Armed Forces

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

We can disagree with nothing in the motion, but without wishing to break the consensual mood of the House, I think that this is too good an opportunity not to ask at least some questions of Ministers, in the hope that they will at least reflect on them and perhaps return later.

I am concerned, as are a number of Members on these Benches, that by keeping on cutting defence expenditure, we risk creating imbalances on a variety of fronts. Can it be right, for example, that the budgets of Departments dealing with health, welfare and international aid are being protected, if not expanded, as a percentage of Government expenditure? That puts disproportionate pressure on other Departments, such as Defence, when trying to save costs. I also wonder whether imbalances are being created in regard to our transatlantic relationship. Our defence capability is one of the key anchors of that relationship, but it is not a one-way ticket. There are obligations on both sides, including our own. If we keep shaving our defence capability, might we put elements of that relationship at risk?

I also suggest that we might be creating imbalances in other areas, such as our capability to meet our foreign policy objectives, whatever they might be, and defend our interests overseas. The House knows that I have not been supportive of our military interventions over the past decade, but let us put that to one side. There have been moments during those interventions when our resources have not matched our ambitions. It was not the fault of the troops on the ground, but in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular the necessary resources were lacking, and that had a knock-on effect on our ability to achieve our objectives.

I have other concerns but, as an ex-soldier, I shall focus on the Army. The plan to disband 20,000 regulars before knowing whether the plan to recruit 30,000 reservists to take their place will work is high risk, given that we do not know whether those reservists will be able to plug the gap from a capability point of view, or from a boots-on-the-ground point of view. I ask Ministers to ensure that that issue is centrally addressed in the forthcoming White Paper. There are key questions that need answering very soon, because redundancies are taking effect as we speak, and we do not know whether the plan will work.

There is a real danger that Government proposals will prove a false economy, in financial terms and in terms of military capability. Let us take cost savings as an example. I am conscious of the figure of £1.8 billion over 10 years, and more details will follow in the White Paper, but at the moment the Government are long on promise and short on costings and details. They have admitted in the Green Paper that it costs more to train reservists than regulars. The financial incentives being offered to regulars to join the reserves mean that they will be on a better scale of pay than a serving brigadier, if we include the £5,000 sign-up bonus, the bounty, the daily rate and so forth. There is also the question of civilian salaries being matched, although I am aware that the Government are considering capping an element of that. Again, we need to see the details. And all that is before we even consider the fact that the reservists will not be deployable in their first year.

I have already raised the question of the number of reservists that will be required. According to Ministry of Defence figures, the present Territorial Army mobilisation rate is 40%. If we apply that to the 20,000 regulars, we will need 50,000 reservists. I look forward to seeing the details of how that magic figure of 40% is going to be increased. It will take a concerted effort to achieve a mobilisation rate of much more than 40%, given that many people in the Army believe that we are not even hitting 40% at the moment.

There is also the question of the capability gap. In the 1980s, when many of us served, the TA did a very good job that basically involved reservists being transported out to Germany, digging a trench and waiting for the Soviet or Warsaw pact forces to arrive. Today, asymmetric warfare is becoming the norm. The skills base will become much higher, and our requirements will be much more demanding, yet I understand that the number of training days is being increased to 40 overall—an increase of only five days. I question that on the capability front, particularly when those forces are going to be mobilised as groups rather than as add-ons. That factor must be considered.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend share my fear that, with the scale of priorities we have at the moment, there is a danger that if we reduce the size of the Army much more, they will all be able to fit into the single first High Speed 2 train?

[Mr Baron]

Let us hope it is not a one-way ticket!

Let me finish with a concern some of us have about the potentially distorting effect on the ground. Excellent, well recruited battalions, such as the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, are being axed, while more poorly recruited battalions are being saved. It is costing millions of pounds to keep over-strength battalions up to the mark. Such a policy is, in many respects, simply reinforcing failure.

In conclusion, I think this is a high-risk policy, and I ask Ministers to make sure that they cover the base very carefully. In my view, we need to see concrete evidence that the reservist plan will take effect and will work—before we let the regular battalions go. Here we are dealing with the defence of the realm, and this is happening when many countries not necessarily friendly to the west are arming and increasing their expenditure on defence. No one here can tell when or where the next threat will come from. I therefore ask Ministers to consider these points very carefully.