Huawei and 5G

John Nicolson Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2020 Westminster Hall

[John Nicolson (Ochil and South Perthshire) (SNP)]

The Government have found themselves between a rock and a hard place, facing a decision between spiralling costs and high security. We have serious concerns about establishing such a fundamental part of our digital infrastructure with Chinese-owned technology. Any and all our concerns and doubts about the impact it could have on the security and autonomy of our data must be answered beyond reproach before such a risk is taken with our vital national infrastructure. To ensure that, the Government should conduct a full independent review and assessment in collaboration with allies in the Five Eyes.

Ensuring our grasp on the information and capabilities reliant on 5G technology is pivotal in exploiting the benefits and power that it undoubtedly offers, as well as in protecting ourselves from it. We have heard a lot about the threat of back doors in Huawei hardware and software that would allow it to be controlled remotely from outside the UK. Of course that is a legitimate concern, but the bigger issue is the more systematic security failings in the software that could be remotely exploited.

The 2019 report of the board that supervises the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre said that Huawei lacks “basic engineering competence” and brings a

“significantly increased risk to UK operators”.

The board could give “only limited assurance” about the ability for risks to be managed.

Another risk is that equipment providers usually have automated authorised remote access to their hardware to provide support to carry out a managed services contract, with the equipment requiring regular software security updates and bug fixes. There is a lot of outsourcing in the sector, including to Huawei, with further potential for security breaches.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

I understand the concerns raised by the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members, but given that our intelligence agencies have designed the Government’s approach, that the National Security Council has signed off on it and that all Ministers going to its briefings have agreed with it, should we not put more faith in the risk mitigation measures that the Government have announced?

[John Nicolson]

No, I would not put faith in them, not least because there is little consensus among former heads of intelligence about the issue.

[Bob Seely]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

[John Nicolson]

I will not; I will make progress.

The UK has spent, and continues to spend, billions of pounds on the development, maintenance and renewal of 20th-century defence systems, such as Trident, that are simply not fit to face the security challenges of the modern era. The biggest threats we now face—terrorism, climate change and, of course, cyber-security—will not be deterred by multibillion-pound nuclear weapons in the firth of Clyde.

In the meantime, our telecoms infrastructure security has been left weak and exposed by decades of under-investment. Countering the threat would require serious investment in, and protection of, our native companies, which would involve a hard look at China’s enthusiasm for the acquisition of small engineering firms. The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) asked who has been asleep at the watch, but we all know which Government and which party has been in charge for the last decade. With China aiming to monopolise the market, it is not too late for the Government and the country to wake up.