Great British Energy Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Josh MacAlister and Harriet Cross

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Josh MacAlister]

Q This is a follow-up for Ravi Gurumurthy, on the theme of autonomy and flexibility for GBE. For this to be a success, there needs to be some appetite for risk taken by GBE. Historically, Government agencies have not been known for being particularly free to do that. The Bill intends to provide a degree of flexibility for GBE to operate and respond with autonomy and pace. Given the work that Nesta has done in this space, Ravi, can you say a little more about what gives you the confidence that the Bill sets that up in the right way?

Ravi Gurumurthy: It is a very challenging question. As you know, good intentions in this area often do not translate. You can mandate and say you want to operate with risk appetite, but it does not really translate into behaviour. What do I think are some of the components? The capitalisation of GB Energy is really important, because that gives it some degree of resource to take risks. I am quite interested in whether, as well as investing in novel technologies with a high-risk appetite, GB Energy can either take cashless equity stakes or invest in more established technologies, because if you have a more balanced portfolio, it might give you the ability to take risks in some aspects.

That gets you into a conversation about the fiscal rules. The one thing I would say about this area is that if you compare offshore wind and other established energy technologies with roads or hospitals, the big difference in my mind is that for offshore wind we will build those wind farms whether the state invests or not, and we will pay as consumers, whereas roads and hospitals will not get built if the state does not. The point is that we are going to pay for it, and we will pay more through private sector borrowing than we will through the state.

The second big difference is that unlike a road or a hospital, there was a guaranteed revenue stream through a contract for difference, so there is a really good rationale for why we should not have fiscal rules that bias us towards 100% private sector borrowing, rather than the state either taking a cashless equity stake via this development process or actually investing. If you do that, it will give GB Energy the ability to then take risks on the much more novel aspects of the portfolio and have failures. If GB Energy does not have failures, it will not be doing its job.

[Harriet Cross]

Q We have heard a lot about public investment and the importance of private investment for meeting net zero. Is there anything in the Bill that encourages you that the amount of public investment going in will attract the amount of private investment that is needed? We have to take this Bill in the round with other energy policies coming forward. How does it sit alongside those in ensuring that we continue to attract private investment into the energy sector?

Marc Hedin: I may be playing devil’s advocate here, but there is a slight risk if a public company were to invest in a utility scale project. At the moment in GB, we manage to attract quite a lot of capital to deploy renewable projects, for instance. There is also a risk of perceived unfair competition that would be detrimental to future capital attractiveness, so I would add that to the global reflection around this topic.

Ravi Gurumurthy: To come in on that, it is very common in other countries for the state to co-invest. I have spoken to a lot of other organisations, and we need to attract £350 billion to £500 billion of capital into power generation in the next 10 years. I think it is perfectly possible for the state to play a role in that. Everything that GB Energy is trying to do is to reduce the risk and increase the predictability of the investment environment. If you take the developer role, at the moment the private sector, when it bids in for a seabed lease, has to have the uncertainty of whether that project will ever get commissioned and the long delay in planning and consenting, grid connection and environmental surveys. If we can actually have the state do some of that and de-risk it, I think it is more likely to get that private sector investment. That is what happens in the Netherlands and it is what the Danes are moving towards, and it is also partly what happens in Germany. There is a good track record of these sorts of environments working well to attract private sector investment.

Shaun Spiers: That is right. You cannot dictate the culture of a company in a Bill. There was a criticism of the Green Investment Bank, for instance, that it invested in rather established technologies and had an insufficiently high appetite for risk. It will be important that GB Energy does pump-prime private investment and not replace it.

Great British Energy Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Josh MacAlister and Harriet Cross

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Harriet Cross]

Q The Bill, as we have discussed, is pretty light on detail at the moment, which means it could be all things to all people or not offer enough answers to give any reassurance to anyone. From your clients’ point of view, is there a different mechanism that they would prefer? How could this public investment be used in a different manner to actually help drive and retain the private investment coming in at the moment? In other words, is this the best mechanism for keeping and driving investment?

Josh Buckland: On the surface, a range of different countries have publicly owned energy companies of different sizes and scales. Therefore, I do not agree with the concept that private investors are either unfamiliar or concerned at a general level. It will all come down to your point around the design of the actual institution and how it operates with the private market.

I think you are right to say that the Bill is relatively high-level. Looking back at some of the precedents that exist, I would mention the Green Investment Bank again. That was operational for a number of years and was established and grown while the legislation was then taken later down the line. It was easier, if you were a private investor, to understand the role that the Green Investment Bank would play and then have the legislation to effectively inform and solidify that.

The challenge in this context is that the Government have obviously proceeded with the legislation early on, as the institution is being established. That does not mean to say that it cannot be created as an institution that is independent and galvanises private investment but, clearly, the current level of uncertainty around the design and the mechanisms that it will deploy will add to that challenge.

Therefore, the Government have said that alongside the Bill they will look to publish more detail on a framework agreement with Government, and how they will set that out and consult with private industry. That, in tandem with the Bill, is critical at this formation stage. That is not to say that it necessarily leads to all that detail being in the Bill itself, but it is critical that it goes alongside it.

[Josh MacAlister (Whitehaven and Workington) (Lab)]

Q It is good to hear you say that the Bill has the full range of mechanisms within it to mobilise capital. There has been a recurring theme today that the Bill should provide flexibility for future eventualities as the energy system changes dynamically. Do you have any reflections on the past 10 years, and looking ahead to the next 10 years, as to how the mechanisms that get chosen by the executive at GB Energy might have changed had it been in existence 10 years ago? Looking ahead as well, how might the mechanisms that it chooses change over time?

Josh Buckland: It is a fair and good question. I think your substantive point is absolutely right; the mechanisms set out under clause 4 give Great British Energy the opportunity to take different approaches as technology shifts and changes. We have definitely seen, over the past decade, a shift towards different mechanisms deployed by Government. At the early stage, they were largely bilateral, non-competitive and largely done on a kind of long-term contract basis. It is very instructive to look at what the UK Infrastructure Bank is now doing; it is now looking at different mechanisms—earlier stage investment, development capital at risk, and equity investments. Those are the sorts of things that Governments have not traditionally done at the scale that is necessarily required for the energy transition but that obviously Great British Energy could play a role in extending.

There is an interesting question around where you draw the line between Great British Energy and the role of other existing institutions. The Government have already talked about the fact that they are going to evolve the UK Infrastructure Bank to be the national wealth fund, and obviously that will have some crossover with the operations and focus areas of Great British Energy. For me—this may be an issue that is separate from the Bill—how the Government set out how the governance will work between the Department, the Government, Great British Energy, the national wealth fund and other institutions will be critical to making that a success over time, as the executive of Great British Energy looks at new issues and technologies as they come through.

I would stress—I imagine that this point may be made by other witnesses—that the fact that clause 3 is relatively broad, in terms of the sectors and areas that the entity can invest in, is really beneficial, because that also allows some level of independence for the executive to take choices as the energy sector evolves. Clearly, we know the many technologies that we have now, but there will be a range of different issues that come through. I therefore think that that flexibility under clause 3 is quite important.