(12 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberNo. The hon. Gentleman rather distorts the implications of the legislation. We are capping success fees, which are currently 100%, at 25%.
On the point about the delay until the review has been undertaken, is that merely a delay or is it a genuine review? If it is a review, what will it consider and will he give an indication of its timetable?
Given the timing of this development, we have not thought through the exact procedures of the review, but it will certainly be undertaken before we move to ending the provisions that remain.
We now come to the amendment in lieu passed by the other place in respect of clause 1, and what has been described as a purpose clause. It was suggested variously in the other place yesterday that this amendment would have no effect; that it would have some effect, although that effect was not entirely clear; and that it would have a future effect in guiding successive Lord Chancellors when consideration was being given to what services might be added to the scope of legal aid under clause 8(2).
The difficulty the other place has so far had in establishing the precise effect of the amendment is instructive as this House decides whether it should stand. A duty with an uncertain effect is desirable neither in legislative terms nor for the person attempting to discharge that duty. However, it is the Government’s view that the effects of this duty can be described and are highly undesirable. The amendment would remove the uncontroversial, unambiguous duty the Bill places on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that legal aid is made available according to part 1 of the Bill. This made a clear link between the duty and legal aid. In terms of a clear duty, it does not get much clearer than this. However, the amendment would not only remove that but would replace it with a duty that would bring ambiguity and uncertainty. It refers to “legal services” rather than “legal aid”.
The argument was also made in the other place that the amendment had no effect other than to underline the Government’s commitment to the principle of access to justice. We contend that the imposition of any duty on the Lord Chancellor in legislation must create in law a potential course of action through challenges to the discharge of that duty. If it is accepted that the imposition of such a duty must give rise to a potential course of action, the amendment’s effect must be to bring into question the range of services provided under the Bill. The matter would then turn on the question of which legal services meet people’s needs. That contrasts with the clear and unambiguous duty in clause 1(1) requiring the Lord Chancellor to
“secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with”
part 1.
The Government believe that the question of which legal services meet people’s needs is not relevant to the Bill. Schedule 1 lists the services that Parliament, following consideration of first principles and extensive consultation, believes it appropriate to make available under legal aid. To reopen that question via an ongoing duty would frustrate our intention to bring certainty and clarity to the scope of services funded by legal aid. The amendment would result in only one thing: numerous expensive judicial reviews—more than likely at taxpayers’ expense as the boundaries of the new duty are tested and because the question of which services should be provided would be reopened.
It was said yesterday in the other place that such JR applications would almost certainly fail, and that consequently there would be no cost implications to the amendment. However, even rejected applications have an inherent cost: lawyers are paid legal aid fees for their work up to that point and the Government pay their own lawyers to defend such cases.
I would also like to address the argument put forward in the other place about the amendment’s effect in guiding future Lord Chancellors. It seems novel to include in the Bill an overriding duty that activates when the Lord Chancellor considers adding a service or services to the scope of legal aid. I am not convinced this is possible, and I am certain it is unhelpful. Adding services to the Bill requires the affirmative approval of both Houses. Such a process will be more than adequate to ensure that the Lord Chancellor takes account of the relevant factors when considering what, if any, services should be added to the scope of legal aid.
I emphasise, however, as Lord McNally did in the House of Lords yesterday, that the Bill’s present form arises from extensive debate and consideration across both Houses and reflects decisions about the future nature of legal aid. In short, the amendment is incompatible with the Bill. It would muddy both the duty to which the Lord Chancellor is subject and the scope of services that might be funded.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe believe that a cultural change is needed. We need to move away from the immediate rush to lawyers and courts, whether through mediation or, if a court alternative is required, a conditional fee arrangement, rather than legal aid. Much more should be made of those alternatives.
10. What plans he has to ensure adequate support for victims and their families during the criminal justice process.
(13 years, 12 months ago)
Commons ChamberT3. What assurance can Ministers give my constituents in west Cornwall that the legal aid reforms published last week will not adversely affect the coverage of, or reduce access to, legal aid, particularly in civil and family proceedings?
The hard facts are that the amount of legal aid being paid out in civil cases will be reduced. As part of the Government’s savings of £2 billion, £350 million is subject to be taken out of legal aid by 2014-15. That means that we will focus legal aid on the most vulnerable who need legal representation.