Yemen

Kevin Foster Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Kevin Foster (Torbay) (Con)]

It is a particular pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), given that we regularly see each other at a range of debates in this House.

It is welcome that we are here again discussing Yemen. Having attended the recent Adjournment debate secured by the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), I share many of the comments he expressed earlier about the scale of the crisis gripping Yemen and the disaster that the conflict has proved to be for the Yemeni people. I think it was earlier this year when the UN highlighted that both sides were preventing the access of food aid. I know he shares my disappointment that the ceasefire has not held. Again, I share his hopes that the forthcoming UN discussions will bring what everyone here wants to see: a return to a system based on a constitutional structure for settling differences, not one based on armed conflict.

That said, we have to look at the choices and the alternatives, and at why the UN voted to support an intervention. It was interesting to hear the hon. Member for East Lothian (George Kerevan) talk about a small rebel group. It is perhaps worth quoting the House of Commons Library on this “small rebel group”:

“The Houthis have managed to gather dozens of tanks and plenty of heavy weaponry from these defectors and deserters.”

It also states:

“Yemen’s government and armed forces have long been weak and fragmented, and have had too many forces lined up against them to put up a strong resistance to the Houthis.”

This is not a small band of people who are incapable militarily; these Houthi rebels are former soldiers who are able to pose a direct threat of overthrowing the main Government. That is why the intervention is there. We then have to be clear about the alternative. If we did not have coalition involvement, the Houthis would overrun the whole country. We would have a failed state in Yemen, equivalent to the failed state we have had in Somalia for so long.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

It is not only a large group. It is well armed with arms from Iran. There is also evidence that there are Iranian revolutionary guards acting on the ground in Yemen.

[Kevin Foster]

Let us be blunt. It is not a small rebel group that fires effectively a ballistic missile at a neighbouring country or attacks a US warship in international waters. That does not fit my definition of a small group of lightly armed individuals. This is a serious and coherent threat to the recognised Government of Yemen, any constitutional process, and, ultimately, to the security of one of the key trade routes of the whole world through what we once saw as the Straits of Aden, with shipping heading up towards the Suez canal. Ultimately, if we allow a failed state in Yemen we will all pay the price for it in the cost of shipping, and disruption to energy supplies.

The alternative to the Saudi coalition—let us assume it is not the Saudis and their allies who intervene—is western intervention to enforce a UN motion. The same people very busily attacking this coalition are the same people who regularly oppose any western intervention in the middle east. For a UN resolution to have any meaning it needs to be implemented and it is questionable who it would want to take the action.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Kevin Foster]

No, I do not think I will as we are running short of time.

The argument that the support should be removed is wrong.

On the motion itself, it was interesting to hear the shadow Foreign Secretary telling us about the two command centres. That is what leaps out from the motion. She talks about the northern command centre in Riyadh, where our advisers are and where the strikes were not authorised. She then talked about the southern command centre, where our advisers are not, and says that that is where the problems are in terms of targeting. Well, it does say something that we are going to pull away from the site where it is not happening, which would not make any difference.

[Emily Thornberry]

The southern command centre has been identified, but who is in it has not been identified. Neither has it been identified whether it included anybody from any particular company—whether it be a British company or not; or indeed what British personnel, if any, are involved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Foster]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. However, I still do not see how pulling out our supporters and advisers from the northern command centre in Riyadh, as the motion suggests, would make any difference to what is happening there. It is therefore a rather interesting point that the hon. Lady has raised. Certainly for me, the Government’s amendment is far stronger than the Opposition’s motion. I nevertheless pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Leicester East, who managed to come up with an amendment that showed a lot more understanding than his party’s Front-Bench motion. It might not agree with the view being presented on Russia Today, but it had a bit more understanding of the region and the area.

Let me move on to the potential or alleged use of cluster bombs. It must be clear—it might not have been clear from one of the SNP’s contributions—that the weaponry was last delivered in 1989. Whether or not that weaponry delivered in 1989 is being used will not change anything that we do today. That said, an issue on which I challenged the Saudi Foreign Minister directly was that the country’s signing up to and ratifying the international treaty is long overdue. Yes, I was told that Saudi Arabia was considering it, but I suspect that its consideration will be a lot longer than most of us would prefer. I would be interested to hear more from the Minister about the work we are doing to encourage the country as one of our key allies to ratify that treaty and send a powerful message that it no longer intends to produce, retain or—crucially—use that type of weaponry.

Finally, I accept that the decision to be taken is going to be difficult for anyone. It is a complex situation and none of the outcomes looks particularly ideal. I accept that we therefore have to be realistic about the outcome. As with so many other situations in the middle east, we need to be careful what we wish for, because we might sometimes find that what we wish for turns out to be a lot worse than the devil we know.