Risk Transformation and Solvency 2 (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Monday 7th October 2019 General Committees

[John Glen]

I am happy to address the points raised by the hon. Member for Oxford East, and the point made by the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk. The SI follows the same process as all SIs. With respect to Solvency 2, the simple reality is that the legislation was amended between the previous presumed exit date and this one. We have simply brought that up to date, and the ILS-related mechanism derived from, and made reference to, the Solvency 2 provision. As a consequence of that relationship, which was something that we authored in the UK, it made sense to update both at this time, given that they are within the same category.

The hon. Member for Oxford East asked what would happen to this SIs if we got a deal. If a deal is secured, any withdrawal agreement Bill will make provision to defer any Brexit SIs that are not needed in a deal scenario until the end of the implementation period. We expect that the Bill will achieve this through a blanket deferral of Brexit SIs that come into force on exit day until the end of the implementation period. We expect that the Bill will also ensure that Ministers can revoke or amend any EU exit SIs as appropriate, so that they deal effectively with any deficiencies arising from the end of the implementation period. In the circumstances that we are talking about, following a hopefully successful conclusion of the deal-making process, we would have a 14-month implementation period, as per the plans at the moment, in which to make provision for the enduring solution. We will ensure that onshoring regulation is not commenced if there is a deal and a transitional period is agreed with the EU.

The hon. Lady asked about the difference between EEA and non-EEA firms. The UK special purpose vehicles are already subject to the same Solvency 2-derived requirements, regardless of whether they are accepting risks from EEA or non-EEA firms. The distinction in the Risk Transformation Regulations 2017 simply reflects the fact that EU law applies only to deals that involve EEA firms. This notional distinction will no longer make sense after exit, so it is being removed, but it will not affect any deals already in place. There is no distinction for these regimes in practice—all deals must comply with UK standards, so equivalence is not necessary.

The hon. Lady referred to her question to the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and to the update of FSMA on the gov.uk website. The National Archives is working to have FSMA updated in time for exit day, and the Treasury is helping with this work. I am not more familiar with the situation than that; obviously my officials helped me answer that question, but I would be happy to examine the matter closely and come back to her on that.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for making that commitment, because his answer contradicts what his Secretary of State said in an answer to me: that the updates would be ready only at the end of this year. I welcome that, and hope the Minister can try to reach towards the date he gave, because otherwise I really worry about people trying to comply with the legislation without having it in front of them.

[John Glen]

I do not try to contradict my colleagues in Government, but that is the information I have received. I will provide clarification as soon as I can.

Turning to the points made by the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk, I recognise the distinction between the Government’s perspective on these matters and his party’s. All I can say is that the financial services industry, which is significant in Edinburgh and Glasgow, is made secure by this process. He may—and indeed does—disagree with the Government about what should happen, but I assure him that in a no-deal scenario, the interests of the financial services industry in Scotland will be looked after as best they possibly can.

I thank the Committee for its consideration of this SI, and the points made by hon. Members on the Opposition Benches. In conclusion, the deficiency fixes in this SI will ensure that the UK’s prudential regime for insurance and insurance risk transfer remains prepared for withdrawal from the EU in any scenario. I hope the Committee has found this evening’s sitting informative, and will now be able to join me in supporting these regulations.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Electronic Commerce and Solvency 2 (amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Wednesday 20th March 2019 General Committees

[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Member for Oxford East and the right hon. Member for North Durham for their questions, which I will endeavour to answer.

As has been the norm, we have exchanged an analysis of the nature of this process, and the desirability of it. I think it was back in October that the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) asked what the point of it was. I must admit, I have had some reflections on that myself. However, we are getting to the end, with the 54th statutory instrument and the 33rd Committee today. We have systematically brought SIs to Committee under the powers of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and, as the hon. Member for Oxford East has shown, we have constructively scrutinised them. We have not agreed on every occasion, but I have sought to do that in as professional a way as possible in the circumstances. I will now examine the points that she has made.

On how the SI is named, I recognise the issues with Google but, as is the case with other pieces of legislation under this programme, it is necessary to group certain provisions together. I am not familiar with precisely how they are named. It is not a process that I have been involved in personally, but I imagine that there is a certain set of protocols, and I recognise that it is rooted in legal language. I cannot say more than that.

On the impact of no deal on e-commerce providers, those established in the UK will lose their exemption from other EEA countries’ laws that fall within the co-ordinated field as defined in the e-commerce directive. UK e-commerce firms will therefore want to prepare by checking for any compliance issues or additional legal requirement that they need to comply with in each EEA country in which they operate. UK providers of online services to EEA countries will need to continue to comply with a range of EEA countries’ individual legal requirements relating to online activities that already fall outside the scope of the directive.

The purpose of the directive was broadly—I think this touches on another point that the hon. Lady raised—around the alignment between different regulators. The purpose was to say that the domestic national competent authority regulator in an EEA country was sufficient in order to conduct financial services trade online with a UK consumer. That has been the broad understanding to this point. Obviously, if we entered into the undesirable no-deal situation, further legislation will be needed to safeguard UK consumers.

The hon. Lady asked why the changes to the Commission delegated regulation were not introduced in the securitisation regulations. The changes that needed to be made to the delegated regulation required further analysis which, due to timing constraints, the Government were unable to complete by the time those regulations were put before Parliament. To ensure that all relevant amendments were captured the Government therefore decided to spend more time on that analysis, and to introduce the changes through a further SI.

I have never said that this is a perfect process. We always envisaged, when we timetabled the SIs, that there would be a few at the end that would allow us to make provision where there would be some degree of aggregation. I recognise the hon. Lady’s point that the neatness, suitability and desirability of it at this stage is not as clear as it could have been, but that was an inevitable consequence of laying 1,000 pages of SIs in this condensed period.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am sorry to rewind the Minister a bit, but I was not sure when he had finished his previous point. Just to be absolutely clear, we have been able to get some agreement, as I understand it, from the EU-level regulators that there would be reciprocal provisions on some other areas of financial services. Is the Minister suggesting that in this area we do not yet have that kind of agreement, and therefore that there could be problems with the continuation of contracts unless agreement is reached with those other regulators?

[John Glen]

In terms of reciprocity in a no-deal situation, actions taken in recent days and weeks give us that equivalence assessment. The scope and effectiveness of those going forward would not be fully compliant. We would then be in a situation, in the case of no deal, where we would need to undertake considerable examination and further legislation in that context.

On registration, EEA firms will need to notify the FCA but they will not need to register. That will not incur a fee. The right hon. Member for North Durham raised a number of points about evaluation and the time of the run-off. The maximum length of the run-off is five years. It is that long because of the scope of the contracts that could be involved.

The hon. Member for Oxford East asked about the assessment the Treasury had done of the number of contracts between UK consumers and EEA firms. It is very small because most UK consumers would not be comfortable entering into that sort of contract with an online-only company in the EEA. Our assessment and that of the FCA is that that number is, therefore, very small.

The right hon. Member for North Durham mentioned the territorial application of the legislation with respect to overseas territories. The SI does not affect the law in Gibraltar or the Crown dependencies, being Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man. I do not know about the overseas territories. I do not know whether Gibraltar is a proxy for all of the overseas territories—I imagine so. I will write to clarify that matter because I do not wish to mislead the right hon. Gentleman.

We had a de minimis impact assessment because we anticipated very few contracts due to the limitations of the online activity and online-only business that exists. We expect EEA firms to use passporting instead of the e-commerce exclusion. I am happy to examine the matter in more detail. I will write to the right hon. Gentleman on that point and acknowledge that my answer is not adequate.

I hope I have answered hon. Members’ questions. I recognise this has been a long and arduous process. I would like to put on record my respect and thanks to the hon. Member for Oxford East for the constructive and thorough way in which she has taken the matter on and how we have engaged in these Committees.

I would also like to acknowledge the considerable support I have had from hon. Members on the Government side of the Committee, in particular the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley, who has been with me on every single one, and the various Parliamentary Private Secretaries who have supported me.

I am not taking for granted that the Committee will agree the SI this afternoon but, in conclusion, I would say that we do need it to ensure that EEA firms providing e-commerce of a financial services nature can continue legally to service their contracts, and that the legislation functions appropriately if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. The SI also ensures that retained EU law remains accurate if the UK leaves the EU without a deal. I hope the Committee found my answers and explanation satisfactory and will agree the regulations.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Investment Exchanges, Clearing Houses and Central Securities Depositories (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Monday 11th March 2019 General Committees

[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Member for Oxford East for her questions. She opened in familiar fashion, with respect to the challenge of volume, flow and transparency. I am sympathetic, to a point, about the volume, which we have both had to tolerate. However, this process was set out in earlier legislation. I accept that there is a dispute over the appropriateness of this mechanism, but these SIs are scrutinised prior to being laid. She made several points on the powers of transfer; the resourcing, preparation and workload of the Bank of England; advice and assistance regarding the EEA; and the requirement for co-operation. I shall endeavour to answer them thoroughly.

On whether the Bank of England will have adequate resourcing to take on the new responsibilities granted to it by the draft instrument, I am confident that it is making adequate preparations and effectively allocating resources ahead of 29 March 2019. It has considerable experience and technical expertise in regulating financial services to high standards, has actively participated in a wide range of groups to develop technical policy and regulatory rules, and has chaired several committees and taskforces. My officials have expressed no doubts with respect to that process. Although I accept that these changes are a burden on the Bank, it is very qualified to deal with them. On resourcing, the transfer of functions from ESMA to the Bank is provided for in separate SIs. I have been in regular contact with the Bank and am satisfied that its resourcing issues are resolved through its budgeting process. It has mechanisms to increase that when necessary.

The hon. Lady said that the impact assessments do not take account of the wider impact of no deal, but the impact assessments for these SIs focus narrowly on the changes they make and how businesses will need to respond. It is perfectly reasonable for the hon. Lady to assert that the wider impact of leaving the EU without a deal has not been assessed as part of this impact assessment, and I recognise that that impact is a contested space. However, an impact assessment for the EU (Withdrawal) Act deals with the impact of the parent Act, and the Government also published in November 2018 an analysis of the potential economic impact of that range of scenarios. I must stress that these SIs mitigate the impact of leaving the EU without a deal. If they were not in place, industry would face substantially greater disruption and greater cost if we left without a deal.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation, but the point I was trying to get at was not about the scope of the impact assessment in terms of different types of no-deal scenarios. I was asking why it is believed that this SI would not impact on an overseas investment exchange. The impact assessment states that any cost would be triggered by that overseas operator’s deciding that it still wants to operate in the UK, rather than by the requirements of this SI. That strikes me as a little bit peculiar.

[John Glen]

The issue of hypothecating the cost of a decision made by an entity in another jurisdiction as a consequence of this SI is arguably stretching the range of what would be appropriate and in scope. I think we have assessed that the cost of making this application is £50,000, if I am not mistaken, but I will look into that further and write to the hon. Lady if I can provide further clarification.

It is worth my exploring two further points regarding the co-operation requirements. The PRA has an existing duty under FSMA to co-operate with other authorities, whether in the UK or elsewhere. The SI applies that duty so that the Bank of England is subject to a duty to co-operate with other bodies that undertake similar functions in connection with the Bank’s functions under the European market infrastructure regulation, the central securities depositories regulation and the securities financing transactions regulation. The Bank has discretion in how it carries out that duty. Clearly, the Treasury cannot bind how other countries co-operate with UK regulators, but the duty did not exist previously, so we have put that in for those three dimensions.

On the application process, the hon. Lady cited what the European regulators have done. As I think I have said, the FCA published on 14 September 2018 a direction clarifying the way in which an application to become an ROIE would be made. That direction states that the application should be made as soon as possible and not later than six months before the applicant wishes an ROIE recognition order to take effect. The length of the application process varies on a case-by-case basis and depends to a large extent on the quality and timeliness of the information that each applicant provides. There is no mandated application form; the FCA looks to firms to provide written evidence that they are held to requirements in their home jurisdiction that have equivalent effect in the UK regime.

[Anneliese Dodds]

That is enormously helpful. Can the Minister clarify whether any of them have actually applied in this case? If they need that designation before they can operate and we are in theory leaving on 29 March, surely they need to have started by now.

[John Glen]

From memory, I think 55 could have applied and I believe 10 have successfully applied in the previous three or four months. If I have made an error, I shall correct it promptly. Regarding why we have not recognised EEA CCPs, this SI does not deal with recognition of overseas CCPs, but I will write to the hon. Lady to clarify the situation.

I hope that deals with the points raised. The Government believe that this legislation is necessary, and I hope the Committee has found my points of clarification sufficiently illuminating to allow us to pass these regulations.

Question put and agreed to.

Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 26th February 2019 Public Bill Committees

[Anneliese Dodds]

I rise to support the Opposition’s new clause 2, which is similar in intent to the SNP’s amendment 10. I would like to associate myself with many of the comments by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central. It is a pleasure to follow her in this debate. Labour’s new clause 2 is broader in scope than amendment 10, but it pushes in the same direction.

Our new clause would require the Treasury, prior to making any regulations under this Bill, to publish a report on the impact of the provisions of those regulations. In particular, we specify that the report should cover the following aspects: first, the impact of the provisions on households at different levels of income; secondly, the impact of provisions on people with protected characteristics as defined in the Equality Act 2010, with which I am sure we are all familiar; thirdly, the impact of the provisions on the Treasury’s compliance with the public sector equality duty with which I am sure, again, Members are familiar; and finally, the impact of the provisions on equality in different parts of the UK and different regions of England. The new clause underlines the pressing need for a greater understanding of the impact of legislation such as this on the real economy and on the people who work within it and are impacted by it.

Throughout this process, the Opposition have been concerned about the lack of impact assessments being provided for different pieces of legislation, yet even when they have been provided to us, they have often been highly restricted in scope as well as often arriving late in the day. Often, the main element receiving consideration within the impact assessments has been the familiarisation costs to business of the different measures. That has rightly been criticised by my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Ms Eagle), and indeed last night by the Chair of the Treasury Committee. They both pointed out that the formula for calculating even familiarisation costs is highly mechanistic, relying solely on an assessment of the time spent reading each word of the new regulations, rather than a proper consideration of the level of impact of new regulations on different business practices, for example. Indeed, the Chair of the Treasury Committee has suggested that a better approach might be to ask firms for an assessment of what their adjustment costs will be, then produce a proxy based on that assessment. That could be a sensible way forward. I appreciate that the formula is currently set across Government, rather than just by the Treasury, but surely the area needs to be considered in a much broader context. We have tried to broaden the debate by specifying the elements that need to be taken into account in assessing the Bill’s impact, in line with our general approach to economic decision making.

Financial regulations often come across as a very rarefied area, but we all know that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Colne Valley pointed out, the consequences of getting them wrong can be enormous, especially for specific groups. Whether or not we agree—personally I do not—that cuts to social security were necessary to reduce the deficit that had been created by measures that followed the financial crisis, the burden of those cuts has clearly had an uneven impact on different groups.

The areas of regulation covered in the Bill could have highly disparate impacts. Arguably, the process of financialisation and the intensification of investment banking compared with relationship banking—boring banking, as we might call it—have helped to fuel the imbalance in lending. Over recent years, there has been an enormous move in the UK banking system away from loans to small and medium-sized enterprises and towards loans for real estate. That process has been much more marked outside London and the south-east—it has had a regional impact. The Bill covers some of the instruments that were involved in that process. Capital requirements also have an impact on the structure of banking and its regional distribution, so it is very important that we consider the issues properly.

Finally, I have a question for the Minister about his understanding of the impact of the better regulation provisions. I had assumed all along, as I am sure many other hon. Members did, that those provisions would not apply to this process, given the Government’s stated intention not to water down regulations. As hon. Members will be aware, the better regulation approach specifies “one in, three out”: for every new regulation introduced, three regulations must go. The same issue came up in a debate last night on a very different subject, albeit one that also related to no deal: the REACH etc. (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, the no-deal provisions on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals—another incredibly complex body of legislation.

We do not have a clear answer from the Minister on the matter, so I would appreciate his assurance that the better regulation provisions will not apply to the process. If they did, it would counteract any claims made in this Committee or elsewhere that there would be no watering down. The issue is particularly relevant to new clause 2, because the better regulation process focuses only on the costs to business; it does not consider the costs, from a regional perspective, of not regulating, or the potential countervailing benefits to other groups. I have been informed that the better regulation provisions will not be applied to Grenfell-related fire safety regulations. Will the Minister confirm that they will not apply to this process, either?

If we suddenly find that the “one in, three out” provisions apply in this case, we will be in very different territory. There will be even more need for a proper impact assessment, because to an extent it will counteract some of the mechanistic impacts of the “one in, three out” process.

[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Members for Glasgow Central and for Oxford East for speaking to amendment 10 and new clause 2. I shall discuss them together, because although they differ in key aspects—the former looks backwards at the impact of regulations, while the latter looks forward—we have a similar response to both. The intentions behind them are sound, because it is only right that the Government make regulations with an understanding of their expected impact, but I suggest that they are both unnecessary in the context of the Bill.

As hon. Members know, the Government publish impact assessments for statutory instruments as a matter of course, and it will be no different for those introduced under the powers in the Bill. The impact assessments will include analyses of economic impacts and equalities considerations where relevant.

I acknowledge the challenges of publishing impact assessments for the SIs closely associated with the Bill. I have explained on several occasions in Delegated Legislation Committees, and I reiterate now, that we have done this in a compressed timeframe. Every SI that has gone through the Regulatory Policy Committee—I think there have been five of them—has been registered green. I note the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Oxford East and last night by my right hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan) about the mechanism for evaluating the familiarisation costs. I am pleased that the hon. Member for Oxford East today acknowledged that this is a cross-Whitehall provision.

I will reflect on the points that the hon. Lady has made about the application of the better regulation “one in, three out” rule in respect of this process. I confess that I am not able to give her a definitive statement this morning; I will need to write to her. We have done what we can, and the Treasury is committed to meeting our obligations on impact assessments to enable parliamentary scrutiny. In line with the duties under the Equality Act 2010, and with Cabinet Office guidance, regulations will be made with the equality duty in mind, and any impacts identified will be included in the relevant impact assessments in the usual way.

I remind the Committee that the Government are required in legislation to produce reports ahead of and looking back at the publication of SIs under the Bill. Such reports will of course include, where relevant, the expected and realised impacts of the legislation that is introduced. I hope that, in the light of those assurances, the amendment will be withdrawn and the new clause will not be pressed.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

The schedule contains a list of financial services files that are essential for ensuring the continued competitiveness and functionality of UK markets. Those files consist of 13 EU legislative proposals that are currently in negotiation and may enter into the EU Official Journal up to two years post EU-exit.

It is not an exhaustive list of all in-flight EU financial services legislation. In order to bring before both Houses a Bill that was as narrow in scope as possible, a triage process was undertaken to settle on files deemed essential to the ongoing functionality, reputation and international competitiveness of our financial sector in the crucial period following a no deal. Some in-flight legislation, for example, relates solely to the eurozone, so it would be inappropriate to include it in the Bill. I extend my thanks once more to the Lords, who suggested expanding the list to include the remaining two sustainable finance files, which was a suggestion that we were happy to accept.

In short, the files in the schedule are those that we believe will be most important for market functioning and UK competitiveness in a no-deal scenario. I recommend that the schedule be the schedule to the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule accordingly agreed to.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I beg your pardon, Sir Edward, but I would like to ask for the Chair’s clarification if I may. We wish to clarify whether it is the case that as clause 1 was ordered to stand part of the Bill, new clause 1 falls, and that that is why we have not had a vote on it. Is that the case?

Draft Official Listing of Securities, Prospectus and Transparency (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 19th February 2019 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for those clarifications. To be absolutely clear, the equivalence gap that I was concerned about was not about EU IFRS and whether they are equivalent to UK rules. It was about non-EEA countries’ accounting rules and the process by which the FCA deems them to be equivalent. That process does not seem to be set out clearly in the SI. I am concerned that it could take the FCA some time to assess that equivalence, and that within that time costs could be imposed on business. Sorry; I obviously did not express that point sufficiently clearly.

[John Glen]

I think the hon. Lady probably did express the point clearly, and I did not absorb it properly. The challenge is to make the distinction between third countries and public bodies.

[Anneliese Dodds]

That is another one.

[John Glen]

To be honest, I think the best thing is to write to the hon. Lady and set out my response clearly for the record, and also to make it available to the Committee.

The hon. Lady asked what we are doing in the SIs within the remit of section 8 powers on deficiency fixing, and I can say a little more about that. The 2018 Act, which gives Ministers the power to lay the SIs before the House, was debated thoroughly, and it represents the considered view of Parliament as we prepare to leave the EU. The section 8 powers were the subject of particular scrutiny and debate, and we spent approximately 12 hours in Committee debating the clause that grants them. What constitutes a deficiency in retained EU law is clearly defined in section 8 of the Act, and the Treasury is clear that the relevant SIs fall within the scope of that power. I do not think that the scrutiny that has taken place so far would have allowed us to reach this point, if that had not been the case.

On the question of whether the FCA has the resources to carry out the extra functions, we are absolutely clear that it does. It has had the additional resource of 130 full-time equivalents over the past year. Its business plan for 2019-20 will give more detail on that, but it has the discretion to raise more from a levy should that be needed. I accept that £16 million has been diverted to Brexit-related SIs, but I contend that that work is wholly necessary to prepare for the unwelcome outcome of a no-deal scenario without an implementation period.

The hon. Lady asked for an explanation regarding the FCA’s sub-delegation powers to legislate. Regulation 72 provides the FCA with the powers to make technical standards for the purposes specified in part 3 of schedule 2 to the SI. Currently, the European Securities and Markets Authority exercises those powers. As the powers relate to technical standards currently made by ESMA, it was considered appropriate to delegate them to the FCA rather than to the Treasury. Again, that is consistent with the financial services legislation domesticated under the 2018 Act.

The hon. Lady also drew attention to the in-flight files Bill. The challenge is that in a no-deal situation without an implementation period, a whole body of work is ongoing, some of which we have been very involved in, as a country within the EU, and some of which we absolutely desire to happen but will not land fully until after exit day. It would be possible to adopt the four files at the start of the in-flight files Bill, as per the terms that we discussed on Second Reading, only if we fixed the deficiencies in the language. They would essentially mark the next iteration of an evolution in the regulations on prospectus. In the same way, the general review that would cover the benchmarks we discussed this morning would have to be in the schedule of files. Those would not be the four that are nearly done, so we would have to make a judgment subsequently.

If I may, I will conclude the discussion. I will examine the record, and if there are any outstanding points, I will write to the hon. Lady and make my response available to the Committee. The Government contend that the SI is needed to ensure that the UK has an effective prospectus regime, listing regime and transparency framework. We seek to do that within the letter of the law. If the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period, we must ensure that we have made the appropriate provisions for the legislation to function. I hope that the Committee has found the sitting informative and will join me in supporting the regulations.

Question put.

Draft Benchmarks (Amendment and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 19th February 2019 General Committees

[John Glen]

I am grateful to the hon. Members for Oxford East and for Wallasey for their scrutiny of this measure, and I shall endeavour to answer the points made.

On the general opening remarks of the hon. Member for Oxford East, all I can say to her is that the Government are not taking any powers beyond those that exist within the withdrawal Act. To the points made by the hon. Member for Wallasey, I say that there has been an attempt at every juncture to be thorough in the way that we have examined the optimal way to transition and onshore these powers, that we have engaged with industry and the regulator, and that we have done that with their consent and allowed scrutiny through that process, even in a condensed period.

I will now address the four points that the hon. Member for Oxford East raised. The first one was around the issue of the relationship with the in-flight files and the fact that there are ongoing challenges to this regulation, which is in the process, essentially, of being fully adopted.

There is a European supervisory authorities review file in the in-flight files Bill, but that is separate and additional to this onshoring process; the regulation is in force already, but it is in a transitional phase. Many requirements in the regulation already apply. It is simply the case that some benchmark administrators are not required to apply for authorisation until 2020. However, on the broader issue, if subsequently the ESA file that is in-flight then makes an EU-wide update, then—in a no-deal scenario—we would have to make that decision at a future point.

The second point that the hon. Lady raised was about deemed equivalence of the EU27. I responded to the hon. Member for Wallasey earlier with respect to the publicly available machine-to-machine software, to ensure that at the point of a no-deal moment—not what the Government expect—at the end of March, we would be completely up to date with decisions made across national competent authorities across the EU at that point.

The hon. Member for Oxford East referred in her remarks to a transition period. Well, we would not have that transition period in a no-deal situation, so it would not apply. I sense that she wants to intervene and I am very happy to give way.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I appreciate the Minister’s sincerity in trying to respond to my comments, and I apologise: I do not think I expressed myself clearly. I was referring to the fact that there could be a divergence between the benchmarks still approved in the UK during the 24-month period—I probably used the wrong language to describe that—and what applies in the EU27, because this regulation says that a benchmark can be retained in the UK even if it is not in the EU27, if the FCA considers that taking it off would not be compatible with its strategic objective and so on.

[John Glen]

On the maintenance of benchmarks if they have been dropped from the ESMA register, I was going on to say that this SI enables the FCA to exercise judgment. It does not have to follow ESMA decisions. The FCA objectives are in place to protect UK markets and consumers. In a no-deal situation, that is a function that the FCA would have to take on.

I have set out the transition mechanism for decisions that have already been made, but in a no-deal situation we would absolutely face a very challenging environment. I am sympathetic to the comments of the hon. Member for Wallasey about the resourcing of the FCA in that situation; it would be significant. In this corpus of 53 SIs, I am concerned about making the transition process clear. There would be a lot of legislation to pass and work to be done in a no-deal situation subsequent to this process.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I know that the Minister and his officials are doing the best they possibly can in the extremely difficult situation that they should not have been put in, but I want to press him on this. These regulations are described as putting into practice the EU benchmark regulation; they are not described as dealing with any eventualities that could come out of no deal. In that situation, surely if we are just following the EU benchmark regulation, we should use the criteria that ESMA uses on benchmarks, not other criteria for the FCA’s objectives. That falls outside the scope of these regulations.

[John Glen]

I think, with the greatest respect, that the hon. Lady is getting two things muddled up. At this point, we are onshoring what already exists. We have a 24-month transition period during which, in a no-deal situation, there would be considerable engagement with industry and regulators about how we would adopt the criteria as a national body independent of the European supervisory authorities. If we were in that situation, we would clearly need to develop a new framework altogether for regulation. How we would harmonise with other bodies outside the UK would depend on the basis of that no deal. If the hon. Lady is asking me whether I am setting out in this SI a comprehensive regime for an independent verification of benchmarks over the next two years in a no-deal situation, I should say that no, I am not.

[Ms Eagle]

It is difficult to think of scenarios that we hope will not happen. We all hope that at some stage sense will break out and there will be time to do this disentangling. Will the Minister reassure me that if there is no deal, the regime that these changes will put in place will be in place the day after no deal, and that there will not be large numbers of loopholes through which very rapid trading, which can be instantaneous, can occur, leading to huge profiteering?

[Anneliese Dodds]

rose—

[John Glen]

I am happy to give way to the hon. Lady.

[Anneliese Dodds]

The Minister is being enormously generous in giving way. I appreciate his comments, but I would like this put on the record. What I take from his remarks is that these regulations are hybrid. They are not just about onshoring the existing regime, because if they were they would not include the reference to the FCA deciding on these matters because of its strategic objectives. Rather, they are partially about the creation of a new regime. As such, they depart from what is allegedly the template for these regulations.

[John Glen]

I am grateful for both points. I will first respond to the hon. Member for Wallasey. I assure her that the regulation will onshore and will not create any cliff-edge risks around the loopholes that she refers to. We have worked very closely with the FCA, which provides the technical expertise. I will address her point about the resourcing of the FCA in a moment.

For the record, I do not accept the characterisation of hon. Member for Oxford East of the regulations as hybrid. In a no-deal situation, there would need to be a lot of extra work to create a new permanent regime. In terms of the divergence between the UK and the EU27, the FCA will not necessarily know why a benchmark has been removed from the ESMA register after exit. It is therefore prudent to give the FCA the discretion to make its own assessment so it is able to protect UK markets and consumers. In a no-deal situation, we would be in a world very different from the one we are used to and we take the view that the provision fixes a deficiency caused by our withdrawal.

The hon. Member for Wallasey raised the importance of the benchmarks being regulated, and I absolutely agree. The SI will ensure that the regulatory regime in the UK will operate effectively in a no-deal scenario. I reassure her that the SIs in the programme have passed through the usual quality control procedures and we have engaged extensively with the FCA in drafting them.

Based on my earlier comments about the additional full-time equivalents that the FCA has had this year in preparing effectively to manage the programme, I am confident that it has adequate resources. Regarding the future pressure, the FCA is not funded by the Government but by a levy on industry, so it will be up to the authority to bring that forward in its plan, which it will do shortly for 2019-20.

I note the observations about the familiarisation costs and the mechanism to calculate them. To be clear, the SI has been assessed to result in an estimated one-off familiarisation cost of £8,300, which, shared between the 16 UK benchmark administrators authorised under the regulations, is £518 each.

Exiting the European Union (Financial Services)

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Monday 18th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

First, may I associate myself with the heartfelt tributes that have been paid to my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), and I express my sympathies to his family?

We are here to discuss two no-deal statutory instruments appertaining to financial services. Members will be aware that the Conservative Government refused to allow a debate on the Floor of the House about arguably the most significant such SI—the one concerning the markets in financial instruments directive, which was sufficiently complex to require a Keeling schedule. The Government did agree to a recent debate on an SI concerning securitisation, but of course that was not a no-deal SI, and the debate only happened when the Opposition prayed against the SI. Members may be forgiven for scratching their heads about why the Conservative Government have adopted such a different tactic this time; I am sure Members can come to their own conclusions on why this debate is taking place on the Floor of the House today.

These statutory instruments make provision for a regulatory framework after Brexit in the event that we crash out without a deal. The volume of such legislation is deeply concerning for accountability and proper scrutiny. The Government have assured the Opposition that no policy decisions are being taken as part of the no-deal process. However, establishing a new regulatory framework inevitably involves matters of judgment and raises questions about resourcing and capacity. Secondary legislation ought to be used only for technical, non-partisan and non-controversial changes, because of the limited accountability it normally allows; instead, the Government continue to push through far-reaching financial legislation via this vehicle.

As legislators, we have to get this right. The regulations could represent real and substantive changes to the statute book, and as such, they need proper and in-depth scrutiny. I am slightly surprised to see some Government Members shaking their heads at the idea that we need appropriate scrutiny. It is incredibly important, and in the light of that, the Opposition would like to put on record our deepest concerns that the process regarding regulations in the event of no deal is not as accessible and transparent as it should be.

The rationale for these SIs is preparation for a no-deal Brexit—something that continues to be retained on the table by the Conservative Government despite clear evidence of the harm that that is doing to our economy. Last week in this Chamber, I mentioned the concerning slowdown in growth rates and the shift into recession of our manufacturing sector. The financial sector has not been immune; quite the opposite. As many Members will know, Ernst and Young has created what it calls a Brexit tracker, which monitors the public statements of more than 200 of the biggest financial services companies operating in the UK. As of January this year, the tracker showed that more than a third of the financial services companies that were tracked indicated that they are considering moving or have confirmed that they will move some of their staff or operations outside the UK. As we consider these two financial services SIs, we must reflect on why the current Government continue to retain the so-called option of no deal, especially given that the House has emphatically shown its opposition to such an outcome.

The first SI appears to cobble together three sets of legislative changes to a variety of parent legislation. The Minister, as he always does, made a valiant attempt to present a coherent case, but we are talking about three different sets of changes. As with other SIs that the Opposition have contested, the parent legislation includes primary legislation, not least, as the Minister acknowledged, FSMA. Yet again, we see here the operation of Henry VIII powers.

In connection with that, I note that as of last Thursday, 288 changes have been made to FSMA as part of the preparation for no deal. That is an enormous number of changes to primary legislation, and it has been delivered in a completely piecemeal manner. We have no indication of when Government will present us with a finalised and integrated version of the new no-deal legislation, coupled with the primary legislation that it amends. Perhaps the Minister, in his concluding remarks, can tell us whether his Department has such an overview and, if so, whether it would be willing to share it with the House and the public so that we can better understand what the financial services regulatory system would look like in the event of no deal.

The explanatory notes for the regulations were truly a masterpiece of the kind we have come to know well from no-deal SIs. I note that Her Majesty’s Treasury uses the crystal mark on some of its documents. I am sorry to speak so bluntly, but HMT would perhaps have done well to use the crystal mark’s drivel detector—its words, not mine—on the explanatory notes. All they did was to list the bits of legislation that were being changed. In no case did they explain why, aside from maintaining that doing so was necessary to address deficiencies. Yet again, we find questionable decisions being taken with no explanation.

Not all the changes in the regulations appear even to relate to the EU. For example, there are changes relating to disclosure requirements and to the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers—in regulation 2—but there is no indication why those changes have been made. Again, definitions are changed, such as that for short selling regulation information, but it is not clear whether that definition will be replaced elsewhere or, indeed, why it had to change in the first place.

Perhaps most worryingly, we see yet again a shift away from EU requirements, which suggests that these measures are potentially going beyond direct transposition and instead diluting existing provisions. For example, the wording of one article of the EU regulation on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps—sorry, that is not a lovely name to pronounce—is amended from “shall, where possible” to “may”. From my reading, the amended provisions relate to the obligation to liaise with third countries concerning the identification of where shares are traded, but it is not clear why that obligation should be watered down. There is a similar change to the 2014 market abuse regulation, where “shall, where necessary” is altered to “may”. It appears that the UK’s co-ordination with non-EU countries and its relations with the EU27 are being altered through these measures. The withdrawal Act does not provide the authority to do that.

The Minister appeared to suggest that this was to do with the exchange of confidential information and that we needed to have a different process. Surely, however, there are different ways of responding to the issue; there could have been measures in this legislation to deal with the problems and to ensure that information was appropriately guarded against anybody who might use it in an inappropriate way. However, we do not have that; instead, we have these provisions, with no explanation why.

Relatedly, there is no clear indication of the process to be used to determine which countries might be chosen for the conclusion of disclosure agreements mentioned by the Minister, or of the process required for those agreements. I absolutely agree with the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman). Obviously, she was referring to the overall import of these regulations, but there are other ambiguities about timing. When it comes to the conclusion of disclosure agreements, does the process have to be completed by exit day? If it does, has that process started? If it has started, on whose authority has it started? Presumably, it is not the authority of this House. In addition, it would be helpful to understand why the Government have decided to follow a bilateral approach, rather than one that might have been integrated, with an integrated disclosure agreement that could have been signed with the European Securities and Markets Authority.

Finally, we are again informed that an impact assessment has not been conducted on this instrument, even though the explanatory memorandum states that there has been engagement with relevant stakeholders concerning the SI. It would be helpful if the Minister provided further details about that engagement.

Let me move now to the Money Market Funds (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019—I will just talk about MMFs from now on. Obviously, the regulations are intended to implement the EU’s MMF regulation of 2018. As described by the Minister, that regulation was intended to make money market funds more resilient against disturbances in the financial markets, reduce the risks of runs in the markets, limit cross-border contagion and improve investor protection. That regulation immediately applied to new MMFs, from July of last year, but it came into practice for existing MMFs very recently—just last month. I will not go into all the details of the use of MMFs, but I would just add charities to the list the Minister talked about—there are a number of different bodies that use these funds.

The process of creating the regulation was led by a UK Labour MEP in the European Parliament, Neena Gill. As many Members may be aware, the process was controversial; it was not entirely straightforward, and there was huge debate about whether the UK should exactly follow the US approach or not. There was a lot of scepticism about whether the system of MMFs, in and of itself, should be encouraged. Many have described it as a system of shadow banking, because of its relative lack of transparency.

As with other SIs tabled by the Government, there are a number of problems with this legislation. First, it provides a new definition of money market funds that is arguably circular. It describes them as

“instruments normally dealt in on the money market which…satisfy…Article 2a(1)”

of the regulation. That is quite a different approach from the one taken by the EU, even back in the days of the Committee of European Securities Regulators. Before ESMA was created, there was an inclusive list of activities that would lead to classification as an MMF. A different approach is taken here.

Secondly, again as with other pieces of no-deal financial services legislation, there is no indication why and how the FCA, in particular, is meant to adopt the regulatory approach suggested in this SI. Regulation 6 provides it with the power to regulate MMFs, but without explaining how that will impact on its existing activities. The Minister intimated the different kinds of activities that the FCA will have to take on as part of this process, but they are very onerous. Just in relation to reporting templates, ESMA produced a 135-page report after consultation with stakeholders about what should go into those templates. I assume that similar levels of detail might be required for the FCA. This will not be a light-touch area to move into. Again, there is a lack of clarity about the extent of industry consultation on this SI.

As has often been the case with these SIs, we have had some rather strange throwaway comments in relation to this SI. The guidance accompanying it states that it does not include provisions that may be necessary to ensure Gibraltarian financial services firms can have continued access to UK markets in line with the UK Government’s statement in March 2018 and other provisions dealing with Gibraltar more generally. It also says that, where necessary, provisions covering Gibraltar will be included in future SIs. Does that mean that provisions for Gibraltar should have been covered but that there just was not time to consider them properly, or is there a procedural reason why they are not covered here? Again, will we need an omnibus SI at some point covering regulatory arrangements for Gibraltarian financial services?

[John Glen]

indicated assent.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am really pleased to see the Minister nodding, and I look forward to his explanation of why this has been an issue.

Above all, we see secondary legislation being used expansively here, with no overall indication of how it will interact with other pieces of secondary legislation and, indeed, primary legislation. There appears to be no rhyme or reason why the Conservative Government wish certain SIs to be taken on the Floor of the House and others to be taken in Committee—aside, that is, from a desire to fill the timetable for this week, after their mismanagement of the Brexit process. Issues of such importance as our nation’s financial stability and resilience surely deserve better than this.

Securitisation Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Wednesday 13th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Anneliese Dodds]

If I may, I will start my remarks with a brief observation. Far too often in this House, I have heard hon. Members suggest that the financial crisis was somehow the result of the then Government’s policies. I am very pleased to have heard the opposite from the Minister today. In fact, it was the correct interpretation of what precipitated the global financial crisis, which did indeed, as he intimated, begin with the sub-prime mortgage collapses in the United States and then spread through the financial system, particularly through the use of complex financial instruments.

[John Glen]

rose—

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am very happy for the Minister to agree with what I am saying.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I am very happy to draw the hon. Lady’s attention to the fact that the default rate for triple A rated bonds in the EU was 0.6%, while in the US it was 16%. The key point that the Conservatives have always wished to stress is that the spending profile from 2002 and 2007 massively compounded the difficulties we found ourselves in.

[Anneliese Dodds]

The Minister—[Interruption.]

Draft Collective Investment Schemes (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 Draft Long-term Investment Funds (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Wednesday 30th January 2019 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve on the Committee with you in the Chair, Mr Bailey. I am very grateful to the Minister for his explanatory remarks. Once again, I sit opposite him to discuss a statutory instrument that would make provisions for a regulatory framework after Brexit in the event that we crash out without a deal, which I hope is less likely following the House’s decision last night. On each previous occasion, my Labour Front-Bench colleagues and I spelled out our objections to the Government’s approach to secondary legislation.

The volume and flow of secondary legislation on our exiting the EU is deeply concerning for accountability and proper scrutiny. The Government have assured the Opposition that no policy decisions are being taken, but establishing a regulatory framework inevitably involves matters of judgment and raises questions about resourcing and capacity. Secondary legislation ought to be used for technical, nonpartisan and uncontroversial changes, because it allows limited accountability. Instead, the Government continue to push through contentious legislation with high policy content by using this vehicle. As legislators, we have to get this right. These regulations could represent real and substantive changes to the statute book, so they need proper, in-depth scrutiny. In this light, the Opposition want to put on record our deepest concerns that the process regarding these regulations is not as successful and transparent as it should be.

The Minister spelled out the fact that the first SI relates to the 2009 UCITS directive, which sets out a common set of standards for investor protection for regulated investment funds that can be sold to retail investors in the EU. The directive established a passporting system to enable UCITS to be marketed and sold to the general public throughout the EU, and to enable UCITS management companies to manage UCITS that are located in other member states. The directive was transposed into UK law through domestic legislation and FCA rules. Many would say that the directive has been successful: it has facilitated far greater choice for investors, and I understand that there are now more than 10,000 funds available to UK investors as a result of the directive. Almost three quarters of those are passported in from the EU27 under the UCITS directive. A large number of non-UK UCITS funds are managed by UK businesses under the directive—by asset value, it is £1.8 trillion-worth out of the £9 trillion industry across Europe. Some £375 billion-worth of that is held by UK investors.

I should express my gratitude to the industry for providing me with those figures. It has indicated that in the event of a no-deal Brexit, UCITS funds from the EU27 could not be marketed to UK investors in a straightforward manner. Furthermore, it would not be easy to list UCITS exchange-traded funds on the London Stock Exchange. Given that this SI largely preserves the status quo on the availability of UCITS funds and exchange-traded funds—albeit temporarily—there is support in the industry for the intention behind it, because there would undoubtedly be problems under a no-deal Brexit.

None the less, the Minister needs to answer some questions on this SI. It is essential that we properly understand its impact—not least because, in common with so many others that we have considered in Committee, it uses secondary legislation to amend primary legislation, which is of course the definition of Henry VIII powers. In addition, the FCA and others have raised considerable concerns about unregulated collective investment schemes, or UCIS. Many of us have heard horror stories about these, with examples that have badly let down their investors or even operated as Ponzi schemes. In the circumstances it is essential that regulations are sufficiently encompassing and do not lead to unsophisticated investors being presented with overly risky products. At the same time, the asset management industry, particularly people who are involved with investment in UCITS, is an important part of the financial services industry. Given that the industry supports one in 10 jobs in our country, it is a matter of regret that our Government have failed to prioritise seeking a better deal for financial services as part of their negotiations, and that the quest for passporting rights was quickly dropped in favour of some form of equivalence. Of course, whether to agree that will be entirely in the European Commission’s gift.

That has already led to economic activity in this area shifting out of our country. Companies from Hermes Investment Management to Legg Mason, Janus Henderson Investors, Jupiter Asset Management and Polar Capital all appear to have created additional positions, functions or operations in the EU27 rather than the UK because of the need to secure service continuity for current and future investors. As I understand it, the issue of delegation, which is essential in this area, is still not fully resolved. It remains unclear on what basis UK companies will be able to manage investments for fund companies based in the EU27. I hope that the Minister updates us on when he expects the Commission to give ESMA the green light to enable concrete discussions to take place on that score.

My second question relates to the legal basis for the draft regulations. They are said to be made under both the European Communities Act 1972 and the EU (Withdrawal) Act. Surely it is rather peculiar to have those two parent Acts, given that one is about giving effect to EU law whereas the other is about inherited EU law. Perhaps the Minister can explain why those Acts form the basis for the draft regulations.

Thirdly, we have been provided with an impact assessment for the draft regulations, albeit we received it just this morning. Clearly that is better than nothing, but it gave us limited time to acquaint ourselves with the impact assessment.

[John Glen]

Ten past 10.

[Anneliese Dodds]

Thank you. That impact assessment suggests there will be a need to charge inbound EEA passporting firms as third-country firms, but that to

“reduce the impact of leaving the EU on funds, the government has committed to reviewing Section 272,”

which governs this process. It adds:

“This will be done through a future legislative vehicle.”

It would be helpful if the Minister provided us with some details about that. Does he envisage that happening at the end of the three-year temporary permissions regime or at some other point? It would, of course, require legislative change.

I turn to the draft Long-term Investment Funds (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations. I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the basis for that instrument. As he explained, the EU regulation has been used far less than many would have hoped, given that it was intended to encourage long-term investment.

There are two issues with the SI. The first concerns empowerment of the FCA. My colleagues and I have frequently referred to the fact that the process of legislating for no deal has in many cases provided the FCA with unprecedented powers, potentially overshooting what is required to transpose the EU acquis. Indeed, colleagues will not have missed the conclusions by City A.M. following the recent Treasury Committee hearing on this subject; it stated that the process involves regulators being given “‘unprecedented’ powers”—its words, not mine. However, in this case, we seem to have undershooting, specifically in relation to the FCA’s powers to create a register of ELTIFs.

ESMA, the EU-level regulator, does not merely have the ability to create a register of ELTIFs; it is under a duty to do so. However, the draft regulations only empower the FCA to keep such a register; they do not require it to do so. There is a direct contradiction between regulations. Article 3 of the 2015 EU regulation on ELTIFs states:

“ESMA shall keep a central public register”.

The draft regulations do not just substitute “FCA” for “ESMA”; they give the FCA a power, rather than a duty, to keep a register. Regulation 6 states:

“The FCA may keep a central public register”.

I note the use of the word “may”, not “must” or “shall”. The Minister needs to explain that discrepancy before the Committee can accept this SI.

There seems to be a drafting mistake. The draft regulations seem to empower the FCA to designate ELTIFs as such across the EU, rather than empowering it to recognise them as such within the UK for the purposes of then recognising them as the new category of LTIFs. To try to explain this horrendously complicated area, I am going to differentiate my pronunciation of ELTIFs—European LTIFs—and LTIFs, the new category the Government suggest they are creating. This point is very difficult to explain without having the relevant pieces of legislation in front of us. The Minister will remember the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) in a previous Committee.

[John Glen]

I do recall. On that specific point, I checked with my officials, as I said I would. Their understanding was that that was not common practice. So I am doing all that is expected, based on the practice of Ministers in this position.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification, if that is the case. However, even if it were not the case previously, there is a prima facie argument that it would be useful for Committees of this type to be able to see in the committee room the previous regulation and be able to compare it with what is being suggested. Otherwise, it is extremely hard for us to understand exactly what is being proposed in some of the very complex changes that are being implemented.

That difficulty had its apogee with the MiFID—markets in financial instruments directive—transposition regulation. I will not go into all the details; I have discussed the matter with the Minister many times. The Opposition had hoped to debate that subject on the Floor of the House because it was recognised in that case that a Keeling schedule was necessary, effectively to track changes. It would be helpful for Members in all such Committees to be able to see the direct impact of changes from this no-deal legislation. Otherwise, it is very difficult to understand.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

Once again, I will begin by thanking the hon. Members for Oxford East and for Aberdeen North for their thorough examination of the statutory instruments; I will do my very best to answer in detail the points that they have made, and where I cannot, I shall write to them as soon as I possibly can.

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North discussed impact assessments. We now have an impact assessment, which was circulated, as she acknowledged, at 10 past 10 this morning and covers all the statutory instruments that will be laid until 11 February. There has been a desire on my part and that of my officials to meet the necessarily exacting standards of the RPC. As I say, that is my responsibility, but I would point out that this is an unprecedented process, doing 53 SIs for financial services, 45 of which have now been laid, and working on each one individually. I hope the existence of the impact assessments up to 11 February—obviously there will be some more after that—will give her some comfort, but the points that she made have been heard.

I will come on to the other points that the hon. Lady made, but I will now turn to the issues raised by the hon. Member for Oxford East. She made some initial observations with respect to the volume, flow and appropriateness of the SI mechanism that I may have heard before, but I acknowledge her sincerity and take them in the spirit in which they are intended. We are acting within the terms of the withdrawal Act, and I have never sought to pretend that this process is optimal, but it is a practical measure to give business continuity and give the industry the answers they are concerned about.

I also recognise that the degree of uncertainty is not helpful, but I draw the attention of the hon. Lady and the Committee to the remarks of Sam Woods, deputy governor of the Bank of England, who said in April last year that we would have 5,000 to 10,000 jobs moved by day one, which is between 0.5% and 1% of financial services jobs in the UK. There is an enormous resilience in the financial services sector, and this process is about ensuring that there is minimal disruption in the event of no deal.

Moving on to the specific points made by the hon. Lady, she said that in a no-deal scenario, EU UCITS could not be marketed in a straightforward manner in the UK. The temporary marketing permissions regime is intended to prevent the market disruption that would result from a sudden end to passporting rights. The regime ensures that the business model of EEA fund operators marketing into the UK can continue for a temporary period while we transfer to the UK-only regime. That includes the new sub-funds, and reflects our intention to allow EEA firms and funds to continue their business operations for a temporary period.

If we did not allow new sub-funds to enter the temporary permissions regime after exit day, there would be a significant risk to the role of the London Stock Exchange as a global hub for exchange-traded products. Therefore, including sub-funds in the temporary marketing permissions regime reduces the risk to the London Stock Exchange and ensures continued access for UK customers to new EEA funds in future. That was a direct change from laying this SI in November and December; we laid it again on 6 December in response to feedback from the markets. There is an iterative process, hence the time constraint that puts pressure on the impact assessment.

The hon. Lady raised the issue of assurances on ESMA and on portfolio delegation. I refer to the comments of the chair of ESMA, who said on 3 October that in the case of a no-deal Brexit, EU regulators and ESMA

“should have in place with our UK counterparts the type of MOUs that we have with a large number of third country regulators…ESMA has coordinated the preparations for such MOUs together with the EU27 NCAs.”

More recently, the Luxembourg regulator stated that the

“delegation of investment management, portfolio management and, or risk management to UK undertakings shall continue to be possible without any disruption post-Brexit”.

I wish it could be more transparent and sooner, but I am convinced and assured that that work is going on and that it will be completed in time.

The hon. Member for Oxford East raised the issue of why the FCA was not required to keep a register of LTIFs and the issue of the power not the duty. The power to keep the register is being transferred to the FCA. As there are currently no LTIFs set up in the UK, there is no register of those funds online. The FCA keeps a register of small UK AIFMs that manage similar funds, European venture capital funds and European social entrepreneurship funds.

The best thing is for me to obtain some assurance from the FCA about its plans, which are, in reality, at a relatively early stage because we are simply trying to transition over at this point. The detail of its ongoing regime and responsibilities will be a matter for it to convey in due course.

[Anneliese Dodds]

We have been told throughout the process that there will be no watering down of regulations under the withdrawal Act. I appreciate that this is an abstract case, because we do not yet have a category of investments operating in the UK that would fall into that designation, but that is not to say that one will not be created in future. If we do not have that requirement, there would surely be that resiling. Will the Minister endeavour to talk to the FCA to make sure that, if such investments start to operate in the UK, it will keep a register of them? Surely that is what the EU legislation requires.

[John Glen]

From my point of view at this point, it seems reasonable not to suggest that there will be a register for something that does not yet exist, but the hon. Lady’s point is perfectly reasonable. I will write to the FCA following what she has said.

[John Glen]

I am sympathetic to what the hon. Lady says, but she has to understand that the regulator is the regulator, and it will have reasons in terms of the market actors around that. My view is that it would be entirely appropriate for the regulator to have that register, and I would expect to see clear market-driven reasons for why it would not be necessary. Again, it would not be responsible for me to make a commitment without knowing all the background factors, but I will write to the regulator to express the Committee’s concerns and ask what its approach would be in the circumstances where those funds existed in the United Kingdom.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for what he has said, but the regulator is required to carry out what this House requires it to do. If we are talking about ESMA, it is meant to carry out what it has been required to do by EU-level policy makers. That EU legislation requires that the register shall be kept, so we need something more emphatic if we are to stick to the existing distribution of responsibilities.

[John Glen]

It is an interesting debating point. Had the hon. Lady seen the report of my appearance yesterday before the Treasury Committee with the chief executive of the FCA and the deputy governor of the Bank of England, she would know that we work collaboratively with the industry to do what is right. The intention of this process is not to deregulate in any way—there is no attempt by the Treasury to create some wriggle room to remove the obligation of the FCA. I understand the hon. Lady’s point, and I expect there to be continuity between the current and future regimes on the FCA’s reporting requirements. I will seek clarification on that point.

Draft Over the Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (Amendment, Etc., and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 22nd January 2019 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds]

The Minister is being generous with his time and none of us doubts his commitment to ensuring that the process works properly, but will he enlighten us as to the blockages that are preventing that? Is it a matter of resources or policy issues that have to be dealt with? It would be helpful for us to understand, because although it is wonderful to hear he is trying so hard to get it sorted out, the Committee needs more.

[John Glen]

I am happy to give clarification. Essentially the process of gaining approval for the impact assessment demands that we share certain information and provide it in an adequate form. Because of the unusual nature of the process and the volume of material, it is difficult to line up. As I said to the hon. Lady in the last Committee in which we served opposite each other, we submitted a group of SIs together, and are working as hard as we can to resolve that.

As Miles Celic, the chief executive of TheCityUK, said in a letter in November, these are exceptional circumstances, which require a unique response. We are doing everything to reach that, but I would not want the process to be truncated. We have not yet had an impact assessment that does not give us a green rating, and I want to make sure that that is how things will end up. However, I fully accept that the situation is not an optimal one. I take on board the observations of all three hon. Ladies, and all that I can say is that I am doing everything I can. I understand that that is inadequate in itself, and wish I could give a date, but it is not possible.

Draft Alternative Investment Fund Managers (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 Draft Venture Capital Funds (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 Draft Social Entrepreneurship Funds (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Wednesday 9th January 2019 General Committees

[John Glen]

Let me just finish with the points made by the hon. Member for Oxford East and then I will come to my hon. Friend’s points.

On the point about regulations on UCITS, I think the hon. Member for Oxford East was asking whether removing the AIF-related reporting requirements for the EEA UCITS, despite their being defined as alternative investment funds, will reduce transparency, in essence. It will not. This instrument carves out reporting requirements on alternative investment funds for funds that obtain recognised status from the FCA, to be sold as UK retail investments. As a result of that recognition process, the FCA will already receive all the information necessary for the effective supervision of the funds.

I want to come to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay. He kindly offered me the device of writing to him by letter, but in essence he set out a series of concerns, which he raised previously in a similar Committee in October, about the distinctions between the investment trust and the unit trust, and the application of key information documents and how they can be misleading. He drew my attention again to the concerns of the different industry bodies. For the edification of the Committee, I wrote to him, as he pointed out on 26 October. In Q1 2019, the FCA will publish its feedback.

My hon. Friend’s point about the obligation of the Government versus the regulator is very fair. I will reflect on his comments and have a regular dialogue. I met the chairman of the FCA this week. I have regular conversations and meetings with the chief executive, and I will make those points to him. That has to be set within the context that I am not licensed by this process to innovate, although I recognise that we must also accept that over the last 10 years we have reached a level of authority and reputation, when it comes to regulatory breadth and depth of oversight, that is commonly welcomed.

My hon. Friend has quite reasonably drawn attention to the lack of familiarity in the EU framework with some of the instruments in some jurisdictions outside the UK, which means that the appropriateness of those conclusions has sometimes been contested. I very much understand the issue.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; he is being very generous overall. Might I gently suggest that, as a Committee, we surely need to know whether the Government raised these kinds of issues at any point in their capacity in the Council, in their relations with MEPs in the Parliament or in their relationship with the Commission?

Of course, as the Minister mentioned, this is a separate process that the Government are undertaking. The UK has frequently drawn attention to the specificities of the British financial sector during the creation of many of these regulations; I experienced that regularly as a Member of the European Parliament. I am not clear whether the British Government made any entreaties about how the KIDs were set up and whether they appropriately covered investment trusts, but surely that would have been the stage. If we start to say that they should be changed at this stage, without having made those entreaties, I think that would raise eyebrows—to put it mildly.

[John Glen]

I respect the deep—deeper than my own—personal experience of both hon. Members who have spoken about that matter. In terms of the previous engagement of the British Government through their representations as the documents were constructed, I cannot account for that now, but I am happy to write to the hon. Lady about it.

The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay is making is that, in the future, when we leave the EU, we will have to take account of the combination of responsibilities to broadly align with common expectations in like-minded investment communities and to attend to real challenges that lead to perverse investment decisions and outcomes for investors, which my hon. Friend is very familiar with.

I hope that has covered the points raised. If there are other points that I have not answered, I will be happy to write to hon. Members.

Draft Money Laundering and Transfer of Funds (Information) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 8th January 2019 General Committees

[John Glen]

It is a pleasure to respond to the hon. Members for Oxford East and for Aberdeen North, who raised a series of thoughtful questions. I have to say at the outset that the draft regulations are about creating the functioning regime that we will need in a no-deal situation. A whole range of points that were raised were discussed during the passage of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, but I will seek to respond to them.

The hon. Member for Oxford East raised concerns about the EU’s high-risk third country list. I can confirm that we will use the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act to update the high-risk register. We will use the affirmative procedure, which will enable Parliament to vote on any changes. International standards will be considered as part of any updates.

The hon. Lady also raised the Financial Action Task Force and its recommendations, and I will come on to some of those around the resourcing of the FIU. However, it is important for the Committee to understand that the comprehensive review of the UK regime that took place last year, which is done on a 10-year basis, judged the UK to be in the best state of all 60 countries that have been evaluated. However, I acknowledge that there are pieces of work that need to be undertaken to improve it.

There has been an 80% reduction in Scottish limited partnerships.[Official Report, 17 January 2019; Vol. 652, c. 9MC.] The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, which leads on this area, published a report in December that set out a series of elements, including tighter regulation, the need for a firmer connection to the UK, increased transparency of information and giving the registrar the power to strike off dormant partnerships. I accept that there is work to be done, but progress is being made.

The hon. Members for Oxford East and for Aberdeen North raised the issue of co-operation with the EU. Paragraph 84 of the political declaration explicitly sets out that the UK and the EU should co-operate on anti-money laundering. I am not able to give chapter and verse on specific mechanisms, but it is important to remind the Committee that the UK is known as a world leader in setting the agenda in this area and it is inconceivable that the Government would not wish to continue to take a lead in driving forward these standards.

Obviously in a no-deal scenario, work would have to take place to establish how the FCA’s relationship with the EU would work, in the context of a thorough and holistic piece of legislation on financial services. The Treasury, working across Government with the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, takes its responsibilities in this area very seriously. I gave evidence to the Treasury Committee’s inquiry on economic crime and we look forward to its report, which will guide us and to which we will respond.

The Home Office leads on the resourcing of the FIU and the SARs reform work, so I am not able to give a detailed answer, but shall write to the hon. Member for Oxford East.

[Anneliese Dodds]

Would the Minister mind also writing to me to indicate when the Government will release their response to the consultation on creating an offence of failure to prevent economic crime?

[John Glen]

I would be happy to respond on that matter as well.

A point that often comes up in these discussions is the resourcing of the FCA. I acknowledge the great work that it has done over the last 18 months in helping the Government to prepare these SIs. It is funded by an industry levy and has set out in its business plan the resources involved in working towards exit. The Government are confident that the FCA has made adequate preparations ahead of leaving. If additional resources are needed in the event of no deal, it would be able to raise those funds very quickly, but we would all be in a situation where we would have to do things that we had not anticipated. This programme of SIs is about getting to the basic starting point that allows us to have confidence in the regulatory regime, but I do not deny that a considerable amount of work would need to take place.

On maintenance of standards and equivalence with the EU on anti-money laundering, the hon. Member for Oxford East discussed the use of the word “may” versus “must”. I want to clarify that what we have removed is the obligation to report in a specific way, as per the legislation. It is not our intention to remove ourselves from either the spirit or substance of that obligation; it is just that it would be inappropriate to leave a legal obligation to an entity when we are a third party. That is the only way that I can describe it.

To expand further on future co-operation, through the bilateral agreement with the EU, we expect to have an expansive relationship that would have a wide scope of cross-border activity. The changes in the SIs do not preclude deep co-operation between UK and EU regulators in the future. It is desirable to have that co-operation.

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North raised the burden on banks’ IT systems. When one makes a transfer between one bank and another, if it is in an unfamiliar, non-mainstream destination in Africa—I will not name an individual country for fear of getting a letter from its ambassador—some checks would be done, because the bank would then obviously receive those funds. A check would be done on that, but because that sort of transaction is inherently risky, the same degree of checking will need to take place—and does take place in practice in the banking industry—with countries in the EU that are more familiar to us. Broadly, there is harmony on that matter anyway.

I mentioned the SARs reform, which the Home Office leads on. We anticipate that new IT will provide a more user-friendly portal for reporters from all sectors and that improved data processing, storage, analytics and distribution will be required. Work is being done across the Treasury, the Home Office and the MOJ to look at how we can refine that.[Official Report, 17 January 2019; Vol. 652, c. 10MC.] At the moment, the basic problem is that there is a high volume of SARs and we could better interrogate that data pool.

The hon. Member for Oxford East mentioned the concerns raised by the Thames Valley police and crime commissioner. He has also raised them with me and I will get in touch with him about them. Obviously, we do not rest on our laurels with respect to the FATF evaluation. I have mentioned the concerns that the Government have acknowledged in terms of the FIU, and the improvements to SARs and to the Companies House register, on which we expect a Government report in Q1 or Q2 of this year.

The statutory instrument is needed to ensure that the UK’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regime operates effectively and that the legislation functions appropriately if the UK leaves without a deal. I hope that I have adequately responded to the points raised.

Draft Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Wednesday 12th December 2018 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the rationale for the measures. Of course, we have talked in previous Committees about other statutory instruments arising out of them. This is a significant problem; I understand that more than 11 million pensioners, in particular, are being targeted annually by cold callers, with fraudsters making 250 million calls a year, which is the equivalent of eight per second. That is a huge problem, and behind those figures there is a significant human impact on some vulnerable people.

As the Minister will be aware, during the Committee stage of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 the Labour party called for the FCA, rather than the ICO, to be given functions in respect of the ban on unsolicited direct marketing relating to pensions. The FCA has much stronger powers than the ICO and can strike off members who contravene the rules. We also called for an offence to be created for the use of information obtained through cold calling.

Will the Minister explain his response to those points? I have looked through the accompanying material and it is not crystal clear to me which body will be responsible for enforcing the ban, or whether the respective powers of the FCA, as against those of the ICO, have been taken into account in this determination.

I am concerned about the restricted powers of the ICO. I am sure that the Minister is aware of the views of various representative bodies. In particular, the Fair Telecoms campaign has intimated that the ICO has restricted means of ensuring compliance. I recall sitting on a previous Committee examining delegated legislation related to other parts of the Act, where we discussed transferring authority to the FCA precisely because it is a more powerful and authoritative body. It would be useful to hear more about that.

Secondly, it would have been helpful to ban the use of information derived from cold calls. That would have resulted in firms that provide financial services covered by the FCA being banned from using information gathered by introducers, thereby breaking that part of the chain. I know that that idea was not accepted by the Government, but has the Minister considered other means of dissuading such forward use of that information?

Thirdly, perhaps I have not got to grips with the relevant part of the legislation, but it is not clear to me exactly who the draft regulations will cover with respect to the telephone preference service register. The Fair Telecoms campaign maintains:

“This change in regulation will only affect the behaviour of callers who are currently checking numbers on the TPS register before making calls. For those who do not it simply adds to the cases that may be the subject of action by the ICO, rather than making any significant change.

Targets with their numbers on the TPS—the basis for many of the statistics given about the volume of calls alleged to be covered—are not affected in any way by this measure. It is understood that 80% of UK households have their number recorded on the TPS. At best, this measure can only affect the remaining 20%.”

Will the Minister clarify whether the draft regulations are focused on those not covered by the telephone preference service? If so, is it the Government’s view that the service is sufficient? It would be helpful to hear the Government’s thinking on the matter.

Fourthly, the Minister states that the draft regulations are in line with GDPR requirements, but some have suggested that their consent provisions are weaker than those in the GDPR. It would be helpful to understand where the exact language used about consent in the draft regulations has come from and why it is formally different from the language used in the GDPR.

Fifthly, as I understand it the regulations are drafted to cover only cases in which there is specific reference to

“funds held, or previously held, in an occupational pension scheme or a personal pension scheme”.

Cases in which a caller fails to make specific reference to the source of the funds that may be used for an unwise investment will therefore not be covered. Is the Department aware of that potential loophole? We can all imagine a particularly inventive and devious caller simply manipulating their sales script to comply with the letter but not the spirit of the draft regulations by talking in general terms without referring to a specific existing personal or occupational pension scheme.

Finally, may I push a little harder on the issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian? Would a response to a text message that was legal under PECR be sufficient to enable future cold calls within this regime?

[John Glen]

indicated dissent.

[Anneliese Dodds]

The Minister shakes his head, helpfully. I will take that as a no, but it would be great to get a response to my other questions.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

Fraud is fraud, and with actionable fraud the police can be contacted in such circumstances. With respect to the cold calling mechanism, I have said all I can on that. The Government are open on the basis of evidence to move forward.

The hon. Lady also raised the issue of how the Government will ensure that consumers do not accidentally give consent through ticking a box on a form. To give clarity on what GDPR sets out, it is a high standard of consent, requiring a positive opt in. Any default method, such as a pre-ticked box, does not constitute consent under GDPR, as I made clear in my opening remarks. Guidance to firms on complying with GDPR highlights that that request for consent must be prominently displayed, clear and specific, and separate from the terms and conditions.

I hope that that deals—

[Anneliese Dodds]

rose—

[John Glen]

Clearly, it does not. I am happy to give way to the hon. Lady.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, who has been generous and helpful in his responses. I have one question remaining, which might fit into the rubric of what he has said about Government being open to further tightening, if necessary. I have handed over my speaking notes, but I recall that the legislation refers specifically to occupational or other pension schemes, and how a scammer or somebody selling inappropriately could use general talk of pensions to get into that conversation, and thus creatively comply. Will the Minister’s Department look at that carefully?

[John Glen]

I am clear that this is about pensions cold calling. I understand what the hon. Lady is saying about loopholes, in the sense that that conversation could hide that intent. It would be appropriate for me to reflect on that and write to the hon. Lady and the Committee. She raises a fair point, and the last thing we want to do is leave such ambiguity out there.

To conclude, this legislation will make a real impact in tackling pensions scams, deterring pensions cold callers by making their actions illegal and signalling to consumers that legitimate companies will not cold call them about their pensions. I hope the Committee will have found the sitting informative and will join me in supporting the regulations.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Deposit Guarantee Scheme and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Monday 26th November 2018 General Committees

[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. All I can do in response to her opening remarks is reiterate my commitment as a Minister to continuing the rigorous process of examining the statutory instruments, bringing them to the Committee in a timely fashion, and being as thorough as possible in our impact assessments.

The hon. Lady raised two issues. First, she referred to the exchange between Baroness Kramer and Lord Bates in the other place on 6 November, concerning the level at which the PRA could set the compensation. The imperative from the directive has been to have a consistent level, and the UK has onshored, essentially, the €100,000. There are no plans to depart from the current level; frankly, there is a significant imperative to keep the levels aligned, regardless of what happens, but that will be a matter for the PRA.

[Anneliese Dodds]

Would that mean that the five-year period could be altered if there were a severe need for a change due to a fluctuating exchange rate?

[John Glen]

In a scenario of unforeseen volatility, there would be an opportunity for the Treasury to ask the PRA to examine that, or vice versa. In such a scenario, we would of course have more immediate discretion on that point.

The second point related to the need to maintain a stable prudential regulatory regime. As the City Minister, I hear lots of representations from different parts of the financial services sector for more flexibility on occasion. This is a matter for the regulator, not me, but in conversations with the PRA, I have made it very clear that the Government do not want to secure competitive advantage based on downsizing our regulatory environment. I agree with the hon. Lady’s sentiments with regard to keeping that as the driving imperative.

To conclude, the statutory instrument is needed to ensure that the rules governing the UK’s deposit guarantee scheme and the other systems covered by the SI function appropriately if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. I hope I have satisfactorily addressed the legitimate points made by the hon. Lady, and that the Committee will support the regulations.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Claims Management Activity) Order 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Monday 19th November 2018 General Committees

[John Glen]

I thank the Committee for the serious questions and the range of issues raised. I will do my best to respond to all the questions. I will start with the hon. Member for Oxford East, who asked about progress on the cold calling plan. The Chancellor announced it in the Budget and laid a statutory instrument two days later banning cold calling in relation to pensions. It will be debated later in the year and hopefully will be in force early in the new year. I texted her counterparts on the Labour Front Bench to make them aware of that.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for enlightening us on that. However, we are talking about claims management rather than pensions.

[John Glen]

I will move on to that in a moment. I also want to touch on the point about the ICO as an enforcer, and why not the FCA. There are two debates here. The hon. Member for Garston and Halewood asked about the FCA’s suitability. One issue that has come up—my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk mentioned it as well—is the ICO’s experience and powers to enforce the restrictions on CMC cold calling. The ICO can levy fines of up to £500,000 for breaches of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003. It has the international reach to enable enforcement action when companies are operating abroad, and perhaps calling my hon. Friend.

The ICO and the FCA work together to establish whether the claims management company has FCA authorisation to carry out marketing activity. The FCA will be able to consider whether the CMC is in breach of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 and will sanction appropriately. It is really about the concentration of the FCA’s skills and experience in this domain.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I will move on sequentially through the points made.

On the question about why the Government are not banning all cold calls, which I think is behind all this, we are determined to tackle CMC cold calling and pensions cold calling, but a balance needs to be struck between ensuring that consumers are adequately protected and providing the right conditions for the legitimate direct marketing industry to operate. I recognise that there is a debate about the extent of the coverage and which sectors should be covered, but we took a view about what should be included at this time so that we could make progress and lay the order. We are actively prepared to consider further sectors that should come under the order.

The hon. Member for Oxford East raised the issue of the interim regime’s funding. The FCA is making a one-off levy from April 2019, and it will continue to collect fees from industry. Having recently closed a fees consultation, it will release a policy statement later this year about the funding mechanism for that transition period.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I asked specifically about the resources available to the FCA for creating that interim regime at a time when it is under enormous pressure in other ways. Is it to be expected to fund all that through its existing budget and receive that levy only after 1 April? Surely that could pose some problems.

[John Glen]

The FCA has made provision for the funding of the activity, and it will make a policy statement later this year about how it will work after April.

I was asked about the impact of new FCA regulation on the fees, so I will give more detail. To cover the costs of the transfer, the firms will be required to pay a one-off levy spread over two to three years, which will be collected by the FCA. Clarification will be given later about the regime following that.

On the point about solicitors’ exemption, which goes to the point about regulatory arbitrage raised by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk, there are strict controls in professional regulation under the SRA. The intention has been to have a tougher regulatory regime for CMCs without burdening solicitors with unnecessary regulation, because we believe that they are robustly regulated. Whether the two are aligned is a legitimate issue that needs ongoing review. We are concerned about the risks. The order is designed to close the potential loophole through a provision that removes the exemption for legal professionals if their claims management activity is not part of their ordinary legal practice. That is what has been happening: they have not been subject to FCA oversight because, in effect, they have been doing something that they could say was under their regulator but that the FCA has nothing to do with.

The FCA and SRA have therefore committed to reviewing their memorandum of understanding where it sets out how they will work together, to ensure that the regulation is effective and avoids precisely the matter that my hon. Friend raised.

In relation to FCA scrutiny, there is a statutory duty on the FCA to report to the Treasury, and that will cover CMC activity. The FCA will do that regularly—on an annual basis. Additionally, there are informal, three-weekly conversations between me and the FCA, and obviously I will be subject to scrutiny in the House. That mechanism is a real one: I am obviously pushing the FCA to get this right and it is keen to get it right.

The hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts asked about the conversation with the Scottish Government. During the passage of the Bill that became the Financial Guidance and Claims Act, the Scottish Government confirmed that it would be proportionate and relevant to bring Scottish CMCs within regulation. This Government have had further, ongoing discussions with the Scottish Government and the Law Society of Scotland throughout the drafting of this legislation, and we are very happy that they are, obviously, included in it.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk asked about the current status of someone making a cold call. The 2018 Act prohibits anyone from making an unsolicited marketing call in respect of claims management activity. As I have said, that is enforced by the ICO, which has the power to levy large fines and has international reach. Under this statutory instrument, any advertising of claims management services must have prior authorisation by the FCA. Breaching the regulations and failure to have FCA authorisation will be an offence. There has been greater clarity about telephone numbers having to be published, but the ICO is the place where my hon. Friend could take the calls that he is facing.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for being so generous with his time. May I try to clarify something? Surely we are talking about two different forms of authorisation. This may have been in the Minister’s mind anyway when he was talking; I am not sure. There is authorisation by the regulator, but also by the person who is being rung by the claims management company. Surely they are two quite different things.

[John Glen]

Somebody should not be called unless they have given explicit permission to be called, so it is an illegal act if that permission has not been given.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk asked whether this regulation covers banks. No, they will be covered by their FCA authorisation and supervision, so they are covered but not under these provisions.

Draft Central Counterparties (amendment, etc., and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Monday 5th November 2018 General Committees

[John Glen]

I shall do my best to answer the questions that have been raised. I think it would also be helpful if I were to set the context with respect to powers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. What is being done through the statutory instruments may be disputed by the Opposition, but it is ultimately a matter of the legislation that was passed. I am using the provisions to do everything I can to ensure that we have the right arrangements should there be a no-deal scenario. I recognise the points about the unusual nature of the process—the large number of statutory instruments. That is why I am committed to doing everything I can to facilitate meaningful scrutiny, dialogue and exchange of information in advance of Committee sittings.

The regulations are tightly constrained to fix deficiencies, not to make wider changes; this is not a power grab. The temporary recognition regime and other transitional arrangements are in line with the expectations of the industry, which needs certainty. It needs the contingency arrangements. I propose to go through the six questions and the additional points raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central and, I hope, answer them meaningfully.

First, as to the consultation, it is right to say that there has been long-standing engagement. It is done case by case, on the basis of the most appropriate mechanism. We announced it in December 2017 and published three letters over the course of this year. Engagement with relevant stakeholders in the industry has to vary according to different statutory instruments. In the case we are considering, I think it is fair to say that the arrangements we have undertaken have been well received by the industry, which welcomes the certainty we have given. Obviously there are a small number of players, and we have done what is necessary.

Secondly, the hon. Member for Oxford East is correct about the alignment of the Commission to the Treasury and the transmission of the ESMA powers to the Bank of England. The Treasury will make the equivalence decision, but the authorisation process will be carried out at a technical level with the appropriate skills in the Bank of England. That is purposefully aligned to the same distribution of roles from the Commission to ESMA.

Thirdly, on the question whether, if there were a need for an extension, it would be appropriate for the Treasury to make that provision using the negative procedure, that is an administrative, managerial decision. It is not based on any extension of the existing powers. It would be on the basis of a clear need to do so. The principle of what we are doing and the criteria for doing it are being discussed now; it is a translation of what already existed. The three years plus one arrangement is designed with industry convenience in mind.

Fourthly, as to the scope of EMIR and any changes, we are retaining most of EMIR as it currently applies in the EU and are unable to make significant policy changes, as I said, under the 2018 Act, so the legislation provides a good basis for discussions on equivalence with the EU. The hon. Lady raised the issue of regulation 14(1)(a) and the equivalence, as compared to EMIR,

“as it has effect in EU law as amended from time to time”.

Regulation 14 applies only before exit day. After exit day our approach to equivalence will be to compare third-country regimes to EMIR as onshored and part of domestic law. We will not necessarily as a matter of policy be following changes to EMIR in EU law; but equally it would not be our aspiration to deviate wilfully. There is obviously a lot of alignment. We start from a common starting point, and obviously we anticipate securing a deal on the basis of the alignment that currently exists.

Fifthly, the hon. Lady rightly pointed out the need for clarity the other way, in how the Commission deals with trades carried out through UK CCPs. It is welcome that, according to Tuesday’s Financial Times, Vice-President Dombrovskis has indicated a willingness to act to mitigate. That outcome is a function of the technical group dialogue that has been going on since April, and it has been welcomed in the City. More details are needed, but we have acted proactively to give as much assurance as we can, and that significant step forward is very welcome.

Sixthly, the hon. Lady asked about the mechanism to switch off the regulations. The SI itself does not include provision for switching itself off in the event of a deal, but the White Paper on the withdrawal agreement Bill confirmed that it would contain provisions to allow SIs like this one to be repealed, delayed or amended should a deal be secured. In the circumstances of a deal, we will do whatever is appropriate, and clearly this SI would not be necessary. The hon. Lady is looking at me quizzically.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. Are we to understand that the decision whether to switch off any SI produced in the context of the withdrawal Act is ultimately in the gift of Ministers?

[John Glen]

To be honest, I will have to write to the hon. Lady to clarify that detail. The essential point is that the statutory instrument is for a no-deal scenario; if we get a deal, we will not need the SI because we will be in a close working partnership and we will have the implementation period. I will need to write to her about the precise mechanism that we would use to get rid of the SI or withdraw its provisions, but that is my attempt to answer her six questions.

The hon. Member for Glasgow Central asked about fees and, quite reasonably, echoed a number of other points. There has been dialogue with the industry on the fees, which will be proportionate to the process that the Bank of England will need to go through. In practice, these firms do not exist in massive numbers. I cannot give her the cost in pounds and pence, but it will be aligned to industry expectations and will not impede the choice to register.

Draft Financial Regulators' Powers (Technical Standards Etc.) (Amendment Etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Wednesday 10th October 2018 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve on the Committee under your chairmanship, Sir David. I am grateful to the Minister for the explanation that he provided.

As the Minister mentioned, the SI is intended, as I understand it, to enable regulators, particularly the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Payment Systems Regulator and the FCA, to remedy any deficiencies in binding technical standards, so that they can operate effectively from the point of the UK exiting the EU. The SI also, as I understand it, and as stated in the explanatory notes, but not necessarily reflected in the Minister’s remarks, enables authorities to have ongoing responsibility for making technical standards required under retained EU law in financial services and amending them so that they remain fit for purpose in the future. It is not just about exit day. As I understand it, it is about a potentially much longer period, at least as expressed in the explanatory notes and my reading of the SI.

The regulators’ powers are subject to the constraints in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, as the Minister explained. They are limited to addressing deficiencies and dealing with any failure of UK law to operate effectively after exit, and that power is time limited under the withdrawal Act.

We first have to question why we have ended up here. It is deeply worrying that the Government feel that they have to go down this path because of the possibility of a no-deal Brexit, which the Brexit Secretary now recklessly describes as offering countervailing opportunities. I am not sure about the Minister, but I have yet to find somebody working in financial and related professional services who can find any countervailing opportunities from a no-deal Brexit. Maybe he has and it would be great to hear of it, if so.

[John Glen]

There are some.

[Anneliese Dodds]

Perhaps a couple of hedges but not many beyond that, I would expect. We could be pushed in this direction by the Government’s dogmatic rejection of a customs union with the EU and their inability to accept the reality.

As a result of that disturbing situation, it is right that those in Government who do want to act responsibly provide us with some kind of assurance of regulatory continuity, hence this SI, but I would say from the beginning that there is a misunderstanding in these proposals: the idea that technical, level 2, standards are non-political.

For two years I was a Member of the European Parliament and negotiated for the Socialists and Democrats a number of level 2 measures, relating to a raft of post-crisis financial services legislation: MAD/MAR, EMIR, CARRP, CSDR and last, but certainly not least, MiFID II. Parliamentarians were deeply involved in negotiations on those level 2 measures, which addressed a massive range of different issues. Of course, those negotiations were with the European Commission as well as regulators, mainly ESMA, in the case of the negotiations I was involved with.

The regulations seem to suggest that there would be public consultation only on changes and no more extensive engagements. That ignores the fact that so-called technical standards can emasculate the intent of legislative proposals at a stroke. One good example of that would be around the new regime in MiFID II for regulating commodities trading, where there is a lot of evidence, as Members will know, that having virtually non-regulated commodities markets had led to spikes in the cost of commodities, which had then led to serious problems in many countries in the global south, including potential famines.

Parliamentarians believed they had got to a situation and agreed at so-called level 1—primary legislation level—that we would have a new regulatory regime that would impose position limits on different types of commodities. That would mean we would not have that kind of speculation pushing up prices again, because we would not have individual traders controlling huge parts of these really important markets, and manipulating them just for financial gain. But the technical standards were really weak initially. We had a big fight and got them back to a much better position—that was through a political process, not a technical one. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s thoughts on whether we are really considering these level 2 measures to the extent that they require. Of course, we as parliamentarians do not want to be poring over level 3, which is the real technical nitty-gritty. That would not be sensible but level 2 measures surely require more scrutiny than we are offered here.

I would like the Minister to respond to three questions. First, at EU level there is a strong institutional aid to the promotion of financial stability in the form of Finance Watch, which is funded by the EU. We lack any such body in the UK. That is significant, given where we are today, 10 years since the fall of Lehman Brothers. I hope the Minister can reflect on how the political imperative of ensuring financial stability will be ensured, or otherwise, by these arrangements.

It is interesting to look at the language and narrative that Government have given in relation to these proposals and contrast that with some of what has come from EU level. I quote from the report by Irish MEP Brian Hayes just before the summer in the European Parliament. It stated:

“In the absence of a transition period, the Commission and the European supervisory authorities must be prepared to protect financial stability.”

That was the first value that he isolated, yet we tend to find that a bit of an afterthought in Government communications on this topic.

Secondly, I am very concerned whether the regulators, particularly the PRA and FCA, have the requisite capacity. That is related to the point made earlier about whether parliamentarians have the capacity to deal with the huge volume of SIs. Of course, it is the PRA and FCA that would have to deal with the arrangements for level 2 legislation. What assessment has been undertaken by the Government of their readiness to accomplish that task? I say that having looked at the document that has just been released by the FCA, snappily entitled “Brexit: proposed changes to the Handbook and Binding Technical Standards—first consultation”, which is 781 pages long. Admittedly, quite a lot of that is a new revised handbook, but it is a very big task that we are giving to our regulatory authorities. It is not clear that they really have the requisite capacity to deal with that task. For example, if we look at some of the new burdens that might be applied to the FCA, the document states that credit rating agencies that are currently registered with the European Securities and Markets Authority and that wish to register with the FCA will need to send the information by exit day—that is information on all credit ratings issued and not withdrawn. We are talking about a lot of information that will have to be transferred to the FCA. Will it be able to cope with that?

The last question I have is about regulatory co-ordination. From my reading of the SI and the explanatory memorandum, these arrangements are not just about the exit point but about ongoing arrangements that are intended to ensure that binding technical standards will remain effective. It is not clear how co-ordination will be ensured between what occurs on the UK side and on the EU side. We could say it would be a function of a no-deal Brexit, which the SI is intended to deal with, but I am concerned by some of the suggestions. For example, the FCA document suggests that we should just remove binding technical standards, such as requirements to co-operate in

“supervisory activities, for on-site verifications, and investigations and exchange of information between competent authorities”.

That seems to be the assumption underlying what a no-deal Brexit would look like. I hope the Government will further consider what future regulatory co-ordination could look like at the same time as we are staring down the barrel of no deal.

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[John Glen]

I am happy to answer any parliamentary question. I think we said there are about 70 SIs, but that will not be fully accurate.

The hon. Member for Oxford East asked, at the macro level, whether financial stability will be protected. The statutory objectives of the regulators for financial stability will not change. They are enduring. A tripartite system was set up as a consequence of the crash. I think there is broad cross-party agreement on the need for that to continue, and it will.

The hon. Lady asked about holding regulators to account. Parliament will be involved in every aspect of the process to onshore EU financial services regulations, so all the changes the Treasury proposes to level 1 legislation and delegated Acts will be put before Parliament for it to approve. Any transfer of responsibility to the regulators, including any transfer of powers to make technical standards, will be put before Parliament for it to approve through affirmative-procedure SIs.

The Treasury is working closely with the Bank of England, the PRA, the FCA and the PSR on how to fix deficiencies, including in the technical standards that we propose should become the responsibility of regulators. As was said, the Treasury will be required to approve all the deficiency fixes proposed by the regulators to ensure they are consistent with the deficiency fixes that Parliament will be asked to approve in onshoring.

[Anneliese Dodds]

The Minister is saying that there will be a change, to the extent that level 2 arrangements will be determined by the regulators. That is a shift away from arrangements at EU level, where parliamentarians—albeit European parliamentarians—are involved in negotiations about level 2 arrangements with the Commission and the regulator. That is a change. As I understand it, we are shifting to level 2 arrangements being uniquely the preserve of regulators, albeit with oversight from the Treasury, compared with a process where there is negotiation, in which parliamentarians are involved.

[John Glen]

We are seeking to give responsibility to the most appropriate body. The regulators are doing what they do. Frankly, some binding technical standards will not be suitably scrutinised or carried out within the Treasury. I refer back to the point I made about tier 1—or tier 2. Binding technical standards are sort of tier 3 within tier 2—it is a bit complicated—but basically, Parliament will have scrutiny over fundamental change, and the consequential changes that flow from that will be delegated to the appropriate body.

I think the hon. Lady asked whether this is about more than fixing deficiencies for exit. The withdrawal Act provides for the transfer of functions where necessary. Binding technical standards will need to be maintained by an appropriate body. After exit, that will be the UK regulators.

On what the hon. Lady said about her role as a Member of the European Parliament, it is absolutely right to say that we will have more to do because we will not have that scrutiny. As I understand it, MEPs can veto some binding technical standards proposals, but the UK FSMA framework of 2000 does not work in that way. Parliament has delegated technical rules to UK regulators, which is a difference.

The draft regulations set out the procedure where responsibility for future binding technical standards is transferred to regulators by other SIs. All those SIs will be scrutinised individually by separate Committees—I will probably be sat here introducing them—and subject to approval by Parliament under the affirmative procedure.

I turn to the Treasury’s authority over regulatory changes. It is appropriate that the Treasury approves all the deficiency fixes that the regulators propose, and Ministers will be accountable to Parliament for that. On the responsibility for binding technical standards that regulators will take on post-exit, the Treasury will need to approve future changes to those technical standards and will be able to veto a proposal for the two reasons set out in the draft regulations: if it appears the proposal would

“have implications for public funds”,

or if it would

“prejudice…negotiations for an international agreement”.

I cannot anticipate what they are, but all I know is that I would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny on that.

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[John Glen]

Candidly, at the level we are at at the moment, in seeking a strong bilateral arrangement to determine the future dynamics of dialogue between the EU and the UK supervisory bodies, I cannot answer with that degree of specificity. I take the point and will seek to come back to him as soon as I can.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; he has been very generous. I have enormous respect for the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay but, surely, it is important that whenever we talk about specific regulations we ground our discussion in an overall commitment not to seek to undercut EU-level regulation. Of course, there will be innovation and change, including at EU level. I would be surprised if these discussions are not happening in other European countries. I accept that the nature of the market is different in different European nations. But we have had this around many other regulations before. The danger is that we could end up with the mentality of a bonfire of regulation, which will overall have much more of an impact, because there are concerns that Brexit could be used as a means to undercut regulations generally. That is much more of a concern for industry than any specific regulation, in my experience anyway.

[John Glen]

I will take on that point, while also responding to the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, who made the same point about watering down of EU regulation. There is no provision to water down in the Act the regulations that we are seeking to onshore. The wider point has been made about the future direction. On that, again, I can be reassuring. We do not want to define ourselves as a nation by regulatory arbitrage.

I also acknowledge, as my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay pointed out, that the financial services have ongoing issues with legislation that has been onshored while we have been members of the EU. They are not about reckless setting aside of prudential regulations. They are in areas, perhaps, on which there is greater emphasis in our UK financial services, as my hon. Friend mentioned, these are things that do not exist in other jurisdictions.

Those are matters that a future framework would at least give us a mechanism to examine and then there would be an understanding, if we achieve what we seek—reciprocal responses from both the sovereign regulatory supervisory bodies. But we are not starting from a point where we are seeking to deregulate.

On the point the hon. Member for Glasgow Central made about UK regulators losing influence, I visited Edinburgh and Glasgow over the recess and acknowledge the growing financial services hub that exists there. The UK is a major financial centre and UK regulators are major players in global forums for financial regulation. There are global colleges for supervision for banks, for example, where we are key players. Although I recognise that the context will be different, this is not the time for UK regulators to adopt a more detached role from international leadership in some of these areas.

Reference was made to the BBC report of the comment I made at the Lords Select Committee this morning about jobs. Throughout the last nine months that I have been doing this, I have been in frequent contact with firms about jobs lost. I was referring to a comment made by Sam Woods, the deputy governor of the Bank of England, about the contingency arrangements. In my opinion, it was not news; I was just reflecting what had been said by somebody else. Of course, contingency arrangements have been made, but I have seen no expectation or desire to move significant tranches of jobs to the EU beyond that. A deal would clearly arrest that fear. We have set out clear proposals on a future ambitious relationship with the EU. We hope that that will transpire, and we expect it to take place.

The other point was about rule-taking. We are not proposing that UK regulators will have to work within a framework, other than the UK Parliament framework. There would be parliamentary scrutiny of any significant changes that we wished to make, and we will set those changes in primary legislation.

The right hon. Member for North Durham made a point about the impact assessment. The regulations would have no cost to business, as they deal with the transfer of responsibility from the Treasury to the appropriate regulators. As a whole, the regulations will significantly reduce costs to business in a no-deal situation. That is the whole point--to ensure that the effects of the transition are minimised in an undesirable situation.

Through our dialogue with firms and trade bodies, we have attempted to minimise the disruption to firms, but it is inevitable that some preparation will be needed. The Government have committed to providing the UK regulators with the power to phase in regulatory requirements that will change as a result of exit, which will mitigate the cost to firms. Due to the wide scope of the changes needed and the broad set of firms affected, however, it has not been possible to accurately quantify the actual costs to firms—I concede that—but these regulations will reduce the cost to business in a no-deal scenario. That is undoubtedly their purpose.

[John Glen]

Because they will set a reliable regulatory framework that will mean that firms will not be at risk of defaulting or of not having the regulatory oversight that would not exist otherwise.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I would always hesitate to speak for my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, but I believe his question was actually about the cost to Government and the considerable amount of civil service time that is being eaten up by the process.

[John Glen]

With respect to that, we have prepared a narrative on the impact assessment, and I believe there is a conversation going on with the appropriate Committee to determine that, but we have not concluded that assessment. Obviously, it is necessary to move quickly to secure all these statutory instruments before the end of March. That has been our objective.

Draft Cash Ratio Deposits (Value Bands and Ratios) Order 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 15th May 2018 General Committees

[John Glen]

For the deficit over the last five-year period on its expenditure on these two functions, the Bank will have been obliged to find the funds from other sources within its organisation. We want to ensure that these particular functions—the monetary policy and financial stability functions—are properly funded and that there is flexibility over the amounts based on the prevailing gilts; they will be transparently and publicly available, because they are quoted all the time.

On the risk of the expansion of costs in the light of Brexit, the Government are working toward a solution that involves a long-term economic partnership. The enduring functions of the Bank of England to satisfy monetary policy and financial stability will continue. If, at some future point, the Bank of England realises further costs, it will be for the Bank to have conversations with the Treasury about the matter, but that is not anticipated. The Bank has been able to make projections over the next five years and commit to a budget that it is happy with under this model.

I have just received some advice on carried-forward costs. There are no fixed costs over five years, and there will be no carry-forward of the deficit. That will be dealt with, and we will start on the basis of the budget over the coming five years.

The hon. Lady made some wider observations about corporation tax. I think that they are out of the scope of this discussion, which is simply about the provision for this function of the Bank of England.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I mentioned corporation tax only because the consultation for the order set the requirement to place deposits with the Bank in the context of overall tax burdens on banks. It was mentioned in the consultation first; I did not come up with it initially.

[John Glen]

That was mentioned in passing, but the order is designed to give better assurance about the realising of the return required for the Bank of England to carry out these functions. I do not have anything more to add, so I hope that the Committee will agree to this draft order for the benefit of the Bank, our banking sector and the users of those services across the country.

Question put and agreed to.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [Lords] (Sixth sitting)

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 6th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[John Glen]

I will come on to explain the history of this and why we are where we are. I am happy for the hon. Gentleman to intervene if he does not feel satisfied at the end of that.

Mindful that the eyes of the world are on us, hon. Members should recognise that this legislation would be a world first. Successful delivery raises significant challenges and it is right that the Government achieve the right balance in an effective regime with robust enforcement that does not have a negative impact on land registration processes across the UK. I acknowledge that some have accused the Government—and we have also been accused this afternoon—of not acting swiftly enough to implement this policy. Let me address those concerns.

We have committed to publishing a draft Bill before the summer to introduce the Bill early in the second Session and for the register to be operational in 2021. Publishing a Bill in draft is the right approach. As I said before, this register will be the first of its kind in the world, it will affect people’s property rights, including not just new purchasers but existing owners. This is a sensitive and delicate area. Getting it wrong would have significant adverse consequences.

[Anneliese Dodds]

The Minister is being generous. He has kindly set out for us a three-year timetable, adding on a couple of years before that when Government committed to this. Is he aware of the Private Eye map, which has been in existence for some time? Through civil society and journalistic activity, Land Registry and Companies House data were put together and a map produced. That appears to have been done quite quickly.

[John Glen]

I am not familiar with that particular map but I would be very happy to examine it. For clarity, and addressing the hon. Lady’s previous point, the register will capture the details of beneficial owners of all non-UK companies—including those in the overseas territories—that own UK property. This will be a world first, so we are moving as fast as possible, ensuring that the register is as comprehensive as possible.

As the Government set out in last year’s call for evidence, for the register to be effective the sanctions to be applied for non-compliance must be a meaningful deterrent. Enforcement must be energetic. Simple criminal sanctions may not be sufficient in isolation. The draft Bill will include enforcement through land registration law. Where an overseas entity buys property, it will never be able to obtain legal title to that property without having complied with the register’s requirements. Similarly, a restriction on the title register for property owned by an overseas entity will signal to third parties that the overseas entity must comply with the regime before selling the property, creating a long lease or legal charge. Those are significant steps on which it is right to consult.

Hon. Members will recognise that there are separate Land Registries in Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as the Land Registry for England and Wales. The approaches taken to land registration and overseas entities by each of those Land Registries have been different until now. That too will need be streamlined. Delivery of an holistic outcome that complements all three land registration regimes is an exercise touching multiple teams across Government and the Land Registries. Put simply, it is an exercise that will take time to get right and a further demonstration of why publishing the legislation in draft is the appropriate next step if we are to get it right. Although I appreciate that the motive underlying the new clause supports the policy as a whole and demonstrates a desire for early delivery and implementation, it does not take account of the complexities that I have set out or the challenges of delivery and implementation.

The register will further demonstrate the Government’s commitment to combating money laundering through the property market. Hon. Members will have seen recent press reports—the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland drew our attention to the splash on 3 February—that two unexplained wealth orders have been obtained by the National Crime Agency in connection with two properties worth £22 million.

Those are the first orders obtained under the relevant powers conferred by the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which commenced at the end of January. They were obtained only a few days after it came into effect. As the Minister for Security and Economic Crime has said, the orders are an important addition to the UK’s ability to tackle illicit finance, and it is great to see them already in use.

The Government will continue to take action. BEIS’s response to last year’s call for evidence will be published shortly, and it will set out the Government’s approach to areas of particular complexity. BEIS has already made significant progress in preparing draft legislation; the work with the office of the parliamentary counsel to draft the Bill is under way.

Separately, BEIS is working to quantify the impact of the legislation on the UK. The impact assessment will quantify the register’s potential impact on the property market and investment flows, around which foreign direct investment is very specific, to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland. The register will rightly make the UK more hostile to illicit flows of money, but we must understand the potential impact of legitimate inward investment.

All those issues were considered in last year’s call for evidence. Scrutiny of the draft Bill will further stress-test whether it will be effective. I hope that that process demonstrates the Government’s continued commitment to enact the policy, and our commitment to get it right. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Lady will withdraw the new clause.

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[Anneliese Dodds]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Cheryl, and in rather warmer circumstances than the last time. New clause 9 seeks to create an offence if a relevant body failed to put in place adequate procedures to prevent a person associated with it from carrying out a money laundering facilitation offence. New clause 15 creates a process for disqualification for those at the top level who have failed to prevent money laundering.

I will deal with each new clause in turn and then speak briefly about the overall regulatory context, which creates a necessity for these new approaches. First, on new clause 9 and the failure to prevent the facilitation of money laundering, there are many problems with the existing system. The FCA has found weaknesses in governance and long-standing and significant under-investment in resourcing for control systems, even in the sector that is actually regulated for money laundering. I will talk about some of the problems there later on.

Many of those who investigate in this area find that rules are intermittently enforced, penalties are low and senior executives face few personal, financial or reputational consequences. It is constructive to compare some of the penalties that have been levied in the UK with those levied in the US. As I understand, the largest fine levied in the UK for anti-money laundering or sanctions offences—the Minister may contradict me if I am wrong—was levied against Coutts & Co for £8.75 million. That is six hundred times less than the penalty that was levied by the United States on BNP Paribas for sanctions-related offences.

[John Glen]

I am very happy to confirm that in fact Deutsche Bank was fined £163 million in January 2017, and Barclays had a fine of £72 million in November 2015. I do not think that comparison is correct.

[Anneliese Dodds]

It would be helpful to know under which pieces of legislation those fines were levied, because I am uncertain whether they were directly under money laundering legislation. I will come back to that, particularly in relation to some of the outcomes of some parliamentary questions that I have asked to try to dig into this and find out what prosecutions have been enabled by existing legislation.

I am grateful for the information that the Economic Secretary has provided; however, there is still a lot of concern about banks’ and others’ ability to root out money laundering and the facilitating of money laundering. The FCA found—admittedly, in 2014—that there was

“significant and widespread weaknesses in most banks’ anti-money laundering systems and controls”.

That is revealed in the case of HSBC. Many members of the Committee will know that it was involved in a money laundering scandal that led to the US fining it £1.2 billion. There was a large investigation into that matter in the United States Senate, where it was said that our UK-based bank had been a conduit for

“drug kingpins and rogue nations”,

including Mexican drug cartels and North Korea. In fact, that case has been referred to already in this Committee.

Particularly worryingly, a congressional report found that George Osborne and the Financial Services Authority—now the FCA—corresponded on numerous occasions with their US counterparts about the case; in fact, they urged a less aggressive judicial approach on the US side. Apparently, the congressional report said that the UK interventions played a significant role in ultimately persuading the US Department of Justice not to prosecute HSBC. I find it quite concerning that the UK actually argued against measures being taken by other countries to try to deal with this problem.

We were hoping to have some change; the Serious Fraud Office has called for the broadening of existing economic offences to cover a kind of umbrella approach, also to cover failure to prevent. It thinks that that would be helpful to hold large companies to account criminally across the board. At the moment, we have the ability to prosecute the failure to prevent bribery and corruption, but those activities are rarely committed in isolation from instances of money laundering by corporate entities. Therefore, it seems to make sense to try to extend corporate liability to money laundering. That would push in the same direction as existing pieces of legislation. Of course, the Bribery Act 2010 created a new offence of corporate failure to prevent. I believe that Act was put in place because of the same kind of repeated criticism of the UK regime that we have seen in relation to money laundering. We also now have the offence of failure to prevent criminal tax evasion in the Criminal Finances Act 2017. Surely there is now a strong case for an explicit reference to failure to prevent money laundering.

Many of us thought that we were not going to have to push for a separate offence of money laundering because we were to have an umbrella approach. In May 2016, the Government committed to consult on a broad offence of failure to prevent economic crime, which would cover fraud, false accounting and money laundering. In January 2017, the Government downgraded that commitment and instead published a call for evidence on whether there was a case for economic crime corporate liability law reform.

As I understand it, the call for evidence closed in March 2017. I have not yet seen the results of that call for evidence. It would be helpful for the Minister to let us know the outcome of that call for evidence, the main findings and how the Government have decided to act on them. Will they introduce the umbrella offence or create a discrete offence, as we are asking for? Because we think we need action now. That is new clause 19.

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[John Glen]

I undertake to address the points raised by the hon. Member for Oxford East. I will come to the point about the directors’ responsibility in my scripted remarks and also to the issue of what provision the fines were imposed under.

On the specific question the hon. Lady asked, the Ministry of Justice’s call for evidence considered a wide range of reforms to the law relating to corporate liability for economic crime. That is against a backdrop of already significant reform in this area in recent years, including the Bribery Act 2010, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and the introduction of deferred prosecution agreements, which the Government would contend have strengthened the UK’s defences against corporate criminality. The Ministry of Justice is carefully considering the responses received to the call for evidence and is analysing the impacts of the Government’s range of recent reforms in this area. It will respond to its call for evidence in due course. I do not have a specific timetable, but that is the best information I can give the hon. Lady.

New clauses 9 and 15 seek to create a corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent money laundering, with an obligation on the Secretary of State to submit a disqualification order to the court against directors of a company found guilty of such an offence without having adequate anti-money laundering procedures in place. New clause 9 provides that a company or partnership is guilty of a criminal offence where the company’s employee, agent or other service provider commits one of the substantive money laundering offences in part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The relevant company would have a defence if it could prove that it had adequate procedures in place to prevent its employees or agents from committing such an offence.

The offence is not necessary in view of the extensive reforms to the UK’s anti-money laundering regime that the Government have put in place. The proposed offence is substantively applied to firms that are regulated for anti-money laundering purposes by part 2 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. Those require that regulated firms have policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. The Government have legislated to require that these policies, controls and procedures are proportionate with regard to the size and nature of the firm’s business and proved by the firm’s senior management. Failure to comply with these requirements is a criminal offence in itself.

The Financial Conduct Authority and other supervisors are additionally able to take action against firms if their measures to counter money laundering are deficient. As was touched on in our exchange earlier, recent regulatory penalties related to firms’ anti-money laundering weaknesses include fines of £163 million for Deutsche Bank in January 2017 and £72 million for Barclays Bank in November 2015. They were a consequence of failures in anti-money laundering measures under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.

The new clause also seeks to address challenges that have arisen in apportioning responsibility for corporate failings. Within the financial services sector, that has been addressed through the senior managers regime, which was introduced after the financial crisis. Banks are now required to ensure that a named senior manager has unequivocal responsibility for overseeing the firm’s efforts to counter financial crime. That ensures that firms and individuals can be held to account for failing to put proper systems in place to prevent financial crime. If a relevant firm breaches its anti-money laundering obligations, the FCA can take action against a senior manager if it can prove that they did not take such steps as a person in their position can reasonably have been expected to take to avoid the breach occurring. The enforcement action includes fines and disbarment from undertaking regulated activities. The Government have legislated to extend the senior managers regime to apply across all financial services firms. That will be implemented in due course, and will further the Government’s reform programme. All those requirements are additional to the substantive money laundering offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act, such as entering into arrangements that facilitate the use of criminal property, which apply to any individual or company.

As hon. Members know, the Government have previously introduced two similar offences: the failure to prevent bribery, in 2010, and the failure to prevent the facilitation of UK and foreign tax evasion, in 2017. They are structured in a similar way to the proposed new clause, but they were introduced following clear evidence of gaps in the relevant legal frameworks that were limiting the bringing of effective and dissuasive enforcement proceedings. It is right that the offences that we have already established apply to legal entities, regardless of whether they operate in the regulated sector.

The situation in relation to money laundering is very different. The international standard is set by the Financial Action Task Force, which has been referred to numerous times in the Committee’s discussions. The UK’s money laundering regulations apply to banks, financial institutions, certain professional services firms and other types of entity, and act as gatekeepers to the financial system. As I have said, such firms are already required to have policies and procedures in place to prevent their services from being misused for money laundering.

Subsection (6) of new clause 9 would require all companies, regardless of whether they are incorporated, to have procedures in place to prevent persons connected to them from laundering money. The Government do not believe that that would be appropriate. It would risk making non-regulated firms liable for the actions of their regulated professional advisers. Instead, responsibility for anti-money laundering compliance should rest in the regulated sector, as is currently the case. The new clause would not go beyond the existing regulatory framework in that area, and it would blur where responsibility should lie for anti-money laundering compliance. Therefore, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Oxford East to withdraw the new clause.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Economic Secretary for those helpful explanations and clarifications. Despite his useful response, however, there are a number of areas where I am unclear. First, I appreciate that he has probably anticipated this question, but the Committee may ask why it has taken Government a whole year to assess the responses from their consultation on economic crime. Government frequently work at a far faster pace than that. He said that we will have the analysis of those consultation responses in due course. It would be helpful to know more about why it is taking so long for Government to analyse them.

Secondly, the Economic Secretary spoke about the requirement for all regulated firms to ensure that their policies, controls and procedures are appropriate to prevent money laundering, but there is a question about who assesses that and whose responsibility that is. That takes us back to the issue about there being myriad professional bodies, which all operate subtly different approaches towards regulation in this area. As I said, I appreciate that OPBAS has been created to try to draw them together, but I do not think we heard exactly what the status of that office is—I was trying to concentrate on what the Economic Secretary was saying. I have seen different descriptions of it as a team, an office and an organisation. It would be helpful to have a clearer indication, particularly because those professional bodies are, as I understand it, required to contribute financially to OPBAS, so a number of them are keen to understand what is happening with it. Furthermore, HMRC is not a member of it, as I said before, so the concern about a lack of regulatory co-ordination persists.

Finally, the Economic Secretary referred approvingly to the senior managers regime that has been brought in since the financial crisis, which looks like a positive step initially—of course, the HSBC problems occurred following that. In any case, as I understand it, the actual operation of this new regime and its extension are quite different from, for example, what was recommended by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Under this approach, the burden to show that senior managers failed to take appropriate steps will be on the regulator, rather than the senior managers themselves.

That is different from the approach taken in many other areas, including road traffic, health and safety at work, the Bribery Act 2010—which the Minister referred to—terrorist legislation, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and so on. It would be helpful to understand why, with the extension of this regime, the burden of proof has essentially now been placed on the shoulders of the regulator, rather than the shoulders of the managers.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Anneliese Dodds]

We tabled the new clause because ineffective anti-money laundering supervision has a clear and obvious link with inadequate compliance and with low and poor-quality reporting of suspicious activity to the National Crime Agency. Research by a number of non-governmental organisations, particularly Transparency International, has indicated serious failings in the current framework for supervising money laundering compliance in the UK, especially with respect to trust and company service providers.

Under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, only TCSPs carrying on business in the UK—that is their formulation in the legislation—have to register with an anti-money laundering supervisor and comply with MLR 2017. That means of course that TCSPs with no UK presence can incorporate UK companies without any oversight from an AML supervisor. They do not have to comply with UK standards for money laundering checks. We have seen a number of clear examples—I will talk about some in a moment—where that has allowed non-UK TCSPs to incorporate UK companies that have subsequently been used in large-scale money laundering schemes. I think many of the concerns raised a moment ago around undercutting existing legislation and the lack of a fair playing field for UK TCSPs come up again in this regard.

In 2012 the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists showed how a number of UK individuals offering company services had moved their base of operations outside our country but continued to form, and act as nominee directors for, UK companies. There are two examples that are particularly important. The first was Jesse Grant Hester, who was originally from the UK and who moved to Cyprus to form Atlas Corporate Services Ltd before moving to Dubai and, finally, Mauritius—he is somebody who has been lucky enough to travel much in life. Those jurisdictions have all been identified as presenting high money laundering risks. Mauritius in particular is very concerning: it scored 5.92 out of 10 on the Basel Institute on Governance money laundering risk index. Ten is the highest level of money laundering risk and zero is the least, so it is well up there. Jesse Grant Hester appeared on numerous occasions as a nominee director for companies embroiled in corruption scandals. In the Moldovan bank theft that we talked about earlier, he signed fake promissory notes using an alias on behalf of a UK firm, Goldbridge Trading Ltd, allowing £444 million to be stolen. Atlas Corporate Services is associated with eight people who, between them, have held directorships of 3,613 UK companies. Again, that is a staggering number of companies to be held by just eight people. As we discussed, that scandal caused enormous problems for the country of Moldova.

Another UK resident who became internationally renowned, although not in a positive way, for his company formation activities, is Ian Taylor. That is not the famous social policy academic, who I had the pleasure of working with, but another Ian Taylor. He also moved around a lot: he moved to Vanuatu.

[John Glen]

There was also a Tory MP of that name.

[Anneliese Dodds]

Oh, there was a Tory MP as well. Goodness—the name is frequently used. He moved to Vanuatu after he was banned from being a corporate director, first in New Zealand in 2011 and then in the UK in 2015, as a result of his companies’ involvement in numerous scandals, including a land banking scam in Somerset. Vanuatu’s self-assessment on money laundering risk found that its TCSP sector was among the most vulnerable to such activity. In 2015 the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering found serious deficiencies in Vanuatu’s AML system. Despite being banned in the UK, Taylor seems to have retained a UK presence. Various investigations have identified the circle of nominee directors that he works with. One of them is a Vanuatu resident who is a director of more than 61 companies. He took over from Taylor as a director of 20 of them on the same date.

Those examples show that physically moving out of the UK does not result in a lack of activity in the UK. Networks of associates make it difficult to stop the formation of UK companies by individuals who have already been disqualified here. Such individuals, who have been shown to have engaged in money laundering activities or have otherwise been disqualified or viewed as not competent in this arena, can function in other countries and create companies. The checking that should go on does not happen, and there is inadequate anti-money laundering supervision. We do not have a means of dealing with that, because we do not have a regulatory system for TCSPs that are not based in countries with appropriate anti-money laundering provisions. That is not currently illegal, which is why we want to change the legal situation.

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[John Glen]

I cannot comment on the specific cases that the hon. Lady mentions, because I have not seen or studied them. I imagine that there is a degree of variability in the effectiveness of regimes, but I am trying to set out the Government’s rationale for what we have in place. I do not suggest that it is perfect, but some of the developments have occurred in response to shortcomings that have been identified.

The individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess international and domestic risks, including the money laundering and terrorism risk, which ensures that the most intensive supervision is applied where the highest risks of money laundering exist. The establishment of OPBAS will assist with the consistent identification of such risks across the TCSP sector. Our national risk assessment makes it clear that the Government are aware of the money laundering risks connected with TCSPs, and further reform in the area should take account of the conclusions of the ongoing FATF review. I assure Opposition Members that the regime is a searching and exacting one. I know from ministerial meetings concerning preparations for it that the evaluation will be exacting. We expect the observations to be meaningful, and we will need to respond carefully to them. However, until we receive the outcome of that review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime and of the experience of OPBAS as its role develops, it would not be appropriate to adopt the amendment.

Hon. Members should be mindful of the fact that anti-money laundering supervision around the world follows a territorial model. Simply requiring non-UK TCSPs to have a UK supervisor when they set up UK companies will not address the challenges of extra-territorial supervision. Effective anti-money laundering supervision depends on measures that include supervisory on-site visits and close engagement with higher-risk firms. Requiring a UK supervisor to do that in relation to a non-UK firm will not, in and of itself, address the issue that hon. Members have identified.

As was noted in the other place, the most effective means of combating international money laundering is cross-border co-operation to drive up the standards of overseas supervision and enforcement. For those reasons, we have imposed a duty on each UK anti-money laundering supervisor to take such steps as they consider appropriate to co-operate with overseas authorities. That is the agenda we pursue through the global FATF process. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for those remarks and clarifications. They have been genuinely helpful, but I regret that some areas are still rather unclear to me; perhaps they are not to other Committee members. He stated that the highest-risk TCSPs are assessed to be UK ones, but it has not been spelled out why. Perhaps he could write to me about that.

[John Glen]

I would be happy to write to the hon. Lady to spell that out. My understanding is that UK-based TCSPs typically offer a wider range of services and there are vulnerabilities in the additional services, but I will investigate and write to her as quickly as I can.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for offering to look into that. We must always be wary of talking about a general pattern of activity as necessarily reflecting the risk profile of that overall activity. Among those TCPS, there could be overseas ones that are not appropriately regulated and that also offer a wide range of services, in the same way as some UK TCSPs do.

I am also a bit confused about the professional regulators. As the Minister said, there are about 22 of them, and then on top of that we stick Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority and so on. As I understand it, the professional regulators do not have members based in other countries; they cover only UK residents. We are talking about, for example, the Law Society of Scotland and the Law Society of England and Wales—professional bodies dealing with UK individuals. We are not talking about professional associations covering professionals in other countries.

The Minister seemed to talk about a process of liaison between these organisations and their counterparts in other countries. I am sure we all want to encourage that, because it sounds like a very good idea. Information sharing is wonderful, but information sharing is not the same as having an appropriate process of regulation to ensure that there is compliance with anti-money laundering requirements.

The Minister said that the approach was an extraterritorial one, because it affects bodies in other countries. That is absolutely right, but those bodies then interact with our company formation procedure. That is the reason why we, as a country, have a stake in this process—a rather large one, given the reputational damage that seems to be being caused by the activities of some unregulated or inappropriately regulated TCSPs. I will be pressing the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[John Glen]

I just want to clarify that, while I would not profess to be an expert on Pakistan’s compliance with the FATF, the concerns raised about its recent greylisting were around the specific handling of various banned terrorist organisations. I would not wish to cast any wider doubt over its intentions to improve the provision of services.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I thank the Minister for that helpful clarification. It is helpful to know the exact locus of FATF activity or the concerns about Pakistan that were focused on terrorist financing. That is not the area we are focused on now, but such financing and money laundering often go hand in hand.

Given the potential effects of such a ruling—we have talked about that in relation to Pakistan—we think it necessary that Ministers should have the flexibility to ensure that FATF standards can be implemented as soon as possible in our country in order to be on top of new international standards. That is particularly important because the UK was a founding member of the FATF, so we need to show that we are at the cutting edge of implementing its requirements.

As I mentioned, we also need to be able to identify or revoke high-risk countries quickly, taking account of the FATF’s standards and given the effect that it can have on the countries themselves and also on our reputation. If we are viewed as not following FATF recommendations, that prevents the co-ordinated approach that the FATF was set up to promote in the first place.

Finally on this amendment, we hope that Ministers will take account of aligning the designations with our EU partners. We have talked consistently in our deliberations about the need for co-ordination, which of course makes all the mechanisms much more effective. When they are not co-ordinated, there can be loopholes. In that regard, it is important to mention the case of Russia. In 2014, the Arms Export Controls Committees—we talked about their composition when we talked about scrutiny arrangements—reported that more than 200 licences to sell British weapons to Russia, including missile-launching equipment, were still in place, despite David Cameron’s claim that the Government had imposed an absolute arms embargo against Russia in alignment with the rest of the EU. We really need to make sure that that alignment is genuine in practice, not just on the surface and rhetorical.

[John Glen]

New clause 16 would limit amendments to the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 to those that would implement standards published by the Financial Action Task Force, or those whose purpose was identifying or revoking a designation of a high-risk third country. The 2017 regulations transpose the fourth EU anti-money laundering directive, which was in turn derived from the most recent major updates to the FATF standards, which were made in 2012. As the hon. Lady acknowledged, the UK is a founder member of the FATF and is committed to playing a leading role in its continuing work. It is right for the Government to have the power to update the UK regime when such standards change.

There are, however, several areas where the UK’s anti-money laundering regime already goes beyond those standards. Our recently established register of trusts generating tax consequences, for example, goes beyond the standards set by the FATF. Similarly, the UK announced at the time of the 2015 Budget that we intended to regulate virtual currency exchanges for AML purposes—an objective that was accomplished through negotiation of the fifth EU anti-money laundering directive—but that was not required by the FATF. So although we will remain aligned with the FATF standards after the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, our anti-money laundering regime exceeds those standards in certain areas.

The Government are determined to ensure that our defences against misuse of a financial system remain ahead of global standards rather than solely reflecting them. That is reflected in our commitment to the establishment of a public register of the beneficial ownership of non-UK companies that own UK property, which the Committee debated earlier, even if we did not agree on the timeline for it. The new clause would reduce our ability to do so. Under the power in question, the UK’s anti-money laundering regime could not go further in areas where we would otherwise want to.

As I said previously, in debating amendment 7, and as my right hon. Friend the Minister said about new clause 3, we do not believe that a bar on new offences is the right way to address the concerns raised by Lord Judge and others. We have instead tabled amendments to ensure that the power is used only where it is needed, and that Ministers are properly accountable to Parliament for it.

Ensuring that we can make regulations to prevent, or to enable or facilitate the detection or investigation of, money laundering or terrorist financing, as well as to implement the standards of the FATF, is the most certain method of placing future changes to our anti-money laundering system on a sound legal basis. The new clause would limit our ability to do so in the future, and I am sure that is not the intention behind it. I respectfully suggest that the hon. Lady might withdraw it.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. It may be the fact that we have been in this room for a few hours, but I am struggling a little with, in particular, the suggestion that new clause 16 would somehow tie the UK’s hands in implementing additional requirements beyond the FATF standards.

The Minister referred to the public register of property owned by non-UK entities. We had a discussion about that, but he is right: it would arguably be an innovation in the UK. Of course it is one that we need more than other countries, because of the use of our property market in many such cases, and the exponential rise in house prices. He could have talked—although he did not—about the register of beneficial ownership of companies being an innovation as well, but countries such as the Netherlands and Norway are putting those into practice anyway, so perhaps we are not quite as far-reaching in what we are doing as we might suggest. Particularly in relation to the charges and fines levied against those found guilty of money laundering offences, we seem to be in a different position from that of our North American counterparts, for example, as we have discussed. None the less, it is not clear how the new clause would stop us going further than those other jurisdictions where we wished to do so. It says that we would take account of the

“best international practice including EU sanctions regimes”,

not that we would be led by it.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 6th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[John Glen]

I will come on to explain the history of this and why we are where we are. I am happy for the hon. Gentleman to intervene if he does not feel satisfied at the end of that.

Mindful that the eyes of the world are on us, hon. Members should recognise that this legislation would be a world first. Successful delivery raises significant challenges and it is right that the Government achieve the right balance in an effective regime with robust enforcement that does not have a negative impact on land registration processes across the UK. I acknowledge that some have accused the Government—and we have also been accused this afternoon—of not acting swiftly enough to implement this policy. Let me address those concerns.

We have committed to publishing a draft Bill before the summer to introduce the Bill early in the second Session and for the register to be operational in 2021. Publishing a Bill in draft is the right approach. As I said before, this register will be the first of its kind in the world, and it will affect people’s property rights, including not just new purchasers but existing owners. This is a sensitive and delicate area. Getting it wrong would have significant adverse consequences.

[Anneliese Dodds]

The Minister is being generous. He has kindly set out for us a three-year timetable, adding on a couple of years before that when Government committed to this. Is he aware of the Private Eye map, which has been in existence for some time? Through civil society and journalistic activity, Land Registry and Companies House data were put together and a map produced. That appears to have been done quite quickly.

[John Glen]

I am not familiar with that particular map but I would be very happy to examine it. For clarity, and addressing the hon. Lady’s previous point, the register will capture the details of beneficial owners of all non-UK companies—including those in the overseas territories—that own UK property. This will be a world first, so we are moving as fast as possible, while ensuring that the register is as comprehensive as possible.

As the Government set out in last year’s call for evidence, for the register to be effective the sanctions to be applied for non-compliance must be a meaningful deterrent. Enforcement must be energetic. Simple criminal sanctions may not be sufficient in isolation. The draft Bill will include enforcement through land registration law. Where an overseas entity buys property, it will never be able to obtain legal title to that property without having complied with the register’s requirements. Similarly, a restriction on the title register for property owned by an overseas entity will signal to third parties that the overseas entity must comply with the regime before selling the property, creating a long lease or legal charge. Those are significant steps on which it is right to consult.

Hon. Members will recognise that there are separate Land Registries in Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as the Land Registry for England and Wales. The approaches taken to land registration and overseas entities by each of those Land Registries have been different until now. That too will need be streamlined. Delivery of an holistic outcome that complements all three land registration regimes is an exercise touching multiple teams across Government and the Land Registries. Put simply, it is an exercise that will take time to get right and a further demonstration of why publishing the legislation in draft is the appropriate next step if we are to get it right. Although I appreciate that the motive underlying the new clause supports the policy as a whole and demonstrates a desire for early delivery and implementation, it does not take account of the complexities that I have set out or the challenges of delivery and implementation.

The register will further demonstrate the Government’s commitment to combating money laundering through the property market. Hon. Members will have seen recent press reports—the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland drew our attention to the splash on 3 February—that two unexplained wealth orders have been obtained by the National Crime Agency in connection with two properties worth £22 million.

Those are the first orders obtained under the relevant powers conferred by the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which commenced at the end of January. They were obtained only a few days after it came into effect. As the Minister for Security and Economic Crime has said, the orders are an important addition to the UK’s ability to tackle illicit finance, and it is great to see them already in use.

The Government will continue to take action. BEIS’s response to last year’s call for evidence will be published shortly, and it will set out the Government’s approach to areas of particular complexity. BEIS has already made significant progress in preparing draft legislation; the work with the office of the parliamentary counsel to draft the Bill is under way.

Separately, BEIS is working to quantify the impact of the legislation on the UK. The impact assessment will quantify the register’s potential impact on the property market and investment flows, around which foreign direct investment is very specific, to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland. The register will rightly make the UK more hostile to illicit flows of money, but we must understand the potential impact on legitimate inward investment.

All those issues were considered in last year’s call for evidence. Scrutiny of the draft Bill will further stress-test whether it will be effective. I hope that that process demonstrates the Government’s continued commitment to enact the policy, and our commitment to get it right. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Lady will withdraw the new clause.

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[Anneliese Dodds]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Cheryl, and in rather warmer circumstances than the last time. New clause 9 seeks to create an offence if a relevant body failed to put in place adequate procedures to prevent a person associated with it from carrying out a money laundering facilitation offence. New clause 15 creates a process for disqualification for those at the top level who have failed to prevent money laundering.

I will deal with each new clause in turn and then speak briefly about the overall regulatory context, which creates a necessity for these new approaches. First, on new clause 9 and the failure to prevent the facilitation of money laundering, there are many problems with the existing system. The FCA has found weaknesses in governance and long-standing and significant under-investment in resourcing for control systems, even in the sector that is actually regulated for money laundering. I will talk about some of the problems there later on.

Many of those who investigate in this area find that rules are intermittently enforced, penalties are low and senior executives face few personal, financial or reputational consequences. It is constructive to compare some of the penalties that have been levied in the UK with those levied in the US. As I understand, the largest fine levied in the UK for anti-money laundering or sanctions offences—the Minister may contradict me if I am wrong—was levied against Coutts & Co for £8.75 million. That is six hundred times less than the penalty that was levied by the United States on BNP Paribas for sanctions-related offences.

[John Glen]

I am very happy to confirm that in fact Deutsche Bank was fined £163 million in January 2017, and Barclays had a fine of £72 million in November 2015. I do not think that comparison is correct.

[Anneliese Dodds]

It would be helpful to know under which pieces of legislation those fines were levied, because I am uncertain whether they were directly under money laundering legislation. I will come back to that, particularly in relation to some of the outcomes of some parliamentary questions that I have asked to try to dig into this and find out what prosecutions have been enabled by existing legislation.

I am grateful for the information that the Economic Secretary has provided; however, there is still a lot of concern about banks’ and others’ ability to root out money laundering and the facilitating of money laundering. The FCA found—admittedly, in 2014—that there was

“significant and widespread weaknesses in most banks’ anti-money laundering systems and controls”.

That is revealed in the case of HSBC. Many members of the Committee will know that it was involved in a money laundering scandal that led to the US fining it £1.2 billion. There was a large investigation into that matter in the United States Senate, where it was said that our UK-based bank had been a conduit for

“drug kingpins and rogue nations”,

including Mexican drug cartels and North Korea. In fact, that case has been referred to already in this Committee.

Particularly worryingly, a congressional report found that George Osborne and the Financial Services Authority—now the FCA—corresponded on numerous occasions with their US counterparts about the case; in fact, they urged a less aggressive judicial approach on the US side. Apparently, the congressional report said that the UK interventions played a significant role in ultimately persuading the US Department of Justice not to prosecute HSBC. I find it quite concerning that the UK actually argued against measures being taken by other countries to try to deal with this problem.

We were hoping to have some change; the Serious Fraud Office has called for the broadening of existing economic offences to cover a kind of umbrella approach, also to cover failure to prevent. It thinks that that would be helpful to hold large companies to account criminally across the board. At the moment, we have the ability to prosecute the failure to prevent bribery and corruption, but those activities are rarely committed in isolation from instances of money laundering by corporate entities. Therefore, it seems to make sense to try to extend corporate liability to money laundering. That would push in the same direction as existing pieces of legislation. Of course, the Bribery Act 2010 created a new offence of corporate failure to prevent. I believe that Act was put in place because of the same kind of repeated criticism of the UK regime that we have seen in relation to money laundering. We also now have the offence of failure to prevent criminal tax evasion in the Criminal Finances Act 2017. Surely there is now a strong case for an explicit reference to failure to prevent money laundering.

Many of us thought that we were not going to have to push for a separate offence of money laundering because we were to have an umbrella approach. In May 2016, the Government committed to consult on a broad offence of failure to prevent economic crime, which would cover fraud, false accounting and money laundering. In January 2017, the Government downgraded that commitment and instead published a call for evidence on whether there was a case for economic crime corporate liability law reform.

As I understand it, the call for evidence closed in March 2017. I have not yet seen the results of that call for evidence. It would be helpful for the Minister to let us know the outcome of that call for evidence, the main findings and how the Government have decided to act on them. Will they introduce the umbrella offence or create a discrete offence, as we are asking for? Because we think we need action now. That is new clause 19.

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[John Glen]

I undertake to address the points raised by the hon. Member for Oxford East. I will come to the point about the directors’ responsibility in my scripted remarks and also to the issue of what provision the fines were imposed under.

On the specific question the hon. Lady asked, the Ministry of Justice’s call for evidence considered a wide range of reforms to the law relating to corporate liability for economic crime. That is against a backdrop of already significant reform in this area in recent years, including the Bribery Act 2010, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and the introduction of deferred prosecution agreements, which the Government would contend have strengthened the UK’s defences against corporate criminality. The Ministry of Justice is carefully considering the responses received to the call for evidence and is analysing the impacts of the Government’s range of recent reforms in this area. It will respond to its call for evidence in due course. I do not have a specific timetable, but that is the best information I can give the hon. Lady.

New clauses 9 and 15 seek to create a corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent money laundering, with an obligation on the Secretary of State to submit a disqualification order to the court against directors of a company found guilty of such an offence without having adequate anti-money laundering procedures in place. New clause 9 provides that a company or partnership is guilty of a criminal offence where the company’s employee, agent or other service provider commits one of the substantive money laundering offences in part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The relevant company would have a defence if it could prove that it had adequate procedures in place to prevent its employees or agents from committing such an offence.

The offence is not necessary in view of the extensive reforms to the UK’s anti-money laundering regime that the Government have put in place. The proposed offence is substantively applied to firms that are regulated for anti-money laundering purposes by part 2 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. Those require that regulated firms have policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. The Government have legislated to require that these policies, controls and procedures are proportionate with regard to the size and nature of the firm’s business and proved by the firm’s senior management. Failure to comply with these requirements is a criminal offence in itself.

The Financial Conduct Authority and other supervisors are additionally able to take action against firms if their measures to counter money laundering are deficient. As was touched on in our exchange earlier, recent regulatory penalties related to firms’ anti-money laundering weaknesses include fines of £163 million for Deutsche Bank in January 2017 and £72 million for Barclays Bank in November 2015. They were a consequence of failures in anti-money laundering measures under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.

The new clause also seeks to address challenges that have arisen in apportioning responsibility for corporate failings. Within the financial services sector, that has been addressed through the senior managers regime, which was introduced after the financial crisis. Banks are now required to ensure that a named senior manager has unequivocal responsibility for overseeing the firm’s efforts to counter financial crime. That ensures that firms and individuals can be held to account for failing to put proper systems in place to prevent financial crime. If a relevant firm breaches its anti-money laundering obligations, the FCA can take action against a senior manager if it can prove that they did not take such steps as a person in their position can reasonably have been expected to take to avoid the breach occurring. The enforcement action includes fines and disbarment from undertaking regulated activities. The Government have legislated to extend the senior managers regime to apply across all financial services firms. That will be implemented in due course, and will further the Government’s reform programme. All those requirements are additional to the substantive money laundering offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act, such as entering into arrangements that facilitate the use of criminal property, which apply to any individual or company.

As hon. Members know, the Government have previously introduced two similar offences: the failure to prevent bribery, in 2010, and the failure to prevent the facilitation of UK and foreign tax evasion, in 2017. They are structured in a similar way to the proposed new clause, but they were introduced following clear evidence of gaps in the relevant legal frameworks that were limiting the bringing of effective and dissuasive enforcement proceedings. It is right that the offences that we have already established apply to legal entities, regardless of whether they operate in the regulated sector.

The situation in relation to money laundering is very different. The international standard is set by the Financial Action Task Force, which has been referred to numerous times in the Committee’s discussions. The UK’s money laundering regulations apply to banks, financial institutions, certain professional services firms and other types of entity, and act as gatekeepers to the financial system. As I have said, such firms are already required to have policies and procedures in place to prevent their services from being misused for money laundering.

Subsection (6) of new clause 9 would require all companies, regardless of whether they are incorporated, to have procedures in place to prevent persons connected to them from laundering money. The Government do not believe that that would be appropriate. It would risk making non-regulated firms liable for the actions of their regulated professional advisers. Instead, responsibility for anti-money laundering compliance should rest in the regulated sector, as is currently the case. The new clause would not go beyond the existing regulatory framework in that area, and it would blur where responsibility should lie for anti-money laundering compliance. Therefore, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Oxford East to withdraw the new clause.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Economic Secretary for those helpful explanations and clarifications. Despite his useful response, however, there are a number of areas where I am unclear. First, I appreciate that he has probably anticipated this question, but the Committee may ask why it has taken Government a whole year to assess the responses from their consultation on economic crime. Government frequently work at a far faster pace than that. He said that we will have the analysis of those consultation responses in due course. It would be helpful to know more about why it is taking so long for Government to analyse them.

Secondly, the Economic Secretary spoke about the requirement for all regulated firms to ensure that their policies, controls and procedures are appropriate to prevent money laundering, but there is a question about who assesses that and whose responsibility that is. That takes us back to the issue about there being myriad professional bodies, which all operate subtly different approaches towards regulation in this area. As I said, I appreciate that OPBAS has been created to try to draw them together, but I do not think we heard exactly what the status of that office is—I was trying to concentrate on what the Economic Secretary was saying. I have seen different descriptions of it as a team, an office and an organisation. It would be helpful to have a clearer indication, particularly because those professional bodies are, as I understand it, required to contribute financially to OPBAS, so a number of them are keen to understand what is happening with it. Furthermore, HMRC is not a member of it, as I said before, so the concern about a lack of regulatory co-ordination persists.

Finally, the Economic Secretary referred approvingly to the senior managers regime that has been brought in since the financial crisis, which looks like a positive step initially—of course, the HSBC problems occurred following that. In any case, as I understand it, the actual operation of this new regime and its extension are quite different from, for example, what was recommended by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Under this approach, the burden to show that senior managers failed to take appropriate steps will be on the regulator, rather than the senior managers themselves.

That is different from the approach taken in many other areas, including road traffic, health and safety at work, the Bribery Act 2010—which the Minister referred to—terrorist legislation, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and so on. It would be helpful to understand why, with the extension of this regime, the burden of proof has essentially now been placed on the shoulders of the regulator, rather than the shoulders of the managers.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Anneliese Dodds]

We tabled the new clause because ineffective anti-money laundering supervision has a clear and obvious link with inadequate compliance and with low and poor-quality reporting of suspicious activity to the National Crime Agency. Research by a number of non-governmental organisations, particularly Transparency International, has indicated serious failings in the current framework for supervising money laundering compliance in the UK, especially with respect to trust and company service providers.

Under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, only TCSPs carrying on business in the UK—that is their formulation in the legislation—have to register with an anti-money laundering supervisor and comply with MLR 2017. That means of course that TCSPs with no UK presence can incorporate UK companies without any oversight from an AML supervisor. They do not have to comply with UK standards for money laundering checks. We have seen a number of clear examples—I will talk about some in a moment—where that has allowed non-UK TCSPs to incorporate UK companies that have subsequently been used in large-scale money laundering schemes. I think many of the concerns raised a moment ago around undercutting existing legislation and the lack of a fair playing field for UK TCSPs come up again in this regard.

In 2012 the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists showed how a number of UK individuals offering company services had moved their base of operations outside our country but continued to form, and act as nominee directors for, UK companies. There are two examples that are particularly important. The first is Jesse Grant Hester, who was originally from the UK and who moved to Cyprus to form Atlas Corporate Services Ltd before moving to Dubai and, finally, Mauritius—he is somebody who has been lucky enough to travel much in life. Those jurisdictions have all been identified as presenting high money laundering risks. Mauritius in particular is very concerning: it scored 5.92 out of 10 on the Basel Institute on Governance money laundering risk index. Ten is the highest level of money laundering risk and zero is the least, so it is well up there. Jesse Grant Hester appeared on numerous occasions as a nominee director for companies embroiled in corruption scandals. In the Moldovan bank theft that we talked about earlier, he signed fake promissory notes using an alias on behalf of a UK firm, Goldbridge Trading Ltd, allowing £444 million to be stolen. Atlas Corporate Services is associated with eight people who, between them, have held directorships of 3,613 UK companies. Again, that is a staggering number of companies to be held by just eight people. As we discussed, that scandal caused enormous problems for the country of Moldova.

Another UK resident who became internationally renowned, although not in a positive way, for his company formation activities is Ian Taylor. That is not the famous social policy academic, who I had the pleasure of working with, but another Ian Taylor. He also moved around a lot: he moved to Vanuatu.

[John Glen]

There was also a Tory MP of that name.

[Anneliese Dodds]

Oh, there was a Tory MP as well. Goodness—the name is frequently used. He moved to Vanuatu after he was banned from being a corporate director, first in New Zealand in 2011 and then in the UK in 2015, as a result of his companies’ involvement in numerous scandals, including a land banking scam in Somerset. Vanuatu’s self-assessment on money laundering risk found that its TCSP sector was among the most vulnerable to such activity. In 2015 the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering found serious deficiencies in Vanuatu’s AML system. Despite being banned in the UK, Taylor seems to have retained a UK presence. Various investigations have identified the circle of nominee directors that he works with. One of them is a Vanuatu resident who is a director of more than 61 companies. He took over from Taylor as a director of 20 of them on the same date.

Those examples show that physically moving out of the UK does not result in a lack of activity in the UK. Networks of associates make it difficult to stop the formation of UK companies by individuals who have already been disqualified here. Such individuals, who have been shown to have engaged in money laundering activities or have otherwise been disqualified or viewed as not competent in this arena, can function in other countries and create companies. The checking that should go on does not happen, and there is inadequate anti-money laundering supervision. We do not have a means of dealing with that, because we do not have a regulatory system for TCSPs that are not based in countries with appropriate anti-money laundering provisions. That is not currently illegal, which is why we want to change the legal situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I cannot comment on the specific cases that the hon. Lady mentions, because I have not seen or studied them. I imagine that there is a degree of variability in the effectiveness of regimes, but I am trying to set out the Government’s rationale for what we have in place. I do not suggest that it is perfect, but some of the developments have occurred in response to shortcomings that have been identified.

The individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess international and domestic risks, including the money laundering and terrorism risk, which ensures that the most intensive supervision is applied where the highest risks of money laundering exist. The establishment of OPBAS will assist with the consistent identification of such risks across the TCSP sector. Our national risk assessment makes it clear that the Government are aware of the money laundering risks connected with TCSPs, and further reform in the area should take account of the conclusions of the ongoing FATF review. I assure Opposition Members that the regime is a searching and exacting one. I know from ministerial meetings concerning preparations for it that the evaluation will be exacting. We expect the observations to be meaningful, and we will need to respond carefully to them. However, until we receive the outcome of that review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime and of the experience of OPBAS as its role develops, it would not be appropriate to adopt the amendment.

Hon. Members should be mindful of the fact that anti-money laundering supervision around the world follows a territorial model. Simply requiring non-UK TCSPs to have a UK supervisor when they set up UK companies will not address the challenges of extra-territorial supervision. Effective anti-money laundering supervision depends on measures that include supervisory on-site visits and close engagement with higher-risk firms. Requiring a UK supervisor to do that in relation to a non-UK firm will not, in and of itself, address the issue that hon. Members have identified.

As was noted in the other place, the most effective means of combating international money laundering is cross-border co-operation to drive up the standards of overseas supervision and enforcement. For those reasons, we have imposed a duty on each UK anti-money laundering supervisor to take such steps as they consider appropriate to co-operate with overseas authorities. That is the agenda we pursue through the global FATF process. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for those remarks and clarifications. They have been genuinely helpful, but I regret that some areas are still rather unclear to me; perhaps they are not to other Committee members. He stated that the highest-risk TCSPs are assessed to be UK ones, but it has not been spelled out why. Perhaps he could write to me about that.

[John Glen]

I would be happy to write to the hon. Lady to spell that out. My understanding is that UK-based TCSPs typically offer a wider range of services and there are vulnerabilities in the additional services, but I will investigate and write to her as quickly as I can.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for offering to look into that. We must always be wary of talking about a general pattern of activity as necessarily reflecting the risk profile of that overall activity. Among those TCPS, there could be overseas ones that are not appropriately regulated and that also offer a wide range of services, in the same way as some UK TCSPs do.

I am also a bit confused about the professional regulators. As the Minister said, there are about 22 of them, and then on top of that we stick Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority and so on. As I understand it, the professional regulators do not have members based in other countries; they cover only UK residents. We are talking about, for example, the Law Society of Scotland and the Law Society of England and Wales—professional bodies dealing with UK individuals. We are not talking about professional associations covering professionals in other countries.

The Minister seemed to talk about a process of liaison between these organisations and their counterparts in other countries. I am sure we all want to encourage that, because it sounds like a very good idea. Information sharing is wonderful, but information sharing is not the same as having an appropriate process of regulation to ensure that there is compliance with anti-money laundering requirements.

The Minister said that the approach was an extraterritorial one, because it affects bodies in other countries. That is absolutely right, but those bodies then interact with our company formation procedure. That is the reason why we, as a country, have a stake in this process—a rather large one, given the reputational damage that seems to be being caused by the activities of some unregulated or inappropriately regulated TCSPs. I will be pressing the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I just want to clarify that, while I would not profess to be an expert on Pakistan’s compliance with the FATF, the concerns raised about its recent greylisting were around the specific handling of various banned terrorist organisations. I would not wish to cast any wider doubt over its intentions to improve the provision of services.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I thank the Minister for that helpful clarification. It is helpful to know the exact locus of FATF activity or the concerns about Pakistan that were focused on terrorist financing. That is not the area we are focused on now, but such financing and money laundering often go hand in hand.

Given the potential effects of such a ruling—we have talked about that in relation to Pakistan—we think it necessary that Ministers should have the flexibility to ensure that FATF standards can be implemented as soon as possible in our country in order to be on top of new international standards. That is particularly important because the UK was a founding member of the FATF, so we need to show that we are at the cutting edge of implementing its requirements.

As I mentioned, we also need to be able to identify or revoke high-risk countries quickly, taking account of the FATF’s standards and given the effect that it can have on the countries themselves and also on our reputation. If we are viewed as not following FATF recommendations, that prevents the co-ordinated approach that the FATF was set up to promote in the first place.

Finally on this amendment, we hope that Ministers will take account of aligning the designations with our EU partners. We have talked consistently in our deliberations about the need for co-ordination, which of course makes all the mechanisms much more effective. When they are not co-ordinated, there can be loopholes. In that regard, it is important to mention the case of Russia. In 2014, the Arms Export Controls Committees—we talked about their composition when we talked about scrutiny arrangements—reported that more than 200 licences to sell British weapons to Russia, including missile-launching equipment, were still in place, despite David Cameron’s claim that the Government had imposed an absolute arms embargo against Russia in alignment with the rest of the EU. We really need to make sure that that alignment is genuine in practice, not just on the surface and rhetorical.

[John Glen]

New clause 16 would limit amendments to the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 to those that would implement standards published by the Financial Action Task Force, or those whose purpose was identifying or revoking a designation of a high-risk third country. The 2017 regulations transpose the fourth EU anti-money laundering directive, which was in turn derived from the most recent major updates to the FATF standards, which were made in 2012. As the hon. Lady acknowledged, the UK is a founder member of the FATF and is committed to playing a leading role in its continuing work. It is right for the Government to have the power to update the UK regime when such standards change.

There are, however, several areas where the UK’s anti-money laundering regime already goes beyond those standards. Our recently established register of trusts generating tax consequences, for example, goes beyond the standards set by the FATF. Similarly, the UK announced at the time of the 2015 Budget that we intended to regulate virtual currency exchanges for AML purposes—an objective that was accomplished through negotiation of the fifth EU anti-money laundering directive—but that was not required by the FATF. So although we will remain aligned with the FATF standards after the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, our anti-money laundering regime exceeds those standards in certain areas.

The Government are determined to ensure that our defences against misuse of a financial system remain ahead of global standards rather than solely reflecting them. That is reflected in our commitment to the establishment of a public register of the beneficial ownership of non-UK companies that own UK property, which the Committee debated earlier, even if we did not agree on the timeline for it. The new clause would reduce our ability to do so. Under the power in question, the UK’s anti-money laundering regime could not go further in areas where we would otherwise want to.

As I said previously, in debating amendment 7, and as my right hon. Friend the Minister said about new clause 3, we do not believe that a bar on new offences is the right way to address the concerns raised by Lord Judge and others. We have instead tabled amendments to ensure that the power is used only where it is needed, and that Ministers are properly accountable to Parliament for it.

Ensuring that we can make regulations to prevent, or to enable or facilitate the detection or investigation of, money laundering or terrorist financing, as well as to implement the standards of the FATF, is the most certain method of placing future changes to our anti-money laundering system on a sound legal basis. The new clause would limit our ability to do so in the future, and I am sure that is not the intention behind it. I respectfully suggest that the hon. Lady might withdraw it.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. It may be the fact that we have been in this room for a few hours, but I am struggling a little with, in particular, the suggestion that new clause 16 would somehow tie the UK’s hands in implementing additional requirements beyond the FATF standards.

The Minister referred to the public register of property owned by non-UK entities. We had a discussion about that, but he is right: it would arguably be an innovation in the UK. Of course it is one that we need more than other countries, because of the use of our property market in many such cases, and the exponential rise in house prices. He could have talked—although he did not—about the register of beneficial ownership of companies being an innovation as well, but countries such as the Netherlands and Norway are putting those into practice anyway, so perhaps we are not quite as far-reaching in what we are doing as we might suggest. Particularly in relation to the charges and fines levied against those found guilty of money laundering offences, we seem to be in a different position from that of our North American counterparts, for example, as we have discussed. None the less, it is not clear how the new clause would stop us going further than those other jurisdictions where we wished to do so. It says that we would take account of the

“best international practice including EU sanctions regimes”,

not that we would be led by it.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 6th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[John Glen]

I am grateful for that challenge. As I set out, the Government would only amend the definition when necessary to meet UN obligations to further the prevention of terrorism. The clause is designed just to give the scope to amend the definition of terrorist financing.

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is good to be here with you in the Chair, Mr McCabe. My reading of the Government amendment—maybe I have interpreted something wrong—is that it says,

“or a purpose related to the prevention of terrorism.”

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [Lords] (Fourth sitting)

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Thursday 1st March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland for not seeking to embarrass me again.

Amendment 36 requires the Government to provide quarterly reports on the impact of all sanction regimes, including the number and value of suspected breaches of sanctions. In considering the sorts of scenario that are in play here, hon. Members will remember that sanctions breaches are highly complex and involve multiple parties across various time periods. Sometimes they take place across borders and in different jurisdictions. The complexity of most sanctions breaches means that the investigation process from initial report to action often takes significant time and resources. There is also often a time lag between the breach taking place and being reported. The Government therefore continually adjust their figures as new information comes to light. Hence, it is very challenging to make the process fully accurate. It would be extremely difficult for the Government to report accurately on the number of breaches suspected or found at any one time. That would render the information published in the quarterly reports of little practical value.

The amendment would also place a significant burden on businesses. Currently, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation collects information on the value of funds frozen annually, which is onerous on businesses but important for compliance purposes.

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

I understand that the US Office of Foreign Assets Control routinely releases details of licences and other information. It believes it has achieved an appropriate balance between commercial confidentiality and public accountability, and it does not appear to be overly onerous in the US context. I wonder why we view it as being overly onerous in the UK context.

[John Glen]

It is not about the reporting, but the frequency of the reporting. The point I am making is that to increase it to quarterly would add unnecessary compliance cost to industry, when that cost is already considerable if necessary. It would also result in an administrative burden for Government to produce figures that may not be of much practical use. We do not think that is the best way to spend the limited resource of public money.

Providing quarterly reporting regime by regime may also risk breaking other laws. At the moment we only provide regime figures for the largest regimes. For the small regimes there may only be a small number of designated persons with frozen funds in the UK so providing that specific information, which can easily be traced back to them, may risk breaching data protection laws.

The Government have already committed to being transparent where appropriate. As part of the monetary penalty guidance published last year by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the Government committed to publishing details of breaches and criminal prosecutions. That is a matter of public record.

For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. I know that he is a very sincere and engaged Minister, but I am concerned that the direct questions that we levelled have not been answered. We asked for an indication of exactly how many of these SLPs had provided that beneficial ownership information. We asked for an update on that, but we have not had it. I also asked for an indication of how many of these SLPs have been prosecuted; I did not receive that, either. I did not receive an indication of how many have been fined under this new regime, which was set up last June. Surely we have had a number of months of operation of that new regime in order to adjudge whether it is truly effective.

I appreciate what the Minister said about BEIS conducting a review, but if the existing system is not working correctly, or if we have doubts about its operation, given the huge damage that these structures already seem to have inflicted, surely we need to have a reference to them in the Bill? We need to show that we are taking this matter seriously, and particularly that the Westminster Government are taking it seriously, in the light of comments from Government figures in other nations and their concerns about the use of SLPs.

I give the Minister one last chance to answer those questions and give that information: the number of prosecutions, the number of fines, and the number of SLPs indicating beneficial ownership information. If we do not get that information, we will have no choice but to press our amendment to a vote.

[John Glen]

I am very sorry but I cannot give those precise details at this point. I undertake to write to the hon. Lady, as soon as I can with that information, but I can do nothing from this place at this moment to provide it.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification. I do not want to go around the houses again, as we did at some length on Tuesday. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland for explaining why we are concerned about the lack of accountability in general for measures imposing criminal sanctions throughout the Bill. I recognise what the Minister said about this being a separate regime; it is obviously not the same one as is applied in the case of sanctions. The offences that can be applied are lesser in their extent—for example, we are talking about shorter prison sentences in the Bill—but we still have many of the same concerns that we expressed previously.

There has been some shift on the part of the Government, but I suppose it is difficult for any of us to judge whether the spirit of Lord Judge has been complied with, or whether there has merely been some kind of interpretation of a clutch of some of his words. Certainly we will look at what is written on the tin, but to us it does not appear to constitute recognition of the concerns expressed or the kind of meaningful engagement that we need. We are doing something very significant in the Bill, which in effect creates de novo a sanctions and anti- money laundering regime. Much stronger accountability is needed than is in the Bill, even as amended by the Government. We have the same concerns as we expressed previously, so we will resist the amendment.

[John Glen]

I acknowledge the outstanding concerns. I think I have set out clearly the rationale, why we need the provisions and how they respond suitably to Lord Judge’s concerns. I acknowledge the genuine difference of opinion, but I have set out the Government’s position and it is now for the Opposition to do as they wish.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

Amendment 10 is a consequence of the proposed new paragraph 20A, which will be inserted by amendment 11. Paragraph 20A(1) refers to offences created for the purposes of the enforcement of requirements imposed by or under regulations under clause 43.

The amendment further narrows the powers for future regulations to make provision for new criminal offences, as I referred to in the discussion on the previous amendment, as compared with the Bill when it was first introduced in the other place. It would make the powers subject to the requirement for a report to Parliament, along the same lines as amendments to part 1 of the Bill. That report would identify the offences created and their respective penalties, and would confirm that the Minister has considered that there are good reasons for creating those offences and setting the penalties at the levels at which they have been set. It would ensure that the Minister does not use the power lightly and is fully accountable to Parliament for doing so.

I take the opportunity to remind hon. Members that these safeguards are contained in Government amendment 11, to which I will turn shortly. These amendments are part of the wider package that inserts safeguards on the use of this power, and have been designed to directly address the concerns raised by Lord Judge and others in the other place.

The amendment restricts the scope of the power to create future offences to offences created for the purposes of enforcing future anti-money laundering regulations. Amendment 12 ensures that references made to regulations made under clause 43, with respect to paragraph 15 of schedule 2, and requirements imposed by regulations made under clause 43, with respect to paragraph 20A of schedule 2, also include reference to, or requirements imposed by, the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. That ensures that the safeguards proposed by Government amendment 11 will also apply to possible future changes made to the 2017 regulations.

The amendment ensures that it is possible for new money laundering offences to be created by amending the 2017 regulations. It will therefore enable the Government to create new offences in order to respond to, for example, emerging risks identified by the national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing, which was published in October 2017, or in response to the ongoing review of the financial action taskforce of the UK’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance regime. When the Government do so, using the powers contained in clause 43, the enhanced procedural protections set out in the amendment will apply.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. First, in relation to Government amendments 10 and 11, the Opposition would like the accountability provisions to be much more extensive than they are. However, given that the Government just won the last vote on an amendment, it would be rather self-defeating for us to oppose these amendments at this stage.

I have a question on Government amendment 12; perhaps the Minister can enlighten us a little bit. I understood that the whole Bill, when it comes to its money laundering provisions, amends the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017. I am therefore slightly confused about the timing and scheduling. Why are the Government bringing those regulations into the Bill when they were not there in the first place? I wonder whether the Minister can enlighten us.

[John Glen]

This is an enabling measure that allows us to take the action necessary. I am not sure I quite grasped the hon. Lady’s point. I think I will need to write to her to clarify that so that I do not say anything that misrepresents the Government’s position.

Amendment 10 agreed to.

[John Glen]

I beg to move amendment 11, in schedule 2, page 54, line 11 at end insert—

“20A (1) In this paragraph ‘relevant regulations’ means regulations under section 43 which create any offence for the purposes of the enforcement of any requirements imposed by or under regulations under section 43.

(2) The appropriate Minister making any relevant regulations (‘the Minister’) must at the required time lay before Parliament a report which—

(a) specifies the offences created by the regulations, indicating the requirements to which those offences relate,

(b) states that the Minister considers that there are good reasons for those requirements to be enforceable by criminal proceedings and explains why the Minister is of that opinion, and

(c) in the case of any of those offences which are punishable with imprisonment—

(i) states the maximum terms of imprisonment that apply to those offences,

(ii) states that the Minister considers that there are good reasons for those maximum terms, and

(iii) explains why the Minister is of that opinion.

(3) Sub-paragraph (4) applies where an offence created by the regulations relates to particular requirements and the Minister considers that a good reason—

(a) for those requirements to be enforceable by criminal proceedings, or

(b) for a particular maximum term of imprisonment to apply to that offence,

is consistency with another enactment relating to the enforcement of similar requirements.

(4) The report must identify that other enactment.

(5) In sub-paragraph (3) ‘another enactment’ means any provision of or made under an Act, other than a provision of the regulations to which the report relates.

(6) In sub-paragraph (2) ‘the required time’ means the same time as the draft of the statutory instrument containing the regulations is laid before Parliament.

(7) This paragraph applies to regulations which amend other regulations under section 43 so as to create an offence as it applies to regulations which otherwise create an offence.”

This amendment requires that where regulations under Clause 43 are made which include offences, a report specifying the offences and giving reasons for any terms of imprisonment that apply to them must be laid before Parliament.

As I said earlier, amendment 11 provides for an important safeguard that will apply when powers are used to create criminal offences. It will require the Government to lay a report before Parliament explaining the Minister’s reasons for using the powers—amendments 10, 11 and 12 are really a package—whenever a criminal offence is created in new or amended anti-money laundering regulations under clause 43.

The amendment requires such a report to be laid at the same time as the draft statutory instrument containing the relevant regulations. Regulations under clause 43 will of course be made using the draft affirmative procedure, unless they update the UK’s list of high-risk jurisdictions in connection with which enhanced due diligence measures are required. The report will therefore facilitate effective parliamentary scrutiny of changes to the UK’s AML regime and will go further than the status quo in enabling Parliament to scrutinise the creation of criminal offences through money laundering regulations.

The amendment specifies that the following elements should be included in the report: the offences that have been created and the requirements to which they refer; the good reasons why those requirements need criminal offences; the maximum prison terms for any offences created that are punishable by imprisonment; the good reasons for setting the maximum prison terms at the levels at which they have been set; and, where the creation of an offence is justified by reference to an existing offence in another enactment, reference to that other enactment.

The requirement for the Minister to demonstrate that they have good reasons for using the power ensures that it cannot be used lightly. I hope hon. Members agree that such reports will provide increased transparency about the reasons for creating criminal offences and give Members a solid basis for holding the Government to account when debating anti-money laundering regulations made under the Bill.

Nevertheless, the Government remain very aware that creating criminal offences and setting penalties in regulations is a serious matter that is not to be undertaken lightly. I am therefore happy to repeat reassurances and existing safeguards that the Government introduced in the other place. As it stands, a criminal offence can be established under clause 43 only if regulations provide either a mental element necessary for the commission of the offence or a defence to it, or both. That will maintain the existing policy position under the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 and preserve the deterrent effect established by criminalising breaches of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulations.

The amendment is an additional safeguard to the changes the Government have already introduced in response to concerns raised in the other place by Lord Judge and others. We listened to those concerns, and the amendment addresses them. It will ensure that Ministers cannot create criminal offences or set penalties —up to a maximum of two years’ imprisonment—without good reasons, and that Parliament has all the information it needs to hold Ministers to account.

That contrasts starkly with current practice, in which new criminal offences are created through statutory instruments made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 under the negative procedure, without any need to state reasons, with no information about such reasons being provided to Parliament, and with no requirement for a vote in Parliament to approve them. The measure is, therefore, a better way of ensuring that proper safeguards are placed in the Bill with respect to offences, rather than removing the ability to create them, and so weakening the UK’s anti-money laundering regime.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. I shall not dwell on the matter, because we have already talked about the amendment to an extent in a previous debate. I repeat our concern that the regime is not sufficiently accountable. Reference to the previous regime may be inappropriate, because the framework in that case was set at EU level, and it was a question of implementing it in the UK. Surely with the brave new dawn that some see coming as we leave the EU, we should be aiming at a system that is as accountable as possible.

In our previous discussions about offences in relation to sanctions, Ministers suggested that there could be a need for speed in the creation of new regimes or new types of criminal offence, because, for example, a human rights challenge could arise suddenly, or there could be gross violations of human rights in a particular country, and we might need to respond quickly. Surely such a situation does not apply to money laundering. It is peculiar that the same almost fast-track, post hoc style of system should be applied to criminal offences to do with money laundering. It would be helpful to have more information about why the Government believe that in the relevant category of criminal offence, there cannot be the same—or at least movement towards the same—degree of scrutiny as there would be in other contexts, when the question of speed surely does not apply. In fact, the Minister did not mention speed.

[John Glen]

I take the hon. Lady’s concerns seriously. As my right hon. Friend the Minister said earlier, when we were discussing similar matters on Tuesday, we should be happy for hon. Members to meet officials to discuss outstanding concerns. I have set out in the amendments a clear affirmative process for laying a statutory instrument before the House, in a situation where Parliament will be able to discuss the requirement and its extent, the underlying rationale, and a mechanism for reporting to Parliament. If there are particular issues and specific cases that the hon. Lady wants to raise, I suggest that we convene a conversation with officials to deal with them. As we move forward, I am keen to secure the widest possible support and consensus about the Bill.

Amendment 11 agreed to.

Amendment made: 12, in schedule 2, page 54, line 39, at end insert—

‘( ) In paragraph 15 (offences), any reference to regulations under section 43 includes the Money Laundering Regulations 2017.

( ) In paragraph 20A (report in respect of offences)—

(a) the reference in sub-paragraph (1) to requirements imposed by or under regulations under section 43 includes requirements imposed by or under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, and

(b) the reference in sub-paragraph (7) to other regulations under section 43 includes the Money Laundering Regulations 2017.”—(John Glen.)

This amendment has the effect that, while the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 remain in force, offences may be created by regulations under Clause 43 for the purposes of enforcing requirements in the 2017 regulations.

Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Mike Freer.)

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 27th February 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I shall speak briefly on a couple of points.

First, the Minister helpfully stated that the Government do support NGO operations in countries subject to conflict. Will he be more explicit and state that the Government support NGO operations in countries subject to sanctions? That is exactly what we are talking about now. The concern for many in the development community is that the balance is currently towards a presumption against activities occurring in countries where there are sanctions, rather than that being feasible for those organisations when fulfilling international obligations, as we would expect.

Secondly, on amendment 18 on the fast-track process, I was encouraged by some of what the Minister said but was slightly concerned by the reference to the Government continuing current processes, with the suggestion that those are adequate. I have certainly received information, as I am sure other colleagues have—the hon. Member for Glasgow Central referred to some of this—on the impact of fuel sanctions. I understand that delays in getting appropriate licences and exemptions in relation to sanctions on fuel in Syria have led to farcical situations in which, for example, a hospital was destroyed before it was possible to get the fuel that would serve that hospital. The current system is not working at the moment. I wonder whether we may have more of a focus on not following existing practices, which clearly are not operating adequately.

The Minister suggested that the fast-track process would lead to some kind of inappropriate, one-size-fits-all system where, for example, a need for medicine in one situation could be trumped by humanitarian concerns. Surely medical needs could come under humanitarian concerns? What we are really talking about is the need for a fast-track approach to humanitarian peace-building action that will be interpreted sensitively and intelligently, but which could get away from the current impediments for NGOs.

[John Glen]

I am happy to address those points. I can of course confirm that NGOs in countries subject to sanctions are still able to access these provisions. On the hon. Lady’s point on the fast-tracking process, and the point on fuel sanctions, I said what I said in response to the amendments, but we are obviously living in a very imperfect situation, with highly challenging environments. It will not be possible to get things right every time, but I think the provisions in this legislation give us the best opportunity to do so. I think I have set out the Government’s position clearly.

Draft Help-to-Save Accounts Regulations 2018

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Monday 22nd January 2018 General Committees

[John Glen]

Today’s debate has been an interesting one, and I am grateful to hon. Members who have contributed. Before I deal with the detailed points that have been raised, I want to thank the many groups of individuals who have given their views on the proposals, including hon. Members, many of whom are here, who participated in debates during the passage of the Savings (Government Contributions) Act 2017.

On eligibility, the hon. Member for Oxford East suggested broadly that the passporting of eligibility rules excludes many people who could benefit from the scheme. I think the hon. Member for Glasgow Central mentioned people under 25, carers, and those who support themselves without claiming benefits. In essence, she was asking why we did not have bespoke rules. The eligibility rules balance simplicity and certainty for individuals and the aim of supporting low-income working families to become regular savers. Passporting the scheme in this way will ensure that it targets effectively those on low incomes, and is a well-established means of targeting Government support across a range of policies. There is a five-year window to enter the Help-to-Save scheme and applicants need to meet the eligibility criteria only at the time they register.

The hon. Lady mentioned eligibility rules in regulation 3(3), which refers to each date, and regulation 3(3)(b), which mentions the first date. The point is that the condition remains satisfied on each eligibility reference date. Respondents to the consultation were overwhelmingly in favour of keeping the eligibility criteria as simple as possible. Keeping in line with eligibility for other benefits and credits will keep the administrative burden on the customer to a minimum, therefore encouraging take-up and maximising the benefit of the scheme. Adding different thresholds for different groups would greatly complicate the scheme. The scheme has been designed in this way to create equality between applicants claiming working tax credits and universal credit.

In response to the point about different providers and the incentivisation of credit unions, using NS&I to build the accounts ensures national coverage of the scheme, as I said in my opening remarks. That is necessary for there to be confidence in the scheme when it starts. NS&I has a proven record in delivering a range of savings products. The hon. Member for Oxford East referenced our exchange last week on the performance of the voucher scheme.

[Anneliese Dodds]

It was tax-free childcare.

[John Glen]

Tax-free childcare; I am sorry. I met with NS&I this morning to discuss the need to get things right and the improvements that have been made, but the hon. Lady raised a legitimate point. During the trial period, we will try to draw out any errors before the scheme is fully rolled out in October. We will use our expertise and what we have learned from the introduction of tax-free childcare to ensure that we provide a service that meets customers’ needs. We are always looking for opportunities to partner with others and we are open to ideas surrounding how we best ensure that as many people as possible benefit from the scheme.

The hon. Member for Glasgow Central referred to the number of people who might sign up. I thought it would be helpful for her to know that based on the take-up of previous schemes, our estimate is that 400,000 people will sign up to the accounts. I welcome the question on how customers will access the Help-to-Save accounts and our plans for the digitally excluded. Help-to-Save is an online savings account. All transactions, including checking the balance and paying in savings, can be managed online through gov.uk. Digitally excluded customers and people with particular needs will be able to manage their accounts through telephone banking. I offer reassurance that that will be through a 03000 number at the standard rate. That will also apply to calls that are transferred to NS&I. Paper statements will be issued to digitally excluded customers.

In terms of the future of the single provider, the regulations would need to be changed to provide for more than one provider. At this point, it would be sensible to monitor things as the scheme goes on. If there is evidence to suggest that additional providers would be helpful and would assist in the take-up, that is certainly something that the Government and I would be willing to look at.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am sorry to intervene, but I wanted to double-check something with the Minister. I was encouraged to intervene because I think this is the only chance I will have. On the exact issue of eligibility, it was not totally clear whether applicants currently claiming universal credit will need to have fulfilled the income criterion and earned the equivalent of at least 16 hours a week at the national minimum wage only when they apply, which is what it looks like from paragraph 3(b), or also when their application is accepted. I share the Minister’s concern about having simplicity. I cannot get my head around this, and I have been able to look at all the different debates. Can he confirm that it is paragraph 3(b) that is right and not the introduction to that regulation, which suggests that the criteria will apply at the point of application and at the point of acceptance?

[John Glen]

I am very sorry for the lack of clarity in my remarks. The criteria will be fulfilled at the point of application. If that is satisfied, that is it for the duration. Many apologies for my ambiguity on that.

I want to deal with Help-to-Save’s impact on entitlement to benefits and credits. Help-to-Save is intended to help people build up a rainy day fund. The Government bonus will not count as income for means-testing purposes when assessing eligibility for housing benefit. The bonus and any savings accumulated in a Help-to-Save account will not affect tax credit awards and would start to impact on universal credit awards only if the customer had savings of £6,000 or over, including the money in their Help-to-Save account.

The hon. Member for Glasgow Central asked about access in the case of broken or abusive relationships. I would be happy to take representations on that issue and to look at it.

I hope that I have dealt with most of the points that have been raised. I acknowledge the broader point that the scheme does not solve every problem. It would be wrong for me to say that it will target everyone, but it is a step in the right direction. It will have a positive effect and it will deliver a change in behaviour with respect to savings that the work by the Money Advice Service two years ago showed is very much needed.

The Government’s vision is to empower working families with the confidence, skills and opportunity to manage their personal finances. The regulations will bolster people’s ability to save by giving a boost to what they manage to put aside each month. Help-to-Save will encourage such families to become regular savers and give them a financial buffer to protect them from income shocks. The ensuing financial resilience will benefit us all. Our economy is the sum of its parts, and the Government are committed to ensuring that every part of it and every person has the support they need. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft Help-to-Save Accounts Regulations 2018.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between John Glen and Anneliese Dodds

Tuesday 16th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[John Glen]

My hon. Friend is right. The Government do not take anything for granted and will look very closely at what is happening with the poorest in our society.

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does the Minister acknowledge that the reasons why a quarter of people on low incomes are currently experiencing significant problems with arrears or debt repayment include, first, his Government not taking on board Labour’s programme to rein in credit card debt and, secondly, the fact that their changes to the tax threshold have been outweighed for the poorest people by alterations to social security?

[John Glen]

The hon. Lady needs to acknowledge the transformation that the national living wage has brought to so many people and this Government’s willingness to increase it above inflation. It is also worth noting that interest payments as a proportion of income are currently at the lowest on record.