Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateKate Green
Main Page: Kate Green (Labour - Stretford and Urmston)Department Debates - View all Kate Green's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI am going to continue.
The Bill will tackle the misuse of limited partnerships, including Scottish limited partnerships, and will modernise the law governing them. We will tighten registration requirements and will additionally require limited partnerships to demonstrate a firmer connection to the UK. Transparency requirements will be increased. The registrar will be able to de-register limited partnerships if they are dissolved or no longer carrying on business, or if a court orders that it is in the public interest.
Nor does the Bill overlook cryptoassets. It will give additional powers to law enforcement bodies so that they can more quickly and easily seize, freeze and recover cryptoassets that are the proceeds of crime or are connected with illicit activity. That will ensure that cryptoassets cannot be a conduit for money laundering, fraud, ransomware attacks or terrorist financing. Most notably, it will mitigate the risk posed by those who cannot be prosecuted but who nevertheless use their funds for criminal purposes. I am sorry to say that cryptoassets are increasingly being used to fund terrorism; we will crack down on that by introducing an amendment to counter-terrorism legislation that reflects those changes.
I turn to anti-money laundering. We will enable better sharing of information about suspected money laundering, fraud and other economic crimes between certain regulated businesses, allowing them to take a more proactive approach to preventing economic crime. As a result, businesses will be better able to detect crime taking place across multiple businesses and to prevent criminals from exploiting information gaps between them. We will also reduce the reporting burdens on businesses, enabling the private sector and law enforcement to focus their existing resources on tackling high-value and priority activity.
Threats evolve and are changing, so the Bill includes a measure to streamline and allow faster updates to the UK’s high-risk third country list. The list will be updated and published on gov.uk for everyone to see, reflecting updates from the Financial Action Task Force, the international standard setter, when it identifies countries with weak anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing and counter-proliferation financing controls. By removing the need to lay a statutory instrument before Parliament every time the list needs to be updated, we will reduce delays in updating the list and free up parliamentary time.
The Bill will add a regulatory objective to the Legal Services Act 2007:
“promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime.”
It affirms that it is the legal duty of legal regulators and professionals to uphold the economic crime regime. That will reduce the risk of lengthy and expensive challenges from regulated members over enforcement action. It will improve the ability of the Legal Services Board, as the oversight regulator, to manage the performance of frontline regulators in meeting that objective.
The Bill will remove the statutory cap on the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s financial penalty powers for disciplinary matters relating to economic crime. That will align the SRA with other regulators that have such flexibility. Fewer cases will be referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, resulting in faster enforcement. There will be a credible deterrent and a more coherent response to breaches of economic crime rules.
The Bill will enable the Serious Fraud Office to use its powers under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 at the pre-investigation stage in any SFO case, including a fraud case—an ability that is currently limited to cases of international bribery and corruption. This measure will mean that the SFO can more quickly gather the information that it needs to allow its director to decide whether to take on a case.
Cracking down on economic crime is a major plank of the Government’s beating crime plan.
My hon. Friend is right. Our law enforcement needs a level of agility to keep up with the scale and pace at which organised criminals and corrupt oligarchs work and the resources that they have at their disposal.
Hon. Members have raised concerns about the huge gap in the Bill when it comes to tackling fraud, particularly serious corporate fraud—many Members have raised concerns about the proposed legislation in that regard—but fraud more widely, too. It has become the single most common crime that we face, not just the most common economic crime. There were 4.5 million fraud offences—40% of total crimes—last year, and, shockingly, only 0.01% of them were charged. Charges for fraud have dropped. In 2015, 9,000 fraud charges were brought, but last year there were fewer than 5,000. That is a 47% drop in fraudsters being taken to court. Serious Fraud Office prosecutions plummeted by 60%, and SFO convictions were down from 10 in 2016 to just three last year. That is not justice, and it is not keeping people safe. It is as though the Government have shrugged their shoulders and said that criminals and fraudsters can have free rein. We must have proper enforcement in place and take action on serious crimes.
My right hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. I want to return to the question of resources for Companies House, and its new enforcement powers. Rightly, it will put most of its effort into dealing with serious organised crime and matters of national security. Does she share my concern that without adequate resourcing, the day-to-day frauds that affect so many of our constituents simply will not receive the attention they deserve?
My hon. Friend makes an important point, because enforcement in these areas saves money—for the economy overall, and often also for public sector organisations. We need a proper enforcement plan from the Government.
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate, which has faced in two extreme directions at once. On the one hand, Members have rightly talked about the potential of the Bill to address issues of serious organised crime and national security. On the other hand, we have heard again and again of constituents’ experiences of crimes that are low level in the scheme of things but are significant abuses, frauds and criminal behaviour, facilitated by the weakness of our company law. Like others, I will concentrate on provisions in part 1 of the Bill, and my interest stems from experience in my constituency of conduct by unscrupulous directors and owners who misuse registration and dissolution processes to avoid their obligations to their creditors and others.
I am pleased that the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the hon. Member for Watford (Dean Russell), has sat through the debate, and I am grateful to his colleague Lord Callanan and his officials for meeting me earlier this year to discuss my concerns. However, as we have heard repeatedly this afternoon, the Bill, while welcome as far as it goes, is a disappointment in terms of its reach and effect. Unless Companies House actually enforces the law and has the resources to do so, the Bill will simply fail to deter directors determined on misconduct from fraudulent and wrongful behaviour.
I turn first to provisions in relation to verification of identity and people with significant control. Clause 76 gives the registrar power to reject documents for inconsistencies, and clause 80 gives her the power to request additional information if inconsistencies are identified. As the Bill progresses, I hope we will get more clarity from Ministers on how inconsistencies in PSC statements will be identified by the registrar and how decisions will be taken regarding criminal proceedings. What processes will be followed? What information will be considered by the registrar? What resources will be available to enable her to carry out her task?
By way of exemplifying my concerns, of a group of eight companies controlled by Mr Jason Alexander and operating in my constituency, only two appear to comply with PSC registration requirements. BEIS and Companies House have been aware of this situation since at least 2019, yet he continues to operate the companies with impunity. How can the new provisions in the Bill have credibility when there has been such a history of lax enforcement?
A particular issue arises where companies are owned and controlled via a network of trusts, for which there is of course no public register, and these trusts are used to obscure the identity of the true owners. In a letter to me in May, Lord Callanan told me that if a trust has any ownership or control over a company, the company must “consider” whether that trust would have met any of the control conditions if it were an individual. He confirmed that if it does meet such conditions, the trustees of the trust may be persons with significant control. A request for companies merely to “consider” the position does not seem to be a very stringent requirement, and the Bill does nothing to prevent shares from being held in trusts in order to obscure ownership and control.
I hope there will be an opportunity in Committee to ensure that the registrar follows up on non-registrable relevant legal entities and to require that those who control trusts are identified. In addition, I cannot see how the Bill will stop phoenixing. Again, I hope there will be opportunities in Committee to consider how the Bill can be strengthened to make it easier for the victims of phoenixing to seek redress.
I turn now to the strike-off, dissolution and restoration of companies. The Government are well aware of concerns about compulsory strike-off. In their response to their consultation in 2018, they stated that
“where a company is insolvent, dissolution should not be used as an alternative to insolvency proceedings.”
But compulsory strike-off continues to be used in that manner; 94% of strike-offs are due to a failure to file required information, and R3, the insolvency practitioners’ group, says that it is that estimated 50% of those companies are insolvent. The compulsory strike-off process, in which the registrar contacts a company and if she hears nothing, can strike it off, suits directors who can use the simple device of ignoring the registrar’s requests in order to take advantage of compulsory strike-off to avoid their obligations to creditors and others, and to avoid late-filing penalties—this is income forgone to the taxpayer. Even so, the process of strike-off is dilatory. Aura Business Centres Limited, another of Mr Alexander’s companies, was finally dissolved by compulsory strike-off early this year, having never once filed accounts in the five-plus years since it was incorporated, and despite Companies House and the Insolvency Service being alerted to this in August 2019.
All that stands in stark contrast to the more onerous expectations placed on those who wish to object to strike-off. When a constituent of mine sought to object to compulsory strike-off in a recent case, she was told:
“We are unable to register your objection without documentary evidence to support your complaint.
Please provide evidence such as invoices, court documents, general correspondence or emails between you and the company, to show that you are actively pursuing them for an outstanding debt.
All evidence should be recent and dated within the last 6 months and must show the full company name, including the word ‘Limited’, or equivalent.”
So a much more demanding burden is placed on an individual who has suffered wrong and seeks redress than the do-nothing approach that can be taken by a company that wishes to use strike-off as a means to avoid its obligations.
R3 has suggested tightening up the compulsory strike-off process by automatically placing a company that fails to comply with its obligations into liquidation, with the process overseen by the Government’s official receiver. That would allow for earlier investigation into the conduct of directors and for the earlier recovery of misappropriated company assets for the benefit of all the company’s creditors. Directors could be made liable for the costs of liquidation, which would be an additional deterrent to misconduct.
Finally, concerns also exist about the process of restoring companies to the register. Currently, that can require a costly court order, creating a clear asymmetry between those who wish to avoid their obligations and those such as creditors, or insolvency practitioners, who need to put things right. R3 has proposed a system of administrative restoration in all cases, which could be triggered by a company director or a creditor once suitable requirements have been met, such as producing evidence of an unpaid debt or a commitment to petition for the winding-up of the restored company.
The fee for doing so could be similar to the cost of dissolving a company. I really hope that the Minister will now carefully consider the provisions on compulsory strike-off and administrative restoration that are missing from the Bill.
I conclude where I began. The Bill is fine as far as it goes, but its modest provisions will not act as a deterrent to misconduct if the registrar lacks the will, powers and resources to enforce them. I welcome the intentions behind the Bill but hope that, as it continues its parliamentary passage, we will be able to make improvements to it to give them full effect.