Lloyds, HBOS and the Cranston Review

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Tuesday 4th February 2020 Westminster Hall

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Lloyds, HBOS and the Cranston review.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Hollobone. I think this is the second time I have spoken under your chairmanship about banking matters. This story is at least as shocking as the last one we discussed.

The story starts back in 2007, when Nikki and Paul Turner, who were then customers of HBOS, told the bank of a huge fraud in its organisation that was affecting them and many other customers. The bank denied all knowledge of the fraud. It sought to suppress the evidence that Nikki and Paul Turner had and to ensure they could not speak out by trying on 22 occasions to repossess their home. Without the Turners, I do not think we would be here today, but they found out, and their determination has brought these matters to this point. The fraud was finally proven in court in 2017, 10 years later—imagine those 10 years of denial.

Despite the fraud happening within HBOS, which was part of Lloyds Banking Group by that point, we were willing and happy for Lloyds to take on its own customer review and compensation scheme for those victims, many of whom had been denied any justice and had it denied to them that any fraud was going on whatsoever. Lloyds set up the Lloyds Bank customer review, also known as the Griggs review because it was headed by Professor Griggs, who was appointed by Lloyds to undertake compensation payments to victims.

The Turners were compensated, but they decided to help other people navigate the Griggs process. They formed an organisation called the SME Alliance, which has been proactive in making sure that people get justice. Not only did they warn Lloyds about the initial fraud; they started to warn Lloyds about how unfair the Griggs review was and how partial the process was to the interests of the bank. In fact, they went as far as commissioning their own review of the review, undertaken by Jonathan Laidlaw in 2018-19, which endorsed the Turners’ findings and said that the process was truly unfair and partial to the interests of the bank

Throughout the process, others were warning Lloyds that the Griggs review and the scheme was completely unfair. Following all those calls and the Laidlaw review, the Minister kindly supported those calls and commissioned a review, carried out by Sir Ross Cranston.

[Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower) (Lab)]

We have had many reviews and redress schemes in different forms over the past eight years. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that to provide comfort to people, the methodology of those reviews should be independently tested against the benchmarks that Sir Ross set out in his report?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

The hon. Member is absolutely right. The biggest learning we have is that the whole process must be independent. It simply cannot be fair to have any review carried out within the bank’s boundaries that provides compensation for victims. It must be independent and independently verified. I very much appreciate her work and support on the all-party parliamentary group on fair business banking.

The all-party group, which I co-chair, made many calls saying that the process simply was not right. The Minister supported those calls, and we commissioned a review. Andrew Bailey, head of the Financial Conduct Authority , and the future Governor of the Bank of England, engaged in constructive collaboration with us and made an excellent choice of reviewer in Sir Ross Cranston, who has done a tremendous job. Most importantly, he got every stakeholder round the table before he properly commenced the review. He consulted us on many occasions, and we had great confidence in his ability to assess properly whether the review was fair.

Sir Ross’s findings were shocking—that is, shocking to anyone not familiar with the process. Anybody familiar with it, whether a victim or victims’ support group, knew exactly what he would say. We should be very grateful to him. It is a long report, but its essence is that: the Griggs review did not deliver fair or reasonable offers of compensation; it was not open or transparent; it had serious shortcomings; it took too adversarial an approach to assessing consequential loss; and, crucially, its design meant that it could never deliver fair and reasonable outcomes. Those were his findings.

We are pleased that the chief executive of Lloyds, António Horta-Osório, has written to us and the victims, and he met us. He has apologised unreservedly for the bank’s conduct in the review and committed himself personally to getting this right. It should not have been a surprise to anyone—he had been warned on many occasions that the process was flawed. Nobody should be surprised about the result if we allow a business to mark its own homework—it shows a fatal misunderstanding of how businesses operate. I speak as a businessperson who has been in business for 28 years and is still in business today. I do not think I should be allowed to regulate my business or regulate where I have customer complaints; independent oversight is critical.

Milton Friedman, the leading economist, once said that the social responsibility of business is

“simply to increase its profit”.

Warren Buffett recently said that the Government have to play their part in modifying the market system. We cannot simply leave this stuff to business; we must ensure independent oversight and fair regulation. Business is not afraid of regulation; it just wants stable, fair regulation, not over-regulation.

A bank found guilty in court of defrauding its own customers, which denied that fraud and even disgracefully mistreated whistleblower Sally Masterton in her efforts to keep the fraud out of the public eye, is allowed to compensate its victims, through its own process. The lessons we learn from the process are not just about how to compensate victims fairly and give them justice for their mistreatment but about how the regulators have dealt with it. We undermine our system of free market capitalism if we let these powerful and dominant capitalists go unchecked.

I will briefly list some of the representations that the all-party group has made over the years. My predecessor as chair wrote in February 2017 to António Horta-Osório about Lloyds’s plan to take forward the review. He said that there were unacceptable exclusion clauses, the process would be poor when it came to the consequential loss and it was critical that redress was transparent, balanced and legally binding. That was three years ago. We recommended the use of an independent process through the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators which would have been much fairer.

We did not leave it there. Over the past three years, I have had many meetings with the senior management team at Lloyds—I recently met the chief executive—including Lord Blackwell, the chair of Lloyds, as has the director of policy for the all-party group, Heather Buchanan. There has been much correspondence between us. In July 2018, we wrote again to Lloyds and said that the victims were still being treated with contempt. The reply from Lloyds—from Adrian White, the chief operating officer—said:

“We strongly believe that the offers made are both fair and reasonable.”

That demonstrates the institutional arrogance of Lloyds and the wider sector, as people were constantly pointing out that the review was not fair. Any protests about the process were simply ignored. For us, it is not that the bank did not know about it; it simply chose to ignore us and many others.

The key is where we go now. Perhaps this is not the first step, but it is incredibly important that the FCA undertakes an investigation under the senior managers regime on both the Griggs review and the people responsible for that review within Lloyds. Lloyds must take responsibility for the review and other things connected to the whole saga, including the disgraceful treatment of Sally Masterton, the whistleblower, who was mistreated for five years. She was discredited by Lloyds to the FCA, for which she was finally compensated in 2018, yet nobody has been held to account for the mistreatment of a whistleblower pointing out some of these very issues.

Another thing we will need to look at is the people who are not part of Lloyds but are connected to the review. The legal advisers Herbert Smith Freehills are clear that they misled the Financial Conduct Authority about Sally Masterton, the whistleblower. They advised Lloyds on the establishment of the Griggs review, on its operation and on some legal points incorrectly, according to Sir Ross Cranston. It is unthinkable that Herbert Smith Freehills should have any influence on the future redress scheme. That must be an absolute minimum; it cannot happen as we go forward. They should also be the subject of an investigation by the Solicitors Regulation Authority.

The Cranston review offers us a crucial opportunity; it is a watershed moment. It is not just about Lloyds but about the wider banking sector.

[Kirsten Oswald (East Renfrewshire) (SNP)]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that a freedom of information request to the Financial Ombudsman Service showed that, between 2015 and 2018, complaints about Clydesdale Bank, now Virgin Money, were disproportionately high in comparison with their larger competitors? There were 404 complaints in total and, worryingly, the percentage of those upheld was only 13%. Does he agree that it is time for the chief executive officer of Virgin Money, as a self-professed challenger to the status quo, to step up and make sure that these legacy cases are dealt with?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Lady. This is not just about Lloyds. A number of independent reviews have taken place, but they have been undertaken by the relevant banks. That simply cannot be right, in terms of justice for victims or their feeling that justice has been done. Justice being seen to be done is a basic principle that, it seems, the banking sector does not have to adhere to.

When the APPG was initially talking about future redress, it proposed a financial services tribunal, similar to an employment tribunal, where there would be no adverse costs, so a claim could be taken forward more easily. That would help to reduce the power imbalance between banks and businesses. A comment that came back from one of those commissioning the review on behalf of UK Finance, the banking representative organisation, was that the courts were not the right place for banking disputes to be settled. Well, they are the right place for the rest of us to settle disputes—that is what our system is built upon.

We need impartial, independent processes. I will talk about the right process for that moving forward, because there is an obvious new alternative approach we can take.

[Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for the way in which he has championed justice for those wronged by Lloyds. He is right to describe this case as one of the worst examples of corporate abuse that many of us in this House can remember. Would he be attracted by the consumer ombudsman model? In this case it was not consumers who were primarily affected, but consumer ombudsmen in other countries—crucially, those with class action powers—can bring actions against big businesses that are guilty of the type of behaviour that the hon. Gentleman describes, on behalf of both consumers and small businesses. Would that not be a powerful addition to the regulatory field and help to hold big banks to justice?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, although that is not a model I am familiar with. Class actions are definitely opportunities that are not well exploited the UK because of our legal system. I would be keen to talk to him further about that approach.

Within our system we have the Financial Ombudsman Service, which does not necessarily have the best reputation, although I know the hon. Gentleman is talking about something different. It is a problem that whoever is overseeing cases has to be competent and have the right understanding, because there are complex cases that take into account issues around complicated banking products. We have to ensure that the calibre of arbitration or adjudication is at the right level—I will say more about that shortly. We certainly need reform. Moving forward, we think we have a good solution, but we need to continue to improve on that.

This is not just about Lloyds. There are a number of other redress schemes for banking malpractice and mistreatment that have already been conducted by relevant banks. Banks were the principal arbiters of deciding how much compensation people were allowed to have relating to the interest rate swaps schemes and interest rate hedging products, many of which had a devastating effect on businesses. The debates that we have had about the Royal Bank of Scotland, over the past months and years, have raised similar problems about the mistreatment of small businesses. There are problems with their review process and with others, as other hon. Members have said.

I will describe cases that put that into perspective. The first person to write to me about a business banking dispute was Jon Welsby from Filey, when I first became a Member of Parliament. He showed me a huge file of evidence about his business, but the dispute came down to quite a simple problem. He had been sold a swap by Lloyds bank—they were sold by many different banks—that had had a devastating effect on the interest rates he had to pay. The amount he had to pay rose from about £5,000 a month to £17,000—perversely, as interest rates fell, as that was the way swaps worked. He was given direct losses, but he was not assessed as being due any consequential losses by the bank-led review. He was able to gather together the resources to take his claim to court. It was a £10 million claim, although I am not clear exactly how much he received, as he settled out of court. He was able to settle the claim, whereas most people cannot get the money together to take their claim to court. He had had his claim assessed by the bank and was not happy with it, but because he had the money to get to court, it was settled for a much higher figure. It cannot be right that the only people accessing justice are those with the wherewithal to get to court. Given that imbalance of power, people would need millions of pounds to take a bank to court. It is simply unfair.

The constituent of my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), Dean D’Eye, came to us about the RBS Global Restructuring Group scheme. He had a property development business and loans to the value of around 60%. He never missed a payment to RBS. He was sold a swap, which damaged his business, but the key moment came when money from a property sale he had made, to add cash flow to his current account, was taken away by the bank and used to reduce debt. According to Mr D’Eye, that broke the agreement and had a devastating impact on his business.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

It did not just affect Dean D’Eye but it deeply affected his father, who was almost bankrupted and lost his home.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Absolutely, and we see that time and time again. It is not just about businesses or jobs—although clearly businesses and jobs are lost—but about the effect on people’s lives. I understand that as a business person myself. My business has been my life. If somebody had taken my business away from me in those circumstances, I do not know how I would have coped.

The Minister may say that many cases are not proven or that the banks may write with various reasons why claims are wrong. That is why we do not put the APPG forward as an arbiter of whether the customer or the bank is right in such cases. We do not think the APPG, the victims or the banks should play that role; it must be somebody entirely independent. As I have said before, we recommended a tribunal approach to solving this imbalance of power. What my hon. Friend the Minister has managed to bring about is something new, called the Business Banking Resolution Service, which we think is a great step forward. We in the APPG have been working with the BBRS for the past year. It will mean that we can look at historical cases and at cases going forward, and at larger businesses too. It is absolutely the right thing, and we believe that the method of adjudication is good.

Our concern is, of course, as I have discussed with the Minister on many occasions, that that approach excludes people who have been through other independent bank-led reviews, which we think is wrong. We think the banks should look at such cases again where there is material evidence that something has not been settled fairly, but with the BBRS as a fallback. We think that is fair, and that should go for all victims of all bank-led remediation schemes who feel there is still a case to answer.

We also think there are other issues that need to be dealt with within the Lloyds Bank Review, certainly on eligibility. The review had very tight restrictions on eligibility: the victim had to have dealt directly with one of the two people convicted of the direct fraud, Lynden Scourfield or Mark Dobson. We think that is an unfair restriction. Lloyds has made ex gratia payments—I think £65,000 in total—that are only allocated to certain people who have been through that scheme or are assessed as being appropriate to go through that scheme, which, again, we think is unfair. Lloyds should look again at that.

We see a lot of people now putting their cases forward for the Business Banking Resolution Services. Our constituents who have these kinds of problem can put their cases forward, and we urge them to do so, but when they do, while their cases are being assessed, we think the bank should declare a moratorium or a stay of proceedings on any cases going through that process.

To conclude, we see this as a crucial opportunity, not only for Lloyds to get this right now, but for the wider business-banking relationship. We are very grateful to the Minister for the steps he has taken, both in appointing Sir Ross Cranston and on the Business Banking Resolution Service. We very much thank Sir Ross Cranston for his excellent work. We see this as a crucial opportunity to restore confidence in the free market system, to ensure that individual victims have access to justice and compensation and to improve the appetite for SMEs to borrow, start businesses and grow them, thereby giving a timely boost to UK plc. Let us ensure that we do not waste the opportunity.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (in the Chair)]

The debate can last until 5.30 pm. If there are any Back-Bench contributions I can take those, but I need to call the Front Benches no later than 5.7 pm. The guideline limits are five minutes for the SNP, five minutes for Her Majesty’s Opposition and 10 minutes for the Minister, and then Mr Hollinrake has a few minutes to sum up the debate at the end. The latest intelligence I have received is that we are expecting Divisions at 5.30 pm, but that they might come earlier. Members will know that if a Division comes during the debate, we have to adjourn for 15 minutes or half an hour, so Members might want to be mindful of speeding up their contributions to ensure that we finish the debate before a Division occurs.

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[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am grateful, Mr Hollobone, for giving me the chance to respond to this debate. I thank the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) for securing this debate and the all-party parliamentary group on fair business banking for all its efforts to secure justice for victims of banking fraud and misconduct.

The hon. Gentleman has made clear the significance of the Cranston review in reconsidering the process by which banks compensate business customers where there has been historical misconduct. I add my voice to his. Strangely, this is now a positive story: we finally have the review we all wanted, although the journey to get here has been fairly tortuous.

Everyone here has been involved in these issues for some time. In my time as the shadow City Minister I have had to become familiar with and speak about an appalling litany of complaints about how business customers have been treated, not multinational businesses, but the small businesses that we would all recognise as the backbone of our constituencies and this country. The stories have been of livelihoods and relationships destroyed, and of entrepreneurs and companies losing family businesses they have spent years building.

We are here to discuss Lloyds. The HBOS Reading issues were clearly an issue of criminal liability in that bank. In the wider sector we have discussed a whole range of unacceptable conduct: the mis-selling of interest rates and hedging products, the mistreatment of companies in distress by pushing them into restructuring, and the unscrupulous sales of loan books to vulture funds. That is why the question of how redress happens has become so important.

Research shows that a frighteningly small number of small businesses in this country believe that their bank will do the right thing by them. Given the reports detailing the historical conduct we have discussed, we cannot blame them. We must all improve on that. Whether we are politicians, banks or businesses, this lack of confidence is not in our interest. We need to be able to tell our constituents that there is a level playing field when they find themselves in conflict with their bank, and that there is a path to fairness, justice and proper redress.

Too often, in recent years, the response from banks to us has been, “Systems are in place and we believe they are fair. All the historical issues have been sufficiently dealt with.” This report has shown unequivocally that not to be the case, vindicating those of us who have campaigned in this area for years, particularly the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton.

It is not acceptable for industry to equivocate on this any longer and, to use the hon. Gentleman’s phrase, to mark its own homework. Key problems identified in the Cranston review include the lack of independence in assessing complaints and the benchmark for compensation being so high that no customer could hope to meet it. It is important that we, as parliamentarians, learn the lessons from these observations and embed those principles in any new schemes. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the review.

There are other avenues we must continue to consider, to get to the root of this problem. I believe we should consider a full public inquiry into business banking scandals. This review is about the shortcomings of one bank compensation scheme, but it emphasises the importance of investigating all areas of misconduct, not just to ensure that victims get fair compensation—that is the minimum—but to identify systemic problems at the root of these scandals, to prevent them happening again. That could be challenging to us as parliamentarians.

I always worry that the model of banking in this country, whether for customers or small businesses, effectively relies on upselling products, so we do not really pay for the cost of our banking services, and therefore we have business models where products must be sold on to banking customers. Perhaps we need to look at that. We must continue to work towards the success of the business banking resolution scheme, to assess how successful it is in addressing these problems.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point about products and services being sold to consumers and businesses. The royal commission in Australia determined that one of the biggest drivers of mistreatment of businesses and consumers was the incentives paid to people at the sharp end to sell those products. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. A public inquiry might well identify where this is going so badly wrong.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. We must look at the issue that he raises. In some ways, we have already addressed some of the things that the Australians had not yet got round to, as the scope was different, but that must be part of the conversation, because we can go back, decade after decade, and find historical problems in the sector. Clearly, something is happening, whether it involves the incentives for staff or the structure of the sector, that we might want to change.

I mentioned the business banking resolution scheme. Historically, I have always supported an independent tribunal system and I still believe that that proposal has merit, but perhaps we need to revisit regularly the BBRS’s work to ensure that it is getting the results that it requires in the timeframe.

My final point is on whistleblowers. Sally Masterton was mentioned. She was treated disgracefully. Other countries have much stronger protection for whistleblowers. I think we could look at that issue. If I were, as I have always wanted to be, in the Minister’s place, responding to the debate, I would want us to take that forward, to ensure that we really had an appropriate system that addressed all the needs.

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[Kevin Hollinrake]

I am grateful to you, Mr Hollobone, for calling me again, and to the Minister for his comments.

Sir Ross Cranston has left a tremendous legacy with his report, and I am very pleased to hear that the Minister thinks similarly. This matter is not just about this individual review process—the Griggs review. An industry benchmark should be set on how to do things and how not to do them, and on what “good” looks like. The Minister is absolutely right that all banks should look back again at their processes and reviews, and make sure they have got things right.

The other thing we need to learn from this matter is that when these processes—these redress schemes—are set up, we have to put the victims at the heart of them; we have got to get the stakeholders at the heart of them. Lloyds did not do that and nor did Royal Bank of Scotland. Sir Ross, more than anybody else, has done that, which must be the lesson that we learn.

I will conclude by saying that Churchill once said of the Americans that they always do the right thing but only after they have tried all the alternatives. That is what we must consider when we try to hold businesses to account; we must assume that they are not going to do the right thing. They are many very decent people in the banking sector and in business more widely, but we simply cannot trust that people will do the right thing. People do what is inspected and not what is expected, so we must absolutely make sure that we do our bit. I know the Treasury will do its bit to try and ensure that we get this matter right, but the FCA, the BBRS and all those different stakeholders need to ensure this time that we get things right.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered Lloyds, HBOS and the Cranston review.