Subsidy Control Bill

Kirsty Blackman Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 22nd September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Flynn]

I admire the hon. Member’s optimism, but I am not quite sure where he has read that, because, of course, the Bill does not have that detail. He is hoping that the Secretary of State will subsequently provide that detail, but the Bill does not make that clear.

Another extremely important point that the Bill does not make clear is in relation to relocation subsidies. Essentially, the Government are saying that they will not relocate subsidies to areas with a more significant problem. They might want to level up—to use their term—but that is not going to happen under the terms of the Bill.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, in fact, the Bill does the opposite of levelling up, in that it refuses to allow anything to happen in disadvantaged areas that will disadvantage rich areas? That is how the Bill is written—it is in schedule 1F.

[Stephen Flynn]

My hon. Friend could not have put it better. It is a pity that there are not more Tory Back Benchers present to hear her and understand the damage that they are going to do to their own communities.

The Bill’s key objectives also include net zero. Again, there is no detail on net zero or how the Government intend to subsidise its delivery. We are being told to just believe—to hope on a whim and a prayer—that the Government will do this, that they will deliver. Let us look at that from a Scottish perspective. Let us look at the Government’s record. As the Minister and, indeed, others in this Chamber know only too well, Scottish renewables projects, which are key and fundamental to reaching net zero, pay the highest grid charges in the entirety of Europe. In the UK—on these islands—renewables projects in the south-east of England get paid to access the national grid, whereas renewables projects in Scotland have to pay to do so.

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[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

It is great to hear the thoughtful contributions from that Tory Bench, although not from the Treasury Bench, I hasten to add. The hon. Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) and I have spoken in many debates together, and I always appreciate his forensic assessments of the details in the Bills before us. I hope that he will be on the Committee, and I hope that I will be too.

First off, I want to ask a couple of questions about what the Secretary of State said, because I am immensely confused by a couple of the things that he said. First, he said that the devolved Administrations were broadly happy with the Bill. If they are broadly happy, why have the Welsh Government said that they object to five of the six parts of the Bill? One out of six does not equate to “broadly happy”. In fact, I get the impression that they really do not like it and are not happy about it.

We have not seen what the Scottish Government are saying about the legislative consent motion, but I cannot imagine that they will be terribly happy with the power grab that is occurring as a result of the Bill. So I am quite confused by what the Secretary of State said. Does he mean that the devolved Administrations are broadly happy with having a state aid regime? Does he mean that they are broadly happy with the detail of the Subsidy Control Bill? I do not know. I do not understand what he is saying, because it does not seem to be coherent with what the Welsh Government have said in public about this.

The other thing that I am really confused about is what the Secretary of State said about the EU state aid provisions no longer applying to Northern Ireland. I thought he said something about article 21 of the Northern Ireland protocol, but maybe he meant article 16. I am not sure what he meant. In terms of the planned changes to state aid application in Northern Ireland, he seemed to be saying that the new subsidy control regime would apply there and that the UK Government were seeking some sort of change to an article in order to ensure that that happened. I am not aware of any publicity around the UK Government asking the EU for a change, but if that has happened, why have we not heard about it?

Could we please have a bit more information on this? We have the trade and co-operation agreement and we have the Northern Ireland protocol, but how do the UK Government expect these measures to apply in Northern Ireland without us breaking either the agreement or the protocol? That does not make sense. If the Secretary of State was making that important an announcement, you would think he would do it in a ministerial statement rather than as an aside during the Second Reading of this Bill. I would be really keen to hear a bit more information about what this actually means.

[Seema Malhotra]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right about the confusion that has been raised. Does she agree that it is important that the Government clarify what they are suggesting has changed in relation to article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol and whether it has been dropped on the basis of this Bill? Should they not also tell us whether their proposal has been negotiated with the EU, and what the status of those discussions and any agreement might be?

[Kirsty Blackman]

Absolutely. If we as a country can suddenly renege on our international obligations and agreements, why cannot Scotland hold an independence referendum next week? The UK has agreed to these agreements and it would be great, when the Minister speaks at the end of the debate, if he could explain exactly what is going on. This is serious enough for a Minister to be making a separate statement to the House, because it is such an important matter for the people of the UK and particularly for the people of Northern Ireland.

My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn) spoke eloquently about the levelling-up agenda, and I agree that the red wall Tories elected in the north of England should be jumping up and down about this—we are jumping up and down about it, as the right hon. Member for South Northamptonshire (Dame Andrea Leadsom) suggested—because it explicitly excludes us from doing anything that may disadvantage any other area of the UK. In schedule 1, principle F says:

“Subsidies should be designed to achieve their specific policy objective while minimising any negative effects on competition or investment within the United Kingdom.”

And principle G says:

“Subsidies’ beneficial effects…should outweigh any negative effects, including in particular negative effects on competition or investment within the United Kingdom; international trade or investment.”

That reference to international trade or investment confuses me.

The principles try to level the playing field across the UK, so there can be a subsidy in Manchester only if a person in the south of England would not move their company as a result.

[Sammy Wilson]

For balance, does the hon. Lady accept that principle A says:

“Subsidies should pursue a specific policy objective in order to remedy an identified market failure”?

If there is market failure and certain regions of the United Kingdom are disadvantaged because of their distance, history, lack of skills, lack of resources or whatever it happens to be, principle A allows subsidies to be used for levelling up.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Principle F rejects that, so which one has primacy? Which one is the most important? If they directly disagree with each other, is it more important that we can do what is said in principle A or is it more important that we can do what is said in principle F?

I think the subsidy regime should be used in the same way as the EU state aid regime, which focuses on regions that need additional support. Whatever this Conservative Government say—we will not believe them anyway, given the amount of lies we have been told—it is not the case that this regime assists levelling up; it does the opposite. If they want to assist levelling up, they should design a regime that ensures different areas can have different subsidy regimes that benefit their local area even though they may disadvantage other areas.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

The hon. Lady may have identified this herself already, but freeports, for example, allow businesses to relocate and benefit from different taxation regimes. Such businesses are treated more beneficially in how they operate and in their cost of operation. Does she accept that freeports do exactly what she is setting out?

[Kirsty Blackman]

Freeports are not covered by the subsidy regime we are talking about today. They are a separate thing. I can say from the Back Benches that I am not particularly keen on freeports, but the idea is that there is a wall around the port—the guidance specifically says that there has to be a physical barrier around the area—and there is a different taxation regime within that wall. I am yet to be convinced of the economic benefits that will come as a result.

We hope to have green ports in Scotland, and the failure of the UK Government to agree that we can pay the real living wage and focus on net zero within those green ports means that the freeport system, as it stands, is not nearly as advantageous as it could or should be. Even though the freeport system is set up to encourage such things, I have not seen evidence that it will actually do so, particularly given the rejection of the key principles we want to put in place.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

It is unclear that the UK Government have a strategy to replace the EU’s successful regional structural funding for Wales, Northern Ireland and many parts of the highlands in Scotland. Such funding and state aid go hand in hand, and they are seen as different things. Indeed, the freeports are seen as a different thing. There needs to be something else to go with this for areas of the UK that are disadvantaged by policy set in the south-east of England for the south-east of England.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Absolutely. We need to replicate the good things we had in the EU, the things that supported different areas. A system has been put in place to ensure that different parliamentary constituencies can get money from the UK Government, but it is super-interesting that the constituencies the Government have chosen to put at the top of the list are those constituencies represented by Conservative MPs, rather than the constituencies with the highest levels of deprivation. The difference is dramatic.

It is hugely concerning that, if the UK Government are left to do so much in this Bill by guidance, as set out in clause 79, we are going to have a situation where the Secretary of State will have significant control and flexibility without even having to come through door of this House. The Bill says that the Secretary of State is going to issue guidance about

“the practical application of—

(a) the subsidy control principles;

(b) the energy and environment principles;

(c) the subsidy control requirements in Chapters 2 and 3”.

I am clear that there needs to be detailed guidance, but we should be at the stage where we are scrutinising it. When we come to the evidence sessions in Committee, the people before us should be able to talk about the guidance. I get that some of the regulations are going to be made by the affirmative resolution and some by the negative resolution, but my major concern is not those that are going to be made by resolutions in this House; it is those that are going to be made by guidance.

Let us we look in detail at some of the stuff in this Bill. Schedule 2 says:

“Subsidies in relation to energy and environment shall be aimed at and incentivise the beneficiary in—

(a) delivering a secure, affordable and sustainable energy system and a well-functioning and competitive energy market, or

(b) increasing the level of environmental protection compared to the level that would be achieved in the absence of the subsidy.”

I am keen to know what “environmental protection” means. What does it mean? It is not in there. We do not know what it means because we have not seen the guidance that the Secretary of State is going to be allowed to produce on their own without running it past this House.

The same applies in respect of

“a secure, affordable and sustainable energy system and a well-functioning and competitive energy market”.

Does that mean a well-functioning and competitive energy market for those people who buy and sell energy, or for the consumer? Does it mean for the person who is being hit by those higher fuel bills or for the people trading gas on a daily basis? I do not know what it means because we do not have that information. If the Government were willing to provide us with the guidance, and we had access to it and seen it, we would be able to ask questions and comment on the specificity of the guidance. When we have experts come before the Committee, we would be able to hear their expert opinion on it, but we cannot, because we do not have the guidance. It is really unfortunate that, on Second Reading, when we are deciding whether or not the Bill should go forward, we have not got the information we need in order to do that.

I want to make a couple more points about energy. One of my colleagues mentioned the transition charges. The subsidy regime that is being set up says, “We can’t have one part of the UK advantaged over another part of it.” However, it also says, “No subsidy can negatively affect interconnectors.” So we will still have a situation where energy from the EU is allowed to come into the UK—the companies are not paying any charges for using our network—yet people who have wind farms in Scotland are paying £5.50 per unit of energy. And those in Wales are being paid £2.80 per unit of energy. That system was created when fuel was driven around in vans and had to be driven to places that then used the power. One of my colleagues said that there is an incredible level of disinterest among those on the Government Benches about dealing with transmission charges. I appreciate that some of them have considered it, but a Minister has not stood up to say, “You are right. This is a travesty and we need to fix it.” We would really like a commitment on that, particularly if this Bill is going to give protection to interconnectors but no protection to those wind farms in the north of Scotland that are being charged an absolute fortune.

I want to talk about the Labour party’s position on the Bill, as I am really disappointed that it is not willing to vote against it. It is important for it to do that. We are going to vote against it. I am on the left. I appreciate all the things that the Labour party has done in the past, but I have spent six years getting increasingly frustrated by the failure of the Labour party to oppose this Tory Government and to stand up even for the Welsh Government at this point. This is really unfortunate. I do not understand at all why the Labour party is not voting against this tonight. We are voting against it. I am not going to support this Bill, as I do not think it should get its Second Reading. I say that for reasons of the power grab, the massive inadequacies in the Bill and the fact it is going to do the opposite of levelling up—it is going to entrench the inequality we already have.

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[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

In principle, we welcome this Bill. First, it represents an opportunity for us to introduce subsidy control regimes that are specific to the United Kingdom and are not influenced by Brussels and the wider European interest, hence sometimes actually detrimental to our own country. It is an important part of the whole Brexit process that we have this independence.

Secondly, it is important that we have a nationally controlled regime. As one who speaks from a region of the United Kingdom, of course I want an even playing field when it comes to the application of subsidies. Some regions are richer than others and will therefore have more money to be put into subsidies than others. Some areas may have more political influence. That is partly why I find some of the objections raised by Opposition Members very odd. For example, a Minister in central Government could introduce subsidies for constituencies in a way that is beneficial to the electoral interests of his own party—the governing party—and we need a control regime that enables that kind of decision to be challenged.

My only concern about the Bill—perhaps the Minister will clarify this later; it has been raised by Members already—is that the challenge function seems to be limited to either the Secretary of State or to interested persons. As far as I can see in any definitions that have been given in the Bill, interested persons would not include Ministers from any of the devolved Parliaments or Assemblies in the United Kingdom. In fact, the only such definition is in clause 8, which refers to businesses and enterprises. The Minister needs to clarify this. If he wants to argue that this is a robust control regime, then the ability to make referrals must not just rest with the Secretary of State. It must also rest with devolved Administrations, who have interests in how subsidies may be used, particularly by central Government Departments or Ministers. Others may want the challenge function so that they can make mischief. If the Minister is serious about saying that we want to have an effective UK-wide regime, it must be clear that the function is available to all interested parties across the UK.

I come specifically to the Northern Ireland issue. Of course, in Northern Ireland the control of subsidies will not be totally under the Competition and Markets Authority or the tribunals. We will operate a dual regime under the withdrawal agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol. On state aid and its controls, it is quite clear:

“The provisions of Union law listed in Annex 5”—

a whole list of EU rules is there—

“shall apply to the United Kingdom, including with regard to measures supporting the production of and trade in agricultural products…in respect of measures which affect that trade between Northern Ireland and the Union which is subject to this Protocol.”



The Secretary of State said in answer to the Opposition spokesperson and, I think, the Scottish National party representative that, as far as the Government are concerned, it is clear that Northern Ireland is covered by the Bill, but the only way in which Northern Ireland can be totally within its provisions is through the removal of article 10.

I know it is a lengthy Bill, but I have read through it and I do not find any reference to article 10 being altered, removed or changed. Perhaps the Minister can point that out to us later on. I would welcome that, by the way; in fact, I would be overjoyed, and people in Northern Ireland would be overjoyed if that is hidden somewhere in the Bill in words that I do not understand, have not spotted or whatever. If it is there, please point it out. There will be great rejoicing in Northern Ireland as a result.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Even if that were in the Bill, I am concerned that it is not in the competence of this place to change that unilaterally without having a discussion with the European Union.

[Sammy Wilson]

The hon. Member made that point, and I was not sure whether she was supportive of the withdrawal of article 10 or appalled at the prospect because the EU opposes it. The one thing I did notice, however, was that she was appalled that there should be any interference in the role of the Government in Scotland to make subsidy decisions. If that is the case, she should be equally appalled for policy makers in Northern Ireland and welcome any unilateral decision by the Government here at Westminster to give them the same freedom.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I honestly do not have a view on whether it is a good or bad thing. I am just utterly confused, because I do not think that the Government have the power to do it. I want to know what they mean so that I can work out whether I oppose it or not. I do not know what they are saying.

[Sammy Wilson]

Of course, the Government have the power to do it under article 16 where it is deemed that provisions in the withdrawal agreement are damaging economically to Northern Ireland. I cannot think of anything more damaging to Northern Ireland than a subsidy regime that applies in the rest of the United Kingdom but which can be stopped from applying in Northern Ireland.

Let me give some examples of how conflict between the dual systems could operate. One of the principles outlined in schedule 1 is that subsidies should be proportionate—there is no fixed percentage; it is simply that they be proportionate—but under the EEA-EU state aid regime, subsidies cannot be more than 50%. For example, if a subsidy is made available to a firm in Scotland that could equally be looking at Northern Ireland, Scotland would have the advantage of saying that it is so important to Scotland and fits in with its objectives that it will give it a subsidy equal to 70%—that may even be accepted under the control regime in the rest of the United Kingdom. However, Northern Ireland would be excluded from seeking to attract that firm on the basis that the EU state aid rules say it cannot go over 50%. That is one way in which the dual system is going to be a disadvantage.

Another example is that the EU refuses to allow state aid to be given where it is simply for expansion, but under the principles outlined in schedule 1, a subsidy of that nature could be given in the rest of the United Kingdom. We could find that a subsidy complies with the control regime in GB, but does not comply with EU state aid rules in Northern Ireland, so placing Northern Ireland at a disadvantage.

On the EU state rules—and the Secretary of State said it—one of the reasons for bringing forward our own control system is that it can be more flexible and quicker. In fact, I think he said that a decision could be made within 30 days, but under EU state aid rules, there has to be a standstill period that can last up to a year. The Secretary of State said that in the House today. Again, when it comes to attracting businesses by using subsidies in Northern Ireland—even if we could match the subsidy available in England, Scotland and Wales, or wherever else somebody is trying to attract the firm—the slowness of the process, imposed by the fact that we are subject not only to the control regime in the rest of the United Kingdom, but to EU state aid rules, could mean that we find that a firm simply says, “Well, we can get a decision quicker in England, Scotland or Wales, and that is where we are going”, and Northern Ireland would be disadvantaged.

That is one of the reasons why no fiddling about with regulations is going to make a difference here. If Northern Ireland still remains firmly under article 10 of the withdrawal agreement, state aid rules apply there and the dual system has to apply there, then this is not a case, as someone has said, of trying to control the subsidy race, because Northern Ireland cannot even enter the race. We will be spectators of the race, stopped from entering it by the provisions of article 10 and the requirement for Northern Ireland to remain under the state aid rules.

Lest people think that this is just an issue for Northern Ireland—they may say, “Well, tough! That was what happened with Brexit.”—let me say that this is the elephant in the room and the issue has not been addressed in this Bill. Those state aid rules apply to trade between Northern Ireland and the Union, but any subsidies to a firm that operates through Northern Ireland into the EU, even though it is based in England, Scotland or Wales—or might even trade into the EU through Northern Ireland—will also be caught up in this.

The issue of the reach of the state aid rules has not been addressed in this Bill, and it is not just an academic argument. It is not even just for subsidies that may be given to firms in England, Scotland or Wales; this can also affect the international trade deals that the Government do with the rest of the world.

For example, British Sugar has challenged the deal made by the Secretary of State that allows 250,000 tonnes of sugar cane into the United Kingdom tariff free. That has been challenged by British Sugar on the basis that it represents unfair competition in the European market. British Sugar sells on the European market. It uses sugar beet, and tariff-free sugar cane would give Tate & Lyle an advantage. That is being challenged in the courts, and article 10 has been cited. If we are to ensure that a subsidy control regime does not disadvantage one part of the United Kingdom, or catch some of the subsidies that may be made available to firms located in other parts of the United Kingdom, rather than in Northern Ireland, article 10 is all-important. It is important for the Minister to provide clarification on that.

I have spoken to officials in the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland. They have said—it is quite clear why—that they are finding it difficult to get information about how this scheme will work. So much of the Bill depends on new regulations being made. The general headlines are there, but the regulations need to be made. For example, what is an interested party, and will the Minister regulate to widen the scope of that? What about guidance for the subsidy and the person of interest, or about subsidies of particular interest? We do not know which subsidies are likely to be of particular interest, but that will be made by regulation. The Bill is peppered throughout with indications that such things will be clarified by regulations from the Minister, and that is important when it comes to the operation of subsidy control. We are dealing with the Bill, yet we are blind to some of the issues that need to be addressed.

Another issue is the time allowed for appeal or challenge, which is 30 days. I do not want the same long drawn-out process that the EU has, but 30 days in which the subsidy is registered or placed on a database is particularly short. Why has that period been selected, especially since getting information together for such a challenge might be that much more difficult? Lastly, the tribunal has significant powers, but it is how those powers will be used that is important. When the Bill comes to Committee, it is important that many of these issues are addressed.

From a Northern Ireland perspective, I hope that the promise made from the Dispatch Box is correct. If it is, I would love to see where that is being delivered in the Bill. If not, I would say that the Bill does not deal with some of the factors that have caused the greatest distortion of trade when it comes to the application of subsidies, namely a dual regime in Northern Ireland—a regime that allows the European Court of Justice to make those decisions. The promise made by the Minister in his opening speech that the Bill represents the freedoms we have thanks to Brexit is not quite true. The Bill still leaves a significant foothold in the United Kingdom for Brussels and the European Court of Justice when making final decisions about subsidies that apply in Northern Ireland, or about subsidies that are given to firms in England, Scotland or Wales, but that may fall under the EU state aid regime because, through their trading in Northern Ireland, they impact on the European market.

Subsidy Control Bill

Kirsty Blackman Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 13th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Annual report on climate change impacts—

‘(1) The Secretary of State must once every 12 months lay a report before Parliament setting out the impact of subsidies granted in the preceding 12 months on the environment and climate change.

(2) Any report under subsection (1) must include an assessment of the impact of subsidies granted in the preceding 12 months on the UK’s ability to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.

(3) The first report must be laid before Parliament within 12 months of this Act being passed.’

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay an annual report before parliament detailing the climate change impacts of subsidies granted that year.

New clause 3—Post-award investigations—

‘(1) The CMA may conduct an investigation in relation to a subsidy that has been granted or a subsidy scheme that has been made.

(2) A decision under subsection (1) may be made in relation to any subsidy or subsidy scheme in respect of which the CMA considers—

(a) that there has or may have been a failure to comply with the requirements of Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 2, or

(b) that there has or may have been a failure to comply with the transparency obligations set out in Chapter 3 of Part 2.

(3) Where the CMA makes a decision to investigate a subsidy or scheme under subsection (1), it must direct the public authority to provide it with—

(a) any assessment carried out by the public authority as to whether the financial assistance fell within the meaning of “subsidy” or “subsidy scheme” for the purposes of this Act, and the reasons for that conclusion,

(b) any assessment carried out by the public authority as to whether the financial assistance if assessed to constitute a subsidy or subsidy scheme would comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 and 2 of Part 2 and the reasons for that conclusion,

(c) any evidence relevant to those assessments,

(d) in a case where such assessments were not provided, the reasons for the assessments not being provided,

(e) any information that the public authority failed to enter in the subsidy database in accordance with Chapter 3 of Part 2, and

(f) such other information as is specified in regulations under section 60(8)(a).

(4) Where the CMA decides to conduct an investigation under subsection (1), the direction given under subsection (3) must be made before the end of 20 working days beginning with the day on which the subsidy is given or the scheme is made.

(5) The CMA must send a copy of the direction given under subsection (3) to the public authority and the Secretary of State.

(6) The public authority must provide to the CMA the information required under subsection (3) before the end of the information period as defined in section 60(7).’

This new clause provides the CMA with the power to conduct a post-award investigation where the public authority has or may have failed to comply with its requirements.

Amendment 10, in clause 10, page 6, line 31, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

‘(a) is made by—

(i) a Minister of the Crown,

(ii) the Welsh Ministers,

(iii) the Scottish Ministers, or

(iv) a Northern Ireland department; and’.

This amendment allows devolved administrations to make streamlined subsidy schemes.

Amendment 18, page 6, line 33, at end insert—

‘(4A) A streamlined subsidy scheme may be made, in particular, to support areas of relative economic deprivation.’

This amendment would allow for streamlined subsidy schemes to be made for the purposes of supporting areas of deprivation.

Amendment 19, in clause 11, page 7, line 9, at end insert—

‘(4) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.

(5) If consent to the making of the regulations is not given by any of those authorities within the period of one month beginning with the day on which it is sought from that authority, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without consent.

(6) If regulations are made in reliance on subsection (5), the Secretary of State must make a statement to the House of Commons explaining why the Secretary of State decided to make the regulations without the consent of the authority or authorities concerned.’

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to seek the consent of the Devolved Administrations before making regulations under this section. Where such consent is not given within one month, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without that consent, but must make a statement to the House of Commons explaining their decision.

Amendment 20, in clause 32, page 17, line 10, at end insert—

‘(c) the subsidy database is subject to routine audit to verify the accuracy and completeness of entries.’

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to ensure that the database is subject to routine audit.

Amendment 1, in clause 33, page 17, line 21, leave out “£500,000” and insert “£500”.

This amendment would reduce the threshold for entering subsidies into the subsidy database from £500,000 to £500.

Amendment 2, page 17, line 24, leave out “one year” and insert “one month”.

This amendment would require subsidies or schemes to be entered in the database within one month of being made, rather than one year, if given in the form of a tax measure.

Amendment 13, page 17, line 24, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

‘(a) if given in the form of a tax measure, an entry with a provisional tax deduction value must be entered within one month, and a final value entered within one month of the date of the tax declaration, or’.

This ensures that tax measure subsidies are entered in the subsidy database within one month.

Amendment 3, page 17, line 26, leave out “six months” and insert “one month”.

This amendment would require subsidies or schemes to be entered in the database within one month of being made, rather than six months, if given in any form other than a tax measure.

Amendment 4, page 17, line 33, leave out “one year” and insert “one month”.

See explanatory statement for Amendment 2.

Amendment 5, page 17, line 35, leave out “six months” and insert “one month”.

See explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 6, in clause 34, page 18, line 27, at end insert—

“(j) the date the subsidy or scheme was entered onto the database.”

This amendment would require the date a subsidy or scheme was entered onto the database to be included in the information public authorities are required to enter into the database.

Amendment 14, in clause 36, page 19, line 17, after “requirements” insert

“with the exception of duties under section 33,”.

This amendment requires that subsidies under the minimal financial assistance threshold are entered in the subsidy control database.

Amendment 7, page 20, line 4, at end insert—

‘(7) In this section, the reference to the subsidy control requirements does not include the requirements as to transparency in Chapter 3 of Part 2.’

This amendment requires that “minimal financial assistance” subsidies are not exempt from the database transparency requirements, while remaining exempt from other subsidy control requirements.

Amendment 21, in clause 41, page 23, line 15, leave out “£14,500,000” and insert “£500”.

This amendment would make section 33 applicable to SPEI subsidies worth more than £500.

Amendment 22, page 23, line 16, leave out subsection (b).

This amendment would make section 33 applicable to SPEI subsidies worth more than £500.

Amendment 23, in clause 55, page 30, line 40, after “State” insert

‘, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland’.

This amendment extends the call-in powers under this section to the Devolved Administrations.

Amendment 24, page 31, line 2, after “State” insert

‘, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland’.

This amendment relates to Amendment 23.

Amendment 25, page 31, line 7, after “State” insert

‘, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland’.

This amendment relates to Amendment 23.

Amendment 9, in clause 66, page 37, line 39, leave out paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) and insert—

‘(a) all subsidies and subsidy schemes granted in the past 12 months, and

(b) an assessment of the extent to which they satisfy the subsidy control principles and the energy and environment principles.

(2) Any report made under this section must be formally laid before parliament by the Secretary of State.

(3) The Secretary of State must make an oral statement to the House of Commons when any report under this section is laid.’

This amendment ensures that the annual report prepared by the CMA includes all subsidies along with its assessment of the extent to which they fulfil the 7 principles set out in the Bill. The report also places a requirement for the Secretary of State to report to Parliament when a report is laid.

Amendment 26, in clause 68, page 39, line 1, at end insert—

‘(3A) The Chair of the CMA Board may appoint up to three non-executive members to the Subsidy Advice Unit established under subsection (1) in order to ensure that the Unit includes at least one person with relevant experience in relation to each of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.’

This amendment would allow the CMA Chair to appoint up to three non-executive members to ensure that the Unit includes at least one person with experience in relation to each of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Amendment 8, in clause 70, page 39, line 35, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment intends to allow individual subsidies given under a subsidy scheme to be reviewed, without the requirement for the broader subsidy scheme to be reviewed too.

Amendment 12, page 40, line 16, at end insert—

‘(c) the Welsh Ministers,

(d) the Scottish Ministers, or

(e) a Northern Ireland department;’.

This amendment includes the devolved administrations in the list of those who can apply to the Competition Appeal Tribunal for a review of a subsidy decision.

Amendment 27, in clause 79, page 46, line 3, at end insert—

‘(5A) Before issuing guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.

(5B) If consent to the making of the regulations is not given by any of those authorities within the period of one month beginning with the day on which it is sought from that authority, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without that consent.

(5C) If regulations are made in reliance on subsection (5B), the Secretary of State must publish a statement explaining why the Secretary of State decided to make the regulations without the consent of the authority or authorities concerned.’

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to gain the consent of the Devolved Administrations before issuing guidance under Clause 79.

Amendment 15, in schedule 1, page 51, line 8, after “concerns” insert

‘and areas of relative economic deprivation’.

This amendment includes areas of relative economic deprivation as an example of the equity rationales that subsidies should address.

Amendment 16, page 52, line 6, at end insert—

‘(c) consistency with the United Kingdom achieving its net-zero commitments established under the Climate Change Act 2008.’

This amendment adds consistency with the UK’s net-zero commitments as a particular consideration for public authorities before deciding whether to give a subsidy.

Amendment 11, page 52, line 6, at end insert—

‘Net Zero

H Subsidies should not normally encourage behaviour which will have a negative effect on the achievement of the UK’s net-zero commitments.’

This amendment adds a subsidy control principle relating to the UK’s net zero commitments.

Amendment 17, in schedule 2, page 52, line 15, at end insert—

‘(c) delivering the UK’s net-zero commitments established under the Climate Change Act 2008.’

This amendment would ensure that subsidies related to energy and the environment incentivise the beneficiary to help deliver the UK’s net-zero commitments.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Thank you for calling me to speak in this important debate, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is a delight to be present in this incubation Chamber, where viruses from all around these islands—every corner of them—can come to mix freely, so that we can return this toxic cocktail to our constituents, constituencies and families. I am delighted to be able to be physically present at this time.

I will speak briefly to new clause 1, which is in my name and those of my colleagues, as well as the other amendments that stand in my name. My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh North and Leith (Deidre Brock) will fill in the rest of the details and explain more about our rationale for the new clause.

The logic behind new clause 1 is that agricultural subsidies do not fit neatly into subsidy control regimes. That has been recognised by the World Trade Organisation, which is the reason for its agreement on agriculture; it has been recognised by the European Union, which is the reason for the common agricultural policy; indeed, it has been recognised across the world. We, and the Scottish Government, still have no idea why the UK Government decided to go against the flow and include agricultural subsidies in the Bill, rather than providing a separate arrangement for them.

The new clause simply removes agriculture from the consideration. It does not mean that we should not have a control regime of some sort for agriculture, and it does not mean that we should not have rules relating to agriculture. It means that agriculture does not fit neatly here, and should not form part of the main subsidy control regime in the Bill.

Amendment 10 relates to streamlined subsidy schemes. The change for which we are asking would allow devolved Administrations to make such schemes. Given that those Administrations have devolved competences by law, it makes no sense that the schemes can only be made by the Secretary of State in the UK Government. Obviously we would like Scottish independence, but in the absence of a vote on that, we are not asking for devolved Administrations to be able to overstep their devolved competences. We are merely asking for parity—for the ability of devolved Administrations to create streamlined subsidy schemes. They would still only be able to do that within their areas of devolved competence, and they would still only be able to do it within their limited financial envelopes. We are not asking for anything strange or unusual; we are not seeking some sort of power grab; it is simply to do with parity.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I understood from discussions I have had with the Minister in the past that the intention was to give the regional Administrations a say in this process so that their views could be taken on board if necessary, but the hon. Lady seems to be saying that that will not happen. Have I got it wrong, or have I got it right?

[Kirsty Blackman]

Some parts of the Bill give the devolved Administrations a say, but many others do not. The key part concerns the issue of interested parties, which I will explain in some detail later.

Streamlined subsidy schemes can go through a “streamlined” process rather than being made by, for instance, a local authority in order to benefit organisations. We are not asking for all granting authorities to have access to that process; we are simply asking for parity of esteem for the devolved Administrations, specifically on streamlined subsidy schemes.

[Jim Shannon]

The point that I was trying to make relates to farmers’ subsidies and environmental schemes, which are critically important to Northern Ireland, as they are to Scotland.

[Kirsty Blackman]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct. We are asking for the agricultural references to be removed from the Bill because we do not think that this gives us, or any of the devolved Administrations, the flexibility we need. The Welsh Government have raised concerns similar to those raised by the Scottish Government, particularly in relation to legislative consent. As I said earlier, my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh North and Leith will speak in more detail about agriculture in particular, so it may be worth questioning her at that stage.

Let me now turn to the issue of tax declarations and the transparency database. There is already a subsidy control database, which is rubbish. There is very little on it because a huge amount of information is missing. The Minister has made it clear that this is a preliminary database, an interim measure, and not the final database. We have had a degree of reassurance from him that the new database will be better, but the way in which the legislation is drafted—the number of exemptions, and the length of time that authorities have to upload information—causes us great concern. and was raised a number of times in Committee.

Amendment 13 would amend clause 33 in respect of a local authority or granting authority giving a subsidy in the form of a tax measure—a tax rebate or tax reduction. To give a theoretical example, if an authority says in April 2022, “We’re going to subsidise this company by not having them pay a certain kind of tax,” it does not have to put that on the database until the year after it appears on a tax declaration. It can be made in April 2022, it can appear on the tax declaration first in April 2023, and there would be no requirement to upload it to the database until April 2024, which is almost two years after the subsidy was made. By that time, an organisation that had been egregiously damaged by the subsidy would have sunk—it would have gone under.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

The hon. Lady makes some very fair points, but to be fair to the Government there are requirements under clause 37(6) for the business to keep records of the subsidies received and report them. That is probably in many ways more practical. That subsidy might be given to all kinds of different subsidiaries of that particular enterprise and therefore, even if she wanted local authorities to determine what they had received in the past, it would potentially be difficult to do so by checking against the database. It makes sense to give the business some responsibility for recording that.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Actually, what the legislation does is to give the business a responsibility to keep the letter. It does not give the business much more responsibility, in my mind, although I will go back and have a look at the clause the hon. Gentleman points me to. I think having the subsidy on the subsidy control database would make all the difference, but if he wishes to come back in, he can.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Clause 37(6) states:

“The enterprise must keep a written record detailing—

(a) that it has received a subsidy,

and

(b) the date on which it was given, and

(c) the gross value amount of the assistance.”

That to me indicates that it must keep a full record of what it has received.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Once again, yes, it has to keep a full record, but it does not have to show Aberdeen City Council that record. There is no requirement on the company to be transparent about that record; there is a requirement to keep it, but not to share it. Having it on the database or adding the requirement to share that record, should a granting authority ask in advance of granting a subsequent subsidy, would make the difference we are asking for.

However, that does not fix the issue in relation to transparency of data and ensuring that the database and the scheme are working properly. This was mentioned in the witness sessions. We need to know whether this is working, and we will only know if it is working if we have an idea of the subsidies being granted, even if they are below the MFA threshold.

I said I would come on to the definition of interested parties. Amendment 12 adds devolved Administrations to the list of interested parties. Again, we discussed this at some length in Committee and the Minister gave some assurances. I shall quote a couple of questions that I asked and the response that the Minister gave. I said:

“Does a devolved Administration’s interests include indirect interests?”

I also asked:

“What if a number of organisations in their jurisdiction are potentially affected by a subsidy given?”

The Minister answered:

“Yes. I would say that is a direct interest rather than an indirect interest. Public authorities, including devolved Administrations, may be interested parties.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 16 November 2021; c.308-309.]

I am glad that he gave some clarity. It is sort of because of the way the questions were asked that the Minister’s response was slightly woolly. I would very much appreciate it if, when he responds to the debate, he could make it absolutely clear from the Dispatch Box that, in cases of indirect interests, devolved Administrations are considered as interested parties.

Let us say that a subsidy was given somewhere else in the UK, or even in Scotland, and that subsidy negatively affected the chances of seven businesses in Scotland. I think that the Scottish Government should be able to bring a request to the tribunal to say that that needs to be looked at and that they believe that that is an issue. Under the definition of interested parties, it is only those people whose interests have been affected. The Scottish Government’s interests would not have been directly affected by that, but they would have been indirectly affected. I was trying to tease out from the Minister that he believed that, definitely, the Scottish Government or any of the other devolved Administrations could bring a challenge on behalf of organisations within their area. I am quite happy for that to be limited to devolved competences even. However, if they are not in the Bill as interested parties, we very much need that commitment from the Minister. If they are not in the Bill as interested parties, why is the Secretary of State included in the Bill as an interested party? If the definition is wide enough to cover all those areas—

[Kevin Hollinrake]

The Secretary of State is not necessarily an interested party, which is why he needs to be named in here; he might not be affected. The hon. Lady’s point about being directly or indirectly affected is covered under clause 70(7), which says that an interested party means

“a person whose interests may be affected”.

That could be directly or indirectly, surely.

[Kirsty Blackman]

We discussed this at length, with a lot of banter, in Committee. But I have a concern that the provision does not say “directly” or “indirectly”. It does not make that as clear as it could. A clear statement from the Minister at the Dispatch Box would give me a level of comfort. I do not think that it is the intention of the Government to exclude the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government, or the Northern Ireland Assembly from making these challenges, but I think that the Bill is written in a woolly enough way that it potentially accidentally excludes them.

[Jim Shannon]

The hon. Lady has outlined the issue very well on behalf of the Northern Ireland Assembly. This has to be an equality issue. If it should happen that some other part of the United Kingdom affects businesses in my constituency or in Northern Ireland, equality is part of that. Should not the Minister and the Government address the issue of equality for all those reasons as well?

[Kirsty Blackman]

I completely agree that there is not a level of parity here. There should be because the Government recognise that the Scottish Parliament has responsibility for some things—the Government recognise that most days. They recognise that in relation to the other devolved Assemblies, too. This is not about any of those Administrations having a veto; it is simply about the right to refer this to the Competition Appeal Tribunal in order for it to be looked at. It is not about any of those authorities being able to cancel subsidies, or to veto them in any way. It is simply about being able to raise that challenge. It is something that was raised by the witnesses in the Bill’s evidence sessions, so it is not something that I have just somehow invented, or that the Welsh Government have invented, or that the Scottish Government have invented. It is a real worry for people, so the more the Minister could say on this the better.

I will not speak for too much longer. I have just one more amendment—amendment 11—to cover. There are two schedules—schedules 1 and 2—in relation to the subsidy control principles. The subsidy control principles are set in the Bill, and it is clear that they are the principles that authorities need to look to in guiding the decision making about giving subsidies. There are two schedules: one for the general principles and one for the environmental principles, which relate specifically to subsidies around energy and environmental matters.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Penrose]

That is absolutely right. Although I appreciate that there is a technical distinction between amounts of subsidy and amounts of general local authority spend, it is a very strong comparison. If it is worthwhile recording £500 spend on anything by a local council, why are subsidies so special and why should they be different? If anything, because of the scope for potential cronyism and other concerns, we should be tougher on subsidies than on other kinds of spending. Let us at least make the thresholds the same at £500, and then there can be no concern or worry about it.

The first collection of amendments is about the amount. The second collection of amendments, about which we have already heard a bit from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, is about speed. As I have mentioned, in today’s digitising economy, publishing details of a subsidy potentially almost two years later, or even six months later, could be way too late. A company could have gone under if it had been faced by a successfully heavily subsidised competitor in its local area. Jobs will have been destroyed, wealth will have been destroyed, investment will have been forgone and, most importantly, the reputation of that local economy as a free, fair, sensible level-playing-field place to do business will have been damaged.

Clearly speed matters today, and it will matter more and more as our economy moves faster through digitisation. It makes no sense at all, therefore, to allow six months, and in some cases even longer, for those subsidies to be declared. When someone dishes out a subsidy, a letter has to be sent to the person receiving it, so in most cases they could put the subsidy on to the database at the same time—they could probably do it electronically if they had the right interface. I am suggesting that that could happen within a month; it could probably happen within days, but let us be generous and kind, and give people a bit of space.

I will expand on the point about tax-related subsidies. It is true, as we heard, that a tax-related subsidy can take almost two years to be recorded and to become transparently visible under the current proposals. I cannot see any reason why that should be the case, not just for tax-related subsidies but for anything else at all. In general, for most tax-related subsidies, we can do it immediately because we know the value with some certainty right up front. If I am giving someone a subsidy as a reduction on their business rates, I know how much the value of that subsidy is going to be on the day it comes out, so I can put that out on the subsidy database right there and right then. The same goes for most other kinds of tax-related subsidies, such as subsidies on VAT or whatever it may be.

Only for a very small number of tax-related subsidies would there be uncertainty for any length of time. As we have already heard, and I think this is absolutely right, it is perfectly possible to come up with a good estimate to begin with, and I do not think it works—it is not an adequate piece of logic—to turn around and say, “Well, because we don’t know precisely what this particular subsidy amount will be, we should not reveal it at all.” That is making the best the enemy of the good, and the trouble with that, and with saying that we are therefore not going to put anything out, is that we do not end up with the best or the good. We end up with something that is actually pretty dreadful, because we are keeping it secret for up to two years. How does that make sense when, as we have already heard, we can estimate it very accurately? In fact, in many cases these things are done in bands, and we can certainly say, at the very least, that it will be roughly in this or that band. Even if we get it wrong, we can still correct it later, and people know it is there, what it was and roughly how much it will have been. That will have allowed challenge, if necessary.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Specifically on the issue of uploading subsidies to databases and challenging such subsidies, the only way in which a subsidy will be overturned anyway is if the subsidy was given incorrectly—if it was against subsidy principles or was distortive in some way—so surely this has no effect on the vast majority of subsidies, except that it means they will be uploaded much more quickly. However, in the case of subsidies that are wrong, bad and going to cause problems, surely the quickest possible time is better so that we would be able to see them.

[John Penrose]

That is absolutely right. It is not just about whether a particular subsidy breaches those principles, but as the hon. Member rightly points out, it is also a question of whether we can then spot that a pattern of cronyism is emerging. If a particular local council was giving out grants to its mates, we could see that much faster. That may not be breaching the subsidy control principle, but you can bet your bottom dollar that people would want to know about that and that the most almighty stink would be created.

That brings me on to the final group of my three groups of amendments, which is about the ability to challenge and check individual items or individual examples of a subsidy within a broader subsidy scheme. At the moment, if someone registers a subsidy scheme under the terms of the Bill, dishes out subsidies under that subsidy scheme and then basically ignores the terms of the subsidy scheme or misapplies them in some terrible way—because of cronyism, because they are just doing a bad job, or even fraudulently—nobody, under the terms of the Bill, can challenge the individual decisions being made. That cannot be right, and it seems daft. All I am saying is that we need to be able to challenge individual examples within a broader scheme, otherwise this transparency mechanism or challenge mechanism will be fundamentally flawed.

That is the modest proposal. So far, I have not heard a single argument that unpicks the logic of that. As far as I can see, there are three Departments of Government with a dog in this fight. There is Lord Frost, who is in charge of the Brexit dividend, and he ought to be thoroughly in favour of this because of the opportunity it offers. There is the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy—he was here briefly just now, and I hope he will be back later—who is of course a good free marketeer and is thoroughly committed to improving productivity, so he should be in favour of this, too. Finally, there is the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is the guardian of taxpayers’ money. As I have said, we should be taking pride in the fact that we are one of the least heavily subsidising economies in the developed world, and we certainly were when we were part of the EU, so I cannot see that he is going to be objecting to it either.

As I sit down, I therefore just ask the Minister to please explain the logic behind opposing any of the arguments that not just I but others have been advancing. Will please explain who on earth thinks this is a bad idea, because I cannot find them or see them and I do not think anybody knows who they are?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to start with a few thanks. I thank staff member Dr Jonathan Kiehlmann and my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn) for their assistance on the Bill. I also thank—this shows the seriousness with which Scotland treats this—Cabinet Secretaries Kate Forbes, Ivan McKee and Mairi Gougeon, who have all taken an interest in the Bill and in trying to improve it. We recognise that it is an incredibly important regime and we have significant concerns about it. I wish briefly to comment on amendment 19, which we voted for. We did so not because it was perfect but because it would have made the Bill marginally better than it is currently. So the amendment is not something we would necessarily back wholeheartedly, but it is better than the current Bill as drafted. I thought it would be best to make that clear.

The three major concerns we continue to have about the Bill relate to the inclusion of agriculture. Agriculture is not included in subsidy control regimes elsewhere and I do not believe we have heard enough justification from the Minister or the Secretary of State to understand why they have chosen to include agriculture in this scheme. We believe that the scheme is not transparent enough. Indeed, the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) tabled a number of amendments to that effect, as did a number of other colleagues across the House. There are significant concerns about the transparency of the subsidy control database in particular, but that also applies to the subsidy regime more widely. I hope that the Government will take these things into account and will consider them as the Bill moves on to further consideration in the other place.

The last issue we have is about climate change, which should form part of the key principles. I know that the principles can be updated, including by future Governments, but, for the Bill to stand the test of time, reaching our net zero targets should have been put at its front and centre. I appreciate the Opposition tabling an amendment to that effect. The Liberal Democrats did the same, as did we. This is so important and we feel that the Minister and the Secretary of State are abdicating some responsibility on that.

Lastly, I wish to thank the Minister for his clarification in relation to interested parties. I very much appreciate him saying what he said at the Dispatch Box on the role of devolved Administrations when it comes to interested parties. That will make a difference to the operation of the Bill and I appreciate that he did that.

Subsidy Control Bill

Kirsty Blackman Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Wednesday 20th April 2022 Commons Chamber

Well-designed, proportionate subsidies are a critical part of an effective industrial strategy to grow the sectors of the future and to invest in our transition to net zero. The Government now need to bring forward a plan to make that happen.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

It is very good to be here to talk about the Subsidy Control Bill again. The Lords amendments that have been accepted and put forward by the Government do make the Bill better. The Bill is better as a result of almost all the amendments that have been introduced; I accept that that is the case. I feel sorry for the Minister because he had to argue against many of these amendments in Committee and on Report. Now they are in the Bill and he is arguing for them, which is great—I am glad he is arguing for them now—but I feel he has been put in a pretty unfortunate position.

Although the Lords amendments make the Bill better, it still falls far short of where the UK’s subsidy control regime should be. We still have major concerns about a number of significant issues. I recognise the improvements on transparency, particularly through Lords amendment 14, which I drafted in Committee, so I am pleased that the Government have put that forward and that it is now in the Bill. It reduces the threshold for subsidies to be included in the transparency database from £500,000 to £100,000. That is incredibly important.

The database will work, and we will know whether subsidies are working as the Government intend, only if we can see which subsidies have been made. The threshold of £500,000 was too high for us to have a good enough overview, and that is without mentioning people’s inability to challenge subsidies if they do not know they exist. Setting the threshold at £100,000 makes it much less likely that a company will be badly damaged by a harmful subsidy that it is unable to challenge because of the lack of transparency.

I am also pleased that the CMA will report on the regime after three years; the period has been reduced. Again, I moved an amendment on that in Committee. I proposed two years, but we can meet in the middle at three years. I am pleased that that reporting is going to happen. Particularly in the initial period, it is important that we know how the subsidy schemes, the database and the challenges are working. This legislation will work only if it is kept under review, and I am pleased that there is an amendment to that effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I absolutely do. The Government cannot hide behind agricultural being in the trade and co-operation agreement, because the TCA specifically says that agricultural subsidies can and should be excluded from subsidy control regimes. The Government still have not given a good reason for including agriculture in the subsidy control regime. It works in the EU and in the state aid regime, so it is perfectly workable to exclude agriculture from the subsidy control regime. Including such subsidies will cause problems. The fact that NFUs across these islands have raised concerns shows that it is incredibly serious. I urge the Minister to think again about how the issue of agriculture is treated by the Bill.

The shadow Minister extensively addressed net zero. Granting authorities are required to consider the environmental and net zero impacts of energy-related subsidies, but that is not what net zero is about. This is not the only time we will be thinking about how to reduce our impact on climate change. If a granting authority decides to give a significant amount of money to a bus company, for example, it does not have to consider the climate impact. If it decides to scrap all the buses and replace them with diesel taxis, it does not have to consider the net zero impact, because it is not an energy-related subsidy. I am massively concerned that net zero is included only in schedule 2 and not in schedule 1. If the Government are serious about tackling climate change, they need to be looking at every piece of legislation that comes through this place and ensuring that it does not have a negative impact on our ability to meet net zero; and if it does, they should be ensuring that that is then balanced by further, more dramatic actions in order that we can meet net zero.

In summation, the Bill is better than it was, but it still falls far short. I am still concerned about transparency and massively concerned about agriculture. I am hugely concerned about the lack of importance this Government are giving to net zero—that should go through everything we do.

[Paul Scully]

I thank all hon. Members for their engagement throughout the passage of this Bill and for their contributions this afternoon. I am glad that there has been broad consensus, albeit with some questions, which I will try briefly to address. The importance of that new independent subsidy control regime has been clear throughout the passage of the Bill and it was evident again today, so I thank hon. Members for their broad support.

Let me respond to the question from the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) about P&O and that kind of example. Clearly, we are shocked by the action of P&O Ferries and angered by the lack of empathy and consideration it has demonstrated towards its employees. The Government are continuing to work to establish whether P&O Ferries or DP World are in breach of any requirements of them as partners in the Thames and Solent freeports. Speaking more generally, I can confirm that the Bill ensures that public authorities can recover a subsidy where it has been misused, but it is important to note that the purpose of a subsidy is to achieve specific change in behaviour to facilitate a specific policy objective; it is not to give the Government ongoing leverage over how a company conducts its affairs. It is for other areas of law to set out the limits of what is acceptable corporate behaviour. None the less, because the subsidy is there to have that specific policy objective, we will make sure that that policy objective is met as best we can. However, it is difficult to enforce—

[Paul Scully]

It is difficult to come up with the examples, but in essence a subsidy is there to determine a particular policy objective. We would want to partner with businesses and companies that are most likely to deliver those policy objectives: reliable partners. Clearly, ones that are in breach of the kind of examples that the hon. Lady mentions are less likely to be those reliable partners. Technically, she is correct, but this is about how we enforce something, probably after the event; similarly, had we given P&O Ferries a subsidy last year, we probably would not have been able to get that subsidy back. That is the difficulty with enforcement after the event. None the less, the sentiment is absolutely there: we do not want to be partnering with unreliable companies to achieve our policy objectives.

[Kirsty Blackman]

The issue with that is that if a company is given money to run a freeport and it runs a freeport with that money, it can sack all the staff it likes at P&O and still be eligible for the subsidy. The issue is that there is a gap, which has been well highlighted by the shadow Minister.

[Paul Scully]

We will work out how the subsidy control regime is working; it is part of what I will come back to in a moment about the CMA’s approach to reporting back how the regime is working. We have to make sure that this is watertight—excuse the pun—if we are going to go down the road of making sure that we can recover any subsidies. I suspect that other areas of law will be better suited to approaching that, rather than specifically dealing with it within this framework Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

Again, that is up to the public authorities. The whole point about this regime is that it is a loose, permissive framework, rather than something more onerous which adds layer upon layer to recreate the EU state aid system. None the less, I would expect that, again, because of value for money and good governance, any public authority, whether national Government, local government or another public body, would expect to have exactly that kind of criteria—

[Kirsty Blackman]

The Scottish Government asked that the freeports that were going to be in Scotland had green stuff in them and fair work rules, but the UK Government said no. Now the Minister is saying, “Yes, we can totally do that. That definitely should be in it.” The UK Government refused to let us have that in the freeports planned for Scotland.

[Paul Scully]

I am not going to get involved in a wider discussion about freeports; I am talking about a framework Bill, which is exactly why I said that other areas of legislation and of governance will better frame this area, as opposed to having it within this framework Bill. I am going well over time on this issue, because I wanted to cover some of the other areas.

Net zero has been mentioned. Schedule 2 contains a lot of common-sense principles already, which support the UK’s priorities on net zero and protecting the environment. They require subsidies in relation to energy and the environment to meet one of the specified aims, such as increasing the level of environmental protection, and to ensure that subsidies do not undermine the polluter pays principle. We talked about the tax subsidies and the timings. Clearly, within the timings of the tax subsidies a longer period is still necessitated, because of the fact that tax returns and such things take longer to go through the process—as opposed to having the immediacy of sponsorship through a subsidy or more immediate cash assistance.

The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston talked about CMA thresholds and limitations, but ultimately that is what the CMA will be looking at in any case as part of its reporting back on the regime and its overall effectiveness. So we will always be able to look at how those thresholds and limitations are working in practice; we want to make sure that that can be put in place.

I wish to conclude by reaffirming what I set out in my opening remarks: this Bill creates a domestic subsidy control regime that will work for people and communities across the UK, creating a robust yet agile system that allows public authorities to provide subsidies where they are needed most. The rigorous debates in both Houses have resulted in the improved Bill we have before us, so I commend it to the House.

Lords amendment 1 agreed to.

Lords amendments 2 to 51 agreed to.

Building Safety Bill (Programme) (No. 3)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Building Safety Bill for the purpose of supplementing the Order of 21 July 2021 (Building Safety Bill (Programme)), as varied by the Order of 19 January 2022 (Building Safety Bill (Programme) (No. 2)):

Consideration of Lords Amendments

(1) Proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion three hours after their commencement.

(2) The Lords Amendments shall be considered in the following order, namely: 93, 94, 98, 107 to 109, 145, 184, 6, 1 to 5, 7 to 92, 95 to 97, 99 to 106, 110 to 144, 146 to 183, 185 to 191.

Subsequent stages

(3) Any further Message from the Lords may be considered forthwith without any Question being put.

(4) The proceedings on any further Message from the Lords shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour after their commencement.—(Alan Mak.)

Question agreed to.