Bosnia and Herzegovina: Stability and Peace

Debate between John Nicolson and Bob Stewart

Thursday 2nd December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I deployed in September 1992 with 900 men and some women to save lives. We were neutral. We were cast into the middle of a war between three basic sides, not including the mafia. Bosnian Serbs were fighting Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Muslims were fighting Bosnian Serbs and sometimes Bosnian Croats. Bosnian Croats were fighting Bosnian Serbs and occasionally Bosnian Muslims. We have to avoid that happening again. We were sent there to try to give Bosnia a chance. We managed to save quite a number of people, for example in April 1993 we led on pulling out about 2,000 people from Srebrenica three years before the disaster of July 1995, but we failed to save many others, so, in my view, it was not a success.

What is pertinent to this debate is the fact that I witnessed a political solution, the Vance-Owen plan, which the Bosnian Croats immediately tried to put into action by trying to take out a town called Gornji Vakuf. I watched as the Brigadier General of the Bosnian-Croat army tasked his tanks to fire one round at each house, one after the other, destroying the town piecemeal. I spent three weeks personally trying to stop that fighting, at some cost—my escort driver was killed. The lesson for me was that having a political solution that starts dividing Bosnia is asking for real trouble, so it must not happen.

I left in May 1993, but the war ground on. There was political indecision and a lack of will among Europeans, the Americans and the United Nations. It ground on until that awful genocide of Srebrenica in July 1995, when 8,372 men and boys were murdered by the Bosnian Serb army—by the way, the same Bosnian Serb army that might want to split away. Srebrenica was the catalyst for Dayton. The Dayton peace accords—thank goodness it happened—achieved its primary end: it stopped the war.

As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), no one has been shot or blown up in Bosnia since—I am sure they have, but to our knowledge they have not—but it was lousy politics, because it set up a very weak country and a very weak Government, with three Presidents in rotation representing each side for eight months, and it did not work. Dayton was meant to last for only a short while. Look how long it has had to exist. Now, we have this Bosnian Serb, Dodik, who is threatening to take Republika Srpska out of Bosnia.

I was very friendly with the late Lord Paddy Ashdown. Paddy told me a story about having dinner with Franjo Tuđman, the President of Croatia, in May 1995 at the Guildhall in London. Paddy said to Tuđman, “How do you see the future of Bosnia in 10 years’ time?” Tuđman grabbed a menu, drew a map of Bosnia and divided it in half: half Serb, half Croat. Paddy asked, “What is going to happen to the Bosnian Muslims?” Tuđman said, “Well, maybe a small section in a Croatian area.” By the way, they are all south Slav. Everyone is a south Slav, but by religion they are 30% Serb, 15% Croat and over 50% Bosnian Muslim—1.8 million people. Bosnia matters to us, because if the Croats and the Serbs divide the country in half, guess what will happen to 1.8 million people. They are going to be on the road. They will not be looking east, but north and west. It matters to us what happens in Bosnia.

[John Nicolson]

As the right hon. and gallant Member knows, as a BBC presenter I interviewed him many times at that time. He mentioned a number of times the secession of the Bosnian Serb part of Bosnia. If they pull out their troops from the joint army and set up their own army, that surely takes us right back to the time that he was there. It is a clear breach of the Dayton accords. It arms them and makes them dangerous. That should be our line in the sand, surely?

[Bob Stewart]

I agree.

There are two lessons: dividing Bosnia will not work; and the only way to get a solution in Bosnia is by robust international actions. So what will we do? Let me finish by making four points.

First, we have to sustain Dayton at least until we get something to replace it or help it. Secondly, Mr Christian Schmidt, who is sitting here today, requires our absolute and unequivocal support. He must be given all the power we can provide for him to stop the country going backwards. We need another Dayton, which some have called Dayton II. We need the involvement of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Russia, which is playing hard to get, and Serbia. And, of course, in any Dayton II we require the presence of the Bosnian Serbs, because they were not there at Dayton I. I expect—I hope that the Minister is listening to me carefully—the UK to lead on sorting this out.

My final point is this: we must be prepared to send in our soldiers to save lives. That is what we did before: save lives. Fifty-seven of our soldiers died. One of them, Lance Corporal Wayne Edwards, was my driver. That does not count Dobrila Kolaba, my wonderful interpreter who was killed. Minister, it is over to you. The UK must lead and sort out this problem. We can do it.