.
I ask the Committee to consider for a moment that we have measures in place—a safeguard—because of a massive surge on imports. The TRA has done its work. In an entirely novel process—I am aware of no parallel anywhere—Her Majesty’s Opposition, doubtless supported by their allies in the Scottish National party, want to impose a bureaucratic and burdensome measure—[Interruption.] I notice that the SNP Members are shaking their heads. For once, perhaps, they will strike out and not support something that is so clearly damaging to the interests of Scottish producers. Why on earth would the producers have to provide evidence of their adjustment when the main issue should be other aspects and criteria? It is a strange innovation that the Labour party has put forward.
Introducing a requirement for producers to provide evidence of adjustment when seeking to extend beyond four years would undermine the need for flexibility in our approach, which recognises—this is worth reflecting on—that adjustment is not always dependent on a producer’s own efforts. Yet, under the amendment, protection measures would cease if producers were not able to provide evidence that they were adjusting. Adjustment plans are a more suitable way of building in that flexibility and ensuring that there is a commitment to adjustment from as early as the initiation stage. Finally, with regard to the eight-year rule, the Government intend to be WTO-compliant by setting that out in secondary legislation.
I would appreciate it if the Minister let us know where it says that UK producers are supposed to produce that evidence. My reading is that the TRA has to find the evidence rather than the producers submitting it.
The hon. Lady will find that the evidence of adjustment by UK producers is unlikely to be provided by anyone other than UK producers. It is a rather strange innovation to insert that into legislation for the continuation of measures that are put in place because of the injury caused and the massive surge on imports. It is an entirely novel concept. I am not aware of its being anywhere in WTO schedules although, admittedly, after so little time in the job I cannot claim to know them inside out. If any Member of the Opposition, who after all came up with the extraordinary innovation, has evidence of a basis in WTO law or anywhere else, I would be fascinated to hear it. Perhaps the hon. Lady will support the amendment anyway, even though there is no evidence for it, legally or otherwise but I hope that she, like me, will oppose the amendment if it is pressed to a vote.
I rise to speak to amendments 111 to 114 in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife. I am aware this is a framework Bill, but the clause is particularly short and skeletal. It would have benefited from being a bit longer and fleshed out just slightly, because then the Government could have explained more adequately what they are talking about.
Amendment 111 deals with an issue raised with us by the Law Society of Scotland, which said:
“Clause 15(1)(b) makes reference to international law but it is not clear what is meant by this. It would be helpful were the Minister to explain precisely the circumstances in which the Government would need to deal with a dispute by varying the import duty.”
If would be useful if the Minister, either in summing up or at a later point, could provide a bit of clarity. Amendment 111 would ask the Secretary of State to come back with regulations defining what “international law” is for the purposes of the clause. As has been stated, if the Law Society of Scotland does not think that is clear, perhaps it needs a bit more fleshing out.
Amendment 112 suggests to the Minister what he might mean by “international law.” We tabled the amendment to see if that is what the Government mean. If they do, perhaps they will accept it.
Amendment 113 attempts to do something similar, but we are giving the Government a little more time in which to define what they mean by “international law” in the clause. We ask them to come back within three months of the passing of the Bill, making clear what the relevant international law authorising the exercise of powers would be and the circumstances in which they consider it appropriate to deal with a dispute by varying the amount of import duty. It may be that the Government intend to return to that later anyway but, if they were to accept any of the amendments, they will make their intentions clear at this point.
Amendment 114 has a slightly different purpose: to increase the accountability of Government. The Government have the power on international disputes and the Secretary of State will make regulations in relation to that through the clause, but there does not seem to be any accountability to Parliament about regulations or changes, or ways in which they will deal with international disputes. There seems to be no feedback mechanism to allow Parliament to ensure that the Minister makes the correct decisions or to scrutinise those decisions adequately.
In amendment 114, we have asked the Secretary of State to lay before the House of Commons an annual report on the exercise of these powers, making clear the circumstances in which they have used them, which matters were in dispute and which was the relevant international law in deciding the changes.
Now may not be the time to say this, but I will just make my intentions clear. Depending on what the Minister says about his intentions, it may be that we do not need to press amendments 111 to 113. I would very much like to press amendment 114 when we come to that stage, but on the other three I will wait to see what the Minister says.
I will endeavour to follow the good example set by the ever-affable hon. Member for Bootle, who gave not only good content, but brilliant quotes that entirely encapsulated the moment and which we all enjoyed.
Clause 15 enables the Secretary of State to vary the rate of import duty when a dispute or other issue has arisen between the UK Government and the Government of another country, and the UK is authorised to do so under international law. The clause replaces equivalent existing powers available to the European Commission. Under the WTO dispute system, WTO members that have been found to be in breach of their obligations must bring their measures into compliance with WTO law. If they do not do so within a reasonable period, the parties can attempt to agree on compensation. Compensation may take the form of a reduction in the import duty on specified goods from the complaining country, although in practice any such reduction would have to be applied equally to all other WTO members in accordance with the most favoured nation rule.
If the parties fail to agree compensation, the complaining member or members may impose retaliatory measures against the member found to be in breach. Such measures typically involve raising the rate of import duty on specified goods from that country to incentivise it to bring itself into compliance. Free trade agreements with third countries also frequently contain dispute settlement mechanisms, many of which follow similar procedures to those of the WTO. In particular, free trade agreement dispute settlement mechanisms often result in a signatory being required to bring itself into compliance with the terms of the FTA, and often allow retaliatory trade measures to be taken against the offending party if it does not do so, and cannot agree appropriate compensation. Authorisation to implement compensation or retaliation measures may also arise in a number of other specific contexts. For example, a WTO member that imposes a temporary safeguard measure to protect its industry, or that modifies its WTO schedules, must seek to compensate any affected countries, failing which retaliatory measures may be imposed against it.
The ability to vary the rate of import duty in response to disputes and other contentious situations is vital to ensure that the UK can operate an independent trade policy after leaving the EU. In particular, the threat of imposing retaliatory duties following a trade dispute can be an effective means of incentivising other countries to comply with their obligations under international law, and can therefore help to preserve and open up trading opportunities for UK firms.
The European Commission is currently responsible for conducting trade disputes and applying enforcement measures on behalf of the UK. Once we leave the EU, the UK will bring and defend trade disputes in its own right. When such disputes are decided, we will require the powers to be able to take action to enforce and respond to their rulings including, where necessary, varying the rate of import duty. The power in the clause ensures that the UK can do just that.
Amendments 111 and 112 seek to provide a legislative definition of international law in the Bill or in regulations to be made by the Secretary of State, as the hon. Lady set out. Amendments 113 and 114 seek to impose a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to report to the House of Commons on that power, either within three months of the passing of the Bill or annually, providing details of the international legal basis for justifying the use of the power.
As I have explained, there are a number of situations under international law in which countries may be authorised to vary their rate of import duty for the purposes of retaliation or compensation, including in disputes under different types of international agreements and, just to make it even more complicated, in other contentious situations that do not involve a formal dispute. Given the different context in which clause 15 would apply, it is sensible to refer broadly to authorisation under international law. Adopting a narrower approach would risk constraining future action in situations that are not currently foreseeable.
I rise to query something the Minister said and to ensure that I heard him correctly. Is it the Government’s intention, at the negative procedure stage, to explain in the explanatory notes the basis in international law and the reason for the measure being introduced?
It is our intention that the Government, when they seek to make such a change, and they are doing so under international law, would provide evidence of the law upon which they were relying. If the hon. Lady is happy with that, I will leave it there.
In conclusion, after leaving the EU, the United Kingdom will require the ability to vary the rate of import duty to respond to international dispute rulings and other contentious situations. That will ensure that the Government can continue to protect the UK’s economic interests by putting in place, when necessary, effective retaliatory and compensatory measures against other countries. I commend the clause to the Committee and hope that the amendment is withdrawn or rejected.
I will deal with the questions as best I can and in order.
The EU has four retaliatory duties in place. It is not really possible to predict how frequently this power will be used. In some ways the question is not really the frequency but whether, when it does happen, we have a procedure in place to allow us quickly and effectively to take action to ensure that we put the matter right. That, rather than the frequency, might be the bigger issue.
Although we will be seeking, and will be prepared to use, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as a way of ensuring that there is a level playing field for UK business to compete on, and we will have the tools available for us to participate fully in international trade disputes where necessary, we have no particular appetite to be more litigious than is required to protect the UK’s interests.
I will write to the hon. Lady and the Committee on the WTO schedules and the process attached to that.
I would appreciate it if the Minister also wrote to me, because I brought that up last week. I am pleased that the hon. Member for Oxford East is pursuing the issue. It is important that the Government have the power to lodge schedules with the WTO and the power to make the technical rectifications that the Minister mentioned—those may or may not end up being technical rectifications to things like quotas, given that some of the countries in the WTO are challenging whether they would be technical rectifications or would constitute modifications.
On our amendments, the Minister has provided some information around how Parliament will be provided with evidence for each of the things that comes up. Therefore, I do not intend to press amendment 111 or amendments 112 and 113, but I do intend to press amendment 114 because I am not yet convinced that the Government will provide enough feedback about how this mechanism is working, and it would be appropriate for them to do so.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 114, in clause 15, page 10, line 18, at end insert—
“(3) The Secretary of State must lay before the House of Commons an annual report on the exercise of the powers under this section including information on—
(a) the relevant international law authorising the exercise of the powers in each case, and
(b) the matters in dispute or issues arising in each case.”
This amendment requires the Government to report on the circumstances of, and international law basis for, each variation of tariffs as a result of a trade dispute.—(Kirsty Blackman.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI appreciate the Minister speaking on these matters in Committee, and I welcome him to his place. He is absolutely right about the importance of the preferential trade agreements, but perhaps we had a slight misunderstanding. I am not suggesting that opposition to such agreements would be likely. It is just that some organisations such as Fairtrade and Traidcraft have been in touch with us, and they might have better insight into what is happening on the ground in some of those countries. They might be able to provide more information to ensure that the preferential tariffs being provided unilaterally are the most appropriate ones.
The amendment is not about trying to create a blockage in the system. My reason for moving it is not about protecting our industries, but about ensuring that the best possible preferences are put in place for those countries that most need them. That is more likely to happen if there is an opportunity—a requirement, I suppose—for the Government to consult, in particular those bodies and organisations working in the country which can be absolutely clear about the best way forward for any trade deals.
If the Minister is clear that he will consult, that is useful. However, I intend to press the amendment to a vote.
I am disappointed that the hon. Lady will press for a Division, not because the points she has made are not important, not because the Government should not consult and listen to those voices, and not because we should not seek to improve our programme of support for developing countries, but because to put consultation in at that particular point in the process will not deliver the outcome that she desires and might in fact cause damage to the very system that we all want to see improved and working properly after having taken such consultation.
We are in regular contact with external stakeholders. We hold roundtables with representatives of civil society, business and academia, and we have received about 20 responses on trade with developing countries as part of the White Paper consultation. We have heard support from some of the organisations that the hon. Lady mentioned for creating a UK preference scheme, and an understanding of our approach to maintaining in the first instance existing levels of market access as we leave the EU. In effect, we are replicating the system we have now. In the oral evidence earlier this week, the Committee heard someone from the Fairtrade Foundation say of the measure:
“It takes the best bits of current EU policy and brings them over into UK policy.”––[Official Report, Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 21, Q23.]
In some areas, stakeholders have suggested changes for the future, including extending to more countries, simplifying rules and adding more products. All of that can be considered by Government. I suggest to the hon. Lady that it is not too late not to press this amendment to the vote, because I do not think it is appropriate, although I take on board entirely the points she is making.
I still intend to press this to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
This seems like a sensible amendment, particularly because accessing that nil rate is crucial for so many nations. If there is ambiguity around the conditions, they need to be clarified. Definition, initially, as a least-developed country, is partly with reference to vulnerability to economic shocks. Inability to access that nil-rate, or inability have it reinstated when it should be, could cause economic shocks. As we know, the value of access to the nil-rate to UK markets for least-developed countries is incredibly important—it is £323 million a year. It is important that we have no ambiguity and are absolutely crystal clear.
As we have heard, the amendment seeks to clarify that the regulations may provide for the restoration or reinstatement of the nil rate of import duty to least-developed countries where this has been suspended or withdrawn. It is clearly important that we can reinstate preferential rates of import duty after they have been suspended or withdrawn, but the Government do not believe that the amendment is required. The existing power enables the withdrawal or suspension of preferences to least-developed countries to be partial and reversible. That is in line with the general principles relating to regulation-making powers. It goes to show that even when you deal with lawyers as eminent as those at the Law Society of Scotland, they sometimes get it wrong, even technically.
The Government intend to use the power to suspend sparingly and, if used, we will work with the relevant country with a view to reinstating preferences as soon as is appropriate. For trade preferences to be effective, they must be relatively stable, so that businesses have confidence to make decisions to import from beneficiary countries. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Aberdeen North to withdraw the amendments and give a categorical assurance that a provision to do what they suggest is already in place.
Having looked at subsection (2), I still do not think it is particularly clear. It says that the scheme can make provision about the withdrawal, but then does not make clear that it can be reinstated. I will not press it to a vote because I hope the Government will table an amendment on Report to make it clear that they have the ability to reinstate the rate. I would not like a situation in which the Government were unable to do so because there was a challenge around the language used in the law. The amendment seeks to make it as unambiguous as possible. The hon. Member for Oxford East was absolutely clear on the importance of nil rates, particularly in relation to economic shocks. SNP Members would echo that. I am not going to press it to a vote, but I would appreciate it if the Minister would consider returning to the matter on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.