(3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberYes. That is why the scheme is designed for both infected and affected people—and not just spouses; it includes children and siblings, and I am proud that it also includes carers. We think about the awful injustice for those who were infected, but we also remember the effect on their families and those around them. The hon. Member makes a powerful point.
On that point, I acknowledge the huge amount of effort, attention and concentration that the Minister has put into the scheme. I am therefore slightly surprised that the Haemophilia Society, which is a great champion for the community, says that in its opinion, care provided by family members is not being fairly compensated. It says that the scheme does not currently enable carers to make an adequate claim for the full impact of the care they provided, and that it does not sufficiently reflect the financial and personal sacrifices made by those who have delivered that care over decades, with particular reference to children and their educational sacrifices. I know there are no easy answers to this, but has the Minister had an interaction with the Haemophilia Society, which is well placed to represent the affected community?
As the right hon. Gentleman can imagine, I have interacted with the Haemophilia Society and many other charities over the past two years. It is important to mention that the scheme does include carers; I am perfectly willing to look at what the Haemophilia Society is saying about the precise package for carers, but the fundamental point is that carers should be recognised, and they are within the scheme.
(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Commons ChamberI thank my hon. Friend for her question, and for the work that she did as children and families Minister; she did a lot on this, and I pay tribute to her for it. She is right about the support that is needed, particularly specialist therapy; I am in no doubt about that. It is important that we are raising funding for the adoption and special guardianship support fund to £55 million. Across this House, we need to keep talking to those affected to make sure that we get this right.
The Prime Minister has done a good deed today, and he is deservedly getting the united response from the House that he requested. He mentioned the admirable idea of putting the documentation online; will there be a facility on the website for people to upload their own stories, if they wish to do so?
One aspect that is being somewhat skirted around is why this happened in the first place. The answer appears to be that there was too much state respect for dogmatic and fundamentalist interpretations of religious doctrine. Can we look at our society today and say that there is not still, in some parts of that society, too much religious repression of women, and too much respect for cultural sensitivities, which are preventing us from tackling that?
Yes, we can and should say that, and I thank the right hon. Member for reminding us that this is not all about the past. If we mean what we say, we have to tackle the present as well. I was struck not just by the dogmatic adherence to views at the time, but the complete lack of empathy, the complete lack of feeling. That is something else. That goes beyond dogma; that is just how human beings treat each other. I have had examples described to me of individual human beings dehumanising other individual human beings, when they did not have to. They chose to act in that way, adding even more grief and pain to what was an awful injustice in any event.
As for the uploading of stories, there will be the facility for testimonials to be there—obviously, only if people want to share them. We are looking at how that could be done.
(4 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThis debate is very timely, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) on securing it. In recent months, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has been joined by an ever-growing and increasingly anxious chorus of voices despairing at the Government’s failings on national security. Lord Robertson, who this Government commissioned and asked to lead the strategic defence review, warned in April that Britain’s security was “in peril” due to the “corrosive complacency” that was being shown towards defence. He went so far as to accuse the Treasury of “vandalism”.
Earlier this month, the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey) resigned as Defence Secretary. He was clear that the reason was a defence investment plan—which, it appears, The Times newspaper has also had sight of—that did not give the armed forces “the resources they need”. He was followed out of the door by the Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), who said that the Government’s plans were
“neither transformative enough nor sufficiently funded.”
Given that the hon. Member had served in our armed forces, one would have thought that his warning might have been heeded.
Bearing in mind an item that has appeared in the news reports today, does my hon. Friend agree that either the right hon. Gentleman or the hon. and gallant Gentleman to whom she has just referred would be a far more suitable future Secretary-General of NATO than the present Prime Minister, whose lack of proper funding of a defence policy—among other deficiencies—has led him to be looking for a new job?
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) on securing the debate. He will, of course, know the importance to this Government of the topics discussed today. Keeping the country safe is the first responsibility of any Government, and as the world changes, the way we uphold that responsibility must change with it. This adaptability is set out in the national security strategy, published last year at the beginning of the NATO summit in The Hague. Alongside it was the commitment to spend 5% of GDP on national security by 2035—3.5% for core defence spending and 1.5% for broader resilience and security spending.
The Majority of the UK’s hard national security capabilities, such as the recently announced 150,000 drones that the Ministry of Defence will supply to Ukraine by the end of the year, are funded and delivered by line departments. The Cabinet Office’s role is ensuring the effective running of government, and co-ordinating cross-cutting policies and operations. More than 90% of the national security and resilience budget for the Cabinet Office is therefore spent on the day-to-day running costs of the National Security Secretariat. That is a vital body that works with Departments to implement the national security strategy. It develops, leads and delivers policy across Government, and aligns, convenes and brokers the collective efforts of our stakeholders and partners on all aspects of national security. It is the nerve centre of our collective cross-Government security response. However, that spending it is not by any means the vast amount that is spent on national security and resilience across Government.
The Cabinet Office does invest in some assets. For example, the National Situation Centre, which is highly regarded internationally, provides situational awareness for crisis response by bringing together data analysis and expertise. The emergency alerts system is one of many public warning and informing capabilities that the UK Government, devolved Governments and category 1 responders have at their disposal. Since its launch, it has become an integral part of keeping the public safe, allowing the quick sharing of lifesaving information, and it is regularly tested to ensure its resilience. The UK Resilience Academy forms an important part of the skills and engagement offer. It was established in April last year to build the skills that are needed across the whole of society to respond to emergencies.
The national security strategy consolidates various reviews and strategies related to national security into a single, coherent framework. It outlines the strategic context, identifies the main challenges we face as a nation in an era of radical uncertainty, and establishes the framework that the UK uses to guide its actions both at home and abroad. It is both a clear-eyed and a hard-edged plan to deal with the breadth of the challenges that we face, setting out a long-term vision for how we will do three crucial things: protect security at home, promote strength abroad, and increase our sovereign and asymmetric capabilities.
The Government have developed an internal implementation approach to ensure the accountability and delivery of the national security strategy, as well as ensuring that we adapt to a volatile geopolitical landscape. That is why our national security is not the remit of one Department or Minister. We have identified specific objectives, and have assigned lead and assisting Departments to deliver them. Departments are responsible for periodic reporting on progress, and taking action to address any deficiencies.
The Government will continue to update the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on progress, through formal public sessions and confidential sessions where appropriate. As part of the implementation of the strategy, we continue to make ourselves a harder target for hostile actors who seek to exploit our open, democratic society. That includes bolstering our cyber and economic security defences, which are essential to the fostering of innovation and growth.
Additionally, we are strengthening the defence of our borders and territorial waters.
In April the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), exposed covert Russian undersea activity, paying tribute to the readiness of the UK’s armed forces to respond. In May, Baroness Lloyd, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, outlined DSIT’s plans to present new legislative proposals to modernise and strengthen penalties for malicious activity impacting our undersea infrastructure.
As I am sure events in recent weeks have made clear, our overriding priority is ensuring stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, starting with our unwavering support for Ukraine. In total, the UK has committed up to £25 billion for Ukraine: £16 billion in military support, £5.6 billion in non-military support, and £3.5 billion in UK export finance. We continue to go further, renewing and deepening our key alliances, particularly those with the United States and the European Union. All this work is bolstered by new international partnerships, especially in emerging policy areas such as technology—for example, the UK-India technology security initiative and the UK-Japan frontier technology partnership.
It remains the Government’s intention to publish the defence investment plan before the NATO summit, which will take place on 7 July. The plan will set out much of our future strategy when it comes to how we will protect and defend our country. Let me give Members some idea of its focus. We will rebuild our core defence industrial base, focusing on achieving greater resilience in our stockpiles and supporting warfighting readiness.
I am going to ask the rather obvious question. Given that the plan is to be put forward under the existing Prime Minister, does that mean that if the new Prime Minister wishes to change it, it will be changed, or will the commitment that is to be made to the forthcoming NATO Assembly have to stand as it is?
As always, the right hon. Gentleman has asked a very important question. I think the key thing to understand is that this work is ongoing, and that there will be co-operation between the current Prime Minister and—I do not want to get ahead of what Labour party members might decide to do—whoever the next Prime Minister will be. I hope that gives the right hon. Gentleman some assurance.
Beyond defence, we will identify, protect and cultivate other sovereign capabilities, such as foundational industries and frontier technologies, that are critical to our industrial base and national competitiveness. I was interested by what my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington said in this connection. We are in close contact and collaboration with states such as Canada to learn as much as we can about how they do resilience, although I might gently suggest that the Canadian landmass is slightly different from the UK landmass when it comes to thinking of organising a defence for it, and slightly different approaches will clearly have to be taken, given the geographical realities. However, there is much on which we can co-operate.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberLike others before me, I pay tribute to the work of the hon. Member for Eltham and Chislehurst (Clive Efford). He is the driving force behind the all-party parliamentary group, which has done so much to highlight this terrible tragedy.
I was struck by what my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) said about having been alerted to this as far back as 2010. In my case, it was not quite so far back; it was 2015, but that is still more than a decade ago. I spoke in this House about the case of my constituent Lesley, which illustrated how long it often took for victims of contaminated blood to discover that they indeed had been infected. I pointed out that in 1970, she and her future husband had been involved in a serious road traffic accident, and she had to receive no fewer than 44 pints of blood. For many years, she knew nothing about the fact that she had been infected, although over those years she had many visits to GPs and hospitals, with numerous symptoms of illness, and considerable pain and suffering. It was only in 2014 that she finally discovered that she had been infected with hepatitis C by NHS contaminated blood.
Another example of a constituent who is in regular contact with me and my office is Stephen. He came to see me in August 2023. He was diagnosed as haemophiliac as an eight-year-old in the late 1960s. He thinks that he was infected with hepatitis C in 1974, which persisted for nearly 15 years before it eventually cleared from his system. He says that although it did not inhibit his professional life too badly, it had a deep impact on his personal life. He was married in 1986, and he was constantly having to have testing for fear every time that he had to have a transfusion that he might be being infected. He was told in quite firm terms not to have children, and he said that he was often too scared to have treatment. Once he had quite a bad leg injury, which led to complications, and his fear of treatment led to him being effectively disabled for a period of time.
Stephen’s brother’s case was far worse, because he was one of about 400 chronic hepatitis C victims of this scandal. To this day, he can only effectively live on a day-to-day basis; he cannot plan because the complications of his infection mean that whether he will be able to do something will depend on how he is on the day in question.
In Portcullis House on Tuesday, we benefited from briefings from a number of organisations that are concerned with this scandal. I will briefly touch on a couple. One was a campaign about a condition of which I was previously unaware, called thalassaemia. This rare blood disorder requires sufferers to have a transfusion every three to four weeks—a blood transfusion every month. These people are at a very high risk of having been infected, and many of them were. These regular blood transfusions deposit more iron into the major organs, which, coupled with the hepatitis C virus with which they had been infected, maximises the prospect of their developing cirrhosis and liver cancer.
The drug interferon has been mentioned a couple of times already. I am old enough to remember when interferon was first regarded as a great breakthrough in the treatment of some cancers. Sadly, like so many medical interventions, it has side effects that can be harmful. Taken in combination with what these patients are also suffering from by way of infection and, in the case of thalassaemia sufferers, the build-up of iron, the interferon used in their cases also has complicating adverse effects. That was a point impressed on me at the briefing by the representative of the Terrence Higgins Trust, who pointed to the additional negative impact of treatment with interferon, which was for a significant time the only option available for HIV-positive patients.
I am indebted to the Haemophilia Society for briefing material that I hope will simply add to the excellent statement and laying of the groundwork in the opening speech so ably delivered by the hon. Member for Eltham and Chislehurst. The Haemophilia Society draws attention to one or two specific points that I would like to put before the House.
We all acknowledge that the infected blood community has fought valiantly for the truth for decades. We also accept that the Government are clearly committed to compensation following the inquiry. The debate now focuses on how to deliver that commitment and how to make sure that people are compensated without further delay and that the compensation is truly fair.
In this connection, I would like to make reference to a detailed opportunity I had virtually to participate in exchanges with senior people—in fact, the most senior people—at the Infected Blood Compensation Authority back in June last year. Again, that was at the initiative of the chairman of the APPG, the hon. Member for Eltham and Chislehurst. My participation was online, but I was able, as was he, to discuss all these matters with the interim chairman at the time, Sir Robert Francis; the chief executive, David Foley; and other key officials.
In particular, we were able to talk directly with members of IBCA’s cases team. I must say that I, for one, found them to be both compassionate and empathetic. I was very impressed with the calibre of people who are involved in this agency, and I am hopeful that if they are given the direction they need and the resources they require, they can succeed. I got the feeling that this is an organisation that really does want to help the people it has been set up to support, not an organisation that wants to be in any way obstructive. I hope everything can be done to encourage it. I know that it is operating in uncharted waters with a tragedy of this magnitude, but I hope it can succeed in overcoming the obstacles that have been causing the delays.
More than two years have passed since the Government accepted the need for compensation, but the majority of eligible people are still waiting to begin their claims. That includes infected people not previously on a support scheme and affected people—namely, the partners and family members of those who are sadly no longer with us. We have heard concern from the community that progress has slowed while IBCA works out how to grapple with these categories of claims in a process that it calls test and learn.
Every month of delay matters, because many infected and affected people are elderly or seriously ill. We would like to know from the Minister his latest assessment of the timescale by which IBCA will compensate each of the categories of claimant. IBCA’s latest figures show that just 30 affected people have been paid compensation so far. Over 14,000 affected people are waiting to start their claim. At what point does the Minister expect IBCA to truly start making a dent in those very large numbers? In particular, we would like to know what specific steps are being taken to accelerate compensation payments over the next 12 months.
Finally, there is an issue to do with claims that relate to the estates of those who died before the scheme commenced. Those who survived until the scheme commencement are rightly entitled to financial loss compensation from the date of their infection right up to the national age of healthy life expectancy that they should have had. In contrast, those who died before the scheme started have their financial loss calculated only from the date of their infection until the date of their death, which may have been a lot earlier than the normal expectation of a term of life that would have been their lot had this catastrophe not befallen them.
There can be no doubt that this creates a stark and unjust two-tier system. Those who died earlier will often have suffered the same or worse than those who died later, and the financial loss to their estate is clear, yet the Government’s position seems to be that those killed by their infections the soonest deserve less compensation and recognition than those who survived for longer. In many cases, this amounts to a very substantial reduction in compensation—potentially decades of lost earnings. Bereaved families should not receive lesser justice because their loved one died before the scheme was established. The result is that timing, not harm, is determining value, meaning that compensation depends on whether someone survived long enough to see the scheme introduced. As I said, this is about avoiding a two-tier compensation system.
In conclusion, I would like the Minister to explain how it can be in accordance with natural justice for those who died earlier due to their infection to receive less compensation than those who died later from a similar infection. Will the Government commit to reviewing their position on estate claims, to ensure families are not disadvantaged because their relative died earlier?
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My hon. Friend raises a very important point. There will be agreement and recognition that activity online can provide extraordinary opportunities and benefits, but clearly it can also provide a toxic environment that drives the kind of criminality we have seen in recent times.
I hope my hon. Friend will understand that we are working at pace across Government through the defending democracy taskforce, and working with colleagues in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and right across law enforcement, as well as with operational partners, to make sure that activity online is monitored in a way that will best enable us to reduce and eliminate the kind of activity she referred to. She will understand that that is not an easy thing to do. We are constantly looking for the social media companies and the tech companies to exercise greater responsibility, but I assure her of the importance we attach to these matters. I have had meetings recently with ministerial colleagues to look at what more we can do, and I assure my hon. Friend that we are looking into that carefully.
Does the Minister share my concern that, irrespective of the personal motivation of the perpetrator, the circumstances by which he came into this country send a signal to those ideological movements abroad that wish us harm that there is a very easy back door by which they can infiltrate this country? If an operation of that sort is mounted in the future, what sort of violent response will there be to a spectacular terrorist attack that could and should have been prevented by secure borders?
As always, the right hon. Gentleman raises a very thoughtful series of questions. I know he will understand that I am not going to get into the detail of the potential motivations of the alleged offender in the particular circumstances, but his general challenge is the right one. It is the job of this Government, and of any Government, to ensure that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible target for our adversaries and for those who would do us harm.
The right hon. Gentleman knows, from his previous service on the Intelligence and Security Committee, a lot about the nature and range of threats that we face as a country. I hope he also knows that this Government, like the last Government, do everything they possibly can to make sure that where there are particular points of vulnerability, we are bearing down on them, and that we have in place the right capabilities and resources to keep the public safe. There is no more important duty of any Government than being able to do that, and that is what I as the Security Minister and my colleagues across Government spend each hour of every day making sure that we do.
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered the Government’s response to the House’s humble Address of 4 February 2026.
On 4 February I came before the House to debate the Humble Address motion. I said at the time that it was in the national interest to be transparent and to act as quickly as we could, and with the second publication of documents earlier this week on Monday, the Government have done so. Today’s debate is a further opportunity for Members to put questions and, indeed, debate the content of the documents. My right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, who is alongside me on the Front Bench, will listen to the debate and close it in due course.
As we debate these issues today, we should ensure that we keep Jeffrey Epstein’s victims at the forefront of our minds. What Epstein did was abhorrent and unforgivable. He was a vile, evil paedophile, and I denounce him and his actions as strongly today as I did on 4 February when I came to the Dispatch Box.
The Prime Minister has taken responsibility for appointing Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the United States. He has said that if he knew then what he knows now, he would never have appointed him, and he has apologised.
I think it is worth setting out the process that was followed in order to publish such a large volume of material on Monday.
As the right hon. Gentleman is going to talk about process, I would be very grateful if he could clear up one matter. I have a high regard for the right hon. Gentleman’s integrity, and so I hope he will not dance around this subject, as has been done by others in the past.
In the first tranche of documents there were a number of notes sent by private secretaries to the Prime Minister. If I were allowed to use a prop, I would open the documents to pages 3 and 8, where Members would see notes discussing the situation as regards how to appoint the ambassador, Peter Mandelson and so forth. Under those notes are big boxes headed “Prime Minister Comments”. The normal course of action when a Prime Minister receives a document of that sort is that he notes down his response to it. These boxes are totally blank. My simple question to the right hon. Gentleman is this: are they blank because the Prime Minister made no notes whatsoever or because any notes that the Prime Minister made have been redacted and removed? The Intelligence and Security Committee deals routinely with even more sensitive material, and every time there is a redaction in a publication, there are three asterisks to show that the redaction has taken place. Have there been redactions of the Prime Minister’s notes on these memorandums that were sent to him for decision?
The answer is that they are blank now because they were blank then. The formal decision to appoint Peter Mandelson as the ambassador was conveyed by the Prime Minister’s then principal private secretary in a letter to the Foreign Office. I know that the right hon. Gentleman is referring to the empty box notes, and the reason that they are empty is that there was nothing to redact. I hope that is a sufficiently clear answer.
That was another important part of what was done, and the House should also take reassurance from that. I made the point about precedents to the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), and the Government also sought to take that independent legal advice on their interpretation of complying with the Humble Address.
I will take an intervention from the right hon. Gentleman, but then I need to make a bit more progress.
I want to clear up the point about precedents. It may be that I am wrong about this, but I do not think there is any precedent for the House deciding that the Intelligence and Security Committee specifically should look at material that was to be redacted before it went to the public. The Intelligence and Security Committee, as the Minister well knows, was founded in 1994. Since that time, there has never been even one leak from the Committee. So there is no comparison between making things available to the Intelligence and Security Committee—the only parliamentary body entitled to see highly classified material, and one which never leaks—and to any other body. While he says, “This is all led by officials. It is okay for the officials to see it, but not to release it to anyone else,” the reason the ISC was chosen for the motion is that it is within the ring of secrecy, and that is unaffected by any precedents regarding bodies that do not have that special status.
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. It is just that if he looks at the wording of the Humble Address, he will see that it lists a series of classes of documents, and then it says, “except papers”—those that were referred to the ISC. That is our compliance with the motion.
Let me turn back to the process, which, as I said, was undertaken by officials. They sought returns from all Government Departments, including material, as has been referred to, on non-corporate communication channels. There were multiple rounds of discovery to ensure that searches returned material relevant to the full scope of the motion. Some documents were assessed as likely prejudicial to national security or international relations—the point I was just making—and, as I committed to the House in February, they were then referred to the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Due to the wide scope of the motion and the significant volume of material that needed to be located and reviewed, the first publication, on 11 March, was focused on the parts of the motion that were of most urgent interest to the House: Peter Mandelson’s appointment, his withdrawal and the severance. The second tranche, which was published on Monday, contains material relevant to the parts of the motion that cover communications and documents concerning Peter Mandelson’s appointment and vetting, and messages between Peter Mandelson and Ministers, special advisers and senior civil servants in the months prior to and throughout his tenure as ambassador. All documents held by the Government have now been disclosed, save those that are being withheld on the request of the Metropolitan police.
I think it is worth just putting on the record the actual words from that due diligence note, which can be found on page 11 of the first volume. It talks about a 2019 report commissioned by JPMorgan:
“The report cited Epstein’s personal records which showed contact beginning in 2002 and continuing throughout the 2000s.
After Epstein was first convicted of procuring an underage girl in 2008, their relationship continued across 2009-2011, beginning when Lord Mandelson was business minister and continuing after the end of the Labour government. Mandelson reportedly stayed in Epstein’s House while he was in jail in June 2009.”
That is from a document which it is not in doubt the Prime Minister saw, yet he went ahead with making this appointment.
I thank my right hon. Friend for that timely spelling out of exactly what the Prime Minister read—and yet he went ahead and made the appointment anyway. I take the remarks of the Paymaster General and other Ministers totally at face value and totally sincerely, but it is clear that the Prime Minister was not thinking in that way.
We are a very long way from one of the original aspects of this scandal, which was an allegation that the Prime Minister knew when appointing Peter Mandelson that he had failed his developed vetting. We have moved a long way from that, but one thing we have not moved away from is that the man who was appointed was a “best pal” of the world’s most notorious paedophile, that he remained his “best pal” when he was in prison, and that he stayed in his house. Personally, I found it so profoundly shocking when I heard that was what happened. It is a matter of good character to stand by friends when they are in trouble, but when they are convicted of a terrible crime like that, you do not stand with them, you do not stay in their house and they should not be your “best pal”. It is not just that: we have also learned that Peter Mandelson was friends with Russian oligarchs, Chinese Finance Ministers and former Israeli security chiefs; he had a loan of £1 million from an unknown source, which he used to buy shares in a secretive Israeli company; and, of course, there are all the issues in relation to his business dealings.
Given that it is the job of the Foreign Affairs Committee to try to ensure that the Foreign Office is as good as it possibly can be, the Committee has tried to remain focused on why it was that a man like that—when it came to developed vetting, it was decided that he was a case of high concern and that his clearance for vetting should be denied—was nevertheless appointed. There is a lot of gossip and other stuff, the tittle-tattle and things that obviously the Westminster village loves, but the serious point is: how could we have got it so wrong and how did this happen?
At the beginning of her speech, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee said most powerfully that what happened in relation to Epstein should alone have been a sufficient bar for anything to go further, but even if that had not happened, it was already in the due diligence document, purely on foreign policy grounds: the Prime Minister was told that Mandelson gave a speech at the University of Hong Kong where he claimed that the rule of law and independence of the judiciary remain intact there. In November 2024, I personally challenged the proposed appointment on the grounds that Mandelson had said in a radio interview that the basis for a settlement with Ukraine would be that Ukraine should give up to Russia all the land that Russia had so far occupied, and that Ukraine should give up any hope of ever belonging to the NATO alliance. These were political grounds that should have ruled him out. The Prime Minister knew about them, but nothing seemed to prevent him from following through on his intent to appoint such an unsuitable individual.
The right hon. Gentleman tempts me down a path that I was not going to go down, although I have gone down it for quite some length in the Committee hearings. It seems to me that all these papers tend to show one thing: the Prime Minister was not particularly interested in the appointment of the ambassador to the United States. He was certainly not a good friend of his: there is no correspondence between them, there are no chatty messages and there is no attempt to get the Prime Minister to vote for Mandelson when he was standing for chancellor of the University of Oxford—I mean, there is not a friendship at all.
The criticism that I make, and I make openly, is that I think the decision was subcontracted to others who were close to Mandelson. The criticism that one can level at the Prime Minister is that he delegated and he did not watch sufficiently what was going on, essentially giving power to others who then abused it—I think that is central. That is not very flattering to the Prime Minister, but it is an honest assessment of the evidence that I have heard. I think the appointment was being pushed and I think that it was being pushed by his then chief of staff, who has a style—and that style is, “When I want to do something, I will go for it hard, I will go for it fast and I will push everybody out of the way.” Once Mandelson had not been elected chancellor at Oxford, someone who should have been a marginal candidate—and had been, as I understand it, just in November 2024—suddenly, within two weeks, moved from being a borderline candidate to being the main person in the frame.
We may be talking about the same thing. Another way of putting it is that the Prime Minister’s chief of staff had taken responsibility for it on his behalf and was pushing it, and the power that the chief of staff had was because he was the chief of staff to the Prime Minister. It is borderline one way or the other.
I disagree with the right hon. Lady’s analysis because the whole point of what we have been saying from the Opposition Benches is that the Prime Minister himself knew about these points: he knew what Mandelson had done in relation to Epstein; he knew what he had said in relation to justice in Hong Kong; and he knew what Mandelson had said in that radio interview because I had challenged him about it. I must say, although it may not meet the high standards of court litigation, that when the Prime Minister brushed aside my challenge to him on 21 November, he sat down with a very notable and ingratiating grin, and I turned to the person sitting next to me and said, “He’s definitely going to appoint Mandelson.” It was his decision.
I will move on, but before I do so, I will say something that I think any fair-minded person will know. Presumably the job of being Prime Minister means that there is so much on your desk, and if someone comes to you and says, “Don’t worry about this, I’ll take it and sort it”, there is a temptation to go, “Okay, you do that, because I have 7,000 other things that I have to deal with today.” I do not know—I have never been Prime Minister—but I would assume that that is the reality of the situation.
The question is how somebody who is so manifestly inappropriate gets appointed. It may be that those behaving in this way did so because they felt under huge amounts of political pressure, but how does someone whose case was of high concern and for whom it was recommended that clearance be denied become interpreted as a borderline case, leaning against? How do we bridge that gap? The only way that gap is bridged is through mitigations, so I spend my time looking for mitigations, and I cannot find any. Ian Collard, who was one of the security men speaking to Olly Robbins—who, at the time, was the permanent under-secretary—mentioned the importance of mitigations 10 times in his written evidence to us, and Olly Robbins talked about it six times. It is at the forefront of their evidence.
I have already referred to an aide-mémoire that Ian Collard made in September. He says that he looked again at the summary. He accepts that UKSV’s statement was
“‘this case presents as a high concern’ with a recommendation of ‘clearance denied or withdrawn’”,
and he
“noted that, as well as the tick boxes”—
red tick-boxes, which were ticked—
“UKSV stated in the final case assessment: ‘Overall, I believe that this is a very borderline case…If a clearance was awarded to the individual by the Department, it is recommended that a very robust risk management model is put in place’”.
I do not know whether that is just Ian Collard’s memory of what he may or may not have read—well, I know that he did not read it, because he says that he did not read it at that stage. I do not understand how the UKSV paper can say, “Don’t give him the job”, and then it can also be believed to be a very borderline case with robust risk management recommended. I suspect that the latter bit is an interpretation—a way in which, it was hoped, the difficulty that Mandelson was essentially being refused vetting could be slid over into “He can be given the job, so long as there are robust mitigations.”
But where are those mitigations? When Sir Olly gave evidence to our Committee, I said to him,
“I do not really follow why you would not know the contents of the UKSV document and their concerns or even that they said that there was high concern about Peter Mandelson. I do not understand how you can not know that if you are considering what the mitigations are. You cannot have the mitigations without knowing what the problem is.”
He said,
“The risks were explained to me, but I have not seen the underlying documentation. That is what I am saying. That obviously strikes members of the Committee as odd”—
well, it certainly did—
“but in all my years as a civil servant—many of them as a relatively senior one—I have never seen a UKSV document, other than the ones that I have filled in myself.”
It is ridiculous. If he is putting down mitigations in order to deal with legitimate concerns and a security threat, he needs to know what that security threat is, and to understand that UKSV is saying that it is very serious and that Mandelson should not be given the job—yet he says, “I didn’t know. I just thought it was borderline, leaning the other way.” I mean, this is Alice in Wonderland.
I really do not know. The Foreign Office got the UKSV clearance on 29 January 2025, and it says that it did something about it, but we cannot see what that is. An email on page 72 of part I is the nearest thing to mitigations I have been able to find, and Ian Collard referred to it in his evidence. It is an email he wrote on 30 January, and I think it is the mitigations, but I just do not think it is a robust set of mitigations to deal with serious security concerns. The email states:
“As part of the usual clearance policy process, UKSV identified some areas in his application for ESND to review”—
that is the security man.
“I understand that Lord Mandelson’s private sector engagements are being managed by HRD”—
that is human resources—
“and the Legal Directorate through the conflict of interest process.”
Who knows? It continues:
“With regard to personal conduct”—
I think that is hanging out with oligarchs, being friends with the Finance Minister, borrowing money and who knows what else—
“I understand that Lord Mandelson has received a letter from Mervyn Thomas, informing him of his responsibilities as an FCDO employee, including under the Diplomatic Service Regulations.”
Is that it? He got a letter from a man telling him to behave himself! We have not seen the letter, and I do not know what it is. The email continues:
“Matters pertaining to his overseas contacts will certainly be reviewed by the STRAP authorities.”
STRAP is another issue, and we should not be distracted by STRAP. Mandelson needed to follow the developed vetting before getting anywhere near the latest STRAP stuff.
It is important that we take these things in order. We have that email, which is about as pathetic as it can be. There might be something in the nine-page summary that some Members sitting in this Chamber have seen. It might be that that summary showing the security concerns has a page or so at the end—it is a blank page—asking the Foreign Office for its response. UKSV is giving a recommendation saying, “Mandelson should not be given the job, he is a security risk.” The process might be that the Foreign Office has to write something on that form saying, “We have read this. We don’t agree with you. We think he should be appointed, and we’re going to put in the following mitigations”, and then list them. It might be that the Foreign Office did not fill that in properly, and it might be that that bit of the form remains blank. I do not know whether anybody is in a position to be able to enlighten me one way or the other, or whether we will have to wait for the police to give us the document.
I do not think the right hon. Gentleman is one of the people I am referring to, but I give way.
Surely that information would be precisely the kind that could be safely entrusted to the ISC, and it ought to have been entrusted with it.
I suspect that the ISC may have been entrusted with it—that is what I am trying to say. I am hoping that if the form is blank, it is not necessarily the case that anything of particular security interest was being disclosed, and it is just a process issue, where the Foreign Office did not follow process as it should have and at least put on that form, “Yes, we have done these things.”
I am just trying to do my job, holding the Government to account. Why did Britain employ a man who was a security risk to this really important job? We did so because of the mitigations, but nobody will tell us the mitigations. After all these thousands of bits of paper, and after my poor right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West coming to the Chamber 11 times, we still cannot get to the root of it.
I am happy to give the right hon. Gentleman that clarity. The documents that we received were unredacted documents marked with the proposed redactions the Government sought to make for reasons of protecting national security or international relations. Where we agreed with the Government, we agreed that those redactions should be made; where we disagreed, those redactions were not made. We saw all the documents unredacted, and we decided whether to accept the Government’s proposals for redaction or not. The House made it clear that it wanted the final word on those redactions—yes or no—to be ours as a Committee, and not the Government’s. I hope that is of assistance to the right hon. Gentleman.
For the sake of completeness, will my right hon. and learned Friend explain whether the Committee saw the third category of documents—those redacted or withheld because of the police inquiry—or whether the Committee labours under the same degree of ignorance as the rest of us?
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way again. She could still develop her case if she talked about parliamentary Committees in general, but I chaired the ISC for four years, and, as I said in an earlier intervention, the ISC has been in existence since 1994. The ISC never leaks. If it did leak, the person who leaked anything would be criminally prosecuted. There is no question, if these vetting documents were shown to the ISC, of its having a chilling effect on anything, because the ISC is hermetically sealed. It does not leak about far more important things than the miserable private life of Peter Mandelson.
Fleur Anderson
I thank the right hon. Member for his comment about the ISC. I will continue to take advice from that vetting process: it needs to be even more hermetically sealed. We need to take real care over this. Any over-sharing will have an effect on everyone who is asked to sit down and give the frankest and most private information, and we need to make sure that they are doing that so that their potential risk to our security as a country is very well known. We cannot allow self-censoring because of this process. We do not need those far-reaching unintended consequences.
This has been an interesting and wide-ranging debate, but at times it has been painful to listen to, because we are talking about a really terrible decision that was made by the Prime Minister, and about the retraumatising of victims, who have to keep hearing about this issue without seeing justice. If we were talking about a way to get justice, that would be different. The hon. Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones) made an excellent speech, and I agree that she has been a consistent champion of women’s safety, particularly online, but these issues have been constantly raised.
Throughout the debate, hon. Members—not the hon. Member for Pontypridd—have waved or thrown around a significant number of dead cats. In fact, for anyone who has spent a lot of time going through the documents, perhaps it should be red boxes that have been waved around, especially ones with “President of the United States” written on them. An awful lot of time seems to have been dedicated to getting a red box for the President of the United States—that is civil servant time that could have been better spent being more transparent, rather than chasing the specific maker of red boxes and getting them to print things on one.
One of the dead cats, or red boxes, is about the mitigations. It is important that there should have been mitigations, and that point was made when the Prime Minister was first given a document about whether Peter Mandelson should be appointed. Its advice was that mitigations would need to be put in place. The problem is not that mitigations were not put in place—I am not saying that they were put in place, or that we know or do not know which ones were put in place; the problem is that the Prime Minister made the decision in the first place.
The information on the bit of paper that was given to the Prime Minister talked about the “reputational risk” of appointing somebody who was friends with Jeffrey Epstein. It was not a reputational risk; it was just a risk—a risk of retraumatising victims and a risk of giving somebody who had close links to various companies and to Russia a position of power. The Prime Minister knew about those problems, and it was incredibly cute of the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee to try to say that the Prime Minister really was not responsible for this, because he delegated it to other people. The Prime Minister made the decision—the Prime Minister has held up his hands and said that he made the decision—and nobody in the House can say that the fault was that the mitigations were not put in place. The fault is with the Prime Minister for making a political appointment and choosing somebody he knew—he was told it—was friends with Jeffrey Epstein.
I entirely agree with what the hon. Lady is saying. Does she agree with me about this? We have established clearly that those blank boxes, in which the Prime Minister could have made a comment when he was given the crucial information and the options leading up to the appointment of Mandelson, were intentionally blank. They are there precisely for the Prime Minister to record his response and, indeed, his decision. The fact that they were not redacted, but were genuinely blank, suggests to me—I cannot think of any other explanation—that the Prime Minister did not want to fill them in because he knew that there was something shameful about the appointment he was about to approve, and he did not want it on the record.
It is also clear that the Prime Minister had made up his mind, and it almost did not matter what people said. There was an awareness of the article that had been published saying that Peter Mandelson stayed in Jeffrey Epstein’s house while Jeffrey Epstein was in prison—it does not get much worse than that. The Prime Minister had made the decision, as we can see from a whole lot of this documentation.
I appreciate the reasons for how the redactions have been made, and I appreciate that this massive amount of work was pulled together by a significant number of people dealing with things in all different formats. However, there is a significant lack of consistency in this document that makes it really difficult to work out what is going on. For example, there are spaces in the document. If we look at page 199 of part III, Jon Garvie apparently sent a blank message, to which Peter Mandelson replied, “Quite”. I do not know how he could have replied “Quite” to a blank message. The document does not have stars, it does not say that the message has been redacted and it does not explain what the message was. At other points in the document, it does say what the messages were and what the redactions are—a certain picture, or something. As I have said, I appreciate the amount of work that was put in to pull this document together, but we are not getting the full picture. We are not seeing everything because the document has in some places been put together in a not very helpful way.
I turn to the Morgan McSweeney messages. As I have mentioned, Morgan McSweeney has lost his phone and therefore cannot provide WhatsApp messages. However, on page 173 of part III, he has provided group WhatsApp messages. The document specifically says that the
“messages were provided to the Cabinet Office by Morgan McSweeney”.
As the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips) said, it would be really nice if there was an explanation of why the information that is not there is not there. She gave back a nil return: she was asked for her messages with Peter Mandelson, and she replied that there were no messages with Peter Mandelson. On the Morgan McSweeney stuff, for example, it would be helpful if it said against these group chat messages that he could access only these group chat messages through another method, and he could not access his own personal messages, which is why we do not see them, or that he had disappearing messages on, and that is why we cannot see them. We do not know the reason: we do not know if it is because there is nothing, or because there was something, but it has now gone. I think that the level of transparency we are getting is deeply unhelpful.
On the speech by the hon. Member for Putney (Fleur Anderson), I have never had a constituent say that they would like less transparency. I have never had one say that they would like to know less about why the Prime Minister appointed Peter Mandelson; they want to know why the Prime Minister appointed Peter Mandelson. Today is perhaps the wrong day to make a call for there to be less information. I think that our discussions about this decision should be centred on the victims. The fact is that the Prime Minister made these decisions knowing about the victims, and knowing that Peter Mandelson was friends with Epstein and continued to be friends with Epstein.
It did not matter what red flags were shown up by the processes; the political decision had been made. We know that. We know that the appointment was announced in advance of these things taking place. We know that the decision had been made. We know that—for some reason that I am still not totally clear about—the Prime Minister thought Peter Mandelson was the best person for the job and the person who would do the best for national security, the people of these islands and the Labour Government. That was the decision-making process that the Prime Minister must have gone through.
The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire (Ian Sollom), said that we do not know what was in the driver’s head. We do not have that really key piece of information. We can have the driver apologise and say, “I’m sorry, I shouldn’t have done it,” but until they explain why they did it, we are not going to understand it, and the apology sounds hollower than I think the Prime Minister would like it to.
On transparency, we know that, even though there has been a significant amount of work and there is a significant number of documents, we do not have everything. Some things have been held back because of the police investigation or because of national security. I completely understand and accept that that is the case. However, there are other things that we do not have. On 4 February, the day the Humble Address went through, I submitted a number of freedom of information requests to the Cabinet Office. I received an acknowledgment of those FOI requests and, on 9 March, I received an email telling me that there was a delay in responding. I have received nothing since. Despite submitting an FOI request on 4 February, I have received nothing but an acknowledgment and then one update from the Cabinet Office, on 9 March, telling me that it was very sorry about the delay.
It would be very helpful if those on the Government Front Bench could ensure that I get a response to my FOI requests, because it is a legal requirement for Governments and the Cabinet Office to provide responses to such things and to make it clear if there is a delay why there is a delay, or if they are not going to provide a response why they are not going to provide a response. I would be interested to know how many members of the public have submitted FOI requests relating to the decision-making process or messages about Peter Mandelson, and have not received adequate responses from the Cabinet Office. I do not know why the Cabinet Office has not responded to me, but I would be concerned if it was doing exactly the same thing with members of the public, who do not have the ability to stand here and criticise the Cabinet Office.
The last thing I want to talk about is where things are with the Prime Minister and his currency at the moment. The Prime Minister is not standing here defending himself. The Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister is once again having to fill that role—I do not envy him. We have heard a defence of the Prime Minister’s decision from very few Members on either side of the House. I do not think anybody is trying to defend the Prime Minister’s decision. That brings us back to the Prime Minister’s judgment and to the fact that he made this decision. It was not, as some have tried to say, some civil servants or special advisers who made the decision. It was the Prime Minister who made the decision, however much his arm may have been twisted.
Perhaps, as was suggested by the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, it was others who really pushed this appointment and did the decision making. Maybe it was down others, in which case why would you have a Prime Minister who can be so easily led by others that they are willing to appoint somebody who was friends with a convicted paedophile to the most senior role in the ambassadorial service? We must assume that the Prime Minister is not that easily led. We must assume that the Prime Minister cannot have his arm twisted by officials or special advisers, in which case he made the decision. He is not standing here explaining why he made that decision. He is not meeting the victims. The worst thing that has been uncovered today is the fact that the Prime Minister has had requests from those victims and not met them. That is despite the fact that we can see in the mass of documents before us the people who the Prime Minister did meet—people who my constituents would be much less keen on him meeting than the actual victims of Epstein.
The Prime Minister has a significant number of questions to answer. This is not the change that he promised when he stood on his manifesto in 2024. This is not a Parliament that is working for the benefit of people. It is a Parliament that is continuing to hide things, and to duck away from having the difficult conversations and from listening to the people it really needs to listen to the most. The Government need to take a long hard look at themselves, change their priorities, and listen to the requests that are being made by the people who have been harmed the most by this complete shambles.
I thank Members from across the House for their contributions this afternoon and for sharing the condolences expressed by the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the hon. Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart), on the news that we learned during the debate that Sir Alex Younger, the former director general of MI6, had passed.
As I have said to the House before, while it is right for Members to discuss process and how the Government have responded to the Humble Address, we must not neglect to remember the women and girls who are at the very heart of this matter. Their suffering cannot be forgotten in this pursuit of justice—a pursuit that has been denied to them for too long. On that point, I want to start by paying particular thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones) for her powerful speech this afternoon and to take this opportunity to thank her for the work she carried out so diligently as part of this Government as the Minister for Victims.
The accounts that my hon. Friend has shared with this House this afternoon from victims such as Lisa are harrowing and should remind us of the anger and suffering that they rightly continue to feel each time we have one of these debates. But my hon. Friend’s speech has made me think that just reading the words on this page alone feels insufficient in the context of the cultural challenges that she raised, and with your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I would like to take a moment to take this opportunity to ask myself questions about my relationship with Peter Mandelson.
Did I consciously ignore the stories that followed Peter Mandelson, or indeed know about many of them, from many, many years ago? I do not think that I did. Did I ever ignore warnings that were put to me about Peter Mandelson? I did not receive any, to do so. But as I reflected on my hon. Friend’s speech, it made me think: did I at best subconsciously treat Peter Mandelson differently because I believed him to have influence and power within the Labour party? I think the answer to that question is yes, I did. Have I benefited from that relationship in the time I have been an elected politician? I think in part the answer to that question is yes, I did. For that I would like to apologise to the House, to the victims, to Lisa, and commit to then doing something about it.
In the first instance, I hear my hon. Friend’s request for a meeting with the victims of Jeffrey Epstein. I know that there is a request with No. 10 for the Prime Minister to do so, but if she thinks it appropriate, I make myself available for that meeting to discuss the issues that she has raised. I know that she will continue to be a strong advocate from the Back Benches for the action this Government are taking to halve violence against women and girls, as well as to pursue the duty of candour on which I know she worked so hard, and I look forward to continuing my work with her on these important issues.
The Minister has shown once again what a decent man he is, and he is doing a very difficult job in defence of somebody who knew a lot more than he did. He was not chief of staff at the time that the Mandelson appointment was being carried out. On page 8 of the first bundle, we have the note from the private secretary to the Prime Minister, which says:
“We have sought a due diligence review…and your Chief of Staff”—
Morgan McSweeney at the time—
“has discussed Peter’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein which we will go through with you, but your Director of Communications is satisfied with his responses to questions about contact.”
However, we also know from earlier in the bundle that the Prime Minister specifically knew that Mandelson had stayed in Epstein’s flat while Epstein was in in jail for the abuse of an under-age girl. The Prime Minister knew all that at the time. What is the purpose of having a box at the end marked for the Prime Minister’s comments on the alternatives he has been given when in fact, as we now know and as has been clearly explained by the Paymaster General, there has been no redaction—the Prime Minister did not comment? Why did the Prime Minister withhold any remarks on this highly contentious matter? Where did he comment? Where did he give his decision? He certainly did not do it in the place that he was supposed to do it.
In relation to the first part of the right hon. Gentleman’s question, he will know, because I have confirmed it to the House at the Dispatch Box previously, that questions were put by the Prime Minister’s former chief of staff to Peter Mandelson following the due diligence report to seek further information about the stories reported in the newspaper. He will also know that Peter Mandelson replied to those questions, and that information was then considered by those in No. 10.
As I have confirmed to the House, that document—the question and its answers—is one of the documents being held by the Metropolitan police. I have been advised repeatedly that I am not permitted to disclose what I have seen in that document on the Floor of the House, so I am afraid it will have to be one of those questions that remains until such a time as the Metropolitan police publishes its documentation. In relation to the second part of the right hon. Gentleman’s question, I refer him to the Paymaster General’s answer earlier today. That is the answer to that question.
This is my 11th update to the House on this matter, and I am grateful for the opportunity to answer Members’ questions. I will speak to a number of issues first, before turning to some specific questions from Members and setting out what the Government intend to do next.
Since the Humble Address motion was passed on 4 February, the House will know that a huge disclosure exercise has been undertaken by Government officials. The motion called for the disclosure of documents in respect of the appointment and dismissal of Peter Mandelson as His Majesty’s ambassador to Washington, alongside relevant communications. The publication of documents on 11 March, followed by the second tranche on Monday, has done that, in the Government’s view. I hope the Government have provided the House with the reassurance it needs that, with the exception of the small number of documents withheld at the request of the Metropolitan police, which we intend to publish when we are allowed to do so, the Government have discharged their duties to the House in relation to the Humble Address.
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberWe are concluding internal drafting of the peerages Bill, and will look to secure time to introduce it in this Session. I can assure my hon. Friend and the House that we want to introduce legislation that is effective and meaningful; that is certainly our intention.
I think the country has a right to know how the Prime Minister reacted at the end of Mandelson’s vetting process. Have the Prime Minister’s comments on the outcome of the vetting been released, are they being withheld, or are we expected to believe that he made no comment about it at all?
Let me make two points. As I made clear in my statement, vetting documents have been withheld by the Metropolitan police, although some of the documents have gone through the Intelligence and Security Committee, but I refer the right hon. Gentleman to what the Prime Minister said previously. As has been clear, the Foreign Office did not flag this information with the Prime Minister; he was not aware of it until it had been leaked to The Guardian.
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The second tranche of information will publish all remaining documents except those that are currently with the Metropolitan police in relation to ongoing criminal investigations. As I said to the House, this will be a very significant publication, which will warrant careful consideration from Members across the House. We want to publish it with sufficient notice to allow Members to consider it before coming to the House to ask any questions they may have of the Government, which is why we are now publishing it after the Whitsun recess.
In more than 30 years of its existence, the Intelligence and Security Committee has never once suffered from a leak. Therefore, anything that is disclosed to it, no matter how sensitive, is not going to be published. Therefore, the question of it undermining the security vetting process if such raw data were published does not arise, because the ISC is the one parliamentary body guaranteed to ensure that that does not happen. So can the Minister stop obfuscating on that aspect and can he confirm that, irrespective of the question of the raw data, what will definitely be made available to the ISC, if it has not been already, are the annotations and the documents that show how an initial failure to pass vetting for Lord Mandelson became a decision to approve him and state that he had been successful in getting through the process?
I can confirm that all documents that need to be referred to the ISC have now been referred to it. That process has concluded, which is why we can move to publication after the recess.
(3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am not sure that I should declare my voting intention from the Dispatch Box, but I refer the hon. Gentleman to my previous answer.
The Government are keen to emphasise their transparency in the course of dealing with the Humble Address requests and demands, so here is an opportunity to put that to the test. Last Tuesday, I put down a question for written answer by the Prime Minister:
“To ask the Prime Minister who first suggested to him that Peter Mandelson should be appointed as Ambassador to the United States.”
It was accepted and published as such by the Table Office. Subsequently, it has been transferred to the Cabinet Office, for which he has responsibility. It is due to be answered tomorrow. Will the Minister give the answer to that question tomorrow, on time and substantively?
The Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister’s responsibilities are just growing and growing!
(3 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Chris Ward
There are few greater champions of the buy British agenda than my hon. Friend, although there are a few of us in the Government as well. We are trying to make progress on that agenda. What I am setting out today is what I can do with Government guidance and by using the exemptions that already exist in national security restrictions. We have not jumped to legislation; I am trying to use the powers that I have. The point that he is making is about a bigger agenda that I hope we can get to, in order to drive forward more support for British industry. This is the start of it but it is not the end, and we will work with him on doing that.
Too often consumers buy products that, when they get to examine them, turn out to have been manufactured in places like China. What safeguards do the Government have in their new procurement strategy to ensure that there are no concealed foreign supply chain components in the contracts that they intend to award? Why are the SMEs—or any companies—that are bidding having to demonstrate trade union recognition if they might have a workforce that do not require that?
Chris Ward
On the right hon. Gentleman’s first point, we have robust processes in place on supply chains, which the Department for Business and Trade leads on. The announcement that I made before Easter does not change that; the strategy sticks with the existing protections that we have under the Procurement Act regulations. What I am talking about here is how we can use those powers to direct Departments and use Government buying power to do more.
On the right hon. Gentleman’s point about union recognition, I am sorry but I missed the very end of his question. There is nothing in the strategy that changes union recognition within the procurement system—that can already be weighted within the social value requirement—but it takes an important step on insourcing for Government Departments. I am incredibly proud that this Government are doing that and it is part of the manifesto on which we were elected.