European Union (Withdrawal) Acts

Debate between John Baron and Dominic Grieve

Saturday 19th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

[Mr Grieve]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

[Mr Speaker]

I will come to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but I call Mr John Baron.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between John Baron and Dominic Grieve

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I beg to move manuscript amendment (b), to leave out from first “19P” to end.

I am grateful to you, Mr Speaker, for having enabled this amendment to be considered this afternoon by accepting my manuscript. It is a very odd and, I have to say, unsatisfactory aspect of the way in which our Parliament does its business that we frequently end up on ping-pong debating amendments that are irrelevant to what the House is really troubled about. I have to tell the House that, in order to get to this point, it has been necessary also to twist the rules of procedure in the other place, and I am immensely grateful to those peers who facilitated the manuscript amendment that was tabled there and that has enabled us to consider for the first time this afternoon the issue of the meaningful vote in relation to the Government’s view of what it should be and to the suggestion that has come from their lordships’ House. I should like to say here and now how deeply I object to the way in which their lordships are vilified for doing the job that we have asked them to do, which is to act as a revising Chamber and to send back to this House proposals for our consideration.

The issue, which has been highlighted by earlier speakers, is about the form that a meaningful vote should take. There are two options in front of the House. The House will recall that, when this matter first arose last week, the amendment that had come from the Lords included a mandatory element. That is constitutionally rather unusual. Indeed, I do not think that it has happened since the civil war in the 17th century, and I do not think that that ended very well. I seem to recall that it ended with Oliver Cromwell saying:

“Take away that fool’s bauble, the mace.”

Because of this, I considered it to be excessive. I apologise to the House that, in trying to produce something else very late at night last week, I probably did not draft it quite as well as I might have done. However, it led to a sensible discussion, prompted by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who had a number of us in her room and said she would do her best to meet the concerns we were expressing on there not being a meaningful vote on no deal.

Last Thursday, it looked as though we were going to reach an agreement based on exactly the terms of the Lords amendment that has come back to us, but at a very late stage, it was indicated to me that the Government did not feel able to proceed with that. I should like to emphasise that I make absolutely no criticism of those with whom I negotiated, who have behaved impeccably in this matter. Indeed, at the end of the day I have to accept that negotiations may sometimes founder at the last minute. However, this was unfortunate, from my point of view, and I will come back to that point in a moment.

Be that as it may, the Government’s tabled amendment was the one that we are being asked to accept today—the one that simply asks us to note and does not give us the opportunity of amending. Two arguments were put to me to justify that change when it occurred and in the negotiations that followed. The first was that there was concern about the justiciability of the amendment. The Standing Orders of the House cannot be impugned in any court outside of this high court of Parliament, but it is right to say that if one puts a reference to the Standing Orders into a statute, that can raise some interesting, if somewhat arcane, legal issues about the extent to which a challenge can be brought. My view is that I do not believe that the amendment, which is currently the Lords amendment that has come to us, is credibly open to challenge. For that matter, I happen to think that the Government amendment is also not credibly open to challenge either, although it is worth pointing out that it is as likely to be challenged or capable of being challenged as the other. I do not accept a differentiation between them.

The second argument was of a very different kind. It was said to me—this was picked up by the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman—that the Government had real concerns that this issue, which is one of detail, had acquired such a status with those with whom we were negotiating that it could undermine the Government’s negotiating position in trying to get the United Kingdom the best possible deal for leaving the EU. Now, I must say that I found that difficult to accept based on my own range of contacts and on how I thought that the EU is likely to work. However, it is not an issue that I, as a supporter of the Government, can entirely ignore.

I am very troubled about Brexit. It is well known in this House that I believe that we have made an historic mistake in voting to leave, but I am open minded as to what the best course of action should be and respectful of the decision of the electorate in the referendum result. I dislike very much the extent to which we can be fettered or pushed into frameworks of what we have or have not to accept in that negotiation but that is, if I may so, a reason why I should also give as much latitude to the concerns of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister as she indicates to me that she might have.

[Mr Baron]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

No, I wish to conclude.

In those circumstances, there is an issue that I cannot ignore. As the House will have noticed this afternoon, a statement was sent by the Secretary of State that will become a written ministerial statement tomorrow. The first part of it deals with the position of the Speaker and, if I may put it like this, the piquancy of this is that having on the one hand said that an unamendable motion to note is an unamendable motion to note in a statute, the fact is that it really has absolutely no force at all. The reality is that it is part of the Standing Orders of this House, and it is not open to any interpretation in any court and, ultimately, it will be entirely your responsibility, Mr Speaker, to decide what can or should not be treated as a neutral terms motion. Actually, the statement highlights the fact that, although this debate has been about trying to provide assurance—not just in this House, but to many members of the public outside who are worried about the end of this process and what might happen—the truth is that the assurance does not lie in the words of the statute, except in so far as the statute is the word of the Government. The assurance lies in the hands of this House and, in the first part of the statement, in the power of the Speaker.

I then insisted that a second piece be put into the statement, which I will read out. If I may say so, this ought to be blindingly obvious, but it says:

“The Government recognises that it is open for Ministers and members of the House of Commons to table motions on and debate matters of concern and that, as is the convention, parliamentary time will be provided for this.”

If this House chooses to debate matters, including matters on which it may wish to have multiple motions, the reality is that if we wish to exert our power to do that, we can. In the circumstances that might follow a “no deal”, which would undoubtedly be one of the biggest political crises in modern British history, if the House wishes to speak with one voice, or indeed with multiple voices, the House has the power to do so.

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, the hon. Gentleman is right, but if the Government were to concede to the amendment, as drafted in the Lords, for an amendable motion, the House must understand that the Government could ignore it. I can assure the House that it would not be enforceable in any court of law—[Interruption.] No, that really must be understood. It could not be enforceable in any court of law, because that would entirely undermine the rights and privileges of this place. It would be for us to enforce it. Of course, the ultimate sanction that this House has is a motion of no confidence but, short of that, there are other means by which the House can in fact bring its clear view to bear on the Government.

[Mr Baron]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

No, I will not.

In view of that acknowledgement, I must say that I weigh that and the clear words of this statement against what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has told me about her anxieties. My judgment—it is purely personal—is that if that is the issue, having finally obtained, with a little more difficulty than I would have wished, the obvious acknowledgement of the sovereignty of this place over the Executive in black and white language, I am prepared to accept the Government’s difficulty, support them and, in the circumstances, to accept the form of amendment that they want. I shall formally move my amendment at the end, because I do not want to deprive the House of the right to vote if it wishes. Members have the absolute right to disagree, but it seems to me that, with the acknowledgement having been properly made, I am content to go down that route.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between John Baron and Dominic Grieve

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

My right hon. and learned Friend will know that I have never participated in any of that sort of language. May I gently put it to him that amendment 7 leaves open at least the possibility that, given that the EU does not want any member to leave and that there is therefore no incentive for it to negotiate a good deal that would be acceptable to this Parliament, we could find ourselves in a permanent state of limbo, deadlocked in unproductive negotiations?

[Mr Grieve]

I note what my hon. Friend has said and I am very grateful to him for the way in which he put it, but I happen to disagree with him. If he listens to me he will understand why I think that I am right on that point.

The consequence is that we completely lose sight of what the key issues are, and if I may say so before I move on, that matters a lot, because in the course of this, we also lose sight of the fact that we are the Parliament of a deeply divided country on this issue. When I go and lecture to sixth-formers occasionally and talk to them, I point out that the parliamentary process is not just about the imposition of the will of the majority on the minority; it is the process by which we obtain consent for what the majority chooses to do.

The difficulty with this referendum is that, having invoked the public will, which, I regret to say, is not entirely tempered in its expressions of view by some of the courtesies that we extend to each other here, we run the risk of losing sight of the fact that 48% of the electorate did not wish for the policy that we are currently pursuing and have deep concerns about, not trying to reverse it, but the extent to which it will have an adverse impact on their well-being, and request us as a Parliament to pay as much attention to what they are saying as we undoubtedly have to do to those who voted in the referendum and said that they wanted to leave. The most worrying aspect of the debate, as it has progressed, is how we become polarised and so fixated on ends that we fail completely to look at means. We look at the top of the mountain, but not at where we are going to put our foot next. As a consequence, we run serious risks of badly letting them down—all of them, collectively—by enacting bad legislation and taking very foolish decisions.

Of course, when this confrontation comes along, the negotiations immediately stop, the conversation ceases, the Government’s steamroller is invoked, and the atmosphere can suddenly get really quite unpleasant; and I regret it. As a consequence—I will come back to this in a moment—I have to tell my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that I think they have lost a series of opportunities in the dialogue we have had on this to come to a sensible outcome. With that, I turn to the issue that is, in truth, under debate.

John Downey

Debate between John Baron and Dominic Grieve

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I am not sure whether I can use nice words, but I shall do my best to answer the hon. Lady’s question honestly. Had the scheme operated in the way that was intended, then I have to say that I do not think there was any prospect of anyone, relatives or otherwise, being denied justice in relation to anybody who received such a letter. But that is on the basis that the scheme operated properly. It is quite clear that in this case it did not operate properly because Mr Downey should not have been sent this letter. We will have to wait and see whether this is some wider failure, which applies elsewhere, but certainly from the information that I was given when I looked into this matter at the outset, there was a system in place to try to ensure that every nook and corner was looked at before such letters were sent.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

However it is presented, the recipients of these letters are above the law. That is what this court decision has made clear. Will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that a balanced approach will therefore be taken as regards former soldiers serving in Northern Ireland? We have heard that the authorities are already advertising for witnesses in the case of Bloody Sunday. Will he also answer one question that has not been answered so far? Who in the Government authorised these letters?

[The Attorney-General]

I disagree that the letters placed the recipients above the law.

[Mr Baron]

That is what the court has decided.

[The Attorney-General]

No; it has not decided that the letters placed people above the law. If the letters had been correctly sent to recipients against whom there was no evidence at the time on which criminal proceedings could be brought against them if they returned to the jurisdiction, they had no possibility of putting them above the law, and as I mentioned, the letters leave open the possibility that if evidence were to come to light implicating such individuals, they could still be prosecuted. The difficulty in the case of Mr Downey was that the evidence against him was already available at the time the letter was sent, which is why he should not have been sent the letter.

I am not in a position to comment on the position of former soldiers. I simply make the point that the general rules and principles of the rule of law apply, irrespective of who may or may not have committed an offence. But in any event, my own direct responsibilities do not extend to the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland.

Those are the two points I would wish to make, but I reiterate that these letters did not amount to an amnesty.

Points of Order

Debate between John Baron and Dominic Grieve

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I do not often raise points of order, as you know, but I seek your guidance briefly. We have just had an urgent question in which the Attorney-General was asked directly who first authorised those letters, but we have not yet had an answer. How best could we go about gaining one?

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

rose—

Voting by Prisoners

Debate between John Baron and Dominic Grieve

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I must make progress; otherwise I will not be able to do what I principally came here to do.

I want to deal with the point about the Grand Chamber in the Hirst case. The Grand Chamber declined, properly, to provide any detailed guidance on how to make our current regime compatible with the convention. It also made it clear that special weight should be given to the role of the domestic policy maker. Despite the difficulties that the House might face, we have a real opportunity, through debate, to shape the dialogue with the Court if we focus on the key issues.

I will now deal with the main legal issues on prisoner voting. I will set out the main points raised by the main judgments, because it might make the debate more difficult if the House does not have them in mind. I shall first outline the key points in the Hirst judgment, which dates back to October 2005. The Court took the view that it was well established that article 3 of protocol 1 to the convention, to which we are signatories, guarantees individuals the right to vote and to stand for election. The Court considered that to be a right, not a privilege. It also considered that that principle was important in ensuring an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law. It therefore felt that departure from the principle of universal suffrage risked undermining the democratic validity of the elected legislature and the laws that it promulgates. That might not have exercised us very much here, but in the context of the many east European states that have joined the European convention it is probably right to say that those are really serious, material considerations.

In the view of the Court, prisoners continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the convention. I do not think that either my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden or the right hon. Member for Blackburn disagree with that. The Court’s reasoning, with which I appreciate many hon. Members disagree, is that, in view of the fact that the convention does not allow prisoners to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or to have restrictions placed on their freedom of expression or freedom to practise their religion, a restriction on their right to vote should have the aim only of

“preventing crime by sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners, and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law”.

The Court also recognised that the participating states had a wide margin of appreciation in deciding on such restrictions, but that that was not an unlimited discretion. It felt that the restriction should be proportionate and—this is the nub of the issue—that section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 imposed a blanket ban, which was seen as being so indiscriminate as to fall outside the acceptable margin of appreciation.

[Mr Baron]

The central questions are whether the interpretation of the treaty that we signed has gone beyond what the original treaty contained, and who, thereafter, has the right to make a decision on the matter. Should it be this Parliament or an unelected European institution that makes such decisions? The clear evidence is that it should be this House, and that the interpretation has gone beyond the terms of the original treaty. That is what this vote is about today.

[The Attorney-General]

I appreciate that that is what my hon. Friend and many others believe the issue for debate to be. I recognise that it is going to be a major topic for debate this afternoon, but, if he will forgive me, I will suggest that hon. Members might also wish to focus on why they consider the current ban, or some variant of it, to be reasonable and proportionate in our own national context. It was the absence of debate on that issue that appeared to make the Court take the view that our ban was indiscriminate—