NHS Federated Data Platform

Julian Smith Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Westminster Hall

[Martin Wrigley]

I do agree. Palantir will not enable GPs, paramedics or anybody else to see hospital data. They will have to go through Palantir to see that data, and they will not be able to access patient records from the hospital to the GP or vice versa.

Like any data warehouse, Palantir requires connecting software that reaches into each of the NHS’s internal systems and gathers data. That data gathering is being done NHS trust by NHS trust, as there are differences inside each one. That is embedding the use of Palantir-owned code inside every NHS trust by creating custom connecting software to connect and translate data.

In Devon, the local ICB has celebrated as a major success the adoption of the same electronic patient record across Devon’s four main hospitals. It has just gone live in Torbay trust, which serves most of my Newton Abbot constituency. In an organisation as diverse as the NHS, with such distributed responsibility, we can either impose one massive system to rule them all or build interoperability. Interoperability would allow GPs to see hospital records and vice versa. Palantir is not doing that.

Interoperability is how massive systems, such as the internet or mobile phone networks, work. They do not rely on one single system or supplier. In that way, a modular system, a bit like Lego, can be constructed that, overall, is immune to changes elsewhere in the wider environment, providing only the specific data required to deliver improvements in services. That form of system builds long-term capability and delivers without requiring a locked-in, expensive subscription. It can also be built by a UK tech consortium in parallel with phasing out Palantir, which would build UK sovereign solutions, tech skills and competencies.

Meanwhile, NHS England’s October 2025 medium-term planning framework mandates all NHS providers of acute, community and mental health services to sign up to the FDP, and it demands that any existing local data analysis systems are removed. That results in further lock-in.

[Sir Julian Smith (Skipton and Ripon) (Con)]

One of the issues that the hon. Gentleman has not discussed in his excellent speech is governance. The commissioner of the contract is the NHS, and it is also the main oversight body. He has put forward a black-and-white solution—end or maintain the contract—but is there not a case for a more robust governance structure? That could involve giving more powers to the National Data Guardian or setting up a bespoke oversight body for this contract.

[Martin Wrigley]

If the right hon. Gentleman looks at the contract, he will see that it is subscription only: deliveries under supplier software—none; deliveries under third-party software—none. Any programming written under the contract is owned by Palantir. The contract has to be adapted for any next phase so that Palantir can be moved out.

Palantir is not only the wrong technical solution; NHS users report that it is awful to use. An open letter to NHS England said:

“we already have similar tools in use that presently exceed the capability and application of what the FDP is currently trying to develop or roll out”.

An NHS worker said:

“We’re being forced to use a convoluted system that makes even the simplest tasks feel like pulling teeth. It’s demoralising, and honestly, it’s a waste of everyone’s time and public money”.

An NHS data analyst said:

“Not only could similar functionality have been delivered at a fraction of the cost, but the existing tools are already better integrated, more intuitive, and more conducive to collaboration”.

In early 2025, Greater Manchester ICB reported that the FDP

“does not currently have any system-level products that offer the same or better functionality, compared to the custom-built system already in use for NHS GM”.

An NHS developer concerned about Palantir wrote to me to say:

“There are any number of reassuringly boring companies that could deliver this contract, many of them based in the UK, and then we could just get on with the exciting work of using technology to improve care for our patients”—

quite right too.

We must halt this path of chaos before the costs build any higher. I ask the Minister to use the change from NHS England to allow a change of direction towards a distributed, interoperable UK sovereign solution. Will the Minister cancel the expansion of the FDP to community and mental health service providers?

Palantir is the wrong supplier. Its name comes from a magical seeing stone in “The Lord of the Rings”. It is how the evil lord Sauron corrupted the good wizard Saruman—I think we should have known at the beginning. Funded initially by the CIA as a defence contractor, Palantir’s vision is to become the default operating system for data-driven decisions in high-stakes institutions.

Palantir’s chair, Peter Thiel, wrote:

“I no longer believe that freedom and democracy are compatible.”

He has warned about the coming of the Antichrist in the form of an oppressive world government. Palantir’s stated aim is to have domination over most Government Departments across the US and allies, including healthcare Departments. Louis Mosley of Palantir UK recommended that the UK Government develop a “common operating system”, combining healthcare and central Government data. That is just mad.

Palantir is a company that builds lock-in into its architecture as a clear business tactic. Palantir’s Foundry system was installed for £1 to manage covid vaccination programmes, after high-pressure lobbying and persuasion. It bought the advantage for future contracts by providing the system for free. The company had no healthcare experience prior to the pandemic, and demonstrates a lack of data security by design. However, the main issue is trust. The future of the NHS depends on intelligent use of data with patients’ trust. Gaining the public’s trust for research that involves AI will be hard enough anyway, without a company like Palantir controlling it all.

Palantir and its NHS England advocates claim big benefits for the NHS. The BMJ this week published analysis of the initial Palantir trial at Chelsea and Westminster hospital that shows the benefits to be exaggerated and untrue. The National Audit Office has yet to assess the value of the deliveries to date and cannot confirm the numbers in Palantir’s claims. Even if we accept that Palantir has delivered some benefits, they are hardly worth £330 million or the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority’s estimated whole-life cost of over £1 billion.

In addition, Palantir’s history with the Government is not good. After secret meetings and intensive lobbying in 2020, Palantir won a £27 million border control contract—without competitive tender, just like the Ministry of Defence contracts. The border system was subsequently terminated as it had no users and no value.

We need to replace Palantir, the chaotic, all-seeing, single-point-of-failure, data-hungry AI solution. We need a well-architectured, security-by-design, resilient and nationally significant bedrock FDP in the NHS for years to come that must be powered by UK technology. That will build UK skills and business, pay dividends for years to come and build trust from the UK public. The British Medical Association says that

“an FDP has the potential to transform how care is delivered, but only if it is done right—via a UK-owned FDP that has the full confidence and support of the profession and patients.”

I ask the Minister to take action now to stop the expansion of the Palantir solution, to review the dreadful subscription contract with Palantir, and to rebuild the FDP project to deliver a sound, sovereign system to make our NHS thrive in the world of data-driven health.