Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

The Grenfell Tower fire was an unthinkable tragedy that claimed 72 lives. It is one of the few moments in life when we all remember exactly where we were when it happened. Our thoughts are with those who lost loved ones, the survivors who endured unimaginable trauma, and all those who were affected by that devastating night. The state failed them in its duty to protect, and we must ensure that such failures are never repeated. We will work collaboratively with the Secretary of State and the wider Government in the interests of everyone directly and indirectly affected by this tragedy, and I very much welcome today’s announcement about the acceleration of remediation.

Following the tragedy, the Conservative Government took decisive action to uncover the truth, initiating a public inquiry to learn lessons and implement changes to prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again. The right hon. Lady may remember that we served briefly together on the Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee which, under the extremely capable leadership of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts), led much of the thinking and debate following the tragedy. We successfully campaigned for a banning of combustible materials on the outside of new buildings over 18 metres, and for a Government remediation fund for existing buildings. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) who was the first to properly grasp that nettle as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Chancellor, and Prime Minister. More than £5.1 billion has since been allocated for building remediation, and we have acted to strengthen regulations and implement recommendations from the inquiry’s phase 1 report.

I also pay tribute to the right hon. Lady’s predecessor, the former Member for Surrey Heath, for his work in this area, not least the establishment of the building safety levy, which is the source from which much of the funds will flow. However, publication of the phase 2 report in September 2024 revealed the scale of failures that occurred over decades and across multiple sectors, making clear that much more remains to be done, as the right hon. Lady set out. Even those of us who have followed the inquiry closely find the report truly shocking to read. The phase 2 report, chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick and supported by panel members Ali Akbor OBE and Thouria Istephan, makes 58 recommendations to improve fire safety and address systemic issues within the construction industry. Crucially, the report concluded that the Grenfell Tower fire was the result of decades of failures by Government, regulatory bodies and the construction industry to act on the known dangers of using combustible materials in high-rise buildings.

One of the most alarming findings was the role of systemic dishonesty in the construction industry. Companies engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate safety testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market. For instance, the insulation product Celotex RS5000, used on Grenfell Tower, was found to have been sold using manipulated test results—incredibly, with the Building Research Establishment complicit in those practices.

[Mr Betts]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments about the work of the Select Committee. On product safety and product testing, what the Hackitt report, as well as the Select Committee, found was the extent to which product manufacturers were going from one testing place to another until they found one that agreed that their product was safe. Products often failed the tests, but those failures were never in the public domain. Does he think that there ought to be a change of process, so that when a product fails in one testing place, that failure is made known publicly?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, as I did during much of our work on the Select Committee. One of Martin Moore-Bick’s recommendations was exactly that: that all test results should be published, not just the ones that support the safety of the product. That would go a long way towards ensuring that the true safety of the products is established.

The BRE findings highlight a shocking betrayal of trust, and a callous disregard for public safety, driven by financial gain. The report also identified severe leadership and management failings within the London Fire Brigade. It described a chronic lack of effective management, an undue focus on processes, and a complacency among senior officers regarding the brigade’s operational efficiency. Those weaknesses hindered the brigade’s ability to respond effectively to the crisis, and underscored the need for systemic reform and improved leadership in fire services.

To address those failings, the phase 2 report made far-reaching recommendations, including the establishment of a single construction regulator; centralising fire safety responsibilities under one Secretary of State, to end fragmentation across Departments; regular updates to approved document B, to keep fire safety regulations current; and the creation of a chief construction adviser and a college of fire and rescue to ensure high standards in fire safety training and practices. We fully support those recommendations and urge the Government to implement them swiftly and effectively. We will scrutinise their progress to ensure that the necessary reforms are delivered without delay.

Some have questioned the pace of the remediation efforts. I think the Secretary of State was right to do so. I emphasise that the remediation efforts prioritised the highest-risk buildings, and by July 2024, 98% of high-rise buildings with the most dangerous, Grenfell-style ACM cladding had either completed or started work. On the remaining buildings, enforcement action is being taken against non-compliant owners. The complexity of the buildings and legal disputes over responsibility have caused delays. Nevertheless, all building owners must step up, take responsibility, and act swiftly to address the issues, or face the consequences of their inaction. It is important to note that the building regulations regime was established under the Building Act 1984, and fire safety reforms were introduced by other Governments in previous decades, as the Secretary of State acknowledged.

From 2010, the coalition Government sought to remove unnecessary bureaucracy, but fire safety and building safety were explicitly excluded from those reviews. The inquiry acknowledged that key safety regulations, including the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 were excluded from deregulation initiatives. Under our leadership, safety was never treated as red tape. Nevertheless, as the report confirms, mistakes were made by Ministers and officials on our watch. The frequency of changes under Governments of different political stripes, and the frequency of changes in housing Ministers and Secretaries of State, would not have helped. I hope that Parliament may learn that lesson for the future. Since 2017, the Conservatives in Government led comprehensive reforms of building compliance and fire safety. Measures introduced include the Fire Safety Act 2021 and the Building Safety Act 2022, which created the Building Safety Regulator to oversee stricter compliance with standards.

[Dame Meg Hillier]

One issue that arose at an early stage, about a year after the tragedy at Grenfell, was the need for fire safety surveyors. These people are experts and take about three years to train. In retrospect, does the hon. Gentleman not think that a lesson for future Governments of any colour is to look at such issues at an early stage, because we still have a shortage of those people now in 2024?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I agree. Mistakes were made—there is no doubt about it. As the phase 2 report recommends, there should be greater oversight and regulation of people who proclaim themselves to be experts in these fields. I agree with the hon. Lady’s points.

Accountability must remain a cornerstone of our response. Those who knowingly cut corners on safety to maximise profits must face justice. We call on the Metropolitan police and the Crown Prosecution Service to pursue criminal charges against those responsible, be it through a deliberate act, a willingness to look the other way, or gross incompetence. Companies implicated in such wrongdoing should not receive future public contracts. Let us be clear: this was not the responsibility of any single Government, Minister or official. As the report sets out in its opening paragraphs, failures occurred over decades, involving Administrations of all political colours. We must approach these difficult questions with the honesty and determination that they deserve, ensuring that we learn the lessons of the past to protect lives in the future.

While we have made significant progress, the journey is far from over. As we look to the future, we must acknowledge the hard questions raised by the report about past governance. Those failures occurred over decades, involving Administrations led by Labour, the coalition Government, and Conservative Governments. This was a systemic failure, which requires an open and honest response. Our party’s record demonstrates our commitment to making things right. We took swift action after the tragedy to establish the public inquiry, launch the independent review of building regulations and fire safety, and allocate significant resources to remove unsafe cladding from high-risk buildings. The Fire Safety Act 2021 implemented recommendations from phase 1 of the Grenfell inquiry, and the Building Safety Act 2022 overhauled existing regulations, setting up the Building Safety Regulator to oversee stringent compliance measures.

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

Bournemouth East constituents, such as Katie from Queen’s Park in Charminster, have been in touch, horrified about the Grenfell Tower tragedy and desperate for a turning point. Does the hon. Member agree that we need to reach such a turning point? We need justice for those who were let down by the last Government. Does he also agree that we need to get rid of the social housing stigma, which has made so many people in social housing feel like they live in shame?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

There are so many lessons that I hope will be learned across the House. The report is clear that there has been failure by Governments of all stripes over the years, in terms of both building safety and social housing. With the Regulator of Social Housing and the new fire safety regulatory regime, it is hugely important that we turn the page, but I do not think that we will win back the trust of the people affected by this scandal, or by the cladding scandal in other areas, until we have made progress, completed the remediation, and put in place a regime that is seen to be working and bringing about the cultural change to which the Secretary of State referred. It is hugely important that we make that progress.

The actions that we have taken have made strides towards addressing safety concerns, but we recognise that more is needed. I welcome the Labour Government’s pledge to respond to all 58 recommendations within six months and to provide annual progress updates to Parliament. This is a critical moment for accountability and reform, and we stand ready to support all proportionate and necessary measures to protect public safety. Does the Secretary of State agree with the recommendation of a single construction regulator, with one Secretary of State holding end-to-end responsibility, and will that be her? Does she also agree with the point raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East about product manufacturers being held responsible for remediation costs, too? It is her stated policy to continue the use of the CE marking scheme for construction products in the UK, but those standards were set in 2015, three years prior to the post-Grenfell standards revision in the UK. How will she ensure that all products sold in the UK meet the post-2018 UK standard? That issue has been raised on the Floor of the House by my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner (David Simmonds), who is next to me on the Opposition Front Bench.

I recently met campaigners, including Steve Day, who raise the case of the 1.7 million leaseholders who do not currently qualify for the Building Safety Act 2022 protections and who still suffer from higher insurance premiums, higher mortgage rates and an inability to sell their homes. Will the Secretary of State meet him and others to see what additional measures need to be taken? Can she share with the House when announcements will be made on the future memorial on the site? Indeed, can the renovation of properties in the Grenfell community be accelerated? Can we get a target for when that will be completed? Accountability must be at the heart of the response, and those who knowingly cut corners on building safety must face justice.

Grenfell was a tragedy of unprecedented scale, but it must serve as a turning point. We owe it to those who lost their lives, to the survivors and to the public to ensure that their legacy is one of justice, reform and safety. Let us move forward with determination to build a safer future for all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I have got the point. The problem with a public inquiry is that it starts from ground zero. It assembles a group of people who may be expert, but most of the lawyers will not be expert and will have to learn everything from scratch. The advantage of a standing capability is that there are experts who are permanently employed and who really understand everything about building safety, as it would be in this case. There would be human factors analysts, structural engineers, architects—key people with key skills, fully knowledgeable about the safety system that exists. They would start immediately after a tragedy, and they would conclude much more quickly on the basis of much better expertise.

I had hoped that the inquiry would adopt this recommendation, as did the Cullen inquiry into Ladbroke Grove, and also the inquiry into offshore safety following the Piper Alpha disaster. It now falls to the Government and Parliament to get this right.

The second recommendation in our submission is for a comprehensive reform of building control. Building control is the inspection system which should ensure that building regulations are followed, but Grenfell demonstrated its failure. I accept that there has already been some reform here since we wrote our submission. Much has been said, as we heard earlier, about how private sector building inspectors are endemically conflicted because they are appointed and paid by constructors and others, but that misses a horrible truth about the Grenfell case. Ironically, it was the building control function of a local authority, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, that failed so disastrously in Grenfell’s case. Despite that, everyone’s emphasis still seems to be more focused on restricting private sector involvement than on reform of the whole building control sector.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

My hon. Friend is making an important speech. One of the facts that the phase 2 report has established is that the system is too fragmented, and needs to be brought together under a single construction regulator, as he recommends. Does he envisage the functions that he has described, involving investigations of incidents, not falling to the responsibility of that regulator?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

No, because a regulator is a part of the system, whereas a safety investigation body stands above the system. It is very simple. If you are a regulator, you are a participant. You are capable of making mistakes, and you need to be independently investigated, or checked, to confirm that you are not breaching rules, or failing in some way—through no fault of your own, perhaps. Everyone makes mistakes. Most bad things happen because of human error, not because of bad people doing bad things.