Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill

Debate between John Penrose and Alan Whitehead

Wednesday 18th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed.

Five and a half years later, we are almost there. I hope that the procedures on the market issues that we have discussed during the Bill’s progress ensure that while there is a price cap those issues are addressed so that we can, as the mechanism in the Bill suggests, come out of the price cap with market conditions resolved in a much better way for customers. Indeed, just as was suggested in that motion, the Bill provides for a procedure to declare the market in place, at which time the cap is ended. That could be about 20 months or perhaps three years, but nevertheless there is a mechanism for that.

What happens at the end of cap conditions is important, and that is what the amendments that have come from the other place at the end of the Bill process deal with, rather than the principle of the absolute cap—the central principle of the Bill—which, I am delighted to say, was received in the other place as warmly as in this House. On termination of the cap, the Lords amendment would put in place a relative tariff differential that would limit the price range between the highest and lowest tariff a company can charge—the so-called “tease and squeeze” problem that the Minister mentioned. That would be not within the absolute cap but part of the return to market conditions that would nevertheless shape how the market subsequently works for the benefit of customers.

I am delighted that the Government have responded positively in the shape of their amendment in lieu, which I am pleased to say the Opposition not only were given sight of but had the opportunity to work on in detail, to ensure that between us we had a resolution to the outstanding issue from the other place. We can endorse the amendment and recommend that their lordships consider it a worthy response to the message we received.

The amendment is slightly different, using an Ofgem mechanism to bring about a solution to tariff ratios, but from the amendment’s drafting I am confident that Ofgem would receive the message in no uncertain terms of how it should use its powers, should the report it is required to write before termination of the cap comes about demonstrate a continuing problem in tariff differentials.

The Bill has always had more than a tinge of Labour parentage to it and now its offspring has further elements of Labour input, which I, for one, very much welcome. It is now a Bill that all sides can agree does the right thing on energy prices and how the market works. That signal of unity from all sections of the House sends an important message to all those affected by the legislation—that this is a serious piece of work, which will work, and that we are all determined to make it happen. If the Bill can pass back to the other place for its final procedures on that basis, that will strengthen considerably the efforts that we are embarking on to ensure that prices are maintained in the interests of customers over the next period through the freeze mechanism.

I thank the Minister very much for the constructive and open way in which she has conducted discussions on the Bill hitherto, and I at least note in distinguished messages the input of the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose), and of course my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley, who I mentioned at the beginning of my comments, whose role in the Bill’s parentage should be not underestimated at all; indeed, it should be written up in dispatches.

[John Penrose (Weston-super-Mare) (Con)]

We are nearly there. With fingers firmly crossed, it looks as though this is the last, or last but one, trot around the track for the Bill before it goes off for Royal Assent. I echo the thanks that have come from all sides for the combined and cross-party efforts to get us here. The fact that everyone is rushing to claim a degree of authorship shows the truth of the old saying that success has many parents, whereas failure is an orphan. Thankfully, this is not a failure.

I was extremely concerned by the Lords amendment as it came to us before the amendment in lieu was tabled. That was not because I disagreed with the principle of a relative cap—in fact, I spoke strongly in favour of relative caps at earlier stages—but because, in trying to install a relative cap, their lordships had made it an open-ended intervention in this market. For people like me—perhaps more on the Conservative side of the House—who are avowed free marketeers, a temporary intervention is very important. An open-ended commitment would create a great deal of unease among many of us, on the grounds that the opportunity for regulatory meddling would be extremely strong, and that the temptation would prove too hard to resist over time.

I am therefore delighted to see the proposed amendment in lieu. Not only does it not add any fresh powers—it asks Ofgem to use its existing powers, giving it a firm and direct mandate from this House that those powers should be used—but it refocuses the Bill. I for one—I do not think I am alone in this—had become a little bit concerned that the Bill had gone a little off track or off topic in its passage through Parliament.

The Bill was proposed in the first place in response to an underlying mischief or immorality—that of “tease and squeeze” behaviour. People could start off on a razor-keen introductory tariff and then, without taking any firm decisions, they might find that when the tariff came to an end after one or two years, they had in a surreptitious way become liable for a sky-high default tariff. That would happen without their saying yes to anything, because of the tease and squeeze tactics, particularly of the big six. The central behaviour, which is deeply embedded in this market, of taking advantage of people’s loyalty and inertia—their stickiness, as my right hon. Friend the Minister said—was griping everybody and making them feel that customers were being taken advantage of. That was why the Bill was first conceived, and why it rightly garnered so much support throughout the House.

The amendment in lieu brings us back to that central point. It reminds us why we are here and, most importantly, it means that Ofgem will no longer have an excuse to look the other way. We all want this temporary price cap, when it comes to an end, not to be needed any more because the market—the big six in particular, but also the market as a whole—will have learned the error of its ways and will stop behaving in the way that has griped everybody, so that there is no need for further interventions. However, I do not think I am alone in being a little bit cynical and saying that that might not happen, even with all the other interventions and reforms that Ofgem is rightly introducing to try to sharpen competition, improve consumer choice, and both improve the behaviour of suppliers and help us as customers to use our freedoms more actively.

It is just possible that, even after all the changes introduced by Ofgem during the period of the cap, the market is not yet properly reformed. We are all here because Ofgem has in the past refused to use the powers it has. I have had conversations with senior people in Ofgem, as I am sure have many others in the Chamber, asking, “Why don’t you get on with it? Why don’t you use these powers? You’re being weak-willed, and you are pathetically—like wet lettuces—not doing what you are there for. What’s the point of having an economic regulator if you aren’t going to stick up for people who are vulnerable and people who are being taken advantage of?” We all got fed up with arguing that it should do so, and it would not do so, and that was why the Bill came into being. The amendment in lieu should solve that because, for future reference, it should ensure that Ofgem has a backbone statutorily inserted into it.

We all hope that those powers are not needed, and that the reforms designed to sharpen competition mean that they will never be needed, but the amendment in lieu means that they can be used in the future. With any luck, as with a good nuclear deterrent, no one will ever have to press the button, but my goodness me, they will know that they are there. That is the crucial point. With that, I welcome the amendment in lieu. I hope that the message goes out loud and clear to Ofgem that we will not put up with its being weak-willed in the future. It is up to Ofgem to ensure that this market functions properly, not just during the temporary period of the cap, but on an ongoing basis in the future. With any luck, after that none of us will ever have to worry about the energy market’s mispricing again.

Energy Prices

Debate between John Penrose and Alan Whitehead

Thursday 16th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point; they do want to have their cake and eat it. The problem is that we are not sure where the cake is and how we can work out which bits of the cake come from which source, because the whole energy market as it stands is non-transparent. Transparency is central to being able to judge whether such price rises are justified. The transactions that the energy companies undertake in order to trade, to hedge their trading, and to bring the costs of wholesale into the retail market are almost wholly opaque, and they continue to be so.

In addition, as we have heard this afternoon, the persecuted majority get hit all ways; they are hit by the price rises and hit by paying for the most expensive tariffs in the company roster—and in some cases, up to 90% of the customers of those companies are paying for the most expensive tariffs. So not only should we not speak about standard variable tariff customers as if they are an endangered minority, because they are in fact an endangered majority, but we must stop suggesting that it is somehow their fault that they have not switched and as if they are responsible for not switching. If we look at the history that my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley pointed out, we see a correlation between the areas from which modern energy companies originated and their sticky customer base. In fact, in a number of instances, a large proportion of those sticky customers were inherited when the companies were privatised and have stayed with them ever since. One might think that that shows admirable loyalty to those companies, and that to treat those customers in the way we have heard about this afternoon is absolutely the wrong thing to do.

Such behaviour produces a huge base of customers that is advantageous to energy companies, not to put too fine a point on it. As the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare said, those customers will pay more for less year after year, they will not desert the company as a result, and they can be relied on to be milked to the benefit of the company’s finances. That points to the problem with the solution to this issue that the Government and the Competition and Markets Authority have been pursuing, which is sort of to blame those sticky customers for the plight they find themselves in and say, “Well, if only you’d switched, everything would be okay.” Indeed, that idea is at the heart of the recent CMA report on the energy market: “Why don’t all these sticky customers switch? If they don’t, how can we poke and prod them until they do? If we keep prodding and poking them and they still do not switch, we can get other companies in to poke and prod them a bit more and then they might switch.” That is not a satisfactory final remedy, given the scale, the nature and the brokenness of the market.

However, we should not therefore be surprised to read in the principles attached to the provisional remedies that the CMA put forward—the principles on which it operated the recent inquiry—the following statement:

“It is through customers shopping around and making choices between the offerings of rival suppliers that the benefits of competition emerge.”

That is what it thought it was doing through the inquiry.

The CMA has come up with the idea of putting a cap on tariffs for customers on prepaid meters, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Brent Central, who has been instrumental in securing that through her campaigning on the status of those on prepaid meters and the excess sums they were paying. However, although that cap idea is welcome, it does not do very much for the overall issue. We know that those sticky customers are not going to switch in a hurry and that the energy companies know that; we know that there is no evidence that companies are trembling at the thought of their customers switching and are trimming their rises accordingly. As we have heard this afternoon, the evidence from reports is that switching is a substantial occupation for some, but not for most. Switching figures in total often conceal a churn of switching between companies, often ending back in the same place, and multiple switching by a proactive few, but none by most.

So we have almost a perfect storm in our markets. Prices are spiralling. Ofgem said about recent price rises that it did not

“see any case for significant price increases where suppliers have bought energy well in advance.”

Customers were stuck in the middle of that spiral, however, and in most instances were paying out on disadvantageous tariffs, to boot. So, in the customers’ interest, we need to get a grip on that problem urgently.

We have heard this afternoon that getting that grip has been promised on a number of occasions. We heard that the Prime Minister suggested that everyone should be put on the lowest tariff. That has disappeared. We heard more recently Ministers saying that companies are in the last-chance saloon and something has to happen, but very little has actually taken place. That is despite the fact that, as Members have mentioned, it is plain that customers have been overcharged for a long period by energy companies, with the CMA itself estimating a sum of almost £2 billion by 2015.

So a regulated price cap within which competition could take place is a good idea. I recognise, however, that a price cap has to be considered within the context of the fact that there will be real pressures on costs. It is true that, on occasions, wholesale markets go up, and the energy companies will have to absorb that through price increases. So a cap that allows that arrangement to take place, but within which work can be done to ensure that competition remains, is a good starting idea, as is the idea that sticky customers should, after a certain period, be taken into protected tariffs, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley suggested, or on to the lowest tariff that a company offers. That is one way of starting to take action in relation to sticky customers.

I believe that there is rather more to the present dysfunction of the energy market than just the question of sticky customers, however. Ofgem said recently that there was not a case for significant price rises when suppliers had bought energy well in advance. Perhaps we need to deconstruct that sentence. It is not clear whether Ofgem was referring to companies buying wisely in advance or a long time in advance. Either way, the injunction is sound. Long-term buying strategies and smart hedging mean that price rises should not be spiking in the way that they all too often do, but we do not know what companies are actually up to when they are buying.

We do not know what is happening as far as energy company trades are concerned. For example, 95% of trades by wholesale energy companies are over the counter and we cannot see what they consist of. We do not know the extent to which energy companies that are vertically integrated effectively trade with themselves, or the extent to which this reflects fair trade in the market in forward trading. Surely we need to open up the market to full transparency, not just day-ahead but right along the curve, so that we know what is going on and we can act to prevent the abuses of trading positions that take place to the advantage of companies’ resources but to the disadvantage of customers.

[John Penrose]

I am sure that transparency is a sensible and worthwhile thing to aim for, but does the hon. Gentleman agree that it does not matter terribly much from a consumer’s point of view, because consumers do not care whether their supplier has a good hedging strategy or a bad one? That is up to the supplier to deal with and to manage. Some will get it right and some will get it wrong, but if they get it wrong, it should hit their managers’ bonuses and their shareholders’ returns rather than the price that the consumer eventually pays. We might want to understand this, but we should not seek to use it as a justification for high or low prices. Ultimately we should be tougher on the suppliers than that.

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed. The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about the relationship of the customer to those transactions. However, with vertical integration, those transactions could cause money that should go to the customer to be siphoned off into different areas as a result of those opaque trades, and that is important to the customer in the long term. That is why we need full transparency in all those market trade arrangements.