Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between John Hayes and Tom Hunt

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Tom Hunt]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are intolerable pressures being placed on this country through mass legal migration and illegal migration. It is right that more and more of my constituents are seeing the link between that issue and pressure on public services, strains on social cohesion and other things. Immigration at sustainable levels with integration is a force for good. Immigration at unsustainable levels without integration causes intolerable troubles for the people of this country. That is something they want to guard against.

[Sir John Hayes]

That view is held not just by my hon. Friend, by many in the House and by many in the country, but by many countries in Europe. Mass migration is now seen as an issue of salience by countries right across Europe and the wider world. He is far from alone: he is speaking for the people.

[Tom Hunt]

We have heard lots of arguments about the ECHR and about Winston Churchill forming it. That has been defeated time and again but continues to be wheeled out by Opposition Members. I do not agree. I do not think for a moment that if Winston Churchill was alive today, he would be comfortable with the way in which today’s ECHR operates and its supranational nature.

Ultimately, I applaud the Prime Minister’s desire to stop the boats, but it is not enough just to try, and it is not enough to be just 80% or 90% of the way there. We need to be 100% of the way there. We have seen previously that any chinks in the armour of any Bill designed to tackle this issue will be ruthlessly exploited. We share the Prime Minister’s desire and we want to work with him to get a Bill that we can all unite behind to stop the boats.

Immigration is not just an important issue. I honestly believe that it has become an existential issue. Ultimately, it is important that we unite behind the Bill, but it needs to work. The question is: do we think that the Bill will work or not? Do we think it can be strengthened? For all those reasons, I will vote for the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark with a certain degree of pride. I believe in the sovereignty of this country, I believe in listening to the people of this country, and I believe in narrowing the unhealthy disconnect there is between the views of the majority of people on immigration and where we are at the moment.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between John Hayes and Tom Hunt

Tuesday 11th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Hayes]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Tom Hunt]

I am sorry, but I will not be taking any interventions.

Ultimately, what Brexit was about in many respects was taking back control of our borders, and controlling the migration system. If it gets to a point where we feel that, even having delivered Brexit, the popular sovereignty of the people’s wish to decrease net migration and tackle illegal migration robustly is impossible, it is only right that we then look at the legal infrastructure and the different arrangements that this country is subject to. We must listen to the British people, the vast majority of whom do support this Bill. They want to see it enacted and I will be supporting the Government every step of the way. I really hope that, before we get to the summer recess, this vital Bill gets Royal Assent.

[Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) (SNP)]

When the Minister was first appointed, I thought that he was largely going along with the Home Secretary’s language and policy on refugees and asylum seekers out of a sense of loyalty and collective responsibility. But as this Bill has progressed, it appears from the statements he has made in the Chamber and the responses he has given to questions and to Westminster Hall debates that he really has drunk the Kool-Aid. I think he genuinely believes the Government’s rhetoric: that this country is being invaded, that people who come here fleeing war, persecution and famine are actually economic migrants on the make, and that outright hostility and denial of their basic human rights is the only way to dissuade them from coming here. So hostile does he want the environment to be, he will not even allow a splash of colour and cartoons on the walls of the family reception centres. It is more than disappointing. It is worrying that the Government’s attitude seems to be that the way to stop people coming here from countries where they are at risk of oppression and human rights abuses is to create an environment that is at least as hostile as the place from which they are fleeing.

That would explain the Government’s opposition to Lords amendment 1. The safeguards that it provides should otherwise be seen as absolutely essential, and make it clear that nothing in the Bill requires the Home Secretary to break with international human rights law and the treaties and convention that this country has been signed up to for decades. Nowhere in the Conservative manifesto was there a commitment to take the UK out of these conventions, so their Lordships have every right to continue to press this and similar amendments during the next stages of their proceedings.

The Chair of the Justice Committee said earlier that this was an incorporative rather than an interpretive amendment. Perhaps the Lords will come back with something in lieu that will be more attractive to the more level-headed elements on the Conservative Back Benches. But then perhaps that is what the Government have been looking for all along—the Government want a fight with the House of Lords, they want a fight with the Supreme Court and the Home Secretary certainly wants an excuse to withdraw from the European convention on human rights. Those perhaps are the real purposes of the Bill, and the impact on refugees and asylum seekers is really only secondary.

It is ridiculous that we are being asked to consider these amendments barely 24 hours after the Lords gave the Bill its Third Reading. It shows the Government’s contempt for both Houses of Parliament. The explanatory notes and the amendment documents were only available through the Vote Office at 7.45 last night, as the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) said, and yet the Government are proposing 58 motions to disagree with the Lords in their amendments this evening. If that is not picking a fight, I am not sure what is. Well, let us have that fight. Let us vote on all 58 of them and then see how desperate the Government and their Back Benchers are to get this Bill on to the statute book.

Almost all the amendments made in the Lords speak to a basic humanity and respect for the rule of law and the fundamental principles of the global asylum system. That is essentially what the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury’s amendment 104 calls for. Government Members may wish to wish those Lords away, but they are supposed to support the House of Lords and the system that exists. If they want to pick away at it, that is fine, because I do not think there should be a House of Lords in its current form.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between John Hayes and Tom Hunt

Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Hunt]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the key issue in relation to new clause 3 is the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the complexity of the things it will deal with, and the complexity of the roles of the organisation and people it is overseeing? That complex debate should be dealt with only by Parliament. We are best placed to have that debate and to come to the right conclusion. Decisions about whether judicial review will apply to that or not should be for this place, not for the judiciary.

[Sir John Hayes]

I agree. Indeed, when I proposed the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to which the hon. Member for Hammersmith referred and which built on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which Privacy International specifically dealt with, there was a genuine spirit of co-operation across the House. I worked closely with my then shadow, who went on to become Leader of the Opposition. I often say to him these days, “You learned your trade under me.” In fact, I think he said that to me. In any case, we worked closely on those matters and it was detailed scrutiny, as my hon. Friend has just described, that led to that Bill becoming an Act.

Indeed, we undertook extensive pre-legislative scrutiny, and one of the people I appointed to that task is now Attorney General. The scrutiny, under Lord Murphy, looked at the Bill in some detail, as the hon. Member for Hammersmith suggested, and there were long debates in the House and in the other place before it became law. As I emphasised earlier, we were determined that there should be proper safeguards.

The essence of this, Mr Rosindell, is that in these difficult, delicate and challenging matters of security, Parliament has to legislate—I would not say regularly, but as often as necessary—to allow our security services and the forces of law to stay ahead of those who wish to do us harm. The problem is that the capabilities of malevolent elements are dynamic, so the legal powers of those with the mission to keep us safe must match that dynamism. That is always challenging to Parliament, because there is a balance to be struck between the maintenance of law and the protection of liberty. That debate is the context for many of these considerations. It is not the place of the courts of make up the law as they go along, but that is exactly what has occurred.

I referred to the Attorney General earlier. She could not have put that case more plainly in the speech she made a few weeks ago at Cambridge University:

“The Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Privacy International was also profoundly troubling for a number of reasons. A decision by Parliament to limit the judicial review jurisdiction of the Courts should only be taken after the most serious consideration by the legislature. And there may well be circumstances where Parliament does consider that to be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Court should be very slow to deprive legislation of its proper meaning”.

That is essentially what the Court did in the case of Privacy International. It deprived legislation of its proper meaning. The most generous way to describe it is that the Court interpreted the decision made by Parliament in what I regard as a perverse way, and, in the words of the Attorney General, a “profoundly troubling” way.

The new clause, which the Minister will know is in scope—it is not for me to gauge that; our expert Clerks judged it, so there is no doubt about whether it is appropriate to add it to the Bill—would address that concern about creeping judge-made law in what is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich said, a very sensitive area. I am grateful to the Minister, who made a generous offer and rightly drew attention to his helpful letter on issues raised by me and other hon. Members in our earlier consideration. I am particularly grateful to him for fully taking into account the case that I made on behalf of disadvantaged court users; his letter is most welcome in that respect. With the offer that he made of further discussion, the open-mindedness that he has shown and his clear understanding of why the new clause was tabled, I will—hesitatingly and to some degree reluctantly—beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Evidence in judicial review proceedings

“(1) Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, no court shall—

(a) permit oral evidence to be elicited in judicial review proceedings; or

(b) order public bodies or any person exercising or entitled to exercise public authority to disclose evidence in anticipation of or in the course of judicial review proceedings,

(2) In relation to any judicial review proceedings, or in anticipation of any judicial review proceedings, in which a public body or a person exercising or entitled to exercise public authority argues, or indicates its intention to argue, that—

(a) the proceedings concern a matter that is non-justiciable, or

(b) that an enactment excludes or limits judicial review,

(3) In subsection (2), “evidential duty” means any principle of law or rule of court touching the identification of relevant facts or reasoning underlying the measure or other matter in respect of which judicial review is sought, or any order of the court to adduce oral or other evidence.

(4) Nothing in subsection (2) or (3) affects an evidential duty that may arise in relation to judicial review proceedings other than in relation to a measure or other matter that is argued to be non-justiciable or to be excluded from judicial review by legislation.”—(Sir John Hayes.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between John Hayes and Tom Hunt

Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

Tom Hunt

- - Excerpts

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the key issue in relation to new clause 3 is the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the complexity of the things it will deal with, and the complexity of the roles of the organisation and people it is overseeing? That complex debate should be dealt with only by Parliament. We are best placed to have that debate and to come to the right conclusion. Decisions about whether judicial review will apply to that or not should be for this place, not for the judiciary.

Sir John Hayes

-

I agree. Indeed, when I proposed the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to which the hon. Member for Hammersmith referred and which built on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which Privacy International specifically dealt with, there was a genuine spirit of co-operation across the House. I worked closely with my then shadow, who went on to become Leader of the Opposition. I often say to him these days, “You learned your trade under me.” In fact, I think he said that to me, but we worked closely on those matters and it was detailed scrutiny, as my hon. Friend has just described, that led to that Bill becoming an Act.

Indeed, we undertook extensive pre-legislative scrutiny, and one of the people I appointed to that task is now Attorney General. The scrutiny, under Lord Murphy, looked at the Bill in some detail, as the hon. Member for Hammersmith suggested, and there were long debates in the House and in the other place before it became law. As I emphasised earlier, we were determined that there should be proper safeguards.

The essence of this, Mr Rosindell, is that in these difficult, delicate and challenging matters of security, Parliament has to legislate—I would not say regularly, but as often as necessary—to allow our security services and the forces of law to stay ahead of those who wish to do us harm. The problem is that the capabilities of malevolent elements are dynamic, so the legal powers of those with the mission to keep us safe must match that dynamism. That is always challenging to Parliament, because there is a balance to be struck between the maintenance of law and the protection of liberty. That debate is the context for many of these considerations. It is not the place of the courts of make up the law as they go along, but that is exactly what has occurred.

I referred to the Attorney General earlier. She could not have put that case more plainly in the speech she made a few weeks ago at Cambridge University:

“The Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Privacy International was also profoundly troubling for a number of reasons. A decision by Parliament to limit the judicial review jurisdiction of the Courts should only be taken after the most serious consideration by the legislature. And there may well be circumstances where Parliament does consider that to be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Court should be very slow to deprive legislation of its proper meaning”.

That is essentially what the Court did in the case of Privacy International. It deprived legislation of its proper meaning. The most generous way to describe it is that the Court interpreted the decision made by Parliament in what I regard as a perverse way, and, in the words of the Attorney General, a “profoundly troubling” way.

The new clause, which the Minister will know is in scope—it is not for me to gauge that; our expert Clerks judged it, so there is no doubt about whether it is appropriate to add it to the Bill—would address that concern about creeping judge-made law in what is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich said, a very sensitive area. I am grateful to the Minister, who made a generous offer and rightly drew attention to his helpful letter on issues raised by me and other hon. Members in our earlier consideration. I am particularly grateful to him for fully taking into account the case that I made on behalf of disadvantaged court users; his letter is most welcome in that respect. With the offer that he made of further discussion, the open-mindedness that he has shown and his clear understanding of why the new clause was tabled, I will—hesitatingly and to some degree reluctantly—beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Evidence in judicial review proceedings

“(1) Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, no court shall—

(a) permit oral evidence to be elicited in judicial review proceedings; or

(b) order public bodies or any person exercising or entitled to exercise public authority to disclose evidence in anticipation of or in the course of judicial review proceedings,

(2) In relation to any judicial review proceedings, or in anticipation of any judicial review proceedings, in which a public body or a person exercising or entitled to exercise public authority argues, or indicates its intention to argue, that—

(a) the proceedings concern a matter that is non-justiciable, or

(b) that an enactment excludes or limits judicial review,

(3) In subsection (2), “evidential duty” means any principle of law or rule of court touching the identification of relevant facts or reasoning underlying the measure or other matter in respect of which judicial review is sought, or any order of the court to adduce oral or other evidence.

(4) Nothing in subsection (2) or (3) affects an evidential duty that may arise in relation to judicial review proceedings other than in relation to a measure or other matter that is argued to be non-justiciable or to be excluded from judicial review by legislation.”—(Sir John Hayes.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between John Hayes and Tom Hunt

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Hunt]

The sad reality is that in any justice system in the world, every now and then, there will sadly be a case that is not—but can we say with complete confidence that every case heard in the High Court has the right outcome? Perhaps, as I was saying, that is having a fourth or fifth bite at the cherry. We also need to reflect on the fact that the vast majority of these cases are not a good use of our judges’ time. They are not worthy of a further bite at the cherry. What is the practical argument for why they should be treated differently from anyone else in the justice system, who has two bites at the cherry? There is no argument for it.

I will draw my comments to a conclusion. Broadly, I welcome the Government’s moves in clause 2. The vast majority of my constituents would support what is happening. They believe in a fair justice system, in which we have a right to appeal—which we have here; that is not being changed—but they are realistic about the wider pressures on the court and justice systems. They see the Labour party doing everything it can to oppose reasonable and justified means to free up capacity in the courts system, while coming up with no practical arguments for how it would do so or that would be better than what the Government have suggested. That is unreasonable. Also, it is wrong to say that everyone who is going to go down this Cart JR route is not abusing the system and our good generosity as a country, because many are.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

I am inspired to speak to this part in our consideration, partly by the Minister’s eloquent explanation of why the amendments are undesirable, partly by the wise words of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich on how the traditional system is in a way being besmirched by the gaming of it, in particular in immigration cases, and partly because of the delight of serving under your chairmanship, Mr Rosindell, which I have not done often, but am particularly pleased to do, under the watchful gaze of one of my political heroes, Joe Chamberlain, who began life as a radical and ended it as a member of a Tory Government, understanding, as you and I do, that liberalism is the triumph of frenzied licence over dutiful obligation. It is because of obligation and, in the spirit of Chamberlain, our patriotic respect for our constitution that we must resist the amendments.

To hear some critics of the Bill, one might think that the Cart was embedded in the settlement between Parliament and the courts, and yet it is a modern thing. As you know, Mr Rosindell, it is the product of a decision by the Supreme Court as recently as 2011, when it declared that the High Court could judicially review decisions of the upper tribunal to refuse permission to appeal from the first-tier tribunal, whereas previously it was held that it could not.

At the heart of our consideration of the Bill is a fundamental difference about the character of our belief in the character of judicial review, but also a difference in our understanding of the separation of powers. We saw that in our evidence sessions. We had evidence from academics, notably Professor Ekins who, by the way, authored the report by Policy Exchange—which I commend for its excellent work on this subject. He was very clear that some of the recent decisions by the Supreme Court and other parts of the court system have challenged the supremacy of Parliament.

We also heard from Aidan O’Neill, who said he was a constitutional lawyer, and I understand he is—quite a notable one, from what I read. He said that this was about mutual respect, but mutuality is not the basis of our constitutional settlement. The roles of Parliament and the courts are distinct—the separation of powers; the clue is in the name. Of course there is a relationship between them, because this place makes laws and the courts oversee laws, but judge-made law is not consistent with our constitutional settlement and some of the perverse decisions of the courts in recent years have led, in the words of Professor Ekins, to parliamentary sovereignty being openly questioned. He said:

“Parliamentary sovereignty was openly questioned and the rule of law was set in apparent tension with parliamentary sovereignty, which is deeply wrong, I think”.—[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee,2 November 2021; c15, Q9.]

The defence of the rule of law is not a valid one, as the Attorney General made clear in her speech on these matters very recently.

The issue before us in respect of these amendments is clear. The judgment that was made in 2011 opened a new avenue of judicial review and those Cart judicial review cases have mushroomed since. This is particularly true for immigration cases, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich said a few moments ago—not exclusively so, as the Minister pointed out, but largely. This has to be changed. Given that a previous Labour Government tried to tighten the requirements for judicial review, it is surprising that the current Opposition do not understand that this is a return to a stable and steady position—a normal position—that enshrines judicial review as an important part of the way in which citizens can acquire justice, but does not allow it to become what it has become, a means for people to perpetuate political debates that they have lost earlier. This is using the courts to—I never thought we would be speaking so much about fruit during the course of our deliberations, but to use the word that has been used several times before—have many bites of the cherry. We ought perhaps to think about another fruit, just for the sake of variety, but I suppose cherries will do for the sake of argument.

As I pointed out when we last met, the Opposition were going to have a debate yesterday on the court backlog. The amendments seem to me to have the effect of doing the very opposite and do not address the issue of the court backlog. We know that a very small number of cases that are brought under Cart judicial review—something like 3%—are successful, and yet there were around 750 per year between 2026 and 2019. We have many cases being brought on a wing and a prayer, with neither the wing flying nor the prayer being answered in terms of the result of the case. There is a pressing need, just on those practical terms, to reform judicial review in this respect.

I say to the Minister—not provocatively, but I hope helpfully—that I think the Bill can go much further. I think it is a very modest reform of judicial review. I refer him again to Professor Ekins’s work. There is a good argument for changing the rules of evidence, for example, which would tighten the system considerably. There is a good case for dealing with the effects of the Adams case, the Miller case and the privacy case, which he will know had profound effects on judicial review and on the balance between Parliament and the courts.