Bosnia and Herzegovina: Stability and Peace
Debate between John Nicolson and Bob Stewart(3 years ago)
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Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
I deployed in September 1992 with 900 men and some women to save lives. We were neutral. We were cast into the middle of a war between three basic sides, not including the mafia. Bosnian Serbs were fighting Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Muslims were fighting Bosnian Serbs and sometimes Bosnian Croats. Bosnian Croats were fighting Bosnian Serbs and occasionally Bosnian Muslims. We have to avoid that happening again. We were sent there to try to give Bosnia a chance. We managed to save quite a number of people, for example in April 1993 we led on pulling out about 2,000 people from Srebrenica three years before the disaster of July 1995, but we failed to save many others, so, in my view, it was not a success.
What is pertinent to this debate is the fact that I witnessed a political solution, the Vance-Owen plan, which the Bosnian Croats immediately tried to put into action by trying to take out a town called Gornji Vakuf. I watched as the Brigadier General of the Bosnian-Croat army tasked his tanks to fire one round at each house, one after the other, destroying the town piecemeal. I spent three weeks personally trying to stop that fighting, at some cost—my escort driver was killed. The lesson for me was that having a political solution that starts dividing Bosnia is asking for real trouble, so it must not happen.
I left in May 1993, but the war ground on. There was political indecision and a lack of will among Europeans, the Americans and the United Nations. It ground on until that awful genocide of Srebrenica in July 1995, when 8,372 men and boys were murdered by the Bosnian Serb army—by the way, the same Bosnian Serb army that might want to split away. Srebrenica was the catalyst for Dayton. The Dayton peace accords—thank goodness it happened—achieved its primary end: it stopped the war.
As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), no one has been shot or blown up in Bosnia since—I am sure they have, but to our knowledge they have not—but it was lousy politics, because it set up a very weak country and a very weak Government, with three Presidents in rotation representing each side for eight months, and it did not work. Dayton was meant to last for only a short while. Look how long it has had to exist. Now, we have this Bosnian Serb, Dodik, who is threatening to take Republika Srpska out of Bosnia.
I was very friendly with the late Lord Paddy Ashdown. Paddy told me a story about having dinner with Franjo Tuđman, the President of Croatia, in May 1995 at the Guildhall in London. Paddy said to Tuđman, “How do you see the future of Bosnia in 10 years’ time?” Tuđman grabbed a menu, drew a map of Bosnia and divided it in half: half Serb, half Croat. Paddy asked, “What is going to happen to the Bosnian Muslims?” Tuđman said, “Well, maybe a small section in a Croatian area.” By the way, they are all south Slav. Everyone is a south Slav, but by religion they are 30% Serb, 15% Croat and over 50% Bosnian Muslim—1.8 million people. Bosnia matters to us, because if the Croats and the Serbs divide the country in half, guess what will happen to 1.8 million people. They are going to be on the road. They will not be looking east, but north and west. It matters to us what happens in Bosnia.
John Nicolson
As the right hon. and gallant Member knows, as a BBC presenter I interviewed him many times at that time. He mentioned a number of times the secession of the Bosnian Serb part of Bosnia. If they pull out their troops from the joint army and set up their own army, that surely takes us right back to the time that he was there. It is a clear breach of the Dayton accords. It arms them and makes them dangerous. That should be our line in the sand, surely?
Bob Stewart
I agree.
There are two lessons: dividing Bosnia will not work; and the only way to get a solution in Bosnia is by robust international actions. So what will we do? Let me finish by making four points.
First, we have to sustain Dayton at least until we get something to replace it or help it. Secondly, Mr Christian Schmidt, who is sitting here today, requires our absolute and unequivocal support. He must be given all the power we can provide for him to stop the country going backwards. We need another Dayton, which some have called Dayton II. We need the involvement of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Russia, which is playing hard to get, and Serbia. And, of course, in any Dayton II we require the presence of the Bosnian Serbs, because they were not there at Dayton I. I expect—I hope that the Minister is listening to me carefully—the UK to lead on sorting this out.
My final point is this: we must be prepared to send in our soldiers to save lives. That is what we did before: save lives. Fifty-seven of our soldiers died. One of them, Lance Corporal Wayne Edwards, was my driver. That does not count Dobrila Kolaba, my wonderful interpreter who was killed. Minister, it is over to you. The UK must lead and sort out this problem. We can do it.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Debate between John Nicolson and Bob Stewart(8 years, 4 months ago)
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John Nicolson (East Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) and hear the historical background from his perspective.
Two weeks ago, many of us spoke in a moving debate on the centenary of the battle of the Somme. Throughout these islands and beyond, the events of 100 years ago were commemorated, and one recurring theme in this House and elsewhere was the importance of treasuring the young lives of our soldiers. When we read about the senseless slaughter of the Somme, we like to think that we are more sophisticated and less gullible than previous generations—that we are more concerned with the lives of others, whether our own soldiers or civilians abroad. Yet in this House, in very recent history, we voted for a war that was an unpardonable folly.
On 18 March 2003, 411 MPs followed Tony Blair into the Aye Lobby, unleashing the forces of hell in Iraq; 139 of those MPs still serve in Parliament today. It must be difficult to live with that vote. But rather than accept personal responsibility, too many say, “If I had known then what I know now, I would never have voted for the war.” That is what I want to focus on, because I do not buy it. It is too easy a cop-out. Tony Blair has become so discredited that he is a convenient depository for shared guilt. “It was his golden oratory that bamboozled me,” say some MPs. They talk of seductive mendacity, or ask who could have questioned our security services in all their wisdom. They say that they believed Colin Powell and his illustrated talk at the UN with its cartoon mock-up of mobile laboratories on trucks and that they fell for his dire warnings that the secular Saddam Hussein was in cahoots with the fundamentalist Osama bin Laden, however culturally illiterate that claim was. It was just all so convincing, they say—if they had only known then what they know now. It is all nonsense.
We did know then much of what we know now, and if we did not, it was because we chose not to absorb the expert opinion available at the time. We knew then that Saddam Hussein had once possessed chemical weapons. He had used them in the 1980s against the Kurds, the Iranians and the Shi’a. However, we also knew that the implementation from 1991 until the war in 2003 of two no-fly zones, one in the north of Iraq and one in the south, prevented any further chemical attacks, as those chemical weapons could no longer be dropped. Even at their height, Saddam Hussein’s powers had limits. In 1991, 39 scud missiles were fired at Israel—I was there at the time, as a journalist. They were crudely targeted at Tel Aviv, and killed no one.
Even if Saddam Hussein could not fire his chemical weapons, might they somehow have become a threat on the battlefield? In the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf war, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq was set up to inspect Iraqi weapons facilities. It maintained a presence in the country for several years. There was broad agreement among experts that Iraq was not an imminent threat. Those weapons that had been used against Iranian and Kurdish opponents had been destroyed or were degraded beyond use.
Let us remind ourselves of what the experts said at the time. Scott Ritter, a United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, stated in 2002 that
“since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed: 90-95% of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability has been verifiably eliminated… If Iraq was producing weapons…we would have…proof, plain and simple.”
Experts told us repeatedly that chemical weapons do not have a long shelf life. Ritter stated that Iraqi sarin and tabun had a shelf life of approximately five years. Botulinum toxin and liquid anthrax last about three years. As Members debated the war in this House, they knew that at the height of his powers Saddam had never had the capacity to fire chemical weapons long range and that, even if he had had that power, after years of no-fly zone restrictions and the passage of time, his weapons were degraded and beyond use.
Bob Stewart
I seem to recall that the hon. Gentleman and I were together in the television studios at the time and that we laughed at the mock-ups of the vehicles that he mentioned. We agreed that if those vehicles existed they could easily be photographed from the skies. We therefore thought that they could not exist: why would they need to make drawings of them when they would be able to get photographs of any actual vehicles?
John Nicolson
The hon. Gentleman remembers well. We did indeed sit together in television studios, because we journalists called in experts to ask them for their evidence. It was relatively easy, even as a journalist, to pick apart many of the absurd claims.
Of course, some journalists were screaming for war. The Sun ran the absurd headline “Brits 45mins from doom” about a supposed threat to troops in Cyprus. The Star wrote “Mad Saddam ready to attack: 45 minutes from a chemical war”. It was all nonsense. The journalists who wrote it knew that, but it was terrifying for some Members.
In January 2003, United Nations weapons inspectors reported that they had found no indication whatever that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons or an active programme of chemical weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency at the time found
“no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.”
The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission said at the time that it
“did not find evidence of the continuation or resumption of programmes of weapons of mass destruction”.
However, US Vice-President Dick Cheney retorted that he believed that Saddam Hussein
“has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. ElBaradei”—
the director general of the IAEA at the time—
“frankly is wrong.”
Who were parliamentarians to believe—the chemical weapons experts, the missiles experts, the IAEA, or Dick Cheney, George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld and the neo-cons? The House had to make up its mind.
In the run up to the Iraq war, I was working as a journalist, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out. Among other things, I was presenting a three-hour daily radio news programme. We had access to experts, as any news journalists do. We called them in and asked them to outline their evidence. Now, I am not a pacifist. I supported NATO action in Bosnia and Kosovo due to the imminent threat to life and the need to save civilians; in fact, I was on the flight back from Iraq—mentioned earlier—with the returning hostages who had fled from Saddam Hussein. However, during interviews with experts and academics in the run-up to the House’s vote, I saw clearly that the case for war was built on exaggeration and deceit. It was blindingly obvious.
Tony Blair frequently told this House and the British people that he was working towards disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. He repeatedly told the House that his aim was not regime change. The House could have been under no illusion about what it was being asked to vote on. Mr Blair said that Saddam was a “very brutal and repressive” leader but that the aim was
“disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, it is not regime change.”
Regime change was not the basis for war. The challenge for the House on the day of the debate was clear. Mr Blair was asking Members to vote on one basis and one basis alone: the imminent danger posed by Saddam’s weaponry.
What if all the experts talking in public were wrong? Was there an elevated group of experts—an inner core with extraordinary knowledge that was unavailable to the ordinary expert? As Members will recall, Tony Blair often said, “If only you could see what crosses my desk, you’d never doubt the danger that we are in and the pressing case for immediate action.”
Britain and International Security
Debate between John Nicolson and Bob Stewart(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Bob Stewart
I thank my very hon. Friend for her intervention, and I entirely agree with everything she says. Those matters are now considered very seriously in the SDSR.
Of course I support the military being given what it requires to defend our country properly. I remind the House that, at the height of the cold war, we were normally spending as much as 4.6% of our national income on defence. Although I understand and support the need for targeted overseas aid, I am none the less absolutely shocked that we spend the equivalent of a third of the defence budget on it each year. And I am afraid I do not subscribe to the argument that providing international aid can be a proper substitute for sufficient military power. Defence is too serious a matter to be fiddled.
Bob Stewart
Forgive me, but I am really up against the time and I want others to have time to speak. Because of you!
Defence is too serious a matter to be fiddled, yet NATO members, particularly in Europe, do so year in and year out. They most certainly do not pay their NATO club dues and we must give them no excuse not to do so. Surely what is happening in Ukraine is a wake-up call. The situation there is a total disaster. Militarily, the Foreign Secretary has already ruled out armed action by our Army, Navy or Air Force, but surely there are some measures we could take to help Ukraine, in addition to the military training we are already providing. Perhaps we could gift-aid non-lethal equipment such as night vision devices and range-finders, which would greatly help Ukraine’s military to see at night. Right now, Ukraine’s armed forces are almost blind after dark. At the same time I cannot see why we should not give Ukraine some of our vast reserve pool of military transport trucks and Land Rovers.
Bob Stewart
I will give way, as the hon. Gentleman is a very old friend of mine.
John Nicolson
I thank the hon. and gallant Gentleman for giving way. We have identified cybercrime and terrorism as two of the things that threaten us today. Does he therefore agree that it is an absurdity to spend £100 billion on our nuclear so-called deterrent? It is a cold war defence system that is utterly unsuited to dealing with today’s problems.
Bob Stewart
He was my very old friend. [Laughter.] Of course I disagree with him. The point is that, when we are talking about nuclear weapons, deterrence works, whether in a cold war or a hot war.
I know that we provide aircraft to the Baltic patrols, but should we not also position British ground troops permanently in rotation in eastern Latvia, Estonia or Poland? Since 2010, Russian troop numbers around the Baltic have increased from 9,000 to around 100,000 today. Is it too late, colleagues, to stop the redeployment, back to the United Kingdom, of our last armoured brigade in Germany? It may even be cheaper to leave it there anyway—the Germans will be very happy with that. If we reversed that decision, surely it would send a strong signal to the Kremlin that its actions do have consequences. Many of us here will recall the wrong message that we sent to Argentina in 1982 when we withdrew HMS Endurance just before the Falklands war. Keeping an armoured brigade in Germany might be the right message to send today.
Russia would denounce such a move, but so what? Mr Putin and his cohorts have hardly paid any attention to our protests about what he has been doing in eastern Ukraine, the Crimea, or the Baltic. President Putin might protest long and hard, but at least it would prove that NATO still has teeth. Madam Deputy Speaker, I am finished in time.