Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Lindsay Hoyle

Wednesday 2nd November 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 9—Northern Ireland: information about financial resources.

New clause 17—Extension of scope of legal aid in complex cases—

‘(1) Civil legal services other than services described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 are to be available to an individual under this Part if subsection (2) is satisfied.

(2) This subsection is satisfied where the Director—

(a) has made a complex case determination in relation to the individual and the services, and

(b) has determined that the individual qualifies for the services in accordance with this Part,

(and has not withdrawn either determination).

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a complex case determination is a determination—

(a) that the individual has complex, interconnected needs in relation to which the individual requires comprehensive civil legal services, and

(b) not all of those civil legal services would otherwise be available to the individual because they do not all fall within the scope of Schedule 1.’.

New clause 43—Funding for civil legal advice—

‘(1) The Lord Chancellor may make funding available for the promotion of civil legal advice on matters not included in Schedule 1, Part 1 where it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the provision of such services would be consistent with the purpose of the civil legal services provided for under that schedule.

(2) The Lord Chancellor may make arrangements by—

(a) entering into funding arrangements with other Government departments and public bodies to facilitate the provision of services,

(b) making arrangements to support the delivery of civil legal advice through the provision of grant in aid to providers of legal services, including any consortia or partnership arrangements into which providers of legal services may choose to enter, and

(c) any additional arrangements which the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate to ensure the provision of services as set out in subsection (1).

(3) In making any such arrangements the Lord Chancellor shall ensure that value for money is achieved.

(4) Welsh Ministers shall be consulted upon the funding and provision of civil legal advice in Wales.

(5) “Civil legal advice” means the types of services given in section 7(1) and includes advice and assistance which is usually given by any representative in the steps preliminary or incidental to proceedings and as to any appeal, mediation and other forms of dispute resolution, but does not include representation for the purposes of proceedings.’.

Government new schedule 3—‘Northern Ireland: information about financial resources.

Amendment 162, in clause 1, page 2, line 7, at end insert—

‘(c) funding for the promotion of civil legal services, not including representation, on matters not included in Schedule 1, Part 1 where it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the provision of such services would be consistent with the purpose of the civil legal services provided for under that schedule.’.

Amendment 123, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

‘(4A) The Director must, except to the extent that section (4B) applies, act under the direction of the Lord Chancellor.

(4B) The Director must act independently when performing any functions or duties under this Part.’.

Amendment 116, page 8, line 29, leave out clause 12.

Amendment 104, in clause 12, page 8, line 31, leave out from ‘station’ to end of line 20 on page 9.

Amendment 125, page 8, line 35, leave out subsections (2) to (7).

Amendment 90, page 9, line 27, leave out subsection (9) and insert—

‘(9) Sections 20 and 26(2) do not apply in relation to this section’.

Amendment 148, page 21, line 7, leave out clause 26.

Government amendments 1, 2 and 25 to 27.

Amendment 69, in schedule 4, page 130, line 36, at end insert—

‘(3A) A transfer scheme shall make pension provision and compensation provision for and in respect of persons who become employed in the civil service of the State under paragraph 1 which is at least as favourable as the pension provision and compensation provision applicable to them immediately before they ceased to be employees of the Legal Services Commission.’.

Government amendment 64.

Amendment 71, page 131, line 9, at end insert—

‘“compensation provision” means the provision of compensation under a compensation scheme;’.

Amendment 70, page 131, line 14, at end insert—

‘“pension provision” means the provision of pension and other benefits under an occupational pension scheme;’.

Government amendments 65, 137, 66 to 68, 138, 19 and 54.

[Mr Djanogly]

We now move on, or perhaps I should say back to, legal aid. When we discussed legal aid on our first day on Report, we had two very constructive, albeit lengthy, debates in which I took more than three dozen interventions. That was partly the reason, along with the many valuable contributions that were made, why we were unable to cover all the groupings—[Interruption.] I know that that disappointed a number of hon. Members in all parts of the House.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. Let us not start where we left off the other day. Let us see if we can make progress. We do not want to run out of time, and I am sure that those on both Front Benches want to make good time.

[Mr Djanogly]

I want to try to avoid delay today, so I shall speak to Government amendments now and respond to the points made in debate later, rather than pre-empting in my opening remarks what hon. Members may have to say about their amendments.

Government new clause 4, which is a technical amendment, has two purposes. First, it seeks to provide clarity about the role of the director of legal aid casework, by ensuring that the exercise of the functions of the office is on behalf of the Crown, and that service as the director is service in the civil service of the state. The second purpose of new clause 4 is to ensure that the Lord Chancellor is treated as a corporation sole for the purposes of part 1 of the Bill.

The new clause is necessary in order to clarify the position in relation to the Lord Chancellor’s ability to hold an interest in land for those purposes, and so applies to charges that transfer from the Legal Services Commission to the Lord Chancellor at the point when the LSC is abolished, and for future charges to be taken over property under clause 24. The statutory charge is the charge that arises under clause 24 on any property recovered or preserved, including costs, by a legally aided person in respect of the amounts spent by the Lord Chancellor in securing their legal aid services and any other amounts payable by them under clauses 22 and 23. The amendment is essential, as the current value of charges held by the LSC is £212 million.

Government new clause 9 and new schedule 3 make provision on information sharing in relation to checking a person’s financial eligibility for legal aid in Northern Ireland. They replicate for Northern Ireland the information gateway for England and Wales created by clause 21 and further provided for in clause 32. Government amendments 26 and 27 are technical amendments that make it clear that regulations made under new schedule 3 will be prescribed not by the Lord Chancellor but by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Government amendment 54 is also a technical amendment that makes it clear that the Bill extends to Northern Ireland for the purposes of new clause 9 and new schedule 3, which create the information gateway, and for the purposes of clauses 38 to 40. I should point out that under paragraph 2(4) of new schedule 3, it will be a criminal offence to use or disclose information contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2.

Government amendments 25 and 64 to 68 relate to the transfer of LSC employees to the civil service when the LSC is abolished. The powers currently set out in the Bill include a power, in schedule 4, for the Lord Chancellor to make transfer schemes to transfer to the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State the LSC’s rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with an LSC occupational pension scheme, of which there are currently two, or compensation scheme. The occupational pension and compensation scheme arrangements for LSC employees are different from those for existing civil servants. When the employees transfer to the civil service and become civil servants, they will join the principal civil service pension scheme.

Amendment 64 confers new powers upon the Lord Chancellor that can be exercised as part of any transfer scheme. Proposed new sub-paragraph (6A), set out in amendment 64, allows for the Lord Chancellor to apply legislation with modifications as far as it is necessary to give effect to any transfer scheme. That is appropriate when transfer schemes are of an administrative nature relating to the specific issues in question. For example, it will allow the Lord Chancellor to provide that an aspect of pensions legislation applies in a particular way to that particular scheme. It will assist, as appropriate, in enabling the continuation of the LSC pension scheme or schemes after the abolition of the LSC so that they can continue for the benefit of their pensioner and preserved members. Those are members who have contributed to the schemes before leaving LSC employment and either draw a pension from the scheme or will be entitled to do so in future.

For compensation scheme arrangements, as well as allowing the modification of legislation, proposed new sub-paragraph (6B), set out in amendment 64, provides that the transfer scheme may amend or otherwise modify the existing LSC compensation scheme. That will allow compensation arrangements for LSC employees transferring to the civil service to be brought into line with those of other civil servants over a transitional period.

Amendment 65 reflects the fact that when LSC employees transfer to the civil service there will no longer be any active members of the two current LSC occupational pension schemes, known as the No. 3 and No. 4 pension schemes. The amendment provides the Lord Chancellor with the power to make a scheme to merge the two residual pension schemes. It is explicit that a scheme exercising this power must not result in members of the pension schemes, or other beneficiaries under the schemes, being deprived of any rights accrued prior to the merger.

The LSC’s No. 3 pension scheme has fewer than 100 pensioner and preserved members, and no current LSC staff members. The No. 4 scheme is for current staff and also has a number of pensioner and preserved members. At present there is much duplication in the administration of the No. 3 and No. 4 schemes, such as producing two sets of accounts and actuarial valuations. Merging the schemes would allow us to cut significantly the administration costs of running two trust-based schemes. The amendment will also give the power to wind up an LSC occupational pension scheme.

Amendment 25 corrects a slip in clause 38(7)(j). The intention was not to make regulations that contain free-standing provision that modifies an Act either directly or indirectly, subject to the affirmative procedure. Amendments 66 to 68 clarify the fact that the regulation-making power provided to the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 10 of schedule 4 can be used in connection not only with transfers affected by schedule 4, but with schemes under schedule 4, meaning schemes dealing with something other than a transfer.

Government amendments 137 and 138 concern schedule 4 to the Bill, which governs transfers of employees and assets following the abolition of the LSC. They are purely technical amendments that simplify existing provisions. Paragraph 10(1) of schedule 4 currently allows the Lord Chancellor to make consequential supplementary, incidental or transitional provision by regulation, and paragraph 10(2)(b) specifies separately that such regulations may include transitory or savings provision. Rather than continue to separate these related provisions, for the purposes of simplification amendment 137 brings them together in a revised paragraph 10(1) and amendment 138 amends paragraph 10(2) to reflect that simplification. That mirrors an identical amendment to clause 115.

Finally, Government amendments 1, 2 and 19 are minor and technical amendments to clause 32 and schedule 5, consequential on the removal in Committee of what was then clause 71.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Lindsay Hoyle

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment (a), after first ‘paid’ in (1)(a), insert

‘will be paid, has made an agreement to be paid,’.

Amendment (b), after ‘pays’ in (1)(b), insert

‘will pay, has made an agreement to pay’.

Amendment (c), after first ‘paid’ in (2)(b), insert

‘will be paid, has made an agreement to be paid,’.

Amendment (e), at end of (4)(b), insert—

‘(2A) A breach of the provisions of this section shall be an offence, punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or on indictment for a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, or a fine, or both.’.

Government new clause 19—Effect of the rules against referral fees—

‘(1) The relevant regulator must ensure that it has appropriate arrangements for monitoring and enforcing the restrictions imposed on regulated persons by section [Rules against referral fees].

(2) A regulator may make rules for the purposes of subsection (1).

(3) The rules may in particular provide for the relevant regulator to exercise in relation to anything done in breach of that section any powers (subject to subsections (5) and (6)) that the regulator would have in relation to anything done by the regulated person in breach of another restriction.

(4) Where the relevant regulator is the Financial Services Authority, section [Regulation by the FSA] applies instead of subsections (1) to (3) (and (7) to (9)).

(5) A breach of section [Rules against referral fees]—

(a) does not make a person guilty of an offence, and

(b) does not give rise to a right of action for breach of statutory duty.

(6) A breach of section [Rules against referral fees] does not make anything void or unenforceable, but a contract to make or pay for a referral or arrangement in breach of that section is unenforceable.

(7) Subsection (8) applies in a case where—

(a) a referral of prescribed legal business has been made by or to a regulated person, or

(b) a regulated person has made an arrangement as mentioned in section [Rules against referral fees](2)(a),

and it appears to the regulator that a payment made to or by the regulated person may be a payment for the referral or for making the arrangement (a “referral fee”).

(8) Rules under subsection (2) may provide for the payment to be treated as a referral fee unless the regulated person shows that the payment was made—

(a) as consideration for the provision of services, or

(b) for another reason,

and not as a referral fee.

(9) For the purposes of provision made by virtue of subsection (8) a payment that would otherwise be regarded as consideration for the provision of services of any description may be treated as a referral fee if it exceeds the amount specified in relation to services of that description in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor.’.

Amendment (a) to new clause 19, leave out subsection 5.

Amendment (b), leave out from ‘services’ in (8)(a) to end of paragraph (b) and insert

‘but only where the consideration was proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances.’.

Government new clause 20—Regulation by the FSA.

Government new clause 21—Regulators and regulated persons.

Government new clause 22—Referral fees: regulations.

Government amendment 139.

Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Lindsay Hoyle

Friday 21st January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Order. Before we get carried away, I should say that that has absolutely nothing to do with the House. Neither of the points made is a point of order.

[Mr Djanogly]

I am delighted to pull the House back to the important issue of succession.

I was just saying that the property of the killer’s parents was distributed according to the statutory intestacy rules. The intestacy rules are a default regime; they apply where a person has not exercised his or her right to make a will or to the extent that his or her will is not valid. Their aim is to safeguard the deceased person’s family by providing for them from the deceased person’s estate in a manner that is thought to mirror the wishes of the average person had he or she made a will.

Generally speaking, an intestate estate will pass to the surviving spouse or civil partner and the deceased’s children first, but if the deceased is not survived by either of them, then other blood relatives of the deceased will inherit the estate in a strict order of priority set out in section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, as amended. I am not going to read out the rules, but if any hon. Members wishes to know more about them, I shall provide the information.

When there are no known eligible blood relatives to inherit, the estate is dealt with by the Treasury solicitor. On receiving the estate, the Treasury solicitor will make full inquiries into the estate and will advertise for eligible kin in the hope of distributing the estate. If there appear to be no eligible kin, or none can be traced, the estate becomes “bona vacantia” which means “ownerless goods” and it will pass to the Crown, the Duchy of Cornwall or the Duchy of Lancaster, depending on where in England or Wales the deceased lived.

When a minor inherits on intestacy, the property to which they will be entitled is held on trust. The terms of that trust are specified in the intestacy rules. Basically, the trustees will hold the property for the benefit of the child until he or she reaches the age of 18 or marries or enters a civil partnership under that age.

All that may seem relatively straightforward, and hon. Members could be forgiven for thinking that the grandchild in the DWS case would have inherited their property on reaching the age of 18, or marrying or forming a civil partnership before then, but there is a devil in the detail and, sadly, there was a family dispute that led to litigation. That culminated in the decision of the Court of Appeal in 2000 in the case Re DWS (Deceased). By that time, it was agreed that the son himself could not inherit because, as he had murdered his parents, the forfeiture rule prevented it. The forfeiture rule is a common law rule, applying the general rule of public policy that a person is not able to benefit from their wrongdoing. It is illustrated by the 1892 case of Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, when it was held that a person is not entitled to benefit from the estate of a person he or she has unlawfully killed.

A person who is convicted of the unlawful killing of another, or of aiding, abetting or counselling another to do so, is automatically disqualified from inheriting from his or her victim under the forfeiture rule. However, persons convicted of manslaughter or other offences less serious than murder may still be permitted relief to inherit the victim’s property by the court under the Forfeiture Act 1982.

The question for the court in Re DWS (deceased) was who would receive the grandfather’s property. Had the son died before his father, the property would have gone to the son’s only child, who was aged only two at the time of the murder and was also the grandfather’s only grandchild. However, the son—that is, the killer—was not dead, but merely disqualified from inheriting because of the operation of the forfeiture rule.

The relevant provision of the intestacy rules setting out the statutory trusts contained in the Administration of Estates Act 1925 provides that the grandchild will inherit only if his or her parent has already died. The court accordingly decided that the law did not allow the grandson to take the property. Instead, it was decided that the property would have to go to the estate of the dead grandfather’s sister, who had also died by the time of the court case. Thus, in this situation, not only is the killer disqualified from inheriting, but so also are all the killer’s direct descendants. The Court of Appeal expressed concern that this may have been an unforeseen and unintended consequence of the present intestacy rules.

In July 2003, the then Department for Constitutional Affairs, whose responsibilities in this regard have been assumed by the Ministry of Justice, asked the Law Commission to review the relationship between the forfeiture rule and the law of succession. The terms of reference were as follows: first, that in conjunction with its work on illegal transactions, the Law Commission should review the relationship between the forfeiture and intestacy rules; secondly, that the review should be carried out with reference to the difficulties highlighted in the case of Re DWS (deceased) and should explore ways the law might be reformed to prevent apparently unfair outcomes of this sort; and, thirdly, that the review should also consider any ancillary areas of succession law that might produce analogous outcomes—for example, disclaimer and attesting beneficiaries.

In October 2003, the Law Commission published a consultation paper, “The Forfeiture Rule and the Law of Succession”, which considered the problem raised in Re DWS, and discussed whether a similar problem arose in other contexts. The consultation paper provisionally proposed that in cases such as Re DWS there should be a “deemed predecease” solution—that is, where a person forfeits a benefit on intestacy through having killed the deceased, the estate should be distributed as if the killer had died immediately before the deceased. The Law Commission also proposed that the deemed predecease rule should apply where a gift under a will fails because of the forfeiture rule.