Recall of MPs Bill
Debate between Julian Huppert and David Burrowes(9 years, 12 months ago)
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Dr Huppert
I am wary of straying into the debate we had in Committee because there was a huge amount of discussion about that and the House reached a decision. It is about finding a balance and ensuring that we avoid trivial or vexatious cases, while capturing the power for the public. The other deficiency in the proposals by the hon. Member for Richmond Park was that it was a complex, multi-stage process—possibly too complex to be workable. I respect his views and those of many Members who supported him, but that amendment was defeated by the House and we are trying an alternative approach.
Mr David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman is speaking about extending the scope of recall. I declare an interest as a lawyer, but would not new clauses 2 and 3 be a charter particularly for lawyers, meaning that the system becomes unduly litigious? That will detract from the original intention of recall, which is to give real power to the people.
Dr Huppert
I am not a lawyer; I dropped out of studying law after my first year because my exams coincided with the general election, so I bow to the hon. Gentleman’s expertise in how litigious lawyers can be and how they will seek to make money out of whatever proposals there may be. I do not agree, however, that the new clauses will lead to a huge amount of litigation, so allow me to outline how I think they would work. If the hon. Gentleman has proposals for improving the Bill, I would be happy to hear them.
No Government amendment contains all the required measures, so my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome and I worked on the amendments and adjusted them in the light of criticisms from right hon. and hon. Members across the House. Although we do not have the Government’s seal of approval, we believe this is a workable approach that can, if necessary, be tweaked in another place, which has more specialist constitutional lawyers than this House. We feel that we should not simply hand the Bill over to the Lords unamended and say, “Try to sort the whole thing out”, without giving them a strong steer. Recall applies to Members of this House; the other place can consider the detail, but it should not be considering the principles.
Our proposed option would be in addition to triggers already in the Bill and would mean that 500 electors could sign a petition alleging misconduct by an MP. An election court would hear evidence of that misconduct and any rebuttal by the MP, and decide
“whether, on the basis of the evidence, it is reasonable to believe that the MP has misconducted himself or herself, to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the MP, without reasonable excuse or justification.”
If the court upheld the allegation, that would act as another trigger for a recall petition in the same way as a suspension by the standards Committee of this House would do. However, because there would have been no proof of misconduct, only evidence of reasonable belief, we would require a slightly higher hurdle for the petition—15% rather than 10% of the electorate. That change is one of a number that we introduced, and we hope that the new clauses answer the criticisms that were made.
Let me highlight our other changes. The hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) both felt that 100 petitioners, as in the original proposal, was too low a number and too easy to achieve, so we increased that to 500. We are not keen to go higher because the court’s role in ruling out unsubstantiated trivial or vexatious cases is best before the complaint has built up a large head of steam. Otherwise, it rather obviates the point of the later petition phase, which needs 15% of the electorate. The provision also simplifies the rules on expenses. Five hundred is a substantial barrier to a small or trivial claim—one annoyed individual, for example—but not if there is a real sense among the public that an MP has done something wrong.
The hon. Members for North Down (Lady Hermon) and for Liverpool, West Derby pointed out one serious flaw in our previous drafting—my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome was explicit about this. We were trying to apply the common law offence of misconduct in public office to Members representing Scotland and Northern Ireland, where that common law offence does not apply. We sought to get around that by stipulating that courts would act as though the offence were in England and Wales, on the basis that the House is in England, but that was inelegant and we accept that it was flawed. We solved the problem by specifying in the Bill the definition to be used, which is taken from the Attorney-General’s advice on common law in England and Wales. We are therefore no longer asking a court to determine anything based on a jurisdiction that is not its own, and we can still benefit from existing case law for that wording.
Dr Huppert
The wording is exactly the wording there would be for misconduct. First, that offence does not exist in Scotland or Northern Ireland. I will come on to that later with an example, but there are some issues. We would want Members to be equal, broadly speaking, regardless of where they have been elected from. The other issue is that although the offence of misconduct in public office is used quite regularly against police officers—there are a number of other cases—it has never actually been used against a Member of Parliament. There is a question of whether we trust the Crown Prosecution Service to be the deciding factor, particularly when there could be questions about how it would interact with various Members and Ministers.
Mr Burrowes
Drawing on the previous intervention and my point about litigation, does this not then become a shadow trial in a line to what perhaps should be a criminal trial in relation to the common law offence? That is the danger, because we are raising not only a civil but criminal liability that may become very protracted and not lead to the end result of a proper recall process.
Dr Huppert
We have put in provisions so that, in the event of criminal proceedings, they would take precedence and the recall process would be stayed while that was happening, so I think we have addressed that. As I will go on to say, there is a very similar model already in use in the US and that does not seem to have the same sorts of problems that the hon. Gentleman describes.
On other changes we have made, the hon. Members for Richmond Park (Zac Goldsmith) and for Liverpool, West Derby were concerned about a phrase we included relating to gross dereliction of duty as an MP perhaps being considered as misconduct in public office. They both highlighted the point that there is no definition of our duties as Members of this House. We accept that point and have removed it from the revised amendment. However, I think there is general agreement in the House that there should be some provision in the code of conduct to deal with that. The well-known case of the Member of Parliament who spent most of his time running a pub in Ireland is not one that I think any of us would consider acceptable or wish to see emulated. We should try to ensure that the code of conduct is updated so that, for example, an MP who chose not to attend the House for months or years on end with no good reason, could not continue in that way. Local councils have a rule that councillors have to attend a meeting within six months, with a provision for extensions when there is good reason, for example illness.
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Debate between Julian Huppert and David Burrowes(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Burrowes
Obviously the court will always be concerned with the issue of reoffending. However, it must balance a great many factors, not least the severity of offences, the need for deterrence, and the need for offenders to be in prison so that they cannot commit further offences, but also the fact that it is important for others, not least the victims, to know that the offence is very serious. As has already been pointed out, people who carry knives are putting not just others but themselves in danger. We need to ensure that minimum mandatory sentences are par for the course, as they are in the case of other serious offending.
It surprises me that the Liberal Democrats oppose the new clause. In 2011, they agreed—unanimously, I believe—with a measure proposing a minimum mandatory sentence for knife crime which involved the same issue of discretion in exceptional circumstances. When it comes to mandatory minimum sentencing, what is the quantitative, indeed qualitative, difference, in terms of principle, between someone carrying a knife in a threatening manner and someone carrying a knife for the second time? The Liberal Democrats like to say that they are standing on a key issue of principle.
Dr Huppert
I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman cannot work out the answer to his own question. There is a substantial difference between carrying a knife and threatening someone with a knife. In the first instance, the knife could be intended for protection; in the second, the person with the knife risks causing harm to someone else. There is a very clear difference, and I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman cannot see it.
Mr Burrowes
It is clear that they are different offences, but my point is that the Deputy Prime Minister thinks that we should have nothing to do with a mandatory minimum sentence, as a matter of principle. I do not understand the difference between the examples given by the hon. Gentleman when it comes to the principle of mandatory sentencing. He said that people might carry knives for their own protection, but the issue is the same whether a person threatens someone else or whether that person is carrying a knife for the second time. In both cases, a mandatory sentence is applied. It would be necessary to go a considerable way to show exceptional circumstances to avoid a prison sentence.
Dr Huppert
I find the hon. Gentleman’s efforts to bridge everything fascinating: he is in favour of mandatory sentencing as long as there is discretion for the police and the judges—and everybody else. He is thoroughly confused. The judge already has the power to sentence somebody for up to four years. Under this proposal, they will also have that power, so I do not understand what the hon. Gentleman’s point is. There are many such cases.
The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) said that the cases in which there are exceptional circumstances are incredibly rare, but a huge range of cases will arise. They cannot be both incredibly rare and very common.
The main argument for the new clause seems to be that it sends out a message. It is not about changing what the judge can actually do; it is about sending out a message. As was said earlier, sending a message through legislation always seems like a pretty poor argument. I would be interested to hear whether there is evidence to suggest that people will listen to what such a message contains. We must understand why people carry knives: the Home Office has done a substantial amount of work on that over the years, and the main reason it found was that people feel they need protection. A Home Office study found that 85% of young people who reported carrying a knife did so for protection and only a tiny fraction did so to threaten or injure somebody.
People should not carry a knife for protection. It is not a sensible thing to do, but we should consider why they do it. We know that knife possession is particularly high among people who have been victims of crime, especially young males. Once they have been victims of crime, they are far more likely to carry a knife afterwards. That tells us something about the motivation, why they are carrying knives and how we can best persuade them not to do so. If somebody is literally terrified that they may be attacked—this is all too common—and they already know that they could get up to four years in jail for carrying a knife, will the new clause send a strong enough message? Are there better things that we could do to address the issue?
Mr Burrowes
The hon. Gentleman will agree that it is important to look at existing legislation rather than to over-legislate. It is important to use the right examples: if someone is in terror that they are about to be attacked, the existing common law covers duress and coercion, which could then be a defence. A defence is one thing, but mitigation is another. It does not in any way go against the need to ensure that legislation is tough and includes a mandatory sentence.
Dr Huppert
I confess that I am not a lawyer, but I think that it would be hard to make a defence—those who are lawyers may correct me—of generally being scared of being attacked over a long time period, given that people are not carrying a knife because they expect to be attacked on a particular occasion and in a particular place. That is the problem. These people are scared. They are carrying a knife because of the risk that somebody will attack them, not because they ever intend to use it or hope to use it. I recognise that the defence would apply if someone grabbed a knife to defend themselves from an attack, but it would not apply in this case.
The Home Affairs Committee carried out a detailed report into this subject. Incidentally, its findings were unanimous. Earlier, the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) said from a sedentary position that the Committee had a left-wing majority. It was a unanimous report, and I am not sure whether we are seeing a clear majority on the left at the moment. The Committee concluded that
“evidence suggests that the prospect of a custodial sentence may not deter young people from carrying knives. Many young people do not think about the consequences of their actions, and for a small minority who feel at risk of violence, the prospect of jail seems preferable to the dangers of being caught without a weapon for protection.”
It is that issue that we need to think further about. None of us is happy that that is the way things are, and that people are concerned to that extent, but that is the situation that we face.
The Select Committee took lots of evidence from young people who have been involved in knife crime. They said:
“It does not go through your mind at all about prison or whatever; it does not exist.”
There is lots of evidence to show that sentencing does not have that much effect. The 2001 Halliday report on sentencing found no evidence to suggest that there was a link between differences in sentence severity and deterrence effects. It concluded that
“it is the prospect of getting caught that has deterrence value”
rather than the nature of the sentence itself.
The Centre for Social Justice said:
“An increase in the number of people imprisoned for knife possession does not warrant celebration, particularly when we know that the majority of young people carry knives out of fear and…custody exposes young people to more hardened criminals.”
That is another problem that was briefly touched on earlier. When young people have been led astray, and find themselves involved in gangs and knife crime, there are a number of paths that they can take. If they manage to avoid death or injury—unfortunately that is not the case for all of them—they might clean up their act, or they might settle into a life of repeated criminality. We all hope that they will sort themselves out, but we know that prison sentences push people into repeat offending. Prison has its place, and there are strenuous efforts now to try to improve rehabilitation, but we still see high reoffending levels. We should be wary of increasing the damaging effect that prison has on people’s futures.
We should also be looking for unintended consequences on people’s behaviour—if they are listening to the message being sent out. People in gangs who have been charged once with possessing a knife will simply react—if they pay any attention at all, and that will depend on the quality of policing—by making another more junior, more vulnerable gang member carry a knife for them. That will seem like a sensible and rational response, if they are listening to the message that is being sent out. Under-16s will be put under intense pressure to do that for the obvious reason that they would not be caught by the new clause. That would put under-16s at greater risk by leading them further into gang behaviour. If the new clause is added to the Bill, I expect one of the unintended consequences to be an increase in those aged 15 and under carrying knives.
Dr Huppert
The hon. Gentleman makes an extremely good point that I had not thought to add. He is absolutely right, and I hope that he will support us on the matter.
Mr Burrowes
I reassure the hon. Gentleman that although the focus of new clauses 6 and 7 is on knives and bladed articles, they cover offensive weapons. Any weapon, whatever it might be, that is determined to be offensive—whether per se, because it is carried with intent or because of its use—would be covered by new clauses 6 and 7.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Debate between Julian Huppert and David Burrowes(11 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr Burrowes
Unfortunately, we are running out of time.
What is pernicious is equating hon. Members’ opposition to redefining marriage with previous discrimination on the basis of race. That plays into the hands of those who have accused me and many hon. Members of being homophobic or bigoted simply for standing up for marriage—[Interruption.] I will give way to the right hon. Member for Tottenham shortly. Such intolerant reaction to our belief in marriage runs the risk of being fomented by the state orthodoxy in the Bill about the new gender-neutral meaning of marriage. For our constituents—those who really matter—those who disagree risk vilification and discrimination and they certainly will not get the protection they deserve under the Equality Act 2010.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Debate between Julian Huppert and David Burrowes
Mr Burrowes
No. The hon. Gentleman and I were members of the Committee, where we had a chance to have our say. I will not give way, because I want people to be able to have their say. That is the point of this debate. [Hon. Members: “Give way!] Opposition Members are calling for me to give way, but I am not sure whether they will be allowed to exercise their conscience when it comes to voting on the Bill, or whether they are even free to get involved in this debate. They will be whipped into voting against me whatever I say or think, so I am not sure whether it is worth listening to them at this precise moment.
New clauses 4, 5 and 6 and amendment 50 seek to protect freedom of speech, which, along with freedom of conscience, we should all cherish dearly. We should cherish the fact that we are able to stand up and make our points, whether they be for or against the Bill’s principles, and that we can all—Liberal Democrats and Conservatives can, at least—exercise our conscience on the amendments. We are concerned about constituents who will not be able to do that as easily, so we need to ensure that the Bill has clarity.
The Bill has provoked undoubtedly strong feelings across the country. People from all strands and strata of society have deeply held, carefully considered and, indeed, principled views. Some have tried to say that this is an issue for the young, not the old, and for metropolitan, not rural areas, but people—whether they are young or old, or deeply religious or assertively secular—have real concerns. Polls come up with a different figure for the numbers for or against, depending on the question asked. The nation is as divided as the Conservative parliamentary party on this issue. Indeed, we have picked an issue on which our division shows that we are very much in touch with the nation.
At the very least, we need to ensure that we properly protect those who do not agree with the way in which the state wants to redefine marriage. This Bill is undoubtedly a divisive measure, but it is meant to be permissive. However, due to a lack of attention or time, it does not provide against causing further division and isolation or against ostracising the millions out there who are passionately against the principle of the Bill.
This country has a great and honourable tradition—a civilised and progressive belief that we do not censor or ostracise those who hold different views from our own. Indeed, we will defend that right however much we might disagree with those views. The new clauses ask the House a basic and reasonable question: will we stand firm in that tradition? Will we stand with the greats of our political heritage to defend the whole breadth of society, or will we consider only our own particular views, needs and rights? Tomorrow we will gather again to debate the Bill’s Third Reading and we will divide in our usual way to vote on whether we agree with its very principle. We need to ensure that we stand together, despite the Labour Whip, and provide clarity.
The Bill Committee heard a lot of evidence and I am not sure whether everyone has had the chance to pore over the minutiae of our deliberations. We heard from a solicitor called Mark Jones, who represents a number of campaigners whose beliefs are being trumped by equality. When asked about freedom of speech, he replied that the Bill will have an impact
“anywhere where there is a conversation.”––[Official Report, Marriage (Same Sex Marriage) Public Bill Committee, 14 February 2013; c. 161, Q417.]
I was reminded of that just three days ago—on Friday—when a street preacher in Cambridge was nearly arrested for arguing for the traditional view of marriage. A member of the public called the police and told the preacher:
“Anyone who believes in man/woman only marriage should be sent to jail. Equality overrides free speech”.
The street preacher was filmed on mobile phones and a small crowd declared that they had evidence to put him in jail. Two police officers duly arrived and were shown the evidence. A police officer listened intently to the preacher’s words. Thankfully, common sense prevailed and the police went away, but it was a close call and that was before the change to the law. [Interruption.] The Minister of State may well laugh, but if he saw somebody exercising their freedom of speech and experienced that chill factor, I hope that he would stand alongside them and defend their right. I am sure that he is as concerned as others. Amendment 50 aims to avoid the extraordinary situation of somebody being criminalised for exercising their right to support traditional marriage.