Finance (No. 3) Bill

Jonathan Reynolds Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 8th January 2019 Commons Chamber

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 7—Review of effect of carbon emissions tax on climate targets—

“The Chancellor of the Exchequer must review the expected effect of the carbon emissions tax on the United Kingdom’s ability to meet its internationally agreed climate targets and lay a report of that review before the House within six months of the passing of this Act.”

New clause 12—Review of expenditure implications of Part 3—

“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must review the expenditure implications of commencing Part 3 of this Act and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within six months of the passing of this Act.

(2) No regulations may be made by the Commissioners under section 78(1) unless the review under subsection (1) has been laid before the House of Commons.”

This new clause would require a review within 6 months of the expenditure implications of introducing a carbon emissions tax. It would prevent part 3 (carbon emissions tax) coming into effect until such a review had been laid before the House of Commons.

New clause 13—Report on consultation on certain provisions of this Act (No. 2)—

“(1) No later than two months after the passing of this Act, the Chancellor of the Exchequer must lay before the House of Commons a report on the consultation undertaken on the provisions in subsection (2).

(2) Those provisions are—

(a) sections 68 to 78,

(b) section 89, and

(c) section 90.

(3) A report under this section must specify in respect of each provision listed in subsection (2)—

(a) whether a version of the provision was published in draft,

(b) if so, whether changes were made as a result of consultation on the draft,

(c) if not, the reasons why the provision was not published in draft and any consultation which took place on the proposed provision in the absence of such a draft.”

This new clause would require a report on the consultation undertaken on certain provisions of the Bill – alongside New Clause 11, New Clause 14 and New Clause 15.

New clause 19—Review of powers in consequence of EU withdrawal (No. 2)—

“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, no later than a week after the passing of this Act and before exercising the power in section 89(1), lay before the House of Commons a review of the following matters—

(a) the fiscal and economic effects of the exercise of the powers in section 89(1) and of the outcome of negotiations for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union giving rise to their exercise;

(b) a comparison of those fiscal and economic effects with the effects if a negotiated withdrawal agreement and a framework for a future relationship with the EU had been agreed to;

(c) any differences in the exercise of those powers in respect of—

(i) England,

(ii) Scotland,

(iii) Wales, and

(iv) Northern Ireland;

(d) any differential effects in relation to the matters specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) in relation between—

(i) England,

(ii) Scotland,

(iii) Wales, and

(iv) Northern Ireland.”

This new clause would require a review of the economic and fiscal impact of the use of the powers in section 89 in the event of no deal and in event of a withdrawal agreement passing.

Amendment 16, in clause 78, page 51, line 32, after “may” insert

“(subject to section (Review of expenditure implications of Part 3))”.

See New Clause 12.

Amendment 1, in clause 89, page 66, line 38, at end insert—

“(1A) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, no later than a week after the passing of this Act and before exercising the power in subsection (1), lay before the House of Commons a review of the following matters—

(a) the fiscal and economic effects of the exercise of those powers and of the outcome of negotiations for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union giving rise to their exercise;

(b) a comparison of those fiscal and economic effects with the effects if a negotiated withdrawal agreement and a framework for a future relationship with the EU had been agreed to;

(c) any differences in the exercise of those powers in respect of—

(i) Great Britain, and

(ii) Northern Ireland;

(d) any differential effects in relation to the matters specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) in relation between

(i) Great Britain, and

(ii) Northern Ireland.”

This amendment would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review the fiscal and economic effects of the exercise of the powers in subsection (1) before exercising those powers.

Amendment 13, page 67, line 7, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) No statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.”

This amendment would make Clause 89 (Minor amendments in consequence of EU withdrawal) subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 7, page 67, line 19, at end insert—

“(7) The provisions of this section only come into force if—

(a) a negotiated withdrawal agreement and a framework for the future relationship have been approved by a resolution of the House of Commons on a motion moved by a Minister of the Crown for the purposes of section 13(1)(b) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, or

(b) the Prime Minister has notified the President of the European Council, in accordance with Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union, of the United Kingdom’s request to extend the period in which the Treaties shall still apply to the United Kingdom, or

(c) leaving the European Union without a withdrawal agreement and a framework for the future relationship has been approved by a resolution of the House of Commons on a motion moved by a Minister of the Crown.”

This amendment would prevent the Government implementing the “no deal” provisions of Clause 89 without the explicit consent of Parliament for such an outcome. It would provide three options for the provisions of Clause 89 to come into force: if the House of Commons has approved a negotiated withdrawal agreement and a framework for the future relationship; if the Government has sought an extension of the Article 50 period; or the House of Commons has approved leaving the European Union without a withdrawal agreement and framework for the future relationship.

Amendment 8, page 67, line 19, at end insert—

“(7) The provisions of this section shall not come into force until the House of Commons has come to a resolution on a motion made by a Minister of the Crown agreeing its commencement.”

Amendment 14, in clause 90, page 67, line 22, after “may” insert

“(subject to subsections (1A) and (1B))”.

See Amendment 15

Amendment 15, page 67, line 24, at end insert—

“(1A) Before proposing to incur expenditure under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay before the House of Commons—

(a) a statement of the circumstances (in relation to negotiations relating to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union) that give rise to the need for such preparatory expenditure, and

(b) an estimate of the expenditure to be incurred.

(1B) No expenditure may be incurred under subsection (1) unless the House of Commons comes to a resolution that it has considered the statement and estimate under subsection (1A) and approves the proposed expenditure.”

This amendment would require a statement on the circumstances (in relation to negotiations) giving rise to the need for, as well as an estimate of the cost of, preparatory expenditure to introduce a charging scheme for greenhouse gas allowances. The amendment would require a Commons resolution before expenditure could be incurred.

New clause 18—Review of effects on measures in Act of certain changes in migration levels—

“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must review the effects on the provisions of this Act of migration in the scenarios in subsection (2) and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within one month of the passing of this Act.

(2) Those scenarios are that—

(a) the United Kingdom does not leave the European Union,

(b) the United Kingdom leaves the European Union without a negotiated withdrawal agreement,

(c) the United Kingdom leaves the European Union following a negotiated withdrawal agreement, and remains in the single market and customs union,

(d) the United Kingdom leaves the United Kingdom on the terms of the draft withdrawal agreement of 14 November 2018.

(3) In respect of each of those scenarios the review must consider separately the effects of—

(a) migration by EU nationals, and

(b) migration by non-EU nationals.

(4) In respect of each of those scenarios the review must consider separately the effects on the measures in each part of the United Kingdom and each region of England.

(5) In this section—

“parts of the United Kingdom” means—

(a) England,

(b) Scotland,

(c) Wales, and

(d) Northern Ireland;

“regions of England” has the same meaning as that used by the Office for National Statistics.”

This new clause would require a review of effects on measures in the Bill of certain changes in migration levels.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

This group of amendments relates to the tax and fiscal implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

Throughout the last year Parliament has been asked to approve a series of Bills giving the Government the power to deliver every type of Brexit deal conceivable, and this Finance Bill is no different. I said when closing the Second Reading debate on the Bill for the Opposition that this approach was one of “give us the powers now and we will make the decisions later,” and as it currently stands Brexit represents the biggest transfer of power to the Executive in modern constitutional history. That is disappointing for anyone who thought Brexit would see greater powers for this Parliament, but it is also a recipe for very bad decisions, and there is a classic culprit in this Finance Bill in the form of clause 89. Innocently named “Minor amendments in consequence of EU withdrawal”, it gives the Government power to amend tax legislation without any of the usual due process in the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal.

The Government always tell us—I am sure they will do so again—that this is simply a safeguarding provision that we will never have to use, but all of us here today know that as it stands the Government have absolutely no chance of getting their deal through, because that deal does not deliver the basics of what this country needs. It does not deliver smooth, low-friction borders for manufacturing and supply chains, nor does it deliver market access for financial services. It also fails to resolve the big question: after we leave the EU, will we prioritise market access or trade autonomy? Because of that, we will almost certainly end up in the backstop arrangements, a halfway house without any say for the UK—the very worst of all worlds.

The new clauses and amendments are therefore of seminal importance, and I am extremely grateful to the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), for laying amendment 7 before the House today. It is clearly a cross-party amendment, supported by the Chairs of the Treasury, Exiting the European Union and Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committees, but it has the Opposition’s support because it offers Parliament a chance to make a clear statement rejecting a no-deal outcome—a statement that cannot come soon enough.

Anyone pretending that crashing out without a deal is simply about resorting to World Trade Organisation schedules is dangerously misinformed. As The Economist magazine said last month:

“A no-deal Brexit is about a lot more than trade—it would see many legal obligations and definitions lapse immediately, potentially putting at risk air travel, electricity interconnections and a raft of financial services”.

It would mean tariffs on trade with the EU, but it would also affect trade beyond the EU as all our current trade agreements negotiated as an EU member would immediately cease to apply. Agriculture, aerospace, the automotive sector—all these major sectors of our economy—would face potentially irreparable damage, and while tariffs may be reduced over time, excise duties and health checks on food, plants and livestock cannot be reduced so easily. Researchers at Imperial College London have calculated that just two minutes more transit time per lorry at Dover and the Channel tunnel translates into a 47 km traffic jam, and for perishable items like food, delays of that magnitude simply could not be sustained. When we add to that higher prices through tariffs and further inflationary pressure from another inevitable fall in the value of the pound, it is a recipe for significant pressure on living standards. That is why the Opposition say that no deal is not a real option.

There has been some suggestion that the Government might accept amendment 7.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman not acknowledge that by ruling out preparations for no deal one is in effect tying the hands of one’s negotiating team, which in effect makes a trade deal—which we all, I think, would prefer to leaving on WTO terms—more difficult to achieve and therefore makes leaving on WTO terms more likely?

[Jonathan Reynolds]

The facts are as they are. It is far too late for that. Everyone knows the position that this country is in. The Government have run down the clock. They lost their majority through a general election that they did not need to call, and it is far too late to start applying the logic that might have applied several years ago. Because of that, our vulnerability is evident for everyone to see. No one should underestimate the likelihood of a no-deal outcome at this stage. No one should be pretending, through semantics or parliamentary chicanery, that we might be able to present no deal as a way of giving us greater leverage in negotiations. I am afraid that the Government have got us to the point of ruin if that is the strategy that Conservative Members wish to pursue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

Given that the Business Secretary said in the House earlier that no deal should not be contemplated, and that my hon. Friend is outlining the possibility of the Government accepting amendment 7, would it not be right for the Government to say clearly at the end of business today that they are ruling out no deal because it would be so damaging to this country?

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. We all know that several members of the Government take that view, even though they may not be able to say it on the record. They are quite clear as to what no deal would mean, and they would not contemplate going down that route. It would be far simpler and far better to get to a position where ruling out no deal was clearly the Government’s intent.

New clause 3 would oblige the Government to publish a review of the fiscal and economic effects of the exercise of the powers in clause 89, as well as the differences between exercising those powers in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland. As we edge closer to the reality of crashing out without a deal, clause 89 is not simply hypothetical. We are now just two and a half months away from the UK’s exit without an agreement. It is therefore of critical importance that we have a full and transparent view of the implications of a clause of this kind.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman is going to have to do a bit better than this. He talks about crashing out without a deal, but he needs to get into the detail of the implications. Perhaps he is going to start talking about planes, but amazingly, the planes are going to keep flying. Amazingly, we are still going to have drugs supplied into the United Kingdom. He needs to get down into the detail of exactly what the implications will be, because if we are faced with the reality of no overall agreement, there will be a barrow-load of minor agreements to ensure that the common interests of the United Kingdom and the European Union survive the transfer to WTO terms on 29 March with minimum impact on the citizens of the EU and the UK. It is time he got real and stopped this nonsense—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

I have just talked about some of the consequences of crashing out without a deal. I have talked about relationships, about tariffs on products and about the legal definitions under the common agreements that this country has undertaken with other European countries. We all know this—the information is readily available—so I am not quite sure what point the hon. Gentleman is making. I think he is aware of the dangers of taking this course of action.

[Lyn Brown]

He is frustrated with his own Government.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

And yes, people are frustrated with the Government.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

With respect, it is quite right to concede that some of the fears being raised about no deal are grossly exaggerated, but the problems are quite real enough. If we leave with no deal, we will be the only developed country in the world that has no trade agreement at all with anybody and that is having to fall back on WTO rules, which are made to sound marvellous by the Brexiteers but which do not actually amount to very much. We will also be erecting new barriers to trade and investment around the borders of the United Kingdom, including along the Irish border, and that is bound to disadvantage our economy very seriously indeed.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

The Father of the House is as accurate as ever. Some colleagues are pursuing a dangerous argument that all our trading relationships with countries that are not in the EU are somehow currently under WTO terms, which is an absurd misconception. We have entered into trade agreements as a member of the EU that account for something like 16% of our goods exports.

Regardless of the significant impacts of a no-deal outcome, we could go further and say that to leave the EU having not secured a deal—an acrimonious departure —would damage our relationship with our most important trading partner for years to come and fundamentally undermine our credibility on the world stage. I cannot see how any serious-minded Member of this House could understand that that would not be of severe consequence for the United Kingdom, which is why it is so important that this House makes a clear statement today about the dangers of no deal.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Can the hon. Gentleman name a single country that has a free trade agreement with the EU that will not transfer it to the UK under the novation procedures?

[Jonathan Reynolds]

We simply do not know the answer to that question. I always listen to what the right hon. Gentleman has to say in Treasury and Finance Bill debates, but he is one of the archetypal Members who come to the House and pursues what I call the BMW argument: “Everything will be fine because we buy BMWs and everyone will give us what we want.” That argument is still being pursued in these debates, but it has been proved completely untrue by the stage of the negotiations that we are at. It is simply not good enough to say, “It will all be alright on the night. Everyone will transfer over the benefits we currently have. It will be as straightforward as that.” If that were case, the Government would not be in this morass and the country would be in a far better position.

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

First, is it not the case that the UK and, indeed, the entire EU currently trade with major economies, such as the USA and China, under WTO terms? Therefore, while not desirable, they can be made to work. Secondly, if we adopt the shadow Minister’s approach and rule out no deal, we have no choice but to remain in the EU or to accept whatever the EU sees fit to give us, which is not a great negotiating position.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I thoroughly agree that what the Government have got us into is not a great negotiating position, but that is because the negotiations have been driven by the best interests of the internal politics of the Conservative party. If the national interest had been considered, we would be in a completely different place.

Trade can exist on WTO terms. It is not that the UK would somehow no longer be a trading nation, but that is not the test of good Government policy. The test is to consider the ramifications of that decision and to decide whether it is in the UK’s best interests, but I cannot believe that anyone would look rationally at what a no-deal outcome means and say, “I would find that acceptable for this country.”

[Kate Hoey (Vauxhall) (Lab)]

Does not my hon. Friend think that it would be irresponsible for any Government not to be making contingency plans for WTO rules in these circumstances? Does he also agree that the Irish Taoiseach has in the past few days looked for the first time at making some changes to his intransigent approach to the backstop, precisely because the Republic of Ireland would suffer so much more from WTO terms than the United Kingdom?

[Jonathan Reynolds]

The merits of the Government undertaking contingency measures are different from the political case that we must consider, which is whether we would find it desirable to undertake a course of action that would mean that we had to use those contingency measures. The focus of the debate in this Finance Bill should be a seriously hard-headed look at the consequences of no deal, and there should be a statement from Members on both sides of the House that that is not what we seek for the UK and that we do not believe that it is possible.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

rose—

[Daniel Kawczynski (Shrewsbury and Atcham) (Con)]

rose—

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I will take an intervention from the hon. Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke), and I may come to the hon. Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham (Daniel Kawczynski) if the intervention is good enough.

[Charlie Elphicke]

The hon. Gentleman is making an interesting speech. My concern is with how he can support undermining the making of contingency preparations that are in the national interest, which is the effect of amendment 7. It is just the wrong thing to do, and the Labour party ought to be more responsible than that.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I completely disagree with the hon. Gentleman, and a little humility from Conservative Members on the point about responsibility for the Brexit negotiations would be appreciated. For my entire lifetime, this country’s European policy has been dictated by the internal politics of the Conservative party. Every Conservative Prime Minister in my lifetime has been brought down by the issue of Europe. To suggest that any other political party or actor in this country needs to have more regard for the national interest, when it is the Conservative party that has never been able to do so, is not something I will take.

[Daniel Kawczynski]

Bearing in mind that 95% of the world’s growth over the coming decades will come from outside the European Union, what assessment has he made of the opportunities that will be afforded to the United Kingdom by our being able to tailor-make bilateral trading agreements?

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I am extremely glad that that issue has come up, because the opportunities created by growth outside the EU have no relationship to our membership of the EU, and could possibly be undermined by our leaving the EU. If we want to compete in competitive emerging markets around the world, what better way is there to do so than from within the single market? I would wager with the hon. Gentleman that a country like Germany will do far better from that growth around the world through its continued membership of the European Union than we will. I am afraid that it is because of such statistics, which have no bearing on serious Government policy or reality, that this debate has got to where it is, but I will move away from a wider debate on Brexit and return to the Finance Bill before you tell me to do so, Mr Deputy Speaker.

I will now come to clause 89 and the relationship between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Under the draft withdrawal agreement it is widely accepted that, under the backstop arrangements, Northern Ireland will remain in regulatory alignment with the European Union, which would be particularly the case for EU customs law but it would also apply to compliance with elements of EU single market regulation in the technical regulation of goods, state aid and other areas of north-south co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Of course, Northern Ireland would be included in parts of the EU VAT and excise regimes and in the single electricity market.

With that in mind, it is clear that the powers handed to the Treasury by this Bill may not be applicable in Northern Ireland in the legal and regulatory areas under which EU authority would remain. We are therefore seeking a review that clearly sets out any difference in application of these powers in respect of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and I urge Members on both sides of the House to support new clause 3.

New clause 7 relates to clause 90 on establishing an emissions reduction trading regime. It would require the Government to review the expected effect of the carbon emissions tax on the UK’s capacity to meet internationally agreed climate targets. There has never been a more critical time to take urgent action on climate change to avoid environmental catastrophe. The report from the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, published in October 2018, shows that we have just 12 years left to make unprecedented changes to prevent global warming increases above 1.5° C. Our exit from the European Union must not be used as an excuse to step back from action on climate change. Worryingly, clause 90 contains one of the Bill’s very few passing references to environmental issues, and our review, proposed in new clause 7, would ensure that the Government are held accountable for making progress on reducing emissions without using Brexit as an excuse for stalling.

This is evidently a Government in chaos, seemingly without any plan or strategy at all. The new clauses and amendments in this group would improve both the Finance Bill and the process by which we leave the European Union. They are sensible, proportionate and timely, and I commend them to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Vince Cable]

Thank you for your indulgence, Mr Speaker. I just want to say a few words in support of amendments 7 and 8. They are Brexit-neutral, in the sense that they require the House to approve any change, but of course they relate primarily to no deal. The fiscal issues, as the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) explained them, were arcane and rather gentle. I tabled a more brutal amendment that was not called.

In the 30 seconds left, I want to relate an incident from this morning, when I went to the ferry port at Portsmouth. It is very clear that the Government are totally and utterly unprepared for the chaotic impact that there will be on the road system, including access to the naval base, if a no-deal Brexit occurs. Despite repeated requests from the council and others, the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence are refusing to co-operate, and the police now say that the M3 motorway will have to be closed from Winchester to Basingstoke in order to provide a lorry park. Repeated efforts to get Ministers to respond have not been heeded. A meeting was held for 19 regional MPs last week, but only one attended, so I am taking on the job of representing a no-deal Brexit. It is a task I undertake with all the enthusiasm of an arsonist trying to put out a bushfire, but I will do it.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

This has been a significant and important debate. In fact, it is clear that the House desires a longer and broader debate—that point was well made by the Chair of the Treasury Committee. No deal is some people’s preferred outcome, and they are the same people who told us that doing a deal would be the easiest thing in history. They were wrong then and they are wrong now. I feel that the case against the unilateral use of these no-deal powers has been comprehensively made, and I urge all Members to vote for our amendments, because that is best for jobs, prosperity and the national interest.