Trident Renewal

Debate between Julian Lewis and Nick Harvey

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir Nick Harvey]

As I have said, it was something that we calibrated to be our need in 1980. If one casts one’s mind back to 1980, one will see that our conventional defences were very much greater than they are today. The scale of the nuclear deterrent that we mounted at that time was a relatively small proportion of a large defence, but what we are considering now, as we look forward to the next 30 or 40 years, is a much greater proportion of a much smaller defence because of the succession of cuts that have been made since then.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman says that we can look forward in anticipation of certain types of dangers but that there is no known nuclear threat. May I remind him of how suddenly the crisis in Ukraine blew up; if it were to develop, as it could, into all-out war that then spilled over into Lithuania or Poland, which are NATO members, nuclear deterrents might become very relevant indeed, very quickly.

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I will come on to talk about the implications and the consequences of using nuclear weapons, but—although the hon. Gentleman is right to say that the security situation in and around Ukraine deteriorated rapidly—I do not accept for one moment that anything that has happened there makes the prospect of nuclear conflict between ourselves and Russia any more likely than it was before all that started.

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[Sir Nick Harvey]

If the hon. Gentleman bears with me, I shall do my best to explain my position and where I am coming from.

I profoundly agree that we should not allow the Barrow submarine-building capability to fall apart—if we do not place such orders at that shipyard in the next few years, it will be necessary to give it other contracts—but I do not support the construction of submarines whose sole purpose and capability is to carry a nuclear weapon, thus committing us to a £30 billion investment programme with but one purpose and forcing us to be a nuclear power for the next 30 and 40 years unless we are prepared to write off a capital investment of that scale.

The United States has used some of its Ohio class submarines for quite different purposes. The US has developed a means of firing conventional weapons through their missile tubes, and it has used those submarines in a tactical role and in support of special forces operations. To my mind, it is certainly the case that if we are to build new submarines—I think we should, for the reasons I have given—we must ensure that they are capable of performing other functions, as the United States has done with its large submarines.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman is being terribly generous in giving way. The fact is that his party’s policy, strange though it is, is to build another two Trident submarines, however they are deployed. Does it not follow logically, given the terms of the motion, that the hon. Gentleman and his party should vote with us against it?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

No, because that would imply that we were in favour of a full-scale, like-for-like replacement of the Trident programme. [Interruption.] If one is going to be pedantic, the motion refers to a missile system that is not due for replacement for some years. In fact, what needs to be decided in the next year or so is whether we shall build new submarines. I think we should, but if we make such an investment, it is essential that the submarines are capable of performing other functions. I do not believe that it makes any sense whatever for us to sail the high seas 24/7, waving weapons of mass destruction at the rest of the world, because we thought it was necessary in 1980 or because we would be left looking embarrassed if we did not make that £30 billion investment.

The Defence Secretary seemed to suggest that to adopt any deployment posture other than continuous at-sea deterrence was somehow risible and laughable, but many sensible studies by serious people have looked at a ladder of different postures for the UK to take. My belief is that we should for the time being retain the components of a nuclear deterrent—the warhead, and the ability to look after it; the missile, and the arrangement with the Americans; and the submarines capable of firing a nuclear weapon—and maintain a highly skilled work force who are regularly exercised in how to put back together the deterrent’s components. NATO air-based nuclear systems in eastern Europe operate on the same basis of a well-exercised drill to put the pieces of the deterrent together if it is thought necessary.

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[Sir Nick Harvey]

I invite the Minister to look at how the NATO air-based nuclear capability in eastern Europe operates, because what I am describing is a precise replica of what goes on there. That capability is not on constant patrol or constantly armed; it exists in its component parts, and there is a well-rehearsed exercise for mobilising it and putting it together. Does that have a deterrent impact? I believe it does. If anybody intends to strike faster than that capability can be put together again perhaps it would not, but who is going to do that?

This brings us to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which I think are singularly under-perceived in this country and many others, although that is changing fast. The participation of many Governments at conferences—the first in Oslo, the second in Mexico, and the most recent in Vienna—is bringing a far greater degree of awareness around the globe of the impact of using nuclear weapons. I do not believe that the public who have come of age since 1983—the last time we had a meaningful national debate about our nuclear deterrent—understand what the consequences of unleashing the payload of one of our Vanguard submarines, armed with Trident missiles, would constitute.

If one of our submarines were to unleash its payload against, for instance, Moscow—those were the traditional criteria on which we based our capability—I think that some people in this country, possibly even in the House, labour under the misapprehension that the consequences would be pretty grim for people in Moscow and perhaps not very clever for those a few hundred miles around. In reality, if we were to unleash the payload of one of our submarines, the consequences would be global and felt for at least a decade, and at least a billion people would be at risk of dying. The more widely that is understood, the more inconceivable it is that any sane person could ever push the button, and the more widely that is understood, the less deterrent effect the possession of this great paraphernalia comes to have.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that although the British deterrent is used all the time to deter, the only scenario in which it is conceivable that it would be fired would be in retaliation for someone having fired a nuclear salvo against us? Therefore, all the consequences that he mentions would already have happened, and the only question would be whether it would be worthwhile replying under those terrible circumstances. The purpose is to prevent anyone firing the weapons in the first place, and that is how we avoid the environmental consequences.

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I am surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman make that case, because I believe he is right. After such a volley had been unleashed against us, no earthly good could possibly be done by firing one back in retaliation, and the more we think our way through that, the more pointless the whole exercise becomes. Indeed, it is not simply pointless, but the rest of the world is becoming increasingly irate about the complacency of those who continue to have these weapons while saying to everybody else, “You’ve got no right to them, but we’re all right, Jack. We’re going to have them.” That situation is not sustainable for much longer, and it was regrettable that the P5 boycotted the first two conferences. It is much to be welcomed that there was British, American and even Chinese attendance at the most recent conference, because I predict an increasing clamour from other countries around the globe for the nuclear states to begin taking steps down the nuclear ladder. Traditionally that has been done by reducing the stockpile of warheads, but today I have attempted to explain that there are other ways of doing that, and the posture we strike and the way we use our capabilities has an important part to play. It is not 1980 and we do not face the threats we thought we faced then; it is a very different world and there is a way for us to begin climbing down the nuclear ladder. We have the opportunity to do that, and we should take that opportunity and get on with it.

Trident Alternatives Review

Debate between Julian Lewis and Nick Harvey

Wednesday 17th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

I commend my right hon. Friend the Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Danny Alexander) on bringing this piece of work to fruition, and I believe it has genuinely taken an open-minded look at the whole issue. The review did not set out at the beginning by offering preconceived conclusions to those carrying out the work, and I believe it has been a worthwhile exercise. I also note that the principal reason why alternative systems were found not to be viable was not—as some have suggested—because they were not technically viable. In contrast, it was because the length of time such alternatives would take, and the amount of money it would involve to equip a warhead to an alternative system, would make such alternatives prohibitive in the medium term. That is the expert view of those tasked with looking at the matter. If that is the conclusion to which they have come, I for one would not seek to question it and we must accept it.

The second part of the study, which looks at alternative postures, concerns the debate that this report can now seek to inform and trigger.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

Not at the moment.

Given that this report was commissioned by a Government who are a coalition of two parties with fundamentally different opinions on the issue, it was never going to come forward with proposals. It was about considering the alternatives and informing the debate that might follow.

I contend that nobody can rationally argue that the nature and scale of the nuclear threat that the United Kingdom faces in 2013 is the same as it was at the height of the cold war. Then we had a known nuclear adversary, the Soviet Union, that had British targets in its sights and we, similarly, had Soviet targets in our sights. We believed that it might strike at a moment’s notice and we therefore thought it was essential that we were ready at a moment’s notice to strike back. But 25 years after the Berlin wall came down, one cannot rationally argue that the threat we face today is the same as it was then. We can debate what threats we might face in the future, but we cannot argue that the threat we face today is the same as it was in 1980.

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[Sir Nick Harvey]

I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend that we must consider the threat we might face in 20, 30 or 40 years’ time, so we must therefore ensure that we have a nuclear deterrent in 20, 30 or 40 years’ time that is capable of deterring the threat that we might face at that point. My point is simply that the threat we face today is not the same as it was at the height of the cold war. It therefore cannot make sense to operate it on a 24/7 continuous basis facing a threat that simply does not exist at the moment.

I understand the view of those who say that we must retain enough capability to ensure that, in the future when we face threats we cannot anticipate today but know intuitively could come, there is enough of a deterrent to repel them. That is perfectly logical, but it does not make sense for the nuclear deterrent—uniquely among our military capability—to be on patrol the whole time when even our national security strategy has stressed that it is for a second-tier threat and when we do not use our military capability to deter the primary threats on that continuous patrolling basis.

To answer the points made by my right hon. Friend the former Defence Secretary, I am not saying that it might not be necessary in the future to crank up to a more rigorous posture—it might well be—but I do not see how anyone can rationally argue that we have to do that at the moment. The idea that the nuclear capability has a deterrent effect at all only by being patrolled 24/7 is clearly absurd. All the rest of our capability has a deterrent effect against a variety of aggressors in a variety of scenarios and we do not see the need to exercise any of it on a 24/7 basis.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I could just about stay with the hon. Gentleman’s argument if he was saying that we ought to build four submarines but not send them all to sea until the situation became worse, but he is not saying that. He is saying that we should build only two or three such submarines, which would mean if the situation got worse, we would not be able to reinstate continuous-at-sea deterrence because we would not have the submarines. Without the submarines, we cannot have the posture, much as he might like to reinstate it when the situation gets worse.

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I can agree to the extent that we must ensure that we build enough capability that we can mount the deterrent we will need at the point that we need it. What that will comprise is a matter for further debate and further study and I note with interest that even those on the Labour Front Bench and the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), acknowledge that it remains to be seen whether we need four or three to do that.

Collective Ministerial Responsibility

Debate between Julian Lewis and Nick Harvey

Wednesday 13th February 2013 Westminster Hall

[Sir Nick Harvey]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point, and puts the case from his point of view; I do not criticise him for so doing. Of course, in the coalition agreement, it was agreed that the Liberal Democrats would support legislation that would provide for a redrawing of the boundaries and the creation of 600 seats. The Liberal Democrats fulfilled that obligation in its entirety a couple of years ago. We did not agree to support any barmy map that happened to emerge as the product of that process. We fulfilled our part of the deal some 18 months ago.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his courtesy in giving way, as he always does. In a spirit of consensus, may I move away from the particular example to the general point? To form a coalition, there had to be a coalition agreement. Does he acknowledge that a code of ministerial collective responsibility should apply to the contents of that collective agreement? If so, what is it, and why will the Prime Minister not make it public?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

It is certainly not for me to speak for the Prime Minister or the Government, because I am no longer a member of the Government. However, my hon. Friend is right: the question is about the nature of the agreement made. At the outset of a five-year term, an attempt is made to agree a coalition agreement that is to run for the five years. Such an agreement was novel territory in UK politics. We had not seen one for a long time. There were pressing economic circumstances in May 2010, as there still are today, and the judgment was made by both sides in the negotiation that speed was of the essence. However, if historians draw any lessons from this experience, they will surely come to the view that we may have something to learn from the experiences typical in continental Europe, where coalitions are negotiated over weeks, or even months.

Agreements reached in a matter of a few short days, however comprehensive they seek to be, cannot by definition possibly take account of every twist or turn that current affairs or political life will take in the five years that follow. There are, of course, “Events, dear boy, events.” Governments will have to take a position on issues that they had not anticipated at the start of a five-year term; that is inevitable. Collective responsibility, in the sense in which we have understood it, can exist only where there is a collective view, a collective agreement and a collective decision between the two parts of the coalition that they will proceed in a certain way. Where something breaks down or has not been anticipated, or something new arises on which the two parties are unable to reach agreement, it is inevitable that we will not be able to apply a traditional doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility. We should not fret about that or worry ourselves unduly about it.

Transparency has been mentioned. On the point that the hon. Member for East Londonderry (Mr Campbell) made with reference to Northern Ireland, when there are two parties in a coalition, the world can see, recognise and understand that there are differences of view because there are different underlying philosophies. That is healthy and transparent. In Labour’s years in office, there was the running soap opera of the view in No. 10 and the view in No. 11 Downing street. I should have thought that the differences of view between the wings of that Government were every bit as large as those within the coalition, but there was no transparency there—nobody could really see or understand the debates. We relied on the columns of Mr Andrew Rawnsley and others, who provided us with a running commentary on what they thought was going on. It is far more transparent when two parties with acknowledged differences are conducting a debate. There will always be occasions when the two parties are not able to reach an agreement. Therefore, inevitably, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility cannot be applied.

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I am not saying that the ministerial code is perfect in every detail—I do not think for one moment that it is—but I am not entirely sure that it is as deficient or inapplicable in the circumstances that I have been describing as the hon. Gentleman suggests. He said that the responsibility is very much at the top, with the Prime Minister carrying the responsibility for the way that the collective ministerial responsibility provision operates. That is quite correct.

During my short spell in government, I was surprised at the extent to which more or less all Government business seemed to be escalated to No. 10 and the Cabinet Office, and seemed to be resolved on the desks of the Prime Minister and, in most cases, the Deputy Prime Minister. If we recall the provisions of the coalition agreement at the outset, they were that documents passing the Prime Minister’s desk were also to pass the desk of the Deputy Prime Minister.

The hon. Gentleman’s assertion that responsibility for setting aside the ministerial code, where it is set aside, lies with the Prime Minister is basically correct. Given the way the Government conduct their business, things seem to end up either in a one-to-one negotiation between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister or in the quad—the quadrilateral meeting that brings into play the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. It is at the absolute top that the conclusion has to be drawn that agreement cannot be reached on a particular matter.

Effectively, responsibility for setting aside the collective responsibility provision lies with the Prime Minister. He faces a choice. He must decide, in discussion with the Deputy Prime Minister, whether there is a collective view on the subject matter at hand. If there is not, he must conclude whether that is so serious and fatal to the ongoing continuity of the coalition that—this is precisely the choice that the hon. Members for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), and for Christchurch, hypothesised about—the coalition must be ended, or whether it is just a tiresome irritant that will have to be taken on the chin, with the overriding work of the coalition continuing, regardless. It is always open to the Prime Minister to arrive at that judgment.

I completely understand that some Conservative Back Benchers are not great enthusiasts for the coalition, but I should not have thought that a day when the opinion polls showed Labour at 41% and the Conservatives at 29% was quite the optimal moment to aspire to an early general election.

I urge the hon. Members for Christchurch, and for New Forest East, to have a jolly good look at the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, because it simply is not the case that ending the coalition, and the Government ceasing to be able to hold their own in a vote of confidence, results in a general election; it would have done previously, but, now that the Act has been passed, bringing about a general election is a very different proposition altogether. The removal of the Government requires a simple majority, but the early dissolution of Parliament requires a two-thirds majority in the House of Commons. Numerically, that can be achieved only if, on the same day, the Conservative and Labour parties feel they have an interest in an early general election.

As a mental exercise, I often try to think of the circumstances in which the Conservatives and the Labour party could both, at exactly the same moment, think it was in their interests to have an early election. Even in the entirely improbable situation that the Liberal Democrat vote had seemingly evaporated to nothing, I cannot see why the Conservatives and the Labour party would both think, at the same time, that it was in their interests to have an early election, so I have concluded that an early election is very improbable indeed.

The alternative to a Conservative minority Government is simply a Labour minority Government, which might appeal to the hon. Member for Christchurch as being quite helpful in the long term. However, an early election is simply not on offer with the ease that hon. Members believe it is.

We have a coalition, which brings together two parties. Where they can agree, we have collective responsibility; where they cannot, we have a free vote—that is, in effect, what happens when collective responsibility is set aside. The Conservative and Liberal Democrat Whips might then attempt a whipping operation to get the two parts of the coalition to vote in line with a party view, but, in Government terms, there is simply a free vote, which is what has happened on the occasions that have been cited.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

For the sake of clarity, before the hon. Gentleman concludes his fascinating speech, will he explain whether he is really saying that, in a coalition, collective ministerial responsibility applies when both parts of the coalition agree, or in other words, when it is not needed, but not when they disagree, when it is needed?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I believe that it applies in all circumstances other than those where it has been concluded at the top that it does not apply. It clearly applies in the vast majority of cases; the instances where it does not apply are few and far between. It is a matter for ongoing judgment on the part of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister whether these occasional disagreements, which require collective responsibility to be set aside, are of such significance that the coalition’s overall functioning is at stake. I do not believe that anything we have seen to date brings us anywhere near the realm where anyone would rationally conclude that the coalition cannot continue or cannot work, but if such events became increasingly common, the question would arise.

I am sorry that Conservative colleagues interpreted coalition as meaning a situation in which Liberal Democrats were imprisoned as hostages and simply had to do whatever the Conservatives wished them to do. I am afraid that is not what coalition is all about; coalition is about two parties agreeing. The Conservatives did not actually win the election, and would not have been able to form a Government capable of doing very much at all if they had not been able to reach some agreement on key issues with the Liberal Democrats. That is the only way the Government could be formed, and it is the only thing that sustains them in nearly all circumstances now.

Occasionally agreement will break down and the parties will go their separate ways. That is transparent, and it is not unhealthy. The world can have a look at that arrangement and draw its own conclusions. We need to get increasingly familiar with, used to and comfortable with coalition, because I have a suspicion that, during our lifetimes, there will be more coalitions, of whatever colour and stripe—[Hon. Members: “Oh no!”] If those Members behind me who groan at the prospect find it unappealing, they will simply have to go to the trouble of winning a general election in their own right.

Defence Equipment and Support

Debate between Julian Lewis and Nick Harvey

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

It will have no impact on existing contracts. It is the means by which we will secure better value for money in forming future contracts.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Can the Minister explain in a practical way how a complex and expensive equipment programme such as the future carriers would have been better carried out under the new arrangements? For example, somewhere along the line the idea that the carriers should be easily convertible to take catapults was left out of the design. Would that situation be improved by the new arrangements?

[Nick Harvey]

It is probably common ground throughout the House that defence procurement has not been an exemplar of success for a good many years. One reason for that is that despite the good work of good people working for DE&S, they do not have available to them the full range of skill sets that they need to negotiate on equal terms with some of the more complex providers. Granting DE&S the private sector freedoms I have described will enable it to take on board the necessary skill sets to ensure that in future negotiations and future project management there is a better match between those securing value for the taxpayer and good products for the armed forces and the private sector providers of complex programmes. That will be a marked improvement on how things have been in the past.

Afghanistan (Civilian Killings)

Debate between Julian Lewis and Nick Harvey

Monday 12th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I thought you might pick me for that, Mr Speaker.

The Afghan Government and the Afghan people are rightly outraged by this atrocity, but does the Minister agree that the one bunch of people who have no right to promise revenge are the Taliban? It was their hosting of an international terrorist organisation that murdered thousands of men, women and children that led to the invasion of Afghanistan in the first place.

[Nick Harvey]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. In addition to their past atrocities, the Taliban are also responsible for the great majority of civilian deaths in Afghanistan—77% in the past year.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Julian Lewis and Nick Harvey

Monday 4th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Nick Harvey)]

As we set out in the strategic defence and security review, under Future Force 2020 the future surface Navy will have a world-class carrier strike capability, with 19 frigates and destroyers, including the state-of-the-art Type 45 destroyer; an amphibious fleet able to land and sustain a commando group from the sea; 14 mine countermeasures vessels; a global oceanographic survey capability; and a fleet of resupply and refuelling vessels. Work is also under way on the requirements and design of the Type 26 global combat ship, our next generation frigate.

[Dr Lewis]

I am encouraged by that response. Does the Minister remember when he and I sat on parallel Opposition Benches under the previous Government as the size of the frigate and destroyer fleet went down successively from 35 to 32 to 31 to 25 and then to 19? Will he specifically confirm that that figure of 19 frigates and destroyers will not be reduced to a pathetically inadequate baker’s dozen, as posited in some parts of the press?

[Nick Harvey]

I can certainly confirm that the situation remains unchanged from the SDSR. The future force will comprise 19 destroyers and frigates. It was a matter of great regret that the Government had to make a range of cuts in the SDSR, but that was a result of the general economic climate and, specifically, of the defence black hole that we inherited.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Julian Lewis and Nick Harvey

Thursday 16th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

My hon. Friend makes a good point, as he always does on these matters, and I can reassure him that it will be taken into account.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Nick Harvey]

I need to make a bit of progress, and I have a suspicion that my hon. Friend will want to come in a bit later.

The economic context of this security review is one that we cannot ignore. Next year the interest bill alone for the debt that Labour has left the nation will be more than £46 billion—more than the entire defence budget for the UK. Unfortunately, defence cannot be immune from the fiscal challenge that we face, especially when other Departments face strict cost management. As the shadow team knows, the specific challenges in defence are immense, and that is in no small part due to the fact that it bequeathed a forward defence programme with a £38 billion black hole between its commitments and the budget put in place to pay for them. They sat there making future commitments in a manner that resembled a child writing a Christmas wish list to Santa, and they had absolutely no idea how they were going to pay for it all. So on top of the deplorable economic legacy that the previous Government have left, specifically in defence they left a £38 billion black hole—a gap between their forward programme and the forward budget, and that is the size of the challenge facing the new Government.

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[Nick Harvey]

I rather agreed with the right hon. Member for Coventry North East, who said that that point is largely academic: the cost all comes out of the Treasury as a whole, and the particular line on which it is accounted is neither here nor there. We would want to be clear that the funds for Trident were on a separate line from that of the core defence budget. That is what the White Paper said, and as I understand it, that is still the position. However, where precisely it is accounted is neither here nor there; it is a completely semantic and academic point.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

rose—

[Nick Harvey]

Ah! I had anticipated my hon. Friend wanting to come in, and this was the point at which I thought he would want me to give way.

[Dr Lewis]

And the Minister has done so very graciously. He is doing his best at damage limitation. What would reassure me even more would be to know from him that no one employed by the Government was responsible for the extremely damaging story that was leaked to the BBC last night.

[Nick Harvey]

I have absolutely no grounds whatever to think or believe that it was, and to the extent that I am able, I am happy to offer that reassurance. Obviously, I cannot account for every employee anywhere in government, which is rather a large thing, but I do not believe that that is what happened or think that there is any point in the House dwelling on any speculation about what happened.

[Dr Lewis]

Will the Minister allow me one more time?

[Nick Harvey]

Well, as it is my hon. Friend, I will.

[Dr Lewis]

If that is the case and we are meant to discount the story, will the Minister just confirm one thing? When he talks about possible decisions about main gate in the context of value for money, does he accept that no interpretation of a value-for-money assessment could result in a decision that the Trident replacement should not go ahead at all?

[Nick Harvey]

I do not think that that is within the scope of the study under consideration; the study is about how we might improve the existing programme’s value for money and delivery. Again, I cannot pre-empt the decisions that the National Security Council will arrive at shortly, when it addresses the value-for-money report, but my hon. Friend’s point is considerably wide of its scope.

The coalition agreement also said:

“Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives,”

and the Liberal Democrats will. I shall continue to argue that in government; my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) will continue to argue the case for alternatives outwith government. But, the Government are proceeding with the programme, and that is the point that I wish to make clear today. The arrangements that the right hon. Member for Coventry North East left in place are those which the value-for-money report is studying, and to the extent that any better value for money can be squeezed out of the programme, that is the objective of the exercise.