Charter for Budget Responsibility

Justine Greening Excerpts

Wednesday 11th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Justine Greening)]

I beg to move,

That the Charter for Budget Responsibility, a copy of which was laid before this House on 4 April, be approved.

I welcome the opportunity to bring forward the charter for budget responsibility for the approval of the House. The charter sets out the Government’s new fiscal framework following the passage of the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011. I will start by setting out the context for the reformed framework.

Following the general election last year, the coalition Government inherited the largest budget deficit in our peacetime history, which was forecast to be the largest in the G20. Our structural deficit was the largest in Europe. The fiscal situation that we inherited was unprecedented, so on coming into office, the challenge that we faced as a new Government of two parties working together to resolve the problems left by the Labour party was to bring order back to our nation’s finances. The new fiscal framework contained in the charter is at the heart of that task. We published a draft of the charter in November last year, which provided time for substantial scrutiny. Indeed, it was considered at all stages of the passage of the 2011 Act. Perhaps before I get into the details of it, it would be helpful if I set out the Government’s broader fiscal aims.

We believe that fiscal policy should restore sustainability to the public finances. That is essential so that we can reduce our vulnerability to shocks or a loss of market confidence, underpin private sector confidence, support growth and avoid an irresponsible accumulation of debt at the expense of the next generation. We have taken tough and decisive action since taking office, and of course last May, the immediate reduction of in-year spending brought us much-needed breathing space given the acute sovereign debt concerns across Europe.

The emergency Budget in June was the moment when credibility was restored to Britain’s public finances, and in the 2010 Budget my right hon. Friend the Chancellor set out the Government’s fiscal mandate, which is now, for the first time, included in a statutory document, which is the charter that we are debating tonight. That mandate requires the Government to balance the structural current deficit by the end of the rolling five-year forecast period, and it is supplemented by a target for the public sector debt ratio to be falling at a fixed date of 2015-16.

The measures that we set out in the emergency Budget, alongside the departmental allocations that we set out in the spending review, represent a comprehensive four-year plan to meet that fiscal mandate. The 2011 Budget reaffirmed the Government’s consolidation plans set out last year, and reinforced them by implementing a balanced set of tax and expenditure policies. In the assessment of the Office for Budget Responsibility, we are currently on track to meet the mandate and the supplementary debt target one year early, in 2014-15.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does the Minister recall that the decision was taken in the March Budget to increase both spending and borrowing by £34 billion over the following four years? Will she remind the House why we did that?

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[Justine Greening]

We are introducing a series of measure that will, over time, tackle our underlying structural deficit. My right hon. Friend makes the point that in the meantime we need to borrow to pay off the structural deficit, which the country will continue to have until we have been through the process of fiscal consolidation. Until our nation’s finances are in balance, we face a challenge, because debt interest payments will continue to increase. If we had not taken the action that we are taking, we would have the added problem that the rate of interest on that debt would also increase. It is important that we get a grip on the debt interest rate that we are paying, that we tackle the problem now and that we do not leave the problem of debt and the fiscal deficit to future generations. We need to get into a position in which the debt is affordable, because it is currently squeezing the availability of money to spend on the public services on which we all depend. It is critical that we continue with that plan.

Angel Gurría, the secretary-general of the OECD has urged our country to “stay the course”, which is precisely what we will do. Our plan has been praised by the international community and welcomed by the financial markets. As I have said, that will hopefully enable us to keep those interest rates lower for longer. Both the International Monetary Fund and the OECD went from issuing warnings and cautions to the UK regarding economic management under the previous Government to calling this Government’s measures essential and courageous. This Government’s decisive action has therefore taken Britain out of the financial danger zone, and the crucial first step in that process was restoring the credibility of our fiscal policy by replacing the fiscal framework. The charter sets out the new framework before Parliament and for the public.

Perhaps I should remind the House why the Government set up the Office for Budget Responsibility. The previous Government’s forecasts for economic growth over the past 10 years were, on average, out by £13 billion, and their forecasts of the budget deficit three years ahead were, on average, out by £40 billion. Those forecasting errors were almost always in the wrong direction. In fact, all the previous Government’s forecasts for borrowing for more than two years ahead since Budget 2000 underestimated the eventual figure. It is vital for credibility and confidence that the forecasts for the economy and public finances are produced independently, which is why we established the OBR.

In June 2010, the interim OBR produced an independent assessment of the economy and public finances ahead of the emergency Budget. Then, at the Budget, the OBR produced a revised forecast on the basis of the consolidation measures announced by the Government. In November, the OBR produced its economic and fiscal outlook under the leadership of Robert Chote, whose appointment last year was scrutinised and confirmed by the Treasury Committee.

We have moved the OBR on to a permanent status that is underpinned by primary legislation. The 2011 Act establishes in statute the provisions necessary to secure the OBR’s independence, and it received Royal Assent on 22 March. The permanent budget responsibility committee led on the production of the OBR’s March economic and fiscal outlook, which was published alongside the Budget 2011.

The origin of the charter lies in the 2011 Act, which requires the Government to prepare a charter relating to fiscal policy and the management of the national debt, just as with the previous code for fiscal stability. However, the 2011 Act enhances the requirements for the charter compared with the code, because it provides that the charter must formally set out the Government’s fiscal objectives and mandate. The charter must in addition specify the minimum contents of the Budget report. The 2011 Act states that the charter may include guidance to the OBR on how it should perform its duties. Finally, the 2011 Act requires the Government to lay the charter before Parliament. The charter fulfils all those requirements, consistent with the 2011 Act and the remit of the OBR.

The first part of the charter covers the Government’s fiscal framework. It sets out that the Government’s two fiscal objectives are first to ensure sustainable public finances that support confidence in the economy, promote intergenerational fairness and ensure the effectiveness of the wider Government policy, and secondly to support and improve the effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilising economic fluctuations.

As we have heard, the Government’s fiscal policy mandate is a forward-looking target to achieve cyclically adjusted current balance by the end of the rolling five-year forecast period. At this time of rapidly rising debt, that mandate is supplemented by a target for public sector net debt as a percentage of GDP to be falling by a fixed date of 2015-16. That will ensure that the public finances are restored to a sustainable path.

Crucially, the charter cannot simply be ripped up and rewritten whenever is convenient for a Government. Instead, if the Treasury wishes to alter the mandate, it must follow the formal process set out in primary legislation and return to the House for approval, which enhances the Government’s accountability to the House for their fiscal targets. The charter reiterates the Government’s intention also to adopt as the official forecast the OBR’s economic and fiscal forecast, and if the Treasury wishes to disagree with the OBR’s forecast, it will have to explain why to Parliament. Finally, the charter sets out the Government’s debt management objective and how they will set and report on their financing remit. The charter covers each element of the Government’s fiscal policy framework in a statutory document that the House has the ability to approve, enhancing the Government’s accountability for their fiscal policy.

I turn now to the second part of the charter. It is an important part of the charter that provides guidance to the OBR on its role and duties. The OBR’s main duty, as set out in the 2011 Act, is to examine and report on the sustainability of the public finances. The OBR has complete discretion over how it carries out its statutory duties, and the 2011 Act makes it clear that in all its work the OBR must be objective, transparent and impartial. As part of this independence, the OBR has the freedom to decide the methodology that it uses, the forecast judgments that it takes, the contents of its documents and its work programme for future research and analysis. This independence is delivered through the 2011 Act and therefore protected in primary legislation.

The purpose of this part of the charter is to set out extra detail on the OBR’s statutory responsibilities within the scope of the legislation. The charter requires the OBR to produce forecasts that cover at least five financial years, that provide sufficient information to allow the Government to use them as a basis for policy decision and that include all the Government’s announced policy decisions. The OBR must also set out the key assumptions that underpin its forecasts. In fact, it has already published far more detail in its assumptions and judgments than previous Budget and pre-Budget reports. The 2011 Act ensures that this will continue in future publications, while the charter provides further detail on the set of economic variables and fiscal aggregates that the forecasts should include.

Of course, at this time of heightened uncertainty, the charter also sets out that the OBR must be clear about the risks that it has factored into its forecasts. The OBR forecasts result in an assessment whether the Government are on track to meet their fiscal mandate, and the charter also sets out that the OBR independently scrutinises and certifies all the policy costings that feed into its fiscal and economic forecasts. Importantly, the 2011 Act ensures that the OBR has a right of access to all Government information it requires to deliver its remit.

As well as medium-term forecasts, the OBR will look to the longer term. As we have heard, the OBR has a duty to report on the sustainability of the public finances. It will therefore produce an annual fiscal sustainability report that will include long-term projections of the public finances covering the next 50 years. The first report is due out on 13 July. The charter sets out that as well as those projections, the report will include an assessment of the public sector balance sheet. The OBR will also analyse its forecasting performance, drawing lessons for future forecasts from the inevitable differences between its forecasts and out-turn data.

Finally, the charter provides guidance on a number of administrative questions on the timing of interaction between the Treasury and the OBR. These are necessary to ensure that the complex Budget process runs smoothly while preserving the OBR’s freedom to act independently. There is also a memorandum of understanding agreed between Robert Chote, as chair of the Office for Budget Responsibility, and other Departments to support their working arrangements. The charter restates and reinforces the independence of the OBR, and none of the guidance undermines its impartiality or objectivity.

This charter lies at the heart of our reformed fiscal framework. It strengthens institutional arrangements, reinforces the independence of the OBR and restores credibility and confidence to the public finance forecasts.

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[Kerry McCarthy]

We cannot get into a whole debate about macro-economic policy. Needless to say, I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis of how the financial crisis occurred. The point I was making—the intervention was not particularly relevant to it—was that this Government’s action in reducing the deficit too far and too fast is hitting people at the bottom end of the income scale far harder than it is hitting people such as bankers. If the Government were to adopt our suggestion of introducing a banking bonus tax again this year, as we did last year, they would not have to make cuts that hit people at the bottom so hard.

[Justine Greening]

I find the hon. Lady’s comments ironic in a debate welcoming a charter that sets out some guidelines on the operation of the Office for Budget Responsibility—an independent group of forecasters who have looked at and then provided input into distribution analysis showing that the richest people have borne the greatest burden of deficit reduction. I do not understand how we can have that debate on the one hand, yet hear the hon. Lady saying on the other hand that the burden has fallen on the most vulnerable. This Government have worked hard to protect the most vulnerable.

[Kerry McCarthy]

I shall come in a few moments to some of the Government’s measures that have done precisely the opposite of what the hon. Lady claims. Will the Minister explain why thousands of people with disabilities—people in wheelchairs, people with chronic illnesses and so forth—were protesting outside Parliament today under the banner of the Hardest Hit campaign, supported by reputable charities? Is she saying that being hit by what the Government are doing is a figment of their imagination?

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[Justine Greening]

With the leave of the House, I shall sum up the debate and respond to some of the points that have been made. I thank hon. Members for their contributions. As I said at the start of this evening’s proceedings, it is essential that we restore the sustainability of the public finances. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) set out clearly the challenges that we face in doing that, the steps that we are taking and why they are so important.

The hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) asked about the relationship between the OBR and the Bank of England and their ongoing discussions. Ultimately, it is for the OBR to decide how it wants to work with the Bank of England. It must make those decisions on its own and carry them out independently. The OBR’s forecast will be used as an official forecast for the Government. As the hon. Lady knows, that is provided for in the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 and in the charter. She asked what would happen if the Chancellor of the day did not agree with the OBR forecast. He would have to come to the House and explain why not, and he would be accountable. That is one of the safeguards that we put into the Act, and it will strengthen the OBR’s role.

The hon. Lady raised concerns about paragraph 4.12, about the OBR not providing “normative commentary”. We had the debate in Committee and as the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill passed through Parliament. It is critical that we preserve the OBR’s impartiality by ensuring that it never gets dragged into political debate on specific policy measures. Paragraph 4.12 puts that beyond doubt.

I take this opportunity to reassure my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham. He spoke about ensuring that the OBR does its job, not just in terms of what it is meant to be doing, but in terms of the quality. As he knows, the Act—the relevant schedule—provides for the OBR to have non-executive members. It will periodically have an external review of its effectiveness. Aside from the normal scrutiny mechanism, the House can ask the Treasury Committee to examine the effectiveness of the OBR. So those safeguards will be in place to make sure not only that the OBR operates as intended and operates independently, but that there will be scrutiny of the quality of its work. One of the reports that it must publish periodically is its own assessment of how effective it is at forecasting.

With those safeguards in place, the charter, along with the Act, restores confidence and credibility to the public finances. It sets a reformed fiscal framework before Parliament and the public and complements the Act by providing extra detail on the OBR’s duties within the scope of it.

My hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (David Rutley) talked about his role on the Treasury Select Committee. I think that he was wise to point out that the Committee has a unique role, in relation to other Select Committees, because it will have a role in appointing members to the budget responsibility committee. That is an important role that will also strengthen the OBR’s organisation and its evolution over time.

The OBR has complete discretion over how it performs its statutory duties. It will make its own judgments on the economy and public finances and will use its own methodology to produce forecasts. It will make its own assessment of the Government’s performance against the mandate. The charter reinforces that independence and, by providing greater clarity on the interaction between the Treasury and the OBR, sets out the OBR’s key relationships and how it will work with the Treasury and other Government Departments. The charter reiterates our intention to adopt the OBR’s economic and fiscal forecasts as the official forecasts, as we have done since last May.

The hon. Member for Bristol East asked whether the Chancellor will respond to those forecasts as they come out. He has in fact responded with an oral statement to every forecast the OBR has published to date. Compared with the code for fiscal stability introduced by the previous Government, the charter provides a greater degree of accountability before Parliament for the fiscal framework. It requires us to set out formally our fiscal objectives and mandate before Parliament and specifies the contents of the Budget report. The hon. Lady said that it is obvious that there will need to be a Budget report, but I still think that it is important to have that clearly set out. Many people expected the previous Government to get on with the ordinary course of business by having a comprehensive spending review, but of course that was cancelled. Therefore, I think that it is important to put what seem to be normal assumptions about how a Government should approach things into the charter, which is precisely what we have done in relation to the Budget report.

In conclusion, the charter reflects our commitment to restore order to the public finances. It sets out our fiscal objectives and mandate for parliamentary approval. It strengthens governance arrangements and institutions and reinforces the independence of the OBR.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Charter for Budget Responsibility, a copy of which was laid before this House on 4 April, be approved.