Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Keir Mather and Rebecca Smith

Thursday 5th February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Smith]

It is a privilege to work under your chairmanship, Mr Western. I start by conveying the apologies of my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham, who is not able to be present today. Instead, I am standing in on his behalf.

The clause sets out that Great British Railways must issue documents explaining the policies and procedures for access to and use of GBR infrastructure. Policy must cover procedures for applying for access, the criteria that GBR will apply to its decision making, and a procedure for resolving disputes. Subsection (3) permits GBR to set out the terms—that is, the rights and obligations —that a train operator can expect to receive where it has been granted access to GBR infrastructure. Subsection (6) allows a person aggrieved by a provision in the document to appeal to the Office of Rail and Road.

That is crucial information for all open access operators, and yet the Bill has no detail at all. It just makes reference to a future “document or documents”. In our view, that is a totally unacceptable approach, and it leaves the industry in the dark on mission-critical issues. Furthermore, no draft has been published, no direction of travel set out and no assurance given to the sector. We feel that to be a slightly arrogant approach from the Government and not a good sign of the approach that GBR itself will take to the independent sector.

Under the Bill as drafted, GBR can make the application process as one-sided as it likes, favouring its own services over those of other competing operators—in the interests not of passengers, but of GBR. The key issue is that the Government’s approach to the legislation is an assumption that the interests of GBR are synonymous with those of passengers, but we do not believe that that is always the case. Every organisation seeks to remove competition, which is uncomfortable—it exposes failures and weaknesses, and ultimately will show GBR up—but competition is crucial to improve service to customers, because organisations are forced to respond. That is why we believe that it needs to exist.

The Bill gives GBR the power to design out competition to itself, with no checks or balances save what we consider to be a pathetic appeals process, where the Government’s position is that the appellate body should not second-guess the decision of GBR, only errors of law. That is a core problem with the Bill and something that we feel is akin only to what a judicial review can do in other areas.

The clause gives GBR sweeping control over access rules, with very few safeguards. GBR sets both the access criteria and the timetable dispute procedure, so the body compiling the timetable also controls challenges to its own decisions. Subsection (3) makes the publication of access terms optional, allowing for opaque or preferential conditions. Subsection (4) lets GBR change the rules at any time, with no duty to consult. Overall, the clause lacks the transparency and checks promised in the consultation and risks embedding clear conflicts of interest to the disadvantage of non-GBR operators.

Lumo and Hull Trains, in their written evidence to the Select Committee on Transport, stated:

“Maintaining a fair, evidence-based, and independent process for access to the network is fundamental to ensuring continued growth and innovation.”

Under clause 59, however, the access and use policy will be developed and revised by GBR, setting the framework by which new services are assessed and defining the terms under which the ORR will judge appeals. Giving GBR exclusive control over that framework risks creating real or perceived conflicts of interest.

For more than two decades, the independence of access decisions has underpinned rail market growth. The continued involvement of the ORR in assessing applications objectively, balancing passenger, freight and performance needs, is essential to preserving that success. To ensure a transparent and fair access framework that the ORR can meaningfully enforce, it is important that private operators are involved in the development of the access and use policy and that appropriate statutory protections for open access are in place.

Without consultation or clear safeguards, the access and use policy risks becoming a document shaped solely by GBR’s priorities, which would potentially exclude private operators and leave them with no effective mechanism to challenge decisions that affect their ability to operate. A robust and independent access framework will also help to unlock further private sector investment in new services and rolling stock. By maintaining confidence in fair treatment and predictable regulation, the Government can encourage additional capital into the network, supporting the expansion of rail connectivity and the delivery of GBR’s passenger growth targets.

Freight operators currently benefit from statutory protections that recognise their environmental and national importance. Open access services deliver comparable benefits by driving modal shift, reducing emissions and supporting regional economies, and should therefore receive equivalent recommendation. They recommend that the Bill provide statutory protection for open access services, equivalent to that afforded to freight, and ensure that the ORR retains full authority to make access determinations independent of GBR. That would support the Government’s ambition for a network that is accountable, transparent and responsive to passenger demand.

I think that they are right. A core criticism of GBR is that it is a player and, now, the referee at the same time. Everyone must surely see that glaring conflict of interest. If His Majesty’s Government insist on changing the access and use policy to create a non-level playing field through the very tight capacity duty in clause 63, it should, at the very least, have an independent body responsible for applying the access and use policy. That is basic fairness in organisational structure.

We tabled amendment 76, which was not selected. We are not sure why, because it would ensure that the access and use policy would remain with the ORR by removing clause 59. That would mean sticking with the status quo and the existing access and use policy, avoiding the profound conflict of interest that clause 59 creates. If the Government decide to keep clause 59, which I assume they will, amendment 79 would enable a subsequent right of appeal to the ORR after going through the dispute resolution process. That would give open access operators a mechanism by which they could go to an independent regulator where necessary, giving them more assurance that they could survive in a new GBR world. That is a different point to the right of appeal under clause 59(6), which refers to the right to appeal the contents of a document. Amendment 79 requires a right of appeal to be included in the document itself.

Amendment 217 would place requirements on Great British Railways to use the access and use policy to promote high quality service or competition. At the very least, legislation needs to point GBR in the right direction so that other users can hold their decisions to account. The amendment gives such guidance. Without it, all that is left is clause 18, the general duties for GBR, and a bold reference to the public interest. It is inevitable that GBR will consider the public interest and the interests of GBR to be the same thing. The Government must think again on this, because the long-term damage to the wider rail sector will be profound.

Amendment 77 ensures that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways could take any step to implement any part of the access and use policy until it has been laid before Parliament for three months. That ensures that we are not blindly creating law when we have not even seen important documents relating to how that law will work in practice.

Clause 66 lists the bodies that GBR will be required to consult before issuing its access and use documents: the ORR and Scottish and Welsh Ministers. That is it; they are the only ones that have that opportunity by right. There is no requirement to consult freight or other operators that might be affected. We think that that is an extraordinary approach. Amendment 87 addresses the shocking lack of consultation envisaged when GBR creates its crucial access and use policy documents by adding open access operators to the mandatory list.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

Good morning, Mr Western. It is once again a pleasure to serve under your chairship. I thank the hon. Member for South West Devon for these amendments, which all seek to make changes to GBR’s access and use policy.

First, I will provide a brief explanation of what the access and use policy sets out to do. It will set out a clear and consistent process for any operator seeking to run services on GBR’s network. It will therefore provide transparency and certainty for non-GBR operators—such as freight and open access—on the new policy and procedures they will need to engage with when seeking access to GBR’s infrastructure. It will be very similar in concept to the way the ORR publishes access processes and policies today. It will therefore follow a well-known path by which industry can engage with the access process, and like today, this engagement will be underpinned by legislation.

I can reassure hon. Members that the access and use policy is being developed in collaboration with industry. A discussion paper on the initial contents of the policy has already been published. It can be reviewed by hon. Members of this Committee and anyone else who wishes to contribute to its development.

I will turn to amendment 79, which seeks to add an appeals route to the working timetable after the dispute resolution process. I am delighted to start in a place of agreement with the hon. Member for South West Devon because the addition to clause 59 is, in fact, already in the Bill. The Bill provides, first, a mechanism for resolving disputes relating to the working timetable and, secondly, an appeals route to the ORR.

GBR will be required to set a dispute resolution procedure within its access and use policy for applications to be included in the timetable. That will allow parties to resolve disagreements collaboratively before escalation to the ORR, as detailed in clause 61(5). To be clear, the Bill already provides a subsequent route of appeal to the ORR for operators who have disputes over the working timetable. The amendment is therefore duplicative of that existing appeals route, and risks creating additional bureaucracy and confusion within the process. It would not improve the dispute resolution framework and, in our view, is redundant, but I am pleased that we have found at least one thing in these clauses on which the official Opposition and the Government can agree.

Amendment 217 would add requirements that GBR should use the access and use policy to promote high-quality service and competition. I cannot agree with this amendment. GBR’s duties under clause 18 cover the range of points that the hon. Member for South West Devon has suggested GBR must consider for its access and use policy. For example, I agree that GBR must promote a high-quality service, and this is already reflected in GBR’s duty to ‘‘promote high standards” of performance. We must remember that the clause 18 duties are the key decision-making criteria that GBR must apply at every stage—including when making its access and use policy—and so the requirement to drive towards a quality service is already embedded.

On competition, however, I must clarify that the Government support competition on the railways where it can add real value to passengers and farepayers. As the directing mind, GBR will be required to determine the best use of the network for all operators under a new and simpler legislative framework that ensures passengers and taxpayers are at the heart of decisions that are taken on the railways.

Where competition can support GBR in fulfilling its statutory duties—for example, to grow the economy and to provide improved choice and benefits to passengers —without undermining the vast investment made by taxpayers, we are supportive of the benefits of competition, and GBR must take those benefits into account. However, what the Government will not support is competition for competition’s sake. It is ideological and does not help us achieve the goal of making the railway work better.

The hon. Member for South West Devon seems to be equating promoting competition with fairness, but they are not one and the same. GBR must be fair to all third-party operators at all times. To ensure fairness for all parties, GBR will be bound by the Competition Act 1998, under which rules it cannot discriminate or abuse its dominant market position, and the ORR will continue to enforce this as the competition regulator. GBR does not need to actively promote competition to achieve that aim.

Amendment 77 would require GBR’s access and use policy to be laid before Parliament for three months before it can be implemented. GBR would be unable to implement any part of the access and use policy for a period of three months after it had been laid in Parliament. This would only result in delays for operators seeking to access the GBR network—a concept that is unlikely to be considered favourably by either open access or the freight industry.

The hon. Member for South West Devon should note that the access and use policy is a technical railway document. The purpose of this document is to provide a fair and transparent process for operators to apply for access. It sets out, for instance, the timings for applications, so that operators can prepare for the application window in advance. It also sets out what information applicants will need to supply and how applications will be assessed by GBR in accordance with its statutory duties. It is therefore right for GBR to develop it in consultation with industry and other railway bodies such as the ORR. This document should rightly be industry and expert-led. To reassure hon. Members about the content of the access and use policy, Network Rail has published a discussion document that sets out emerging thinking on a future access and use policy, with input from industry stakeholders. If Members of Parliament are keen to scrutinise the document, they are welcome to do so now, and I encourage them to engage with Network Rail’s external engagement process, or the usual processes in Parliament.

The industry has responded positively to the transparent and collaborative approach that has been taken in the development of the access and use policy. The freight sector has commented on how the discussion document acknowledges the key role of private investment. Network Rail’s engagement with industry will continue as the policy is developed, and there will be a further full consultation on the access and use policy with the ORR as a statutory consultee, which Members of Parliament are again welcome to contribute to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith]

Something that the Minister said reflects back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham said on Tuesday. Not putting private operators, open access and freight on this mandatory list is making us nervous that it is not the Government’s intention to keep involving them in the future. I appreciate what the Minister is saying about them being consulted at the moment, but this amendment is important because it would keep them as a fixture of the future of GBR, rather than as an optional extra, where they can be useful, but if they are not considered to add any value to the railway, they will not be there any more.

As we have already alluded to, industry certainty and assuredness needs to be there for private investment to come forward, some of which I know the Government will welcome. It is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation: if we do not have them in the framework at the beginning, they are not being encouraged to stay involved and have that confidence. Does the Minister agree?

[Keir Mather]

The hon. Member is of course right to be wary about the involvement of open access in the railway, because although such provision forms a comparatively small proportion of railway journeys, we have discussed at length how certain access operator services provide great inter-city connections. There is of course a role for open access in the system being created by the Bill.

With GBR having regard to its duties when creating its access and use policy, it will have to factor in how users of the railway, both current and future, are able to make best use of services, whether they are provided by GBR or anybody else. Being bound by competition law, and the transparency and fairness inherent in it, will ensure that those that already provide services on the railway, and those that seek to provide services in the future, will have the opportunity to do so. I understand the hon. Member’s point about making sure that something is prescriptively listed in the Bill so that it is given due regard, but I would say that, whether through existing open access entitlements or the two rail freight targets that exist, there are sufficient assurances that there is scope for the inclusion of those services in the future of the railway, and that the access and use policy has to reflect that. I will turn to that in more detail soon.

All of the work on the access and use policy so far has happened without the need for a long and ever-expanding list of operators in the legislation, which would be the likely result of the amendment. If we name open access operators, we should presumably also list others, such as freight operators and devolved operators. Clause 66 currently requires that GBR must consult

“such other persons as it considers appropriate”,

and that formulation is deliberate; it ensures that consultation can be targeted, relevant and proportionate. Network Rail’s actions so far clearly demonstrate that open access operators are considered to be other appropriate persons in the reading of the clause, so both the reality and the future can be accounted for.

I reassure the hon. Member that there is no world in which GBR will create an access and use policy without consulting the relevant industry bodies that are affected. The amendment would add complexity, without delivering additional practical benefit. Although I thank the hon. Member for the amendments, for those reasons, I urge that she does not press them to a vote.

Clause 59 requires Great British Railways to publish an access and use policy. That key document will provide transparency and certainty for non-GBR operators, such as freight and open access, on the new policy and procedures they will need to engage with. For example, the policy will set out how operators should apply to access and use GBR tracks and infrastructure. It must set out the criteria Great British Railways intends to apply, in accordance with its statutory duties, when making access decisions, as well as its procedures for resolving competing demands and disputes. That will include, for instance, details on the economic and performance assessments GBR will undertake to determine best use. The policy must also include an explanation of how GBR will carry out maintenance and improvements to GBR infrastructure, and other necessary provisions, to ensure that the network works effectively. That exists in today’s system, within the industry network code, and we would expect GBR to draw on that when developing its policy on these key points.

The access and use policy is being developed in collaboration with industry. A discussion paper on initial content has already been published, and can be reviewed by the Committee or anyone else who wishes to input into its development. We hope that the extensive engagement being undertaken will ensure that a robust and effective document is produced that industry will be content with. However, as a backstop, any person aggrieved by a provision in this policy may appeal to the ORR.

Clause 66 will make it a legislative requirement that GBR must consult the ORR, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and such other persons as it considers appropriate before issuing, revising or replacing its access and use policy, which is dealt with in clause 59. That is in addition to GBR being a public body bound by public law principles. GBR must behave in a fair and transparent way, and therefore must consult interested parties, including rail freight and open access. The clause also ensures that GBR consults such persons as it considers appropriate before issuing, revising or replacing its infrastructure capacity plan, before issuing a working timetable and before making, revising or replacing a charging or performance scheme. Those issues are dealt with in clauses 60, 61 and 62.

Clause 66 is essential to provide reassurance to industry and our Scottish and Welsh counterparts that key parts of the new framework—GBR’s policies and processes—will not be designed in isolation, but will be underpinned by a transparent and consultative process. The clause provides the essential framework for collaborative and strategic planning by GBR across the rail network. I therefore commend clauses 59 and 66 to the Committee.

[Rebecca Smith]

I think I have said everything I want to say, but we would like to press amendment 79 and then amendment 217 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

I take fully on board the hon. Member’s point that we need to ensure services are not squeezed out. The process I am outlining is specifically to ensure that that does not happen. Where GBR has regard to its duties under clause 60 when deciding best use, it has to have regard to the freight target and the need to grow freight, but also the need to accommodate a range of services on the railway. That best use policy is locked in. It is under clause 63 that the capacity duty comes into effect, and GBR can make practical operational decisions about how to effectively actualise those proportions being allocated on the railway.

GBR will have to have regard to open access and freight under its duties in clause 60 when making the macro decision about what constitutes best use, which at the end of the day is not a binary yes or no question. The capacity duty in clause 63 merely ensures that it can provide the services it has been allocated. I will come to that in a bit more detail and set it out further. The hon. Member is welcome to intervene again if he feels my subsequent detail is insufficient.

On the capacity duty more broadly, the Government have been nothing but consistent. Put simply, the services that offer the genuine best value proposition for passengers, freight customers and the taxpayer, consistent with GBR’s duties, should be allocated capacity. Clause 63, meanwhile, creates a legal duty for Great British Railways to ensure there is enough space in the timetable to run the services funded by the Government and taxpayers. To reiterate, clause 63 is a requirement for space in the timetable. It is not a requirement for space in the capacity plan. It does not apply to the capacity plan and it therefore does not and cannot undermine the best use decisions taken at the capacity planning stage. That is because the Government are paying for certain GBR services and must not waste public funds. The clause 63 duty is about managing taxpayers’ money after best use has been determined. It is not about keeping anyone out.

Amendment 78 would require GBR to consult open access and freight operators in preparing the infrastructure capacity plan. Amendment 80 would require GBR to have regard to its key performance indicators when preparing the plan, and amendment 81 would amend clause 63 to require GBR to retain capacity for open access and freight operators. Amendments 253 and 229 would both give freight operators more weight in the capacity process.

Adding a further consultation requirement to clause 60 is unnecessary as there is already a separate requirement in clause 66 for GBR to consult affected operators when developing or amending the capacity plan. Were GBR to publish or amend a capacity plan at any point without consultation, that would constitute a breach of its duties under the Bill and present strong grounds for appeal to the ORR. Amendment 78 is therefore duplicative of the provisions already in the Bill.

As for amendments 80, 81, 253 and 229, the intended effect of clause 63 is to create a statutory duty for GBR to ensure that there is enough space in the timetable to run its own passenger services, which are funded directly by taxpayers. That is because taxpayers spend many billions of pounds subsidising the railway. Any responsible Government would be obligated to protect that investment and ensure that taxpayers get full value from it. The clause is therefore needed to ensure that where GBR considers its services constitute the best use of the network, and where it then allocates capacity to itself, it will actually run the trains that it is proposing to run and which it will be funded for. I do not believe anyone on this Committee would be delighted to find that, following GBR being paid several billion pounds to run services, it was unable to do so. Clause 63 is therefore an essential legal safeguard to prevent that from happening.

The interests of freight and open access operators are protected by GBR’s general duties under clause 18, and freight operators are further protected by the duty on GBR to have regard to the rail freight target set by the Secretary of State under clause 17. Those duties will apply when GBR establishes best use at the capacity planning stage for all operators, including freight. The existence of not just one but two statutory duties is a clear signal of this Government’s view that freight must be front and centre of GBR’s decision making. This will give freight much greater prominence in capacity planning and allocation decisions than the current system, in which capacity is too often allocated on a first come, first served basis without reference to any coherent view of the best overall use of available capacity. The clause 63 duty exists only to protect the Secretary of State’s investment in the railway; it is not intended to influence GBR’s capacity planning or to keep anyone out of the network. The amendments are therefore not compatible with the intended purpose of the clause.

Amendment 80 draws a link to the concept of key performance indicators. As I have set out in previous debates, the Government do not accept the need to make statutory provision about KPIs and so cannot support the proposed reference. As I have consistently said throughout these debates, KPIs should be in GBR’s business plan and not in legislation.

Amendment 211 would require GBR to publish a statement on any decision not to provide access on the basis of capacity. As a public body, GBR is bound by public law principles to behave in a transparent and non-discriminatory way. That means that GBR must set out its decisions transparently, including when granting access, with robust evidence that shows how it has acted in accordance with its duties, access and use policy and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. If GBR failed to do that, it would be grounds for appeal to the ORR. The amendment is unnecessary because GBR is already required to transparently account for its access decisions, whatever the reason for them.

Finally, new clause 56 would require GBR to report on the merits of a centralised train planning and auctioning scheme, with high-yielding services being operated by private sector operators rather than GBR. This Government were elected with a clear mandate to return franchised passenger services to public ownership. Public ownership, with responsibility for passenger services and infrastructure brought together in a single organisation, is the only way to make the railway run better. It enables everybody to focus on a single set of objectives centred around the needs of railway users and the interests of the taxpayers who fund it, rather than shareholders and private profit. Public ownership of passenger services will save the taxpayer up to £150 million a year in fees to private operators alone. Therefore, GBR, rather than private operators, must be responsible for operating the services that taxpayers will fund it to deliver. Making GBR responsible for essential services also avoids the costs of maintaining a public sector operator of last resort function ready to step in if a private operator suffers financial failure or chooses to withdraw from operating the services.

While I fully support the provision of services by open access operators on the network where they add value and where there is capacity on the network, the model set out by the new clause is not compatible with the mandate that this Government were elected on: to bring franchised passenger services back into public ownership. It is not compatible with the regime set out in the Bill, which already provides clarity about the role of private sector operators and the opportunities for them to run services.

Given what I have set out, I hope that the hon. Member for South West Devon feels able to withdraw the amendments. I commend clauses 60 and 63 to the Committee.

[Rebecca Smith]

I have listened to the Minister’s comments. As I said earlier, we will not press amendment 80 to a vote, but I wish to press the others to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

Amendment 174 will provide greater clarity for all parties that the agreement GBR is obliged to have under clause 61(4) can be made in advance in a contract or other document between GBR and the operator in line with the terms set out in GBR’s access and use policy under clause 59(3). The amendment broadly replicates the current industry practice of making changes to the working timetable through contractual arrangements, so it is familiar to industry and was always the intended approach. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendment, tabled by the Government in my name.

I thank the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) for tabling new clause 52, which would require the Secretary of State to publicly consult on and publish a report that recommends an appropriate train frequency that would meet local need and which GBR would then be obliged to deliver. Although this Government support the principle of designing a train service that meets passengers’ needs and local needs, the new clause would embed that responsibility in Government, and not with GBR. That would serve only to continue Government’s micro-management of the railways, under-mining GBR’s intended role as an empowered, directing mind that is enabled to take decisions on the best use of the network.

To take access decisions and plan its passenger services —which GBR will do in accordance with its duties, which are clearly defined in the Bill—GBR, and not the Department, must be able to design its own passenger train services. GBR will also be legally required to consult devolved Governments and mayoral strategic authorities before making certain decisions, such as service frequency decisions that will significant affect their local areas. The Government and GBR will also have to consult the new passenger watchdog when developing their policies, strategies and priorities for the railway, including when GBR is developing its business plan and passenger offer. The Secretary of State will set the long-term strategic objectives of the railway through the long-term rail strategy, which GBR will need to consider when taking decisions about service frequencies. The Secretary of State will also have to approve GBR’s integrated business plan, which will cover both track and train activity.

That framework represents the right balance between an empowered directing mind that can independently weigh up its duties in a considered and rational way when delivering its statutory functions, including developing the timetable, with appropriate consultation requirements and proportionate Government oversight. We do not want to continue the current system, under which stifling Government interference hampers the efficient running of the railways. I therefore urge members of the Committee not to move new clause 52.

Clause 61 requires GBR to issue a timetable that defines

“all planned train movements which will take place on GBR infrastructure during the period for which it is in force”.

Enabling GBR to establish a working timetable is fundamental to running trains safely and reliably at their published times. The current system cannot deliver significant timetable changes, even where there is a strong public interest case for doing so with significant taxpayer investment. That is because the process for revising the timetable is dependent on different organisations taking, at different points, different decisions that affect the timetable’s production. That creates complexity and challenges that can result in significant delays to the implementation of a new timetable being implemented and passengers and taxpayers losing out.

Despite the significant efforts made by Network Rail and the ORR, the new east coast main line timetable was delayed for over four years, which resulted in delayed benefits to passengers. Ultimately, until the current Rail Minister was appointed no one was willing to make a final timetabling decision. That cannot happen again: GBR must be empowered to take decisions or passengers and taxpayers will not see improvements.

Under clause 61, as the directing mind GBR will be responsible for taking decisions on timetabling in a process overseen by the ORR. A person whose application to be included in the timetable is rejected or who disagrees with the terms and conditions of their inclusion may appeal to the ORR. The clause ensures that GBR will deliver an achievable, reliable timetable that the network is able to deliver. Better co-ordination of the timetable and engineering works will reduce delays, improve reliability and reduce cost. GBR’s holistic review of the whole network can also improve connectivity for passengers. Without the clause, the current unacceptable system of timetable delays, disagreements and ministerial intervention will continue, which serves no one.

Clause 62 sets out the steps that GBR must follow before issuing a working timetable, as previously described in clause 61. It is a critical provision as a timetable is the backbone of a safe and efficient railway operation. Without a clear and structured timetable, trains cannot run reliably at their published times. GBR must invite applications for inclusion in the timetable from operators other than GBR’s own passenger services. The invitation must specify the period within which applications must be made and the information that must accompany an application. GBR must prepare and send a draft of the working timetable to those applicants. A person who has had an application rejected by GBR may appeal that decision to the ORR. The clause ensures that the process for developing the timetable is fair and transparent. I commend clauses 61 and 62 to the Committee.

[Rebecca Smith]

Clause 61(1) sets out that GBR must issue one or more timetables covering all train movements on GBR infrastructure for the period that GBR intends the timetable to cover, to be known as a working timetable. Subsection (3) allows GBR to alter a working timetable, for example to add new train movements, change a planned train movement, allow for maintenance works, deal with disruption, or change the duration of the timetable. Subsection (4) allows GBR to alter a planned train movement of an operator other than GBR only with that operator’s permission. Subsection (5) provides a right of appeal to the ORR for an operator who applied for a train movement to be included in the working timetable by GBR but was refused, or where the inclusion was made subject to conditions. The duty to consult and appeals provisions in clauses 66 to 68 also apply to the working timetable, but not to alterations of the working timetable.

Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Keir Mather and Rebecca Smith

Thursday 5th February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. There is not much to say, except that the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage raised a question about our amendments and what he called phantom paths. I think he may have been referring to ghost trains, as opposed to phantom trains—if you google “phantom trains”, all sorts of weird films come up, and they are far too scary for me to watch. He is not here to disagree with me, but I think he was alluding to the issue of trains running entirely empty through stations where people would have quite liked to get on them.

The point I think we are making with our amendments is more about where issues that it is within Great British Railways’ responsibility to fix mean that services cannot run, and about not believing that the operators, which have no responsibility for the infrastructure, should still be expected to pay a fee if they are not able to run their services. I think we would have been alluding to that, rather than where they are running empty trains. There may well be empty trains as well, but I think we were talking specifically about where GBR had the responsibility—

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

I thank the hon. Lady for giving me an opportunity to piggyback on her response to the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. I want merely to say that, from the Government’s perspective, having one centralised body accountable for access to and use of the railway and for determining best use is a good way to avoid the phantom train scenarios she describes, such as the 7 o’clock service from Manchester Piccadilly to London. I am grateful that she has given me the opportunity to row in behind her on this point.

[Rebecca Smith]

I thank the Minister for that. Yes, absolutely; I believe our amendments are much more about the infrastructure that GBR has responsibility for and about operators not having to pay if they are un able to operate their services. A natural disaster is probably a bit too extreme, but if, for example, a train is running through to Dawlish and the line gets closed, I think it is fair to suggest that the operator should not have to pay the fees for that train. We will press some of these amendments to a vote for that reason, but I just wanted to clarify that point. Without further ado, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 230, in clause 64, page 36, line 7, at end insert

“, except where the services cannot operate due to a failure of the GBR infrastructure or the need for GBR to take capacity for work on the network.”—(Rebecca Smith.)

This amendment would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

It is, once again, a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. Amendment 254 would require GBR, when charging above the cost directly incurred—in other words, when charging mark-ups—to consider its target to increase the use of freight. I can reassure the hon. Member for West Dorset immediately that GBR will not be able to raise charges in a way that is not compatible with its statutory duties or targets.

In practice, that means that when developing its own test of affordability, GBR is expected to establish bespoke criteria for divergent market segments operating on the railway, including freight, as Network Rail set out in its discussion document on charging. That allows GBR to design a test that can support its duties, including those under clause 18, and the targets to increase freight under clause 17.

We intend that the provision will operate in a way similar to the “market can bear” test today. GBR will develop its own test of affordability in consultation with the sector, including the Office of Rail and Road, before publishing it. However, as we move away from European law, in which the “market can bear” test is established, and to the Bill, which carries over the same principles, we must ensure that the language in the drafting is fit for purpose for UK statute. That is why the Bill stipulates that GBR will be able to levy mark-ups only if it is affordable to efficient operators. The Bill preserves that fundamental safeguard for operators, but in a form that can be applied more clearly in the UK context.

The test will be published with clear routes of appeal, as a further layer of protection for any operators, including freight, that are subject to charges when using GBR infrastructure. When hearing appeals, the ORR will consider the extent to which GBR has appropriately considered all factors before levying a mark-up. I hope I have reassured the hon. Member for West Dorset that amendment 254 is unnecessary, as the Bill already achieves its intended effect.

Amendment 255 would give the ORR an explicit power, following an appeal against the content of a charging scheme, to direct Great British Railways to revise the scheme in cases where it considers GBR has not dealt fairly with the appellant. However, the amendment is not necessary to achieve that aim. The Bill already provides clear and robust rights of appeal to the ORR in relation to the content of a charging scheme. Those rights are supported by strong and effective remedies where an appeal against GBR is successful, as set out in clause 68.

In the system set out in the Bill, where the ORR upholds an appeal on the content of a charging scheme, it has the power to remit all or part of the provision appealed against to GBR for reconsideration. That means that the ORR can require GBR to make changes to the charging scheme if it was identified during the appeal process that GBR had acted in a discriminatory manner, inconsistently with its statutory duties or in a way deemed procedurally unfair.

The ORR can also give legally binding directions to GBR, which could include setting out what it failed to take account of in the original decision and what it must do to ensure that those matters are properly assessed when reconsidering it. The amendment would therefore introduce powers that are already provided for in clause 68. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member not to press amendments 254 and 255 to a vote.

[Rebecca Smith]

Amendment 254 is good in so far as it goes in relation to rail freight, but other rail operators also provide public benefit and should receive a similar level of protection. The Opposition are happy to support the amendment, but we do not think it goes nearly far enough.

Amendment 255 would give the ORR the power to order GBR to revise a charging scheme if it found, on appeal, that GBR had not dealt fairly with the appellant. With the current constraint on appeals, the amendment would make no practical difference. The Government need to go much further by providing a genuine appeals process to assess appeals on their merits, with an independent body, not a direct competitor, taking the key charging decisions.

[Keir Mather]

I believe that hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have expressed all the points on these amendments, and I have nothing further to add at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

The right hon. Gentleman pre-empts my later comments about the role of the ORR in this process.

On the principle of whether GBR should be able to design a performance scheme for its own network, that is completely in keeping with the aspiration of the Bill to create a single uniting mind for the railway. We are cognisant of the fact that GBR has a threefold obligation in this process. First, it must create a scheme that it can use to deliver the efficiencies and operational realities of the railway in a way that suits the interests of the travelling public. Secondly, operators that use the service need to be able to ensure that they can have fair service under it. That is why consulting with the industry is so important.

Thirdly, and arguably most importantly, GBR must protect taxpayers’ interests where it is reasonable to do so. A scheme is being created that directs GBR to run the railway in a purposeful way but with robust consultation and enforcement mechanisms, which I will come to in a moment, embedded within it. I believe that strikes the right balance. We are giving GBR control over the system but not allowing it to mark its own homework in every way, as the Opposition might see it. I will go into that in more detail in a moment.

[Rebecca Smith]

To build on the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston made, clause 65(3)(b) says that compensation may not be paid by Great British Railways

“in relation to any disruption that is outside its control.”

It strikes me that that relates to what the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield said happens already: people have to decide what constitutes significant disruption, and what is inside its control. If I were an outside operator looking at this, I would be thinking, “Hang on a minute. Where’s the definition of what is inside GBR’s control?” There is a whole long list of options that I will not even begin to bore the Committee with for what could be said to be outside its control, but where is that conversation? It strikes me that it might be like trying to claim for a bag that was stolen on holiday on insurance—you have to literally prove that you were mugged to get reimbursed. I would be interested in a bit more information on how “outside its control” will be defined.

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[Rebecca Smith]

I think he probably would have said it, to be perfectly honest.

Clause 73 marks the end of a very significant chapter in the Bill, with many poorly drafted or simply ill thought through clauses. I am sure the drafting has been done with the greatest attention to detail; it is just the “thought-through-ness” that we are struggling with. But we end on a positive note, with no objections to clause 73.

[Keir Mather]

I am pleased to speak to this group of provisions, which concludes the scrutiny on the access chapters of the Bill.

Clause 72 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations to amend the Railways (Access, Management and Licensing of Railway Undertakings) Regulations 2016 via the affirmative procedure. The access and management regulations are the existing body of secondary legislation that sets out the rights and obligations of infrastructure managers, train operators and the role of the ORR in relation to access, capacity allocation, access charges and performance. At present, those regulations can be amended only using powers under the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, but those powers will expire on 23 June 2026, which means that, after that date, there will be no means other than an Act of Parliament by which those detailed and technical regulations can be amended.

Great British Railways infrastructure will not be subject to the regulations, as the Bill establishes a new access framework to enable GBR to be the directing mind, which we have discussed over the last few groups. However, alongside Great British Railways there will be a number of rail networks, such as Transport for London, London St Pancras Highspeed and the Core Valley Lines in Wales, that will continue to be subject to the access and management regulations. Those “adjacent infrastructure managers” will therefore not be part of GBR’s access regime. The purpose of the power in clause 72 is to ensure that the legislative framework governing the other infrastructure managers can be updated to address any inconsistencies between networks—to “keep pace” between the two different regulatory regimes. Without this power there may be disruption to the smooth passage of train services across different networks—which the Government have a duty to protect.

For example, the power might be used to secure alignment on the date when a new working timetable must come into effect. The access and management regulations currently stipulate a date in December, but given the risk of weather-related events, staff absences during the Christmas season and the engineering works that usually take place between Christmas and the new year, GBR will likely want to move away from that. If it did, it is not unreasonable to think that other infrastructure managers might want to follow suit to avoid being affected by the same risks and to ensure consistency in the timetable change date. To achieve that, it would be necessary to amend the regulations for the other infrastructure managers who wish to align with the date that GBR chooses in the future. The regulation-making power would enable that simple change to be made without needing an Act of Parliament.

There may also be opportunities for adjacent infrastructure managers to seek further simplifications to the current regulations in a way that meets our ambitions to reduce regulatory burden and support growth, while maintaining a sustainable and predictable framework so that businesses have confidence to plan and invest. The Government consider regulations, rather than primary legislation, as a better way in which to achieve that.

Regulations made under the clause must be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring full parliamentary scrutiny. Before exercising the power, the Secretary of State will consult all interested parties, ensuring full transparency, that industry has the chance to comment and that Parliament approves the regulations before any changes can be made. Amendments 256, 221 and 231 all seek to narrow that power in some way.

Amendment 256 would prevent the power from being used to direct operational matters of customer and facility owner freight sidings and terminals; amendment 231 would similarly exclude freight-only facilities. Those amendments are unnecessary, as the purpose of the power is to ensure alignment and remove inconsistencies in the regulatory regimes that will apply to GBR and non-GBR infrastructure and to enable simplifications where they align with the objectives of adjacent infrastructure managers.

[Rebecca Smith]

The Minister just said that the amendments are completely unnecessary, because the stated concerns are not real, effectively. That does not answer the very real concerns put forward time and again in the Transport Select Committee and in this Committee’s evidence session—the written and oral evidence—by businesses that are experts in the field. They are not reassured by the Bill as it stands. How can the Minister go back and say, “No, we’re right and you’re wrong,” to those experts in the industry?

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I am not arguing that stakeholders are not valid in raising concerns about the issues: they are. I am seeking to ameliorate their concerns by outlining what provisions are in the legislation to offer sufficient scrutiny and ensure that the way in which the process happens offers robust safeguards.

Constraints are built into clause 72 to ensure sufficient oversight, with the Secretary of State consulting persons considered appropriate and making changes in secondary legislation that is subject to the affirmative procedure. That means that legislation will be subject to full public consultation and subsequently debated in both Houses, which reflects the importance of the regulations in providing certainty for business.

I have already said that the Secretary of State will consult all interested parties to ensure that there is full transparency and industry comment. Amendments 256, 221 and 231 would all narrow that power in some way. Amendment 256 would prevent the power from being used to direct operational matters of customer and facility owner freight sidings, and amendment 231 would exclude freight-only facilities. I have already spoken on why some of the principles that lie behind those amendments are unnecessary.

Let us take my example of GBR changing the date when its new working timetable is to take effect. On the basis of the amendments, other infrastructure managers would forever be misaligned with that new timetable change date, even if they wished to align. The Government do not intend to use the power to direct the owners or operators of private freight facilities on operational matters.

I am happy to reassure the Committee that the power cannot be used to bring other infrastructure managers or operators of privately funded facilities into public ownership, as I know how exercised Opposition Committee members have been about that principle. In the consultation, industry broadly supported the ability to make necessary amendments, although it is of course right to raise concerns when they arise. Most sector bodies agree that it will be important to ensure that there are no regulatory barriers to passenger and freight operators crossing between different networks, and that is what the clause seeks to achieve.

Amendment 221 would make the ORR and affected facility owners statutory consultees to the power. That is unnecessary as before exercising the power to make regulations, the Secretary of State is already required to consult all persons they consider appropriate, which would include the ORR and any affected facility owners. If the Secretary of State did not consult such persons, there would be strong grounds to challenge the regulations.

Clause 73 will ensure clarity in how key terms are applied throughout the access chapter of the Bill. It defines “GBR infrastructure”, “GBR passenger service” and “working timetable”—fundamental terms to the operation of GBR. The definition of GBR infrastructure ensures that the new access arrangements developed by GBR apply only where intended. The clause also includes a power to amend the definition, which is necessary to ensure that, as GBR’s network evolves over time, it remains clear to GBR and other infrastructure managers which parts of infrastructure are GBR’s responsibility. The clause is therefore critical to provide clarity and transparency.

Given what I have set out, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments. I commend clauses 72 and 73 to the Committee.

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[Keir Mather]

Me too, Mrs Hobhouse. Thank you for placing such confidence in me; we will see in due course if it is justified.

I thank the shadow Minister for speaking to amendment 222, which would require the ORR to monitor KPIs. My response will be brief, to avoid repeating myself, as the amendment is heavily linked to new clause 2, which we have already debated.

We expect GBR to have KPIs, as I have said before, but the right place for them is in GBR’s integrated business plan, alongside the detail of the activity that GBR will carry out over the five-year funding period. No sensible business would ever set its KPIs in stone, potentially for generations to come.

It is important that the ORR, in its role scrutinising GBR’s proposed business plans and monitoring its delivery of them, is able to assess whether commitments made by GBR are ambitious and realistic. As the independent expert adviser to the Secretary of State, the ORR will have a clear route to influence the formulation of GBR’s KPIs. By keeping them within the business plan, the ORR’s involvement is already ensured by legislation.

Amendment 97 would require the ORR to monitor whether GBR is implementing safety recommendations and standards set by industry bodies. I sympathise with the sentiments behind the amendment. Britain’s railways remain some of the safest in the world, which is why we are maintaining the roles of the statutory bodies in this area—the ORR and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch —and preserving the legal duty on all public bodies, including GBR, to give due regard to the investigation branch safety recommendations addressed to them.

Existing safety legislation already gives the ORR broad powers to monitor GBR’s safety management, including its implementation of investigation branch recommendations, and to take enforcement action if it finds that GBR is not managing safety effectively. The amendment risks confusing or duplicating well-understood roles and responsibilities in relation to the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of safety best practice. I hope I have reassured the hon. Member that this suggestion is already covered.

Amendments 99 to 101 would require the ORR to audit GBR’s statutory functions when undertaking its monitoring role. That is unnecessary, and would distort the clear and distinct roles set out in the Bill for both GBR and the ORR. The Bill retains the ORR’s important role as sector regulator and creates an enhanced monitoring function through which it will monitor GBR’s statutory functions and provide independent advice to the Secretary of State.

The ORR’s role as sector regulator is rightly separate to the role of an approved auditor. The annual accounts of GBR will be audited by the National Audit Office in the usual way. We do not propose to change that effective system, and cannot agree to an amendment that would layer it with unwarranted and inappropriate duplication, given that the ORR will already be monitoring GBR’s delivery of the KPIs within its business plan and GBR’s consideration of its duties when doing this.

Oversight of GBR will be proportionate, risk-based and focused on the outcomes that matter most to users of the railway, taxpayers and the wider public. The ORR will have a crucial part to play in providing this oversight, including by undertaking its enhanced monitoring role in the way it, as the independent regulator, considers appropriate. With that in mind, I urge the hon. Member not to press those amendments.

I commend clause 74 to the Committee. It will provide the ORR with enhanced monitoring powers, in line with its new role in the reformed sector. It will ensure that the ORR can effectively scrutinise GBR and provide independent expert advice for the Secretary of State for Transport and Scottish Ministers on its performance. As set out in the Bill, GBR will be required to produce an integrated business plan that demonstrates how it will deliver its priorities across the breadth of its statutory functions, including passenger services and the management of the GBR network.

Although GBR will report to the Secretary of State on the delivery of the plan, the ORR will be required to monitor the performance of GBR and independently advise the Secretary of State. The clause sets out that the ORR will monitor how GBR exercises its functions, including whether the commitments in GBR’s business plan are being met, how costs and income compare with estimates in that plan, and the extent to which GBR is ensuring safety on the railway. On an ongoing basis, the ORR will be able to escalate concerns to Ministers as it considers necessary, enabling the Secretary of State to make informed decisions in line with her responsibilities as funder of GBR. Given that the Secretary of State is democratically responsible for the billions of pounds of taxpayer subsidy invested in the railway, it is right that she has the final say on how it is used, with proper, comprehensive advice from an expert independent regulator to support her.

To fulfil its new role, the ORR must have the ability to gather information, conduct investigations, and assess whether GBR is fulfilling its statutory functions and business plan commitments. Clause 74 provides that statutory basis. It will allow the ORR, where it deems appropriate, to publish any information or advice it provides to the Secretary of State in connection with this monitoring function. That will ensure that the public can see how GBR is being held to account for its performance and how it is delivering in the interest of its customers, taxpayers and the public.

The policy rationale is clear: the Government are committed to preserving an independent expert adviser within the rail system and are providing the necessary tools for that body to operate and scrutinise GBR effectively. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Rebecca Smith]

I have indicated that we want to press amendment 99 to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith]

Clause 75 prevents the ORR from issuing directions to GBR relating to providing, improving or developing railway facilities. It also prevents the ORR from imposing a fine on GBR for licence breaches. We think those are both terrible ideas.

The Transport Committee asked Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group:

“What is your view on the ORR’s downgraded power merely to ‘advise’ the Secretary of State on GBR’s performance, rather than having actual powers of enforcement?”

She said:

“I am quite worried about this.”

To the same question, Steve Montgomery from First Rail said:

“Following on from that, the independence element of it—marking your own homework—is a big concern for us. How do we ensure that we do not see a perverse behaviour where GBR looks after its own operations to the detriment of others?”

Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said:

“I can only echo that. With GBR writing the rules, controlling capacity and being linked to the main operator in the country, there is a structural conflict of interest, unless there is a clear duty of fairness and non-discrimination. I do not know of other European countries that do not have a strong independent rail regulator, across the EU and beyond. To be the judge and the jury at the same time is somewhat worrying.”

Emma Vogelmann, the co-chief executive of Transport for All, told the Transport Committee:

“Our recommendation on the role of the ORR is to retain its independent authority. We are definitely interested to see how that transition of powers, as Ben mentioned, plays out, and how enforceability plays into that.”

For once, the Government need to stop and listen. The sector is speaking with one voice and telling them that this is the wrong approach. The clause needs to be removed in its entirety. It is common for regulators to be able to issue financial penalties to private utility companies that are in breach of their statutory duties. Why should that consumer protection not also be applied to a public body like GBR? Removing clause 75 would restore the ORR as a strong, independent economic regulator.

Government amendment 271

“would ensure that the ORR may not impose a fine on GBR under an order to secure compliance with conditions etc, to align with the amendment to section 57A of the Railways Act 1993 made by clause 75(3) of the Bill.”

The Conservatives are against the whole clause, but, to save time, we will not seek a Division specifically on this amendment—I am sure that everybody will be pleased to hear that. However, as somebody who serves on the Transport Committee and sat through a lot of those evidence sessions, one of the key things that concerned me and some other members of the Committee was the breakdown of the relationship between the ORR and GBR and the weakening of the ORR’s powers. When I heard that evidence, I certainly felt that it was a compelling argument.

Liberal Democrat amendment 212 would remove the restriction on the ORR to impose fines on GBR for licence breaches. That is okay as far as it goes, and we will support the amendment, but we think that it does not quite go far enough. As I am sure Members expect on the basis of what I have just said, we will vote against clause 75 as a whole.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for his amendment, which would retain the ORR’s power to fine GBR in the event of a licence breach. He will be pleased to hear that I do not intend to repeat the arguments that I made in my opening remarks. However, as I suspect he knows, I cannot accept his amendment, because in creating the ability for the ORR to fine GBR, it would simply lead to the recycling of public funds, which he so ably outlined as being an issue.

On the subject of licence breaches, the ORR can issue an enforcement order to direct a different outcome from GBR. There is also a point to be made about accountability for GBR’s executives. That kind of relates to the penalties for Network Rail today: the ORR already recognises its public sector status and scales penalties accordingly. The chair and board of GBR will be responsible for ensuring that the CEO has in place robust performance management for senior staff, inherent to which will be not defying the ORR when it has issued legally binding directions. There will be a clear expectation that any significant failures will have a material impact on performance-related pay, and where the failure is sufficient to demand it, an individual should be at risk of dismissal. Put simply, removing the ORR’s power to fine will not cause the executive of GBR to be remiss in their duties.

Although the hon. Member asks me to speculate on potentially extreme cases where GBR could defy the ORR, I believe that, in the round, sufficient safeguards remain in place, with the ORR retaining its existing ability to issue mandatory and legally binding enforcement orders to GBR on matters within the licence; it is only the monetary aspect that is targeted here.

Amendment 271 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

Clause 76 updates the Office of Rail and Road’s information duties by inserting a new section into the Railways Act 1993 under which the ORR must proactively publish documents and information about key regulatory matters, including licences, access contracts, closures and railway administration orders, in whatever manner and form it considers appropriate. At the same time, the clause removes the ORR’s duty to maintain a formal statutory register under section 72 of the 1993 Act and repurposes that section so that it better reflects modern expectations of transparency, while retaining strong safeguards so that information that would seriously and prejudicially affect individuals, businesses or the wider public interest is not disclosed. The clause is not retrospective: it does not compel the ORR to publish historical material, but it allows it to publish information already held on the existing register where that is appropriate.

The main purpose of clause 77 is to replace the Secretary of State’s duty to keep a statutory register under section 73 of the 1993 Act with a focused duty to publish information, in keeping with the Government’s commitment to ensure appropriate levels of transparency on the railways. Clauses 78 and 79 do the same but for Scottish and Welsh Ministers.

These clauses retain strong protections for individuals, businesses and the wider public interest, making it clear that material that would seriously and prejudicially affect those interests must not be published. They allow Ministers to publish material currently held on the existing register, so that there is no gap in transparency during transition. The clauses deliver a modern, proportionate and more accessible publication regime, in keeping with the Government’s ambitions for a reformed railway.

[Rebecca Smith]

Clauses 76 to 79 change the current duties on the ORR, the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to maintain a register, in sections 72 to 73B of the Railways Act 1993, and put them under duties to publish certain information. The ORR must publish documentation relating to licences; access agreements; access contracts, other than those using GBR infrastructure, for which GBR will be responsible; experimental passenger services; closures; and railway administration orders, except where that would affect individual public or commercial interests. The Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers must publish determinations that a closure is a minor modification, and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions. Each clause contains restrictions about publishing information that would affect individual, public or commercial interests. Each clause also allows for the publication of documentation that was previously contained in the registers.

Clause 77, which is very similar to clause 76 and, indeed, clauses 78 and 79 on the devolved Ministers, amends section 73 of the 1993 Act, on the publication of a register by the Secretary of State, so that they are under duties to publish information—in particular, determinations that a closure is a minor modification and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions. However, proposed new section 73(5) of the 1993 Act is interesting. It states:

“The Secretary of State may not publish particular information or documents under this section if it appears to the Secretary of State that publication of that information or those documents would be against the public interest or the commercial interests of any person.”

Can the Minister outline under what circumstances not being transparent is not in the public interest? What determines public interest? I would be grateful to hear the methodology in this instance. Further, the only person with commercial interests in the railway will be the guiding hand of the Secretary of State herself, as it is all public money.

I am sure that proposed new subsection (5) is standard practice in statute, but it raises an interesting point about transparency that I ask the Government to spend some time thinking about. Public trust is low—perhaps it is even lower today than it was when my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham wrote this speech—and any part of any Bill that allows the Secretary of State to get away with not publishing information under a perceived public good would look most suspicious indeed. I do think that, in the light of yesterday’s events, my hon. Friend will see the irony in the words that he wrote there.

Clause 77(2) allows publication of anything that was in the register before the Bill’s commencement. What is the timeline for publication, and will the Minister commit to publication? Those queries aside, Members will be pleased to hear that we have tabled no amendments at this time.

Clause 78, which relates to publication of information by Scottish Ministers, mirrors clause 77. As I mentioned, it amends the 1993 Act, and aside from my query about the ability that it provides to not publish information against a perceived public good, we have no objections to the clause—unless it falls outside the devolution settlement, but presumably the Minister can reassure the Committee that it does not.

Clause 79 relates to the powers of Welsh Ministers, which are similar to those enjoyed by Scottish Ministers. The rationale behind allowing Ministers to not publish information over a perceived public good remains interesting to me, but I see no need to revise the clause.

[Keir Mather]

The intention of these changes is not to reduce transparency, but to modernise what is published and how. The new duty focuses on determinations under the Railways Act 2005 and the exercise of key enforcement and closure powers, which are among the most significant decisions the Secretary of State takes in relation to the railway. Other publication requirements—for example, on designations, directions and guidance, and the long-term rail strategy—are dealt with in other clauses, so the transparency framework should be viewed as a whole, not just through the lens of these changes to the 1993 Act.

The shadow Minister raised an important point about how commercial and public interest protections interact with freedom of information and scrutiny. The clauses preserve a carefully balanced approach that has long existed under the 1993 Act. This is not a wholesale change in how that process works. The Secretary of State must not publish material where it would be against the public interest or commercial interests, or where it would seriously and prejudicially affect individuals or particular bodies. Those protections sit alongside and do not displace the wider legal framework, including freedom of information legislation and parliamentary scrutiny, which of course continues to apply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 76 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 77 to 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Nesil Caliskan.)

Railways Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Keir Mather and Rebecca Smith

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Mather]

I sincerely thank the hon. Members for Broadland and Fakenham and for Didcot and Wantage for the amendments, which are about discounted travel for members of the UK armed forces, veterans, their families and the police.

On amendments 46 to 55, first and most importantly, the Government fully recognise the enormous contributions made by members of the UK armed forces, UK veterans and their families. I am pleased to confirm that there are absolutely no plans to change the existing range of discount schemes, including the veterans railcard and the armed forces railcard, which also covers family members of serving personnel. Those are valuable discounts for people who have sacrificed in the public interest, and the Government are rightly committed to them.

In our view, however, it is not necessary to reflect that commitment on the face of the Bill,. The Bill gives continued statutory protection to the discount schemes that are already protected by the Railways Act 1993 to ensure consistency for groups for whom cost has historically been a particular barrier to travel, to ensure that our railway continues to be inclusive and to be consistent with previous Acts. That does not mean that other discount schemes are not at the forefront of our mind and will not continue.

[Rebecca Smith]

I appreciate what the Minister is saying but, if that is the case, surely we should just remove the whole clause. If the Government do not seek to remove any discount schemes, why do they need three discount schemes, and none of the others, on the face of the Bill? It seems to me that there is a bit of a contradiction there.

[Keir Mather]

As I have just mentioned, we want to carry over those schemes to provide consistency for those groups. We are carrying over the role of the discretionary schemes as set out in legislation. We think that consistency is important but, for reasons that I will come to later, we also believe it is important that GBR is able to move in an agile way and think about evolving needs when it comes to concessionary travel. It is important, in terms of legislative carry-over, to ensure that that remains in place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point and is absolutely right to note that we want the concessionary schemes to be able to evolve to reflect the needs and lived experiences of those they are designed to help. I will expand on that point in more detail later.

I will make some progress now. We are of the view that minimising the number of listed discounts on the face of the Bill will enable GBR to develop and adjust discount arrangements over time, reflecting passenger needs and other objectives. For example, in the future it might be desirable to rationalise the existing concessionary offer for current and former military personnel and their families to ensure consistent terms and conditions between the armed forces and veterans. GBR should be able to consider such options but, if we enshrine the schemes in primary legislation, it will become virtually impossible to amend and improve them.

The Government remain fully committed to supporting the armed forces community through travel discounts and other means. For that reason, while I sincerely understand the motivation behind the amendments, the Government do not believe they are necessary and I ask the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham to withdraw them.

New clause 51 requires GBR to provide free travel

“to and from events that commemorate Remembrance Sunday.”

As I have said, the Government remain committed to all those who serve, and that includes supporting their attendance at events commemorating Remembrance Sunday. Last year, as in previous years, the Government worked closely with the rail industry to ensure that serving members of the armed forces and veterans were eligible for free travel to and from services of remembrance across the country. Likewise, Poppy Day volunteers and collectors—and their children—travelling to the London Poppy Day events were given complimentary travel to support their fundraising efforts on behalf of the Royal British Legion.

[Rebecca Smith]

I appreciate the Minister’s reassurance that there will still be opportunities for people taking part in remembrance events. However, there are additional matters such as the poppy train, which comes up through the south-west with Great Western Railway. While such things may be worked through in conjunction with the Secretary of State, they are put on by a privately owned franchise rail company. Is the Minister effectively saying that it will be down to the individual business units to decide what happens within their railway scope, or will it be in guidance through the licence or something else? There are many things that have been provided by privately owned franchises that the Bill does not confirm will take place once the railways are state owned.

[Keir Mather]

While I do not anticipate provision around the specific instance the hon. Lady described—for example the poppy train being frozen into the licence of GBR—I do expect that GBR will be minded and motivated to continue to ensure that members of the armed forces community, veterans and their families can attend Remembrance Sunday services across the country. In our view, concessionary travel more broadly will improve the ability to do that. It will allow GBR to set provisions in an agile manner through an evolving concessionary fares scheme, rather than freezing them as part of the Bill—and, moreover, to set provisions that are not already locked into legislation and do not therefore need to be carried over, in the interest of consistency for the groups that they affect.

Turning back to my remarks on Poppy Day volunteers travelling to events with their children, I do look forward to that policy continuing in the years to come, although precise arrangements for how that will work will be confirmed closer to the time. All that being the case, we do not see the need for legislative amendments. These are things that the Government and rail industry already strongly support and have been providing for many years. A regulatory framework would only complicate delivery, which is more effectively facilitated at the operational level, so, while we wholeheartedly support the spirit of new clause 51, I urged the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell to withdraw it.

New clause 59 requires GBR to provide a scheme enabling free rail travel for police officers and police community support officers who are in full uniform or who are travelling for operational purposes. The Government gratefully acknowledge the service of police officers across the country and all that they do to keep us safe. The speed, skill and professionalism of the response by British Transport police and other brave first responders to the horrific train attack in Huntingdon last year is just one example of how police officers and all our emergency services save lives every day across our country.

While I understand the intention of the new clause in supporting that vital work, the Bill is not the correct place to set out the requirements for such a scheme. As the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage knows, any new staff travel scheme should be the product of negotiations between the relevant organisations. To prescribe a scheme in primary legislation sidelines that process and risks the creation of a scheme that is not fit for purpose, as well as unfunded financial impacts to the railway. Therefore, while I am sympathetic to the intentions of the new clause, the Bill is not the appropriate avenue to establish such a scheme, and I urge the hon. Member not to move it.

Clause 34 ensures that GBR will be able to provide discount schemes, such as those offered today as railcards. First, the clause continues the 1993 Act’s statutory protection for young, senior and disabled passenger discounts. Prices are historically more likely to be a barrier to these groups’ accessing rail travel, and they are covered by the protected characteristics of age and disability. Maintaining these concession schemes in primary legislation supports equal access to employment, education and essential services. It is worth noting that, while other concessionary discounts are not included in the Bill, the Government recognise that they too are important, and there are no plans to withdraw any of the discounted schemes currently being offered.

Nevertheless, the clause also gives GBR the flexibility required to simplify and modernise discount schemes across the network, and to evolve the offer where that is considered desirable to meet passenger needs in the future. Finally, the clause ensures that devolved operators will still be required to offer the core statutory discounts, and that they will have flexibility over whether to participate in the GBR scheme or to create their own.

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[Keir Mather]

Let me start by reasserting the principle that we do not want Ministers to be micromanaging the railway. However, the point about gin miles was very well made and I shall relay it to GBR.

[Rebecca Smith]

It was Plymouth gin!

[Keir Mather]

Well, there we are.

Let me start by responding to what the shadow Minister described as a probing amendment. He asked me to set out a little more detail on how we envisage the use of conditions on discounts, and I want to reflect the intent that he described. We want to ensure that eligibility for concessionary schemes and discounts is kept up to date, is reflective and is rationalised where necessary. A good example could be changing terms and conditions to change the eligibility criteria for the disabled railcard to include non-visible disabilities, which we have committed to in the accessibility road map. The intent to make sure that discounts are reflective of the lived experience of those who rely on them very much lies behind the provisions.

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendment 61, which would seek to remove GBR’s ability to set conditions on the use of discounted fare schemes. As drafted, the legislation will enable GBR to develop and adjust discount arrangements, if necessary, to reflect changing circumstances and passenger needs. More generally, it is worth noting again that the future framework on fares introduces clear and enforceable mechanisms that can be used to hold GBR to account, to ensure it delivers value for passengers and sustainable outcomes for taxpayers. Under this model, the Secretary of State will set parameters and guardrails aligned to GBR’s financial settlements. We believe that strikes an effective balance between strategic oversight and operational independence.

Railways Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Keir Mather and Rebecca Smith

Committee stage
Thursday 29th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

Good morning, Mr Western. It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship.

I thank right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions and for the clarity and succinctness with which they delivered them. I am afraid I will not be able to follow in their footsteps when responding to what is a chunky group of amendments and new clauses, so they will have to bear with me for this section of our deliberations. Clause 15 has been of considerable interest to members of the Committee and to the rail industry more generally, as we heard during oral evidence. I am thrilled that so much enthusiasm is being expressed for the strategy both verbally and in amendments, each of which I will now address.

Amendments 134 and 25 relate to the timing of the strategy. Amendment 134 would require the strategy to be set for 30 years. The Government have already confirmed that the strategy will cover a 30-year period. Setting that in legislation, however, is inflexible and unnecessary. Although the Government’s ambition is for a 30-year-long strategy, we need to provide for the ability to make reasonable changes to that term when needed.

Amendment 25 would remove the ability for the strategy to be amended within a 15-year period. That would fundamentally limit the railway’s ability to respond to unforeseen circumstances such as the covid-19 global pandemic. I hope the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham agrees that such a circumstance, or any number of other possible events, would clearly require the strategy to be revisited within a timeframe of less than 15 years.

[Rebecca Smith]

The Minister’s comments imply that a 15-year strategy would be fixed in concrete and could not be amended. I am assuming that the 30-year strategy will be fluid and flexible to take into account the circumstances that he has just mentioned, such as—God forbid—a future pandemic. I feel the way he has described the amendment is not entirely in the spirit of what was meant, so it is worth reflecting that. Ultimately, we all want a flexible railway; we are just trying to say that the strategy could last for 15 years instead of the current 30.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. My reading of the amendment is that it would remove the ability to amend the strategy within a 15-year period. Her broader point, about having flexibility to make determinations about the long-term rail strategy and cater for unforeseen events, technological innovations and global events that we cannot predict, strengthens the argument that we made about amendment 134, when we considered whether to set the period in stone and make it exactly 30 years. There has clearly been deliberation between the official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats about whether it should be 15 or 30 years, but we think that not being overly prescriptive is the best way to ensure that the rail strategy gives a long-term perspective and is sufficiently malleable to meet changing operational realities on the railway.

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[Keir Mather]

I thank hon. Members from all parties for their well-considered contributions to this debate. I shall endeavour to give full answers to them.

First, on the point made by the shadow Minister about how GBR will handle conflicting priorities that emerge within different strategies, as laid out by mayoral combined authorities or otherwise. As part of the business planning process, GBR will need to demonstrate how its integrated business plan aligns with the objectives contained in the long-term rail strategy and the Scottish Ministers’ rail strategy, reflecting the role that they have as funders of the network. The Bill also requires GBR to have regard to the various other national and local strategies. Fundamentally, however, establishing no hierarchy between the general duties to which GBR is subject, in my view gives the necessary flexibility to allow it to manage competing priorities where those may arise. It will be the responsibility of GBR to ensure that its decision making demonstrates consideration of potentially competing requirements and strikes an appropriate balance in making trade-offs.

On the statutory role of mayors as part of the process, GBR must have regard to their transport strategies. Mayors of course will have the right to request services and work in active partnerships with GBR. However, I also hear clearly the concerns of not only the hon. Member for South West Devon, but my hon. Friends the Members for Truro and Falmouth, and for Hyndburn about those who do not live in mayoral strategic authorities. I appreciate the hon. Lady’s scepticism when comparing this to our existing system. When it comes to engaging with private operators and with other arm’s length bodies, at the moment it feels as if parliamentary accountability cannot always be applied, and that where power resides is very diffuse, making it hard to tell who is responsible. We are actively trying to avoid and redesign that through the creation of GBR.

The hon. Member for South West Devon points to the fact that the business units might not have the teeth to engage properly and to reflect the needs of local areas, but I would say that we are creating a decentralised Great British Railways, where local areas are imbued with the powers to enter into dialogue with local authorities especially to avoid that being the case. That does not change the fact that the reason that within the Bill we have referenced mayoral strategic authorities is that we believe they are the right unit of economic and of demographic power to drive forward truly devolved change on the railway. That does not mean that we cannot not have regard to those who do not benefit from living within a mayoral strategic authority.

[Rebecca Smith]

Will the Minister give way?

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[Keir Mather]

I will give way briefly in a moment, but first I will build on the point that was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford about how services can run across the boundaries of mayoral strategic authorities. Through GBR, we will be able to enter into processes that engage not only with a mayoral strategic authority, but with such authorities acting in a sense as a representative of pressures that exist in cross-border dynamics that may arise. That offers another useful lens through which to engage with local areas that do not have a mayor. I appreciate that the hon. Lady might want a little more reassurance, so I will give way.

[Rebecca Smith]

On those local business units, how large an area are they likely to be structured on? That has not been in the debate to this point, and may reassure me. I appreciate that that may be a detail that is coming later, but some indication of how many counties might be included within each business unit would help.

[Keir Mather]

The hon. Lady must have read my mind about that detail being forthcoming. If she will allow me to take away that specific point over the break that we are about to have, I might be able to come back to her when we resume the debate.

For the moment, I will quickly turn specifically to the amendments in the group. The lead amendment would require GBR and the ORR to “seek to achieve” the long-term rail strategy and devolved strategies, rather than to “have regard to” them. The existing wording deliberately reflects the nature of those strategies within the system. The LTRS will take a 30-year perspective and set strategic objectives, rather than define a narrow set of deliverables.

We of course want GBR and the ORR to have regard to the strategies in all decision making, but they must also have the flexibility to balance long-term objectives with the practical business planning processes that operate over fixed periods. To legislate that such a vision should be achieved would not be in line with that principle, or with the overall approach to the general duties that set the conditions for successful decision making, but do not dictate specific outcomes. As I have reminded hon. Members, GBR, not the Government, will be running the railway.

New clause 37 also relates to GBR’s delivery and looks to establish a statutory annual reporting framework. The Bill already provides robust reporting and accountability arrangements. GBR is required to produce an integrated business plan for each funding period, which must be published and kept up to date, and that will give Parliament and stakeholders a clear view of GBR’s objectives, activities and expected outcomes. A separate statutory annual delivery report would in essence duplicate that information. Furthermore, the ORR will have a role in monitoring GBR’s performance against its business plan and will provide independent advice to the Secretary of State. Such oversight ensures that GBR can be held to account without the need for an additional statutory reporting requirement.

New clauses 33 and 36 relate to GBR’s long-term approach to securing rolling stock. The former calls for the Secretary of State to publish a long-term rolling stock leasing framework and sets out a substantial amount of detail on what that should include. Within that detail, there are certainly points on which we can agree, including the benefits of longer leases and the proper consideration of whole-life asset costs, both of which have been made more challenging to achieve under the franchising model. However, I profoundly disagree that the Secretary of State should dictate the detailed approach that GBR should take to rolling stock leasing, and with the specific terms set out in the new clause. It is rightly for experienced industry professionals within GBR, guided by the Secretary of State’s long-term rail strategy, to secure the best value and achieve GBR’s other objectives through commercial arrangements with the rolling stock leasing market. It should not be for the Government to dictate the detail of those arrangements.

On new clause 36, I of course agree that GBR should have a long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, which is why we are already working with parties across the industry to develop one. The strategy will be published this summer, and will remain a live document. GBR will inherit and implement it as soon as it is established. The new clause is therefore unnecessary, as by the time it would take effect, GBR will already be up and running with a long-term rolling stock strategy.

Amendment 218 would require GBR to have regard to the transport strategies of single strategic authorities. We are of course supportive of a more locally focused railway under GBR. The provisions in the Bill are pitched at mayoral strategic authority level, reflecting their growth across England, the vital role that mayors play in convening local partners and the scale and capability required to integrate rail into the wider public transport network. Nevertheless, all tiers of local government will benefit from empowered local GBR business units that are outward facing and actively engage local authorities on their priorities and local transport plans. That engagement will ensure there is sufficient opportunity for local authorities outside the mayoral strategic authority areas to collaborate with GBR on their priories and to consider proposals. I hope the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham therefore feels comfortable withdrawing the amendments.

Clause 16 places duties on GBR to have regard to the long-term rail strategy, devolved transport strategies and local transport plans. Overall, it seeks to ensure that strategic decisions on matters such as future services and infrastructure plans appropriately reflect national, devolved and local priorities. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Railways Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Keir Mather and Rebecca Smith

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Mather]

I defer to my hon. Friend’s expertise on that particular matter, but my overall point is that, rather than create events in our heads about when this enforcement power may be required, it is important that we give GBR, and the Secretary of State in exercising accountability in relation to it, a full suite of measures to ensure that it remains compliant with the law. Actually, specific duties outlined in the Bill encourage GBR not only to be compliant with the law but to deliver for passengers, including those with disabilities, and to make sure that we have a long-term infrastructure strategy for the railway and unify it in a way that serves the interests of passengers.

Amendment 16 would require the publication of the assumptions, criteria and objectives used when giving directions about fares. The Government have been clear that GBR will have a greater level of autonomy and flexibility over fare setting than train operating companies do today; however, given the need to balance passenger and taxpayer contributions to funding the railway, that freedom will be within strategic parameters and guardrails set by the Secretary of State.

While it is possible that the directions power could be used to set strategic parameters and guardrails for fares, there are alternative routes, most notably the ability for public service contracts awarded to GBR to contain fare parameters and guardrails. Nevertheless, it is crucial that the Secretary of State retains the powers to direct and give guidance to GBR on fares. It is necessary that the Government and GBR alike can respond to exceptional circumstances. Beyond that, the Government are committed to interacting with GBR clearly and transparently, and the refreshed role of the Secretary of State on fares is no exception.

Finally, I turn to two additional amendments, which relate not to directions but generally to the accountability of GBR. Amendment 24 would require the long-term rail strategy to be geared towards enabling GBR to meet the key performance indicators set out in new clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham. New clause 4 would allow the Secretary of State to dismiss the head of GBR were it not meeting the key performance indicators proposed in new clause 2. We have already discussed new clause 2, so I will not repeat my arguments, but in relation to amendment 24, the long-term rail strategy is clearly meant to be just that—long term. The amendment would make the strategy a document focused on short to medium-term performance indicators, which could change much more frequently.

[Rebecca Smith]

I would argue that my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham has tabled a key amendment, which relates to something that came up in the scrutiny of the Bill in the Transport Committee; indeed, I asked a question of the noble Lord Hendy about it when I quizzed him on how we as MPs are supposed to hold the Government to account for the delivery of the long-term rail strategy. I appreciate that it is long term, but we have to get from the short term to the long term, and if nothing is set out in the Bill about what delivery is supposed to look like on the route to the long-term delivery, we effectively cannot do our job. The Minister in the other place rightly said, “It’s going to be an amazing railway system. It’s going to be perfect,” but he could not answer me on how we hold people to account on getting from A to B. I would be interested in the Minister’s response to that if he is not prepared to accept amendment 24.

[Keir Mather]

It puzzles me that with all the other transport bodies that have been set up—National Highways is an interesting example—I do not recall a series of concerns having been outlined that one of the most robust systems of parliamentary democracy in the world was in some way, shape or form incapable of—

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[Keir Mather]

Clause 11 introduces schedule 1, which will amend part I of the Railways Act 1993 to set out GBR’s licensing regime in a way that broadly mirrors the existing licence provisions in the 1993 Act. I will deal with schedule 1 in more detail later, but for now I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Rebecca Smith]

I do not think I said this earlier, because I was merely intervening, but it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alec.

I appreciate what the Minister just set out in correcting the record from last week, because a lot of what I was going to say had to do with the lack of the licence. In spite of what he said, I still think that it is a problem for us to be debating clause 11, and later schedule 1, without that detail in front of us. It is very generous of him to say that we can be part of the consultation process, but given that we are encumbered with being here for 10 hours a week, I am not quite sure when would be able to do that. With all due respect, I still want to put on record how disappointing it is that we do not yet have the licence. Ultimately, Great British Railways is entirely premised on that licence: it does not operate without it, cannot deliver its functions without it, and will not create this supposedly amazing utopia of perfection for passengers and infrastructure deliverers alike without it.

Debating the clause without that context feels like a completely wasted opportunity—indeed, I fear that this debate will be incredibly short. This is something that I have seen happen with other Bills. The Minister will say that this is what the Opposition would also have done, but we were not in the position to set up Great British Railways, which—next to the NHS—will be the biggest Government-funded and backed body in this country. Without the scrutiny of hon. Members this morning, we cannot do our job properly.

Such scrutiny is in the interest of all the stakeholders—the public, the staff who work for all the railway companies that are to be brought into Great British Railways, and all the other stakeholders that provide services through open access or freight. Whether it is the coffee shop in a station or the trolley service on the train, all these people need this information, and I am disappointed that we cannot provide that scrutiny at this stage in the debate. I would welcome the opportunity to see the draft as soon as it is out, but it is disappointing that has not come in time for debate in Committee. No doubt similar comments will be made on Report and, hopefully, in the other place.

Railways Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Keir Mather and Rebecca Smith

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Smith]

That is a very long time ago. Under privatisation, the unions have done a very good job. In my constituency in the south-west, there are no seven-day contracts, for example. If I want to get a train up from my constituency on a Sunday, those trains are cancelled quite regularly, because the service relies on the good will of the staff to do overtime to make the train even come up to London.

Whatever we do, we need to look carefully at the terms and conditions that will be brought forward into this new public body. Up to this point, it has been down to each individual company to negotiate. That has been done with highly professional and competent union representatives, but we are not on a level playing field at the moment. As a member of the public, I want to be sure that those public sector staff are not receiving undue recompense for what they are doing, which would not be in accordance with other public sector bodies.

Private companies have been expected to give their staff a huge amount of benefits—quite rightly; that is their choice as private companies. If the staff become public sector, things like free rail travel need to be on the table. We must at least acknowledge those issues and make a decision to continue them, rather than assuming it is a given, which is down to unions to negotiate.

There is no conversation in the Bill about that TUPE-ing across of staff members. Value for money is really important. We do not want inequality being built into our public sector workforces simply because we are renationalising something.

Subsection (7) of new clause 39 provides that we should be showing where revenue comes from. That is absolutely justifiable. The private companies that will continue to operate in the railway system will have all that information available to their shareholders—to the people they are reporting to. If Great British Railways does not show that information, there is, again, no opportunity for scrutiny. If commercial retail income is flopping because GBR is not doing a very good job, we have no way to hold it to account for that. I do not see why it should be frightened to share that revenue information. It should instead see this as an opportunity to show good practice and how things could potentially progress under GBR.

I have one more point, which came up right at the end of the Select Committee hearing—I managed a question to the Minister, Lord Hendy, but have not seen a response. There is a huge amount of land and value that belongs to these railway stations, currently run by private companies, in some cases, including for things such as parking. What happens with all that income and all the opportunities for Great British Railways to potentially make some money? How will we know about that money and where it is coming from? New clause 39 seeks to bring that information to the fore and ensure that it is transparent and in the public domain.

Turning to new clause 40—this might be something of a segue, but I am going take the opportunity to put it on the record anyway—there is something about the aspiration to move from heavy taxpayer-funded reliance that speaks to the devolution conversation that we have been having. We have had multiple conversations, and I am sure we will have more, but ultimately GBR is being set up to give more powers to certain local authorities and local areas if they wish it, which is great—we want those communities to be able to control more of what happens. However, as we have been discussing, we are effectively developing a two-tier system, whereby anyone who is not in a mayoral authority will effectively be paying into the railway company and GBR, but not necessarily getting the levers to effect change locally. The Minister has reassured me that that will be done through business units and so on, but given that we do not know the scale of those business units or which regions and communities they represent, it is important that we know how that taxpayer money is to be used for funding across the country.

There has been a huge amount of storm damage in the south-west this weekend. Where will the funding come from under the new GBR? The south-west is not a mayoral strategic authority. Will we get our fair share of funding through the set-up for GBR? New clause 40 sets out the aspiration to move away from taxpayer funding and would surely create a more equitable system for the future.

Finally, new clause 44 would introduce a savings target. My hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham has been alluding to the point about the costs we currently see in the system, particularly around infrastructure. That has certainly come up in the Transport Committee, in terms of how much it costs to build a bridge or a new station and the lack of competition and challenge. The new clause would create an opportunity to ensure that we pay as little as possible for the best outcomes. We have had lots of evidence in the past few months to show that other parts of the world can produce the station infrastructure that we need for a lot less than we are paying for it. I believe that is down to how the system currently works, and new clause 44 would force us to look at how it could work under GBR.

[Keir Mather]

I thank Members for tabling amendments on GBR’s funding and financial framework. In this chunky group of important amendments and new clauses, I first turn to new clause 26, tabled by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, which would require the Secretary of State for Transport to publish a mid-funding period review of GBR’s funding, and new clause 41 from the shadow Minister, which seeks to create a GBR annual statement of financial performance.

In my view, the Bill already creates sufficient transparency about how GBR is funded. Further process could constitute unnecessary bureaucracy. Under paragraph 7(2) of schedule 2, the Secretary of State is already required to publish details of the financial assistance given to GBR using the funding period review funding power. Under paragraph 5 of schedule 2, GBR must publish its business plan and keep it up to date throughout the five-year period. Between those two commitments, the Transport Committee of the House of Commons will already have key information about how much funding the Secretary of State is providing to GBR, and the details on GBR’s business plan to understand what GBR is doing with its money. It would be unnecessary and inefficient to conduct an extra review.

New clause 34 would require the Secretary of State to set funding two years in advance of the funding period. First, I believe that it is misplaced to require that funding be committed two years in advance. There will inevitably be changes to economic circumstances over a five-year period, and new projects will surface. That was well acknowledged by all the witnesses at the oral evidence sessions, including those representing the railways supply chain. If there is no practical discretion, a settlement agreed two years in advance will be redundant before it even starts.

I can also assure the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that the Bill already accounts for the need to provide the railways with certainty, and ensures that the funding process completes before the start of the next five-year funding period. The ORR, which will run the process, intends to set deadlines so that funding is committed in time for the industry to prepare. Secondly as with new clause 26, new clause 34 seeks to introduce additional reporting requirements that are unnecessary, given the transparency requirements already provided for in the Bill.

I now turn to new clauses 39 and 40. New clause 39 would create a duty for GBR to achieve value for money and long-term fiscal sustainability. New clause 40 would require GBR to develop a transition plan toward ending any reliance on taxpayer funding within its first operational funding period. I agree with the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that GBR must deliver as efficiently as it can, ensuring good value for money and reducing costs to the taxpayer, and I assure him that the Bill is already very specific about GBR’s achieving value for money. Clause 18(2)(f) includes a specific legal duty on GBR and the Secretary of State to take into account

“the costs that will need to be met from public funds and the need to make efficient use of those funds”.

The ORR must also provide advice to the Secretary of State on whether GBR’s estimated costs in GBR’s draft business plan represent good value for money, with a requirement to publish a summary of that advice as part of the funding process. That is before the Secretary of State signs off on the business plan. Therefore, the hon. Member’s intent is already achieved by the Bill, and the amendment would only create extra bureaucracy and inflexibility without adding to transparency or financial sustainability.

A statutory transition plan to eliminate taxpayer funding would be unrealistic, and would undermine the railway’s ability to achieve its social goals. The reality is that taxpayer subsidy will always be needed for some parts of the railway. For example, while we aim to have the most profitable and efficient network possible, there will always be some lower-population regions of the UK in which rail travel will not make a profit and will need taxpayer subsidy. Clearly, it would not be appropriate for the Government to withdraw funding and neglect connectivity in those important rural regions, whether that be in Devon, Dorset or elsewhere—constituencies represented by Members across the Committee. Rapidly forcing GBR to operate without public support would be devastating for the economy and for the mobility of the public, not to mention reducing efficiency and the long-term capacity of the network.

Finally, new clause 44 would require the Secretary of State to set and publish an annual savings target for GBR. Introducing a statutory savings target risks creating a rigid measure that might not reflect the operational realities of the railway. Efficiency is already embedded in the Bill’s framework and will be a key consideration when GBR publishes its business plan and sets out how to meet its objectives, including on efficiency. Statutory targets are therefore not required to drive performance.

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[Keir Mather]

I respectfully disagree with the shadow Minister’s interpretation. This is about how GBR discharges those legally binding duties, and whether we should be overly prescriptive about the means by which it does so. It is important to have flexibility. Given the amount of technological change that we have seen in railway processes over recent decades, as well as socioeconomic factors and the need for GBR to balance those duties, we cannot be overly prescriptive about how we ask it to meet them—apart from the fact that it is legally required to do so.

I assure the hon. Member that GBR’s business plan will have not just a robust but a comprehensive set of KPIs against which it will be held to account. Progress against them will be tracked, and GBR will publish updates in line with the requirements in the Bill. The ORR will also monitor GBR and its business plan, and provide advice to the Secretary of State.

[Rebecca Smith]

I am thinking through the schedule. Forgive me if I am wrong, but ultimately, it is GBR’s business plan. Effectively though, there are going to be wheels within wheels, in terms of each of the business sectors, the different mayoralties, and the operators that are doing different things in different countries. To me, it feels overly simplistic: we have got one plan, which is the plan for the funding of the entirety of GBR, but if there are no KPIs at all, how are we supposed to even compare parts of the country against each other? Surely there will be different funding streams and business cases for different things. To me, it just feels like one overarching plan. How on earth are we supposed to hold the Government to account for delivering that, let alone ensuring parity and equality across the country, and making sure that funding is going into the right places, where it is most needed?

[Keir Mather]

That is a very important point. While the hon. Member points to a system that is simple in the objectives that it sets out for the railway overall, I see one that provides sufficient breadth to allow the organisation to develop over time and offer a system of operation that is closer to the communities it seeks to represent—and which, most importantly, is agile in adapting to changing socioeconomic circumstances and technological innovation.

The need for objectives that are not overly prescriptive, and the place for KPIs being in the business plan, allows a holistic approach to setting objectives for the railway, which can guide work overall for a national organisation, offering a single uniting mind, while at the same time not fettering GBR’s ability to evolve as an organisation in future.

In that sense, I believe we desire the same outcome: to make sure that the railway operates in the most effective way possible. In the light of the measures in the Bill that I have outlined, I hope that the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 125 would require GBR to include in its business plan information about how it will minimise costs to the taxpayer, while amendment 127 would require the ORR to advise the Secretary of State on this. I agree that it is important for GBR to deliver in the most efficient way that it can. That is why GBR, the ORR and the Secretary of State—all the people involved in the railway, and in the business plan—are all subject to a cost and efficiency duty, which is applied by clause 18. That will ensure that GBR aims to be cost-efficient at all times, which aligns with the intent of amendment 125.

Adding additional requirements for GBR in this space could create perverse incentives. For example, a focus on minimising costs, without other checks and balances, could drive GBR to cancel unprofitable lines even if they are important to local communities because doing so will save money. Clearly, it would not be appropriate for GBR to neglect connectivity in those important rural regions. GBR will also be robustly scrutinised from a value-for-money perspective by the ORR, and the Secretary of State will need to consider the ORR’s advice before approving GBR’s business plan. I hope that is enough to assure the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that the Bill can deliver the outcome he seeks without amendment, while allowing GBR the autonomy necessary to plan in the way it sees as most appropriate.

Finally, amendment 128 seeks to limit the information that GBR could redact from its approved business plan. I agree that GBR’s activity must be transparent, and that will be an important part of how we hold GBR to account. That is why the Bill already requires GBR to publish its business plans. The Bill provides for slightly more discretion for GBR to redact sections of the business plan than amendment 128 proposes. That is because it is important that all types of sensitive data, not just the commercially sensitive, are able to be protected. Personal data, security-sensitive information about stations or anything legally privileged are all examples of content that may need redaction from the final plan. A flexible requirement can be better used to navigate these nuances. However, let me be clear that GBR’s public law duties and wider accountabilities framework will ensure that GBR will not be able to hide information that is important and relevant to public scrutiny.

In the light of these considerations, I ask the hon. Member not to press the amendments.

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[Rebecca Smith]

I want to briefly speak to the proposed new subsection added by amendment 23, which would offer anybody given conditions by GBR the opportunity to appeal that decision to the Office of Rail and Road. The issue of accountability and the unequal playing field faced by those on the outside compared with those on the inside came up in the Transport Committee’s evidence sessions and last week. Having heard a lot of that evidence, the amendment appeals to what I think is the right way to do things. We must ensure that organisations engaging with the railway, or offering services to the railway—even if they are being paid separately for them—have the opportunity to appeal a decision that affects or impacts them. I feel that not having such an opportunity is particularly onerous. I support amendment 23 and concur with everything that the shadow Minister has said.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendments 22 and 23 and the hon. Member for South West Devon for speaking in their support. Amendment 22 seeks to require GBR to set reasonable charges for the delivery of its functions, and amendment 23 seeks to require the ORR to provide an appeals role for anyone who considers the charges set by GBR to be unfair.

On amendment 22, we clearly agree that GBR must act reasonably when setting charges and there is no suggestion that it will not do so. In fact, safeguards to ensure that GBR cannot levy unreasonable charges already exist in the Bill. Clause 18 requires GBR to act in the public interest and to ensure that railway service providers, such as devolved operators, freight operators and open access operators, can plan, invest and make decisions about their own businesses. When setting charges, GBR must therefore do so in a manner consistent with those duties, and it must not set charges that undermine operators’ ability to run viable and successful businesses.

Railways Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Keir Mather and Rebecca Smith

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse.

I completely appreciate what the Minister is saying. However, I suppose that the outstanding question is this: how will the general public come to understand what GBR is going to mean for them if it is not going to be established for 12 months and if there is not a fixed timetable for reporting back to MPs on how it is going? There has already been a fanfare about delivery; I am sure that there is going to be another fanfare from the Government once the Bill is passed. However, if we are going to take passengers on this journey, so to speak, we must ensure that there is an opportunity for us, as Members of Parliament, to be able to report back, even if it on an issue relating to our own constituency. I think the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham is actually quite sensible.

[Keir Mather]

May I draw the hon. Member’s attention to the fact that so far I have not made a single rail pun in the course of this debate—and I intend to keep it that way?

The hon. Member made a really important point about both parliamentary accountability and the general public being able to understand more about how GBR works and what it constitutes. Throughout the establishment of GBR, there are concurrent process that will allow the Secretary to State to outline more properly the long-term future of the railway and GBR’s role in it, including the long-term rail strategy, as well as work that we are already advancing on the accessibility road map and the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy.

Existing parliamentary structures in our Westminster democracy provide ample room for us to hold Government Ministers and the Secretary of State to account on the establishment of GBR. We have oral questions for Transport, as well as the ability to ask urgent questions on GBR’s establishment. Through both Lord Hendy in the other place and Ministers in this House, we have a real ambition to explain GBR’s provisions and ways of working to the general public, because we are confident in its ability to revolutionise how the railway runs on behalf of passengers, but I take the hon. Lady’s point.

Establishing GBR is the primary purpose of the Bill, and clause 1 provides the Secretary of State with the power, by regulations, to designate a body corporate as GBR. The clause enables wider provisions in the Bill relating to GBR to apply to a body corporate, such as the statutory functions and general duties set out in it. Following Royal Assent, a company will be designated as GBR, and it will consolidate Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd, DfT Operator, train operators and parts of the Rail Delivery Group into one organisation to ensure that GBR can be mobilised as quickly as is practicable.

The clause is essential for the Government to deliver our manifesto commitment to reform the railways by establishing GBR as the directing mind, bringing track and train together. I commend clause 1 to the Committee.

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[Rebecca Smith]

I thank the Minister for the clarity on the code of practice, which has also been echoed in some written answers I recently received from him. While we are talking about open access, what thoughts have the Minister and the Department given to working with independent retailers who have probably spent billions of pounds developing an app and a website that do a particularly good job? What work will they do collaboratively with those organisations, rather than viewing themselves as competition?

[Keir Mather]

The hon. Lady is right to point out that there are certain areas where GBR will operationally have to work with third-party retailers to ensure that they have the information that they need to continue to discharge their service.

However, another important point is that there are lessons to be learned about existing functions—where they work and where they do not work—in providing value for money for passengers and ease of access to the railway network. That is certainly something that we can take forward as part of the discussion on the Bill. I know that the Rail Minister consistently meets with stakeholders across the breadth of the railway industry, and it should be incumbent on us all to ensure that competitive measures, where they serve the interests of passengers, are incorporated into the way GBR works.

[Rebecca Smith]

The point I want to come back to is about value for money for the taxpayer. I want some reassurance that GBR will not go right back to the beginning of the journey of creating a ticketing app and website, which would effectively cost the general public an inordinate amount of money, when we already have a lot of platforms that could be brought in-house rather than having to be separate businesses.

On the value for money point, call me a cynic, but my understanding of computer programming is that it is not very cheap. I assume that that is something that GBR will have to factor in. Perhaps using some of the existing independent retailers might be a better value for money option.

[Keir Mather]

Of course, those independent retailers can continue to operate. GBR also has, as part of its duties—the things that it is required to follow by law—an interest in promoting the efficient use of public funds. We also think that there are significant economic benefits that can be realised through consolidation when it comes to aspects of ticketing.

As has been so ably pointed out, taxpayers and railway passengers are the same people. To that extent, people being taken in different directions by a vast variety of ticketing apps, not being able to realise the potential savings that are in place, does them a disservice economically. We believe that consolidation can offer them a smoother experience of ticketing and, hopefully, access to benefits that otherwise they might not be able to realise.

To return to the code of practice, it will be fully consulted on before its introduction, so it would not be appropriate for the Bill to pre-empt the specific provisions that it will contain. However, I can confirm to the Committee that the principles I have set out today, which I believe are consistent with some of the concerns that amendments 2 and 117 and new clause 3 seek to address, will very much guide ongoing work in this area.

On that point, I turn back to one of the comments made by the Opposition spokesperson about his concern regarding the setting of fares. I would like to make clear to him that it is not for the Secretary of State to interfere in day-to-day fare decisions. The Secretary of State will be limited to setting high-level strategic parameters to ensure that fares remain affordable for passengers and sustainable for taxpayers. GBR will make all of the operational decisions within those parameters and changes to those parameters would occur only to reflect GBR’s financial settlement, or in exceptional circumstances. That is, in my view, a necessary and proportionate safeguard to protect passengers, taxpayers and Government money. Therefore, as we are already taking significant and sufficient steps to deliver what the amendment envisages, so I urge the hon. Member to withdraw it.

I turn now to new clause 9 an amendments 131 and 132, which are dependent on it. New clause 9 would mandate the publication of a report covering various elements of GBR’s fares, ticketing and retail functions. Many of the items that this report would be required to cover relate to affordable and accessible rail travel—causes to which the Government are steadfastly committed. Affordability for passengers will be a key consideration when the Secretary of State sets strategic parameters and guardrails for GBR to follow on fares. As the Committee is by now aware, the Bill ensures continued statutory protection for concessionary discounts for young, older and disabled passengers.

Elsewhere, new clause 9 covers matters such as tap-in, tap-out payment and integrated ticketing, as well as third-party retailers’ access to systems and products. On integrated ticketing, we are already working with local authorities to integrate rail with local transport modes—and to trial or expand pay-as-you-go travel where appropriate. We are also progressing evaluations of how different pay-as-you-go schemes impact passengers, and the final reports will be published in due course. This work, which has not required additional legislation, is consistent with the ambition set out in various parts of new clause 9.

In summary, a legislative requirement to publish the envisaged report is not needed to deliver the outcomes that we want to see going forward. With that reassurance, I hope that the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage will agree not to press new clause 9 to a vote. Amendments 131 and 132 are dependent on new clause 9 and, for the reasons set out, the Government do not believe the report that new clause 9 would require is necessary, so I hope that the hon. Member will also agree not to press these amendments.

Railways Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Keir Mather and Rebecca Smith

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Smith]

I will touch briefly on two points that are not necessarily related, but overlap. First, let me build on what my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham said about the word “may” in clause 5(1). Anyone who was at the oral evidence session earlier this week would have heard the Manchester and west midlands mayors talking about wanting a meaningful relationship. They could not pinpoint exactly what meaningful would look like, but the gist was a desire to make sure that the relationship has some “oomph” or a decent foundation to it. I am therefore concerned about the use of the word “may”. Will the Minister define what “may” means and when “may” might happen? Ultimately, that is potentially the biggest get-out clause for not having to act. I know that that is not the intention, but I do not think that the Bill as drafted clearly describes that.

I referred earlier to the general premise of devolution and the Minister tried to reassure me about devolution outside strategic mayoral authorities, but I still do not think that the Bill is clear enough about what is going to happen. Given that the Bill sets up a railway system that the Government hope will last forever, it is not clear how other parts of the country will come into play. The Transport Committee has debated that and heard lots of evidence as well. The question remains. While I appreciate the Minister’s reassurances, they do not go far enough to help me and many others across the country to understand what is in the Bill for them regarding local control and power.

We have debated changing language today and I have already talked about the potential for referring to “local transport authorities”. I am intrigued about why subsection (5)(c) is the end of the line. It refers to a

“Passenger Transport Executive for an integrated transport area.”

Why does this not go further? We know that the Government have huge intentions for devolution and local government re-organisation but, despite their best intentions, that might not come to pass in the way they think.

How can the Bill be changed to reflect areas of the country that do not have a mayor or any of the bodies included in subsection (5)? How will the Government ensure that the whole country benefits from GBR, not just those areas that have great, charismatic mayors—of all colours? They keep being brought in front of the Select Committee as the solution to all of our transport problems, but unless other areas in the country get a mayor, they will not see the benefits of any of it. I know that that is the Government’s intention, but I genuinely do not think that it will be the reality for a number of years.

[Keir Mather]

I turn first to the definition of “may”, which feels as philosophically profound a point as it does a political one. I interpret “may” differently to the hon. Lady. Mayoral strategic authorities, and other local government organisations across the piece, have incredibly divergent aspirations, ambitions and existing structures through which they may want to realise their local transport opportunities and overcome challenges. Using “may” gives them the opportunity to explore the full range of them in a way that is not over-prescriptive. If we combine that with the role that mayors can have in the system to exercise accountability, that provides sufficient safeguards for the mayoral piece of the puzzle.

More broadly, building on the point made by the hon. Member for South West Devon and the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston about what the reality could look like, it goes back to the operational reality that we do not want GBR to be set up as a highly consolidated, top-down organisation that does not have a presence in local people’s communities. On the other hand, GBR’s integrated business units will provide closeness both to the people who maintain assets that are directly related to the railway, and to local government representatives, who will have a very refined view of how the system meets passengers’ needs.

[Rebecca Smith]

The Minister’s point speaks directly to something else I am concerned about: how the business units relate to local government areas. His explanation still uses language that makes it sound like the authorities will be much smaller, granulated local authorities rather than larger strategic ones. Can the Minister help me to understand how the business unit will work in an area that does not have a mayoralty—that top level of devolution—in place?

I do not want to be parochial, but two railway companies currently provide services in the south-west, and there are three in the far south-west, if we look at some of the other routes down from London to there. If there is a business unit, what is it controlling? Is it controlling the entire south-west? Is it controlling the railway company providing that service? Does it have to be linked to a level of devolution, or will it exist anyway, meaning that local councils, such as the one in my area, would still refer to them?

[Keir Mather]

The hon. Lady will have to forgive me, but I do not want to be over-prescriptive, and that is for two reasons. The first is that, as she outlines, there are very different cases in different local areas, and I want integrated business units that are set up as part of GBR to be responsive to those particularities. Those matters are part of operational design, which necessarily does not sit in the Bill, because we do not want GBR to be frozen in aspic through legislation. We want its operational workings to be future-focused and agile, as we would want any private organisation to be, which the shadow Minister has outlined.

Secondly, however—this relates to the Conservative and Liberal Democrat amendments—I do not want to create phantom clauses in the Bill and build in accountability structures for council systems that may be replaced by mayoral strategic authorities. We talk a lot about Christmas tree Bills in this place, but I envisage this as more of a bonsai Bill, with each part perfectly formed and maintained, so I do not want to put provisions into statute that quickly become irrelevant.

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendment 232, which would create an appeals process for relevant local authorities when a GBR decision affected rail services in their area. The Government support a more locally focused railway and an enhanced role for mayoral strategic authorities. Local partners know their areas best, and that is why GBR will agree partnerships with mayoral strategic authorities to enable close collaboration and joint working on local priorities.

We believe that the amendment is not necessary because clauses 81 to 84 require GBR to consult with mayoral strategic authorities and receive advice from relevant local authorities. Those are the proposed mechanisms through which mayoral authorities will be engaged when one of GBR’s decisions could have a significant impact on the local area. At that point, GBR can receive advice from relevant local authorities and will co-operate with them to find a workable solution. It does not make sense to require a statutory appeals process for something that engagement via other routes can easily solve. I also point to the fact that mayors can appeal the capacity plan or appeal against access decisions if they are aggrieved by them. They can also go to the ORR if GBR ignores the transport strategy, under the existing legislation.

The shadow Minister raised a really important point about the partnership practitioner guide, which was published earlier this month to set out how those partnership models might work. He asked me to point to which functions we have in mind through those models. It could be mayors agreeing local fare packages with GBR as they relate to passenger services, such as through the Bee Network. Hopefully that provides him with a little more detail, but if he has subsequent questions, I will be happy to answer them.

Amendment 214 would enable GBR to enter into arrangements with all tiers of local government, rather than just mayoral strategic authorities. As I have mentioned, the provisions in clause 5 are pitched at that level to reflect the growth of MSAs across England and the role that mayors can play in convening local partners and tackling regional challenges. That level of authority also represents the appropriate scale and capability for integrating rail with wider public transport, and the provision on the intersection with buses is obviously of great importance to the Committee.

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[Rebecca Smith]

I thank the Minister for the further detail that he has provided. A lot of these regions feed into London and the big cities. If local councils are holding their local business units to account, how does that connect with services going from those regions to big cities such as London or Birmingham?

[Keir Mather]

The hon. Lady’s comments speak to the advantage of an integrated railway with a single point of accountability—whether that be at the local level, or through an integrated business unit or GBR’s HQ functions in Derby. The reason for having integration is that accountability is not diffuse, as one single point of contact at the local level can radiate through the system to ensure that local residents get what they need. Beyond that, there are the duties that underpin GBR’s need to promote the interests of passengers as being both a national consideration and something that local businesses should have regard to.

Clause 5 also enables GBR to co-operate with relevant local government bodies, such as MCAs, by entering into formal partnership arrangements with them or by sharing information. The clause does not detail what the co-operation arrangements should be, as every local area is different, but arrangements could include local authorities funding GBR for additional services or enhancements beyond the national baseline. The information-sharing provisions can also allow for more integrated transport planning, for example, so that new bus stations can be located alongside new train stations. This provision enables GBR to co-operate with local authorities, allowing local areas the opportunity to genuinely shape the railway and have greater influence over services.

I have heard from many mayors and MPs that this is how the railway should work, and I know that a lot of members of the Committee have local priorities that the clause can help to deliver. In the future, GBR will be accountable for every part of the railway, and it should be able to do sensible business with every Member of Parliament to get the right outcomes for everyone. I commend clause 5 to the Committee.