United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Edward Miliband]

The hon. Gentleman speaks eloquently of the evil of Colonel Gaddafi in doing that. The care taken by our armed forces, which the Prime Minister has talked about, is incredibly important because they are facing incredibly difficult decisions.

The responsibility to protect recognises that there need to be tests applied to intervention, but also, crucially, that interventions require international authority and consent. In this case, the Arab League endorses a no-fly zone, and the UN Security Council expressed a clear will, with the support of 10 countries. It is worth drawing attention to which countries those are, because they include Lebanon, Colombia and South Africa. A broad spectrum of countries from across the world gave their support to the UN resolution.

There is international consent, a just cause and a feasible mission, but we also need—this is very important—to maintain public support here at home, because this House is not just contemplating expressing its support for an international resolution; it is discussing its position on the use of armed forces. We are a generous and compassionate people, but there will no doubt be some people in the country—indeed, we have heard it in parts of this House—wondering whether it really needs to be us, now, at this time. It is a valid and important question, but in the end, as well as there being the geopolitical questions that the Prime Minister raised, we have to make a judgment about our role in the world and our duty to others. Where there is just cause, where feasible action can be taken, and where there is international consent, are we really saying that we should be a country that stands by and does nothing? In my view, that would be a dereliction of our duty, our history, and our values. Let us not forget that those who have risen up against Colonel Gaddafi are part of a wider movement for reform and democracy that we are seeing across north Africa. We cannot and should not abandon them.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I have supported humanitarian interventions in the past, and I am minded to do the same in this case, but the reason why we are expected to intervene, rather than others, is that we are stronger than others. The right hon. Gentleman knows that there has been a huge hole in the defence budget. Does he know from his conversations with the Government whether the funding for what could be a very long-term and expensive operation will be added to the core defence budget, or taken from it?

[Edward Miliband]

I have been given those reassurances by the Prime Minister. Today, as the House debates this question, I want to concentrate on the important issues before us, including the capability of our armed forces, but I have been given that reassurance by the Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

If I am to follow the good example of those engaging in genuine debate, I should refer to previous comments made tonight. Two of the speeches that have been much praised so far—quite rightly, in my view—were those from the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) and my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart). They were praised not only because of their excellent delivery, but—one would like to think—substantially because of their comment and analysis. If I try to marry those two speeches, I come out with two propositions: intervention should be for humanitarian purposes only, and strict limits should be imposed on how we become militarily involved.

As will emerge as I develop my argument, I believe that the most likely result of such an approach—if it is what hon. Members want—would be not dissimilar to what was set out by the hon. Members for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell). That might surprise some hon. Members. I shall come back to that point in a moment, but I wish people to think about it a little. It is one thing to praise a speech about having limited objectives in a war, but it is quite another to proceed as if there will not be consequences of limiting those objectives in the way that we should rightly limit them.

In the early 1990s, when I was not in the House, I looked on in horror at what was happening in Bosnia, and I was particularly ashamed of the fact that our Foreign Secretary of the day, when asked why we would not go to the help of the moderate Bosnian Muslims and would not even allow them to have the weapons with which to defend themselves, replied that we did not wish to create a “level killing field”. I thought that that was a disgraceful statement.

[Mr Cash]

Yes, disgraceful.

[Dr Lewis]

My hon. Friend agrees that it was disgraceful.

I looked on with horror and impotence while the world and Britain stood by. Then, partly for that reason, in 1998, during my first term in the House, I was one of just three Conservative Members—if I remember correctly, the others were the now Lord Cormack and the late Michael Colvin—who actually called for military intervention against Milosevic in relation to Kosovo a year before the intervention actually happened. I therefore have a track record of supporting humanitarian intervention. I say that because I have grave reservations about what we are doing now. I will—very reluctantly—support the motion in the Lobby tonight, but I want hon. Members to realise the consequences that are likely to follow.

In such a situation, we need to ask ourselves four questions: who should intervene, how should the intervention be carried out, who should pay for it and what will be the result? Who should intervene? The answer is: those who are willing and strong enough to do so. How should it be done? Here we get to the nub of the matter. We can intervene in such a conflict by using what has been called air power but is actually the use of precision weapons from the sea and the air. We can intervene using such power only, which is what we say we are doing, or by introducing troops. If we confine ourselves to using precision weapons from sea platforms or the air, we should not expect Colonel Gaddafi to disappear.

The question of who should pay is terribly important. Throughout our years of opposition, we said that Labour Governments had let defence fall too far down our list of priorities. However, I have not noticed us proposing to increase the proportion of GDP we spend on defence. I note that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence is here. I have asked the Foreign Secretary this question twice, and he has brushed me off twice. Will this campaign be paid for out of the existing core defence budget, or will it be met by additional funds from the Treasury reserve? We have to know.

Finally, what will be the outcome? It will be entirely dependent on whether ground troops get involved. We have ruled out ground troops. If the Arab League wishes to see Gaddafi removed, it may have to supply ground troops, but we will not do so. We are left with a situation in which we are making a limited intervention to stop people being massacred. However, let us not fool ourselves into thinking that this will result in the removal of Colonel Gaddafi. Unless there is a coup or ground troop involvement by Arab states, Colonel Gaddafi will probably survive. He will lose control of part of the area, and we will have a long-term commitment to look after the remainder of Libya. For that, payment must be found.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I have some reservations about what we are doing. I am pleased to see the Foreign Secretary in his place; I hope that he will answer some of the reservations that have been voiced today.

My first point is a House of Commons point, because I received an absolute assurance from the Leader of the House two weeks ago on the Floor of the House that before we went to war in future, there would be a substantive vote in the House of Commons. When we went to war in the Falklands, the House of Commons sat on a Saturday. We have to establish the principle—this is not just a House of Commons point; it is a serious and important constitutional point—that in future when we go to war, the House of Commons should vote first.

Secondly, I have a number of questions about what we are doing in this operation. I voted against the Iraq war, because although it was ostensibly about dealing with weapons of mass destruction, in fact, as we know, it was about regime change. A lot of people have said that the current situation is very different, but is it? We are told that it is about humanitarian objectives, but is it not, in fact, about regime change, just as in Iraq? We need to ensure that our objectives are entirely and only humanitarian, and about protecting the people in Benghazi.

In one sense, the current situation is very different from the situation in Iraq, because at least there we were determined to go in and achieve regime change. Speaker after speaker has asked what we are going to achieve with the current operation. People say that we cannot always foretell the future and that that is not an excuse for doing nothing, but surely if we set off on a journey, it is generally a good idea to know the destination. Planes do not occupy ground. Missiles can destroy tanks, but they do not destroy regimes. Bombing Tripoli might bolster the regime’s support among the population there—indeed, it already has.

I have already asked the Prime Minister on the Floor of the House—no answer can be given—what will happen if the current operation just produces a stalemate. What will we do then? Will we be able to resist the moral pressure to get more and more involved, and to send in troops? There is absolutely no enthusiasm in this country for getting involved in a third war in the Muslim world. Aircraft can stop things happening—they can stop tanks entering Benghazi and I will support the operation to that extent—but they cannot make things happen.

A lot of lazy thinking has gone on along the lines that the regime was so unpopular that simply imposing a no-fly zone would make it fade away. Will that happen? Where is our strategic interest in Libya, which after all is 1,500 miles away? What are Egypt and Tunisia doing? They are its neighbours. Why is there not a single Arab plane in action at this moment?

We know that the first casualty of war is truth. The second casualty may well be a UN resolution, so that we are sucked into something far beyond what we have voted for. What are Russia and China doing, or rather not doing? Why is Iran silent? Is it because it supports Islamist irregulars in the east and is already there? Why would Gaddafi need to contest a no-fly zone if he can simply infiltrate troops? Is this a humanitarian war or is it a military war to change the regime? Will our efforts simply make Libya into another long-term brutal Sudan-type war?

It is often assumed that there are good guys and bad guys, but in fact Cyrenaica, in the east and controlled by the rebels, has always been separated from Tripolitania in the west. The two parts only became one state in 1934 and there has been a long-term dispute or semi-civil war between them for a long time. Indeed, in the 18th century Tripolitania invaded Cyrenaica and there were many massacres. History is extremely complicated; this region is very complicated, and we need to understand what is going on.

I was pleased to see the Defence Secretary in his seat. The old adage from Theodore Roosevelt is:

“Speak softly and carry a big stick”,

but we have been in danger of speaking loudly and breaking our sticks in two in the strategic defence review. Reading the British press, one would imagine that the whole world is hanging on to our words. They are not. I was reading the French press, and there was little mention of Britain. In Italy, no doubt, they believe that Berlusconi is taking the lead. There is only one capital that matters and that is Washington.

Oratory is not enough; we need air power. How many Tornados do we have? I believe that the strategic defence and security review was a disaster—as big a disaster as the Nott review, which was finally overtaken by the Falklands war. I hope that this operation overtakes the disastrous defence review. France has an aircraft carrier; Spain has an aircraft carrier; Russia has an aircraft carrier; the USA has 11 aircraft carriers; and we have to fly a round trip of 3,000 miles to impose our military force. By the way, all we have done is send three Tornados and two cruise missiles.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am glad that my hon. Friend raised that point, which I did not have time to raise. Although it is true that in this case we can get by from land bases, when it comes to the fuel costs of flying a single mission, a Harrier from a carrier would have cost £5,750, one from Sicily or southern Italy costs about £23,000 and one from the United Kingdom costs £200,000.

[Mr Leigh]

My hon. Friend makes the point. We could have had a carrier just 100 miles off the coast. The Prime Minister could have been sending our power. The Army is primarily a projectile of the Royal Navy and the defence review has been an attack on our traditional maritime and air power. I hope that we will use this operation to learn lessons about that.

In conclusion, I believe that we should review the strategic defence review, and that we should state firmly that our operation is simply and only a humanitarian exercise to save people in Benghazi and that there is absolutely no intention of our trying to achieve regime change.