EU: Withdrawal and Future Relationship (Motions)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Monday 1st April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I will not, because I am trying to make some progress. We will support motion (E), because at this late stage it is clear that any Brexit deal agreed in this Parliament will need further democratic approval, and that is what the motion will provide. It will put a lock around any deal that the Prime Minister forces through at the eleventh hour, or any revised deal that comes about at this very late stage. It will ensure that any Tory Brexit deal is subject to a referendum lock. In other words, it upholds the principle that any such deal must be confirmed by the public if we are to proceed.

I want to finish by dealing briefly with motion (G). I understand why it has been tabled, and I have had the opportunity to discuss it with the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) . Our focus today is on the way forward, and that is why we are supporting the three motions that I have mentioned. Motion (G) is, in a sense, a fall-back for if that exercise fails, so I understand why it has been tabled. We will not be voting in favour of it tonight, but we accept that it deals with an issue that the House will have to confront in due course.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am extremely puzzled by the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s position. We all have to compromise today. I am going to vote for motion (D), and I am on the record as having concerns about it and saying that it did not go far enough. What does he think will be the reaction of working-class voters if the Labour Front Benchers’ failure to support motion (G) means that we crash out with no deal a week on Friday?

[Keir Starmer]

As we try to find a way forward, I think it is important that we all adopt the right tone, rather than throwing around, “What will people think of this, that and the other?” We have always said that we will take whatever measures are necessary to stop no deal. The exercise that we are involved in is an attempt to break the impasse and find a way through, using the indicative process. I accept that if that fails, there will have to be an insurance exercise, but we are not at that stage yet.

[Joanna Cherry]

rose—

[Keir Starmer]

I am not going to take another intervention. I am not rejecting the principle, but I am not going to stand at this Dispatch Box and listen to Members from across the House throwing around allegations that we are not interested in this, that and the other. We are trying to have a different debate, with a grown-up tone, to find a way forward. I am prepared to engage in that, and I am prepared to accept that we will have to confront the principle, but at the moment our focus is on how we break the deadlock. If we can do that, we will be able to move on to how we progress. If we cannot do that, we will have to look at other options. That is a genuine and sincere position from someone who cares a great deal about whether we crash out without a deal.

UK’s Withdrawal from the European Union

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Thursday 14th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

I rise to support amendment (e) tabled in my name and that of the Leader of the Opposition. The Prime Minister announced two weeks ago that she would hold a second meaningful vote on 12 March; and that if that failed she would enable a vote on 13 March to rule out leaving the European Union on 29 March without a deal; and that if that succeeded, she would enable a vote on the extension of article 50 on 14 March, which is today. She was taken at her word. Had she simply done that yesterday, and tabled a simple motion to seek agreement that the UK would not leave the EU on 29 March without an agreement, she would have succeeded with a hefty majority. However, for reasons best known to herself and her advisers, she tagged unnecessary words on to her motion, causing splits, divisions and chaos on her own side, and putting further into question the ability of the Government to govern.

Today, it seems that the lessons of yesterday have not been learnt. A simple motion today seeking a mandate from this House to ask for an extension of article 50 for a length and purpose to be negotiated with the EU would pass by a hefty majority, but again the Prime Minister risks splits, divisions and chaos by tabling a motion that wraps the question of whether there should be a third meaningful vote into what should be a simple question of extension. The idea of bringing back the deal for a third time without even the pretence that anything has changed—other than, of course, using up more time—is an act of desperation.

Mr Speaker, yesterday I was offered a £50 bet on the third meaningful vote by the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), which would go to Help for Heroes. I should have taken up that bet. Perhaps he and I should now both offer £50 to Help for Heroes, because, in all seriousness, it looks as though the Government are adopting the absurd and irresponsible approach of simply putting before us the same deal again a week later, but now not even pretending that anything has changed other than that another week has been used up.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

I am very grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. Has he, like me, read the rumours in the newspaper that the Government might try to argue that there has been a material change in circumstances by changing their legal advice to take into account article 62 of the Vienna convention? Does he, like me, agree with the weight of legal opinion that they are on a hiding to nothing with that argument?

[Keir Starmer]

We wait to see what further advice the Attorney General gives, if any. I have to say, however, that the suggested nuclear option of crashing the treaty completely—bringing down citizens’ rights, the financial arrangements, the customs arrangements, the trading arrangements and so on—as the way forward came as rather a surprise. That is the reason I thought the Attorney General left it out of the advice he gave last week. To burn the whole house down to try to suspend or stop the backstop is so extreme that I would be extremely surprised if the Government rest their case next week on that basis.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I could not agree more. I suspect that that is why it was left out, in any meaningful sense, from the advice last week. We will wait to see what the Attorney General says if there is a meaningful vote next week. If the idea is to bring back the meaningful vote with the suggestion that what has changed in a week is that we now know we can crash the entire treaty, we will wait for that argument to be presented, but I am not sure it will be persuasive to those whom the Government hope to get back on board with their deal.

[Joanna Cherry]

The hon. Member for Banbury (Victoria Prentis) indicated that she thinks that the article 62 option was already foreshadowed in the existing legal opinion. If she is right about that, then it will not be a change in circumstances justifying meaningful vote 3, will it? It was there already.

[Keir Starmer]

The problem with the argument is that as far as the Government are concerned the mere fact that it was available last time we voted does not appear to inhibit them from saying that it is a change of circumstances.

UK’s Withdrawal from the EU

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Wednesday 27th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I have not finished answering the question, and it is an important question.

If that cannot be done, we will be faced in two weeks with what I think will be the Prime Minister’s red-line deal or no deal. In our manifesto we rejected both, and in those circumstances we would either put forward or support a motion on a public vote with a credible leave option—when we tabled a Front-Bench amendment three or four weeks ago we spelled out that that deal or proposition would have to have the confidence of the House—with the other option being remain.

[Joanna Cherry]

I welcome the Labour party’s movement towards a second referendum. Some people say a second Brexit referendum would be undemocratic, but does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree with Martin Wolf writing in the Financial Times today, who said:

“If democracy means anything, it means a country’s right to change its mind”?

[Keir Starmer]

Yes, and I think that was repeated by the first Brexit Secretary on a number of occasions, although I am never quite sure whether I should quote the first Brexit Secretary—[Interruption.] Yes, or the second, but of course I listen carefully to the third every time, and look forward to seeing him yet again tomorrow morning at the Dispatch Box.

Leaving the EU: No Deal

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Wednesday 19th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

rose—

[Keir Starmer]

I will give way, but then I will make some progress.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. Let me congratulate him on achieving this important debate this afternoon. On the question of the extension of article 50, is he, like me, not hearing from interlocutors in the EU that the EU would be unlikely to grant an extension of the article 50 period for further negotiation, but that it would grant an extension of the article 50 period for either a general election or a people’s vote?

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. As the hon. and learned Lady knows, I have had a number of discussions about the issue of extension with the Commission, the Council and various EU countries. The clear message from them is that the only basis for an extension would be if it was coupled with a good reason for the extension. Therefore, again, that is why we need to get on to the debate about what happens if and when this deal is voted down because these are very serious considerations.

Exiting the EU: Sectoral Impact Assessments

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Wednesday 1st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

For clarification, it was me who asked the Secretary of State whether he would share the impact assessment on the Scottish economy with the Scottish Government. After I corrected him that it has in fact not been shared, he went on to give an undertaking that it will be shared with the Scottish Government. If that particular assessment will be shared, should not the other assessments be shared with the other relevant sectors?

[Keir Starmer]

The hon. and learned Lady makes a good point. If some of these reports can be or have been shared with some Governments or Administrations, there is simply no basis for arguing that they cannot be shared with this Parliament, through the Select Committees.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Thursday 7th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

This is the conundrum that the Secretary of State and the Bill have created. If exit day is in March 2019, it is difficult to see how we could transition on terms similar to those we are now on. What could we do? We could choose to push exit day two years down the line. [Interruption.] No? Well, if we did not do that, but we recognised that the ECJ was necessary to the process, we would end up repealing what was once this repeal Bill, only to have to bring it back in again. That is the extent of the absurdity of the powers in the Bill.

[Joanna Cherry]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is making an outstandingly concise and forensic speech dissecting the difficulties in the Bill. He has drawn our attention to the problem with the definition of “exit day”. Does not that problem also feed into the delegated legislative powers? Clause 7(7) states that Ministers cannot make regulations

“after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.”

If exit day is going to disappear down the line, as the shadow Secretary of State has suggested, would not the power to make delegated legislation continue for even longer than the Government are now proposing?

[Keir Starmer]

It certainly could. The only way out of that would be to have multiple exit days. Members might think I am joking, but someone who drafted the Bill has thought of that, and it is conceivable that there could be multiple exit days, all chosen by a Minister and not by Parliament.

The combined effect of the Bill’s provisions would be to reduce MPs to spectators as power pours into the hands of Ministers and the Executive. This is an unprecedented power-grab—“rule by decree” is not a mis-description—and an affront to Parliament and to accountability. The name of the Bill was changed from the great repeal Bill to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The word “great” should have been preserved, however. The title should have been changed to the great power grab Bill. Labour voted for the article 50 legislation, because we accept the referendum result. As a result, the UK is leaving the EU. That we are leaving is settled. How we leave is not. This Bill invites us to surrender all power and influence over that question to the Government and to Ministers. That would betray everything that we are sent here to do. Unless the Government make very significant concessions before we vote on Monday, Labour has tabled a reasoned amendment and will vote against the Bill.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

No, and we need to press the Minister on that when he rises to speak.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

The hon. and learned Gentleman has ably outlined the Government’s position to date. He has ably shown all of us that the Government have made quite a major change in their position today. That change in position appears to have taken place when we are debating many differently nuanced amendments about the circumstances surrounding a final vote, so does he agree that it is important for the Government to commit to exactly what their concession is in writing, and to do so in the appropriate way, which would be by way of a manuscript amendment?

Parliamentary Scrutiny of Leaving the EU

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Wednesday 12th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I will not take long responding to that, because I have made the point, which is that the mandate on 23 June was not a mandate as to the terms, and I think that most people understand that; I cannot put it any clearer than that.

There is the question of how Members would vote, what they would vote on, and what happens if Parliament does not like the terms. The Secretary of State, in his statement on 5 September, emphasised that he would consult widely, including the devolved countries, which of course are very important in all this, and which deserve scrutiny of how exit will impact each of them. He also said he would

“strive to build national consensus around our approach.”—[Official Report, 5 September 2016; Vol. 614, c. 38.]

The question for the Secretary of State is: how will he build consensus around his approach if he will not tell the House what his approach is?

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

The hon. and learned Gentleman is, of course, a first-rate lawyer of international renown, and it is a real pleasure to hear him develop his argument. I am interested in what he said about the devolved Administrations. Does he agree that the Scottish Government and other devolved Administrations should have a central role in negotiations on the UK’s terms for exiting the European Union, and will he and his party throw their weight behind that argument?

[Keir Starmer]

I do agree with that, absolutely, and we will throw our weight behind it. In fairness, the Prime Minister signalled that by her early visits as soon as she assumed office. I was hesitant to answer that question in case I got relegated from second to third or even fourth-rate lawyer. I will press on—

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Report: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

Obviously, I should be very interested to hear how that could be done at the outset, and I am sure that the Minister would as well.

Let me make two points to emphasise why there is such concern about bulk powers. It may well be possible, depending on the parameters that are set, to reduce the likelihood of obtaining through bulk powers material that is sensitive in one shape or form, but I do not think it is possible to eliminate it. It may well be that most of that is done at the filtering stage, rather than at the stage of the initial exercise of the bulk power. I am not seeking to explain why bulk powers inevitably capture such information, or to justify that; I am simply explaining why I think so many people are concerned about the bulk powers. That is why Labour has made it clear that, given the breadth of the powers, the operational case for them must be properly made and properly reviewed, and that is why the safeguards must be reviewed.

The issue of the safeguards may need to be revisited when the Bill is in the other place. As the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden knows, the Tom Watson and David Davis case is currently midway between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of Appeal. Although it touches on existing legislation and retention powers, it may have implications in relation to the Bill when it is given further consideration, and will certainly be important when it comes to consideration of safeguards. Let me also, in passing, echo the concern expressed by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) in relation to operational purposes, an issue which also arose in Committee.

As for the review, the first stage is to ask whether the operational case has been made. I referred yesterday to an exchange of letters between the Minister and me. I hope that copies of the letters have been made available; I think that they have been made available to the House, and that every Member has them. However, I want to put on record what was being asked for, and what the response was. Let me say at the outset that this was a constructive exchange, which moved a significant issue significantly further forward.

I wrote to the Minister that the review to be carried out by David Anderson should be

“supported by a security cleared barrister, a technical expert and a person with experience of covert investigations”,

that it should

“Examine the operational case for the bulk powers in the Bill, not merely in respect of the utility of the powers, but also their necessity”,

that it should

“Have access to all necessary information as is needed to undertake the review effectively, including all information provided to the Intelligence and Security Committee”,

and that it should

“Take about three months to complete and…report to the Prime Minister in time for the findings to inform Lords Committee considerations of Parts 6 and 7 of the Bill.”

The Minister’s reply is important, as Members who have had an opportunity to read it will appreciate. He wrote:

“I can confirm that the basic framework for the review will be as set out in your letter…David Anderson has hand-picked this team and we are confident that together they have the range and depth of knowledge needed to undertake a comprehensive review.”

I was very anxious that David Anderson should pick as members of his team people whom he considered to have the necessary competences to help him with the review that he has been asked to carry out independently, and I am pleased that he has done so. I have been assured by him that he is very happy with his choices, and with the skills from which he will benefit as a result of that exercise.

The Minister’s letter continues:

“In relation to your second point”—

this is really important—

“it is absolutely the case that this review will be assessing the specific question of whether the bulk capabilities provided for in the Bill are necessary. The review team will critically appraise the need for bulk capabilities, which will include an assessment of whether the same result could have been achieved through alternative investigative methods.”

That goes to the heart of the issue. If that is the focus of the review, it will give comfort to the Labour team—and, no doubt, to members of the Scottish National party, notwithstanding their concerns—and to all our constituents as well.

[Joanna Cherry]

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the timetable for this independent review is such that, whereas the House of Lords will have time to scrutinise and debate it, the House of Commons will not? Does he agree that that is not acceptable in a democracy?

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Report: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 6th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister—that was what the Opposition pressed for.

There have been differences of approach to the test for judicial commissioners. On the one hand, colleagues on both sides of the House have made a powerful argument that the judicial commissioners should retake the decision. On the other hand, others have argued that the decision should be reviewed. The amendment strikes a third route, which is to apply a review test but to confine it to the stricter end of the judicial review principles.

As hon. Members know, I have been a lawyer for many years and have dealt with many public law cases, as other hon. Members have. The difference between strict scrutiny and long-arm judicial review is very real —it is a material difference. That is why the manuscript amendment is highly significant.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

It has been a pleasure to work with the hon. and learned Gentleman on the Bill. Like me, as a lawyer, he will have advised clients frequently on judicial review. He will no doubt agree that judicial review looks to the reasons given for a decision. There is no duty on the Secretary of State to give reasons for her decision on whether or not to grant a warrant. How can there be judicial review when no reasons are given?

[Keir Starmer]

The hon. and learned Lady made that very important point in the Bill Committee. Normally when decisions are subject to judicial review, there are reasons for the decision. What is envisaged is that the decision itself, plus such material as has been looked at by the Secretary of State, will be put before the judicial commissioner. There will not be reasons, which makes the task more difficult, but what is important about the test set out in the manuscript amendment is that the judicial commissioner must ensure that the duties under the privacy clause are complied with, which means that he or she will have to look at that underlying material. It might well be a good point to say, “If there are reasons, it would be an easier task,” but I do not believe the task cannot be performed without reasons. In due course, the judicial commissioners may say, “We need further help on particular issues.”

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 15th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd May 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

The amendments go in pairs: amendments 853 and 854 are to clause 216, amendments 845 and 855 to clause 217 and amendments 852 and 859 to clause 220. They all have the same purpose and intent: to subject the powers in the clauses to the double-lock mechanism—in other words, to involve the judicial commissioners in those powers.

Clause 216 is concerned with national security notices. Subsections (1) and (2) make the power to issue such notices subject only to the test that they be

“necessary in the interests of national security”

and “proportionate”. There is no specific reference to any operational purposes; it is a very broad power. Once a notice is issued, subsection (3) takes effect:

“A national security notice may…require the operator to whom it is given—

(a) to carry out any conduct, including the provision of services or facilities, for the purpose of—

(i) facilitating anything done by an intelligence service under any enactment other than this Act, or

(ii) dealing with an emergency (within the meaning of…the Civil Contingencies Act 2004);

(b) to provide services or facilities for the purpose of assisting an intelligence service to carry out its functions more securely or more effectively.”

The Secretary of State issues a notice; once that notice is issued, the requirement on the operator is very broad. To be fair, subsection (4) makes it clear that a national security notice cannot be used to sideline or cut across a warrant or authorisation that is required under the Act, but the clause does make a very wide-ranging power available to the Secretary of State and it seems subject to pretty well no check, balance or safeguard.

The amendments would subject the procedure to the double-lock mechanism, to ensure that such a notice would go before a judicial commissioner, who would consider whether it was in the interests of national security and proportionate under subsections (1) and (2). The Joint Committee raised concerns about this issue when it looked at the draft Bill, and in particular how the lack of a definition of national security means that the power granted by the clause is very wide indeed.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that, in the absence of a definition of national security, it is difficult to foresee the kinds of activity or intrusion that obligations under the clause could entail? Is it not therefore providing a blank cheque power to the Government?

Investigatory Powers Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 16th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd May 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I will. I hope that the hon. and learned Lady will mention the non-governmental organisations that have helped us. Thank you.

[Joanna Cherry]

I add my thanks to all those who have been mentioned so far. It has been a true pleasure to work so closely with the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. I pay tribute to the people behind the scenes who have greatly assisted Opposition Members in our preparation for this Committee.

A number of non-governmental organisations have been mentioned. I will not mention any one in particular; they know who they are, and they have been of great assistance to us. I also want to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North. This is my first time on a Bill Committee, and without his assistance, I would have been in even more of a guddle than I was on some occasions. I am very grateful to him for keeping me right.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 13th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

We come to part 8, “Oversight arrangements”. Clause 194 deals with the appointment of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The second set of amendments to the clause deal with appointments; I will deal with them when we come to that group.

There are numerous amendments in the first group, but they all relate to the structure of the oversight mechanism, because the structure set out in the clause is considerably different from that proposed by David Anderson in “A Question of Trust”. His recommendation 82 was that there should be a new independent surveillance and intelligence commission. In its scrutiny, the Joint Committee on the draft Bill asked why that had not been done, because, according to its recommendation 51,

“the work of the oversight body will be significantly enhanced by the creation of a Commission with a clear legal mandate.”

That was the clear view of David Anderson. The Joint Committee asked why that recommendation was not carried out. The Government response, as I understand it, was that it is too costly. At the moment, that is the only basis suggested for not acting on David Anderson’s recommendation, or that of the Joint Committee.

Our view is that such a commission, with a “clear legal mandate”, would be far better. Unless there is some significant difference in costs, there seems to be no good reason for not having it. Will the Minister tell us what calculations lie behind the suggestion that one model would be very costly and the other not so?

This issue was raised by the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office when it gave evidence on the structural divide that it thought there should be between the judicial function and the audit function. In its written and oral evidence, it said it would be more appropriate for those functions to be split, so that the same group of individuals did not look at both aspects. The amendment would create a commission with a clear legal mandate. It would split the functions in a way that those who exercise those functions at the moment think is appropriate. It also challenges the suggestion that the only reason not to implement the recommendation is that it is too costly.

I intend to press the matter to a vote. I will press amendment 741, and if I lose that vote, I will take a view on pressing the others, as there are so many of them, but for the record, I stand by all the amendments.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

I support the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I intend to deal with funding under clause 208. I appreciate that new clause 19 is in this group, but that is probably only because it contains the word “commission”, so I will deal with it at a later stage. However, I have listened to what the Solicitor General said.

The amendments are supported by the Interception of Communications Commissioner, who was most concerned about the structural division of the two functions. The Solicitor General says that there are advantages in being able to do an end-to-end review, and that it brings focus; I can see that. If it were an end-to-end review of someone else’s work, that would be a good thing. The structural problem is that, within that end-to-end process, the same team takes the steps and does the overseeing. That is more than just a philosophical issue. It is a practical issue with how oversight works. I am therefore unpersuaded.

[Joanna Cherry]

The hon. and learned Gentleman will recall that Jo Cavan, the head of the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office, not only covered that in her written evidence, but was asked about it by me in her oral evidence to the Committee. She reiterated the position that we set out very strongly.

[Keir Starmer]

I know that the Interception of Communications Commissioner feels very strongly on this point. I think that he raised it in evidence, and he has certainly raised it with me. For that reason, I will press amendment 741 to a vote. I will review my position on the remaining amendments, depending on how that vote goes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

The amendments are fundamental and important, because one of the main features of the Bill is the role of the judicial commissioners and the role, therefore, of judges in the double lock. The Home Secretary made a great deal of introducing that judicial element when the Bill was published in draft form, and again when it came back before the House in its current form. The Government have repeatedly and understandably emphasised that point throughout the scrutiny process. The amendments are focused on the appointment of the judicial commissioners. The way in which senior judges are appointed in this country has evolved over time, but we now have a clear and agreed way that has gone through numerous processes and consultations, with numerous recommendations on how it should properly be done.

We welcome the fact that, following the pre-legislative scrutiny, the provisions in clause 194 have been amended, but it remains the case that the Prime Minister will appoint the judicial commissioners, which is most unusual. The change from the draft Bill is that the Prime Minister must now consult the Lord Chief Justice. That is a step in the right direction, but it is fundamental, under our unwritten constitution, that judges are appointed independently of the Executive and those in political positions, and are not appointed by the Prime Minister.

The step of requiring the Lord Chief Justice to be consulted does not go as far as the Joint Committee on the draft Bill wanted. It recommended that the Lord Chief Justice be responsible for appointing the commissioners, to “ensure public confidence”. It was clear about how the separation of powers should operate in this important field. The Joint Committee also recommended:

“The Judicial Appointments Commission must also be consulted to ensure that the appointments procedure is fair and transparent.”

It wanted a move away from the Prime Minister making the appointments to the Lord Chief Justice doing so, drawing on the Judicial Appointments Commission, which was set up to ensure the transparency and independence of the appointments regime.

In short, the Prime Minister should not be involved. The Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office agrees, stating in its evidence to the Joint Committee:

“It is inappropriate for the Judicial Commissioners to be appointed by the Prime Minister”.

It, too, said there should be a role for the Judicial Appointments Commission. As I said, the Judicial Appointments Commission has evolved over time. It was set up to ensure the independence of the judiciary, by requiring vacancies to be advertised and published, with the criteria for appointment and so on.

The changes proposed in the amendments are ones of principle that are rooted in the separation of powers and in line with the view of Lords Constitution Committee on judicial appointments. That Committee has affirmed that judicial independence is a basic constitutional principle, and it found wide agreement among those that gave evidence to it that the appointments process must be designed in such a way as to reinforce judicial independence and that judges should not be appointed through a political process.

The amendments are fundamental to the how the judicial commissioners are to be appointed. If there is to be public confidence in the double lock, judicial commissioners should be appointed independently, in accordance with the understanding and arrangements under our unwritten constitution.

[Joanna Cherry]

I support the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister. In the circumstances, I will not press the amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 194 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 195

Terms and conditions of appointment

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to move amendment 745, in clause 195, page 149, line 34, leave out “three” and insert “six”.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 14th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 198 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 199

Additional functions under this Part

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to move amendment 792, in clause 199, page 154, line 17, at end insert—

“(1A) A Judicial Commissioner may refer to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal any matter the Commissioner considers may have involved the unlawful use of investigatory powers.”.

This amendment would give the Judicial Commissioners power to refer issues of concern to the IPT without having to rely on a complaint being made.

The amendment, which would insert a new subsection in clause 199, was proposed by the Equality and Human Rights Commission and is jointly tabled by the Scottish National party and the Labour party. It would give the judicial commissioners power to refer issues of concern—matters that came to their notice and about which they were concerned—to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal without having to rely on a complaint being made.

Under the Bill as drafted the unlawful use of investigatory powers may not receive sufficient scrutiny, because often the subjects of surveillance will be unaware of it and so not in a position to make a complaint. The amendment would improve the safeguards in the Bill by addressing that problem so that where judicial commissioners are aware of a concern, they can refer it to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The judicial commissioners decide whether to approve the issue of warrants and are well placed to identify issues of systemic concern and of law requiring resolution by the tribunal. They are, in fact, much better placed to do so than those subject to surveillance, because they have an overview of the whole picture. It is therefore sensible to permit them to refer matters of concern to the tribunal.

The amendment is in line with a number of recommendations made during prelegislative scrutiny. Recommendation 66 of the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill was that

“The Judicial Commissioners should be able to make a direct reference to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal where they have identified unlawful conduct following an inspection, audit, investigation or complaint.”

Recommendation 16 of the Royal United Service Institute’s report, “A Democratic Licence to Operate”, says:

“The judicial commissioners should have a statutory right to refer cases to the IPT where they find a material error or arguable illegality or disproportionate conduct.”

The Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office, in written evidence to the Draft Bill Committee, made similar recommendations.

In their response to prelegislative scrutiny, the Government did not accept those recommendations, but they appear to have agreed that judicial commissioners should have this power, as it is referred to in the draft codes of practice. For example, the draft code of practice on interception of communications states:

“The Commissioner may, if they believe it to be unlawful, refer any issue relating to the use of investigatory powers to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal”.

However, there is no express power to do this in the Bill. We argue that the referral power needs to be set out clearly in the Bill for two reasons.

First, such an important power should be in primary legislation, rather than in a draft code of practice that may be subject to revision after the passage of the Bill through Parliament. If it is in the Bill, any change to the power in future would be subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny, requiring the amendment of primary legislation rather than the mere revision of codes of practice. Secondly, providing for the power in codes of practice but not in the Bill creates uncertainty, which the amendment would resolve. Without the amendment, there may be a lack of certainty about whether the judicial commissioners have what would be a crucial power, and it could be argued that the codes of practice cannot create such a power without it being in the Bill.

The confusion over those issues could be resolved in a straightforward manner by the Government accepting the amendment. Their general response to prelegislative scrutiny referred to the fact that courts and tribunals do not usually have the power to carry out investigations on their own initiative, but the amendment would not give the tribunal that power; rather, it would give the judicial commissioners the power to refer an issue to the tribunal, which the tribunal would then investigate on the initiative of the judicial commissioners. In support of that approach, I note that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal explains on its website:

“The Tribunal adopts an inquisitorial process to investigate complaints to get to the truth of what has happened in a particular case, unlike the adversarial approach followed in ordinary court proceedings.”

I suggest that that approach is appropriate in situations such as those envisaged in the Bill, where the victims of the measures will not have knowledge of them but the judicial commissioners will. They may therefore refer to the IPT, and because the IPT is an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial body, it is well placed to investigate a referral from the judicial commissioners. I ask the Government to take on board the amendment in the spirit in which it is intended and indicate that they will agree to it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I hear what the Minister says. I wonder whether the amendment might benefit from tightening up, perhaps by making the referral body the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I will give it further consideration, but for the time being I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 199 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 200 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 201

Annual and other reports

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 808, in clause 201, page 156, line 37, leave out “the Prime Minister” and insert “Parliament”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I am grateful for that. We have had a lot of debate about these issues already, and I am very grateful to the Solicitor General for indicating that he is going to look at them seriously. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 203 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 204

Funding, staff and facilities

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 833, in clause 204, page 158, line 41, leave out

“The Secretary of State must”

and insert “The Treasury must”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said, and it is now on the record, so on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 204 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 205

Power to modify functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Joanna Cherry]

I wish to oppose the clause, in relation to submissions I made earlier about clause 196.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 11th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I have had no indication that anybody is speaking to this clause.

[Keir Starmer]

I am sorry, Mr Dorries. It is my fault. We had a very late night last night on other matters. I should have notified you this morning about who is to be leading on each of these provisions, and I did not do that. If it helps the Committee, I can indicate that when we get to each of the bulk powers, the clause that introduces the bulk power will be subject to considerable debate for obvious reasons. I anticipate, although I cannot say with certainly, that the pattern will be pretty similar to the one we have just seen, and that as we go through the following clauses we will go at much greater speed.

I have been trying to divide the work between me and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West. We had agreed that she would lead on this clause, and she was just checking with me that that was my understanding. I apologise. We were tied up in another debate yesterday and I did not give you notice as I should have done, Ms Dorries.

[Joanna Cherry]

I can confirm that that is what the hon. and leaned Gentleman and I agreed. I apologise for any inconvenience caused by my momentary inadvertence, Ms Dorries.

The Scottish National party’s approach to chapter 3 of part 6, which deals with bulk equipment interference and is introduced by clause 154, is to oppose the inclusion of bulk equipment interference warrants in the Bill until such time as a proper and adequate operational case has been produced. I will speak at some length on this matter because it is of great importance.

I remind hon. Members that when I spoke earlier this morning I said that David Anderson had reached

“no independent conclusions on the necessity for or proportionality of…bulk equipment interference”.

In paragraph 8d of his supplementary written evidence to the Joint Committee in January—he reminded us in his supplementary written evidence to this Committee in April that he still holds this view—he said that he reached no independent view

“on the necessity for or proportionality of…bulk equipment interference…which in view of pending IPT litigation and the limited nature of my remit…I touched upon only briefly in my report…The remarkable potential for this capability is evident from the Snowden allegations relating to the hacking of and implantation of malware into systems operated by persons not themselves suspected of wrongdoing”.

Hon. Members will recall that last Thursday I addressed the issue of how bulk equipment hacking could cause severe problems for our security services. I gave examples of how in the past it has led to the outage of the internet in Syria. I also referred to modern defence systems and said that it could disrupt the radar and photonic systems of our fighter pilots in Syria, which could result in danger not only to them but, perhaps more importantly, to civilians on the ground. All of us, no matter which side of the debate on bombing Syria we were on, want to avoid that.

Similarly to chapter 2 powers, the use of targeted hacking by the agencies was only very recently acknowledged by the Government through the Home Office’s publication of an equipment interference code of practice, although it made no mention of bulk hacking capabilities, which are now to be put on a statutory footing by part 2 of the Bill. The scope of a bulk equipment interference warrant, as outlined in clause 154, is astonishingly broad and will pave the way for intrusions over and above those revealed by Edward Snowden, pinpointing hacking as the modus operandi of surveillance. As with bulk interception, clause 154—particularly subsection (1)(c)—and the clauses that follow provide that the main but not sole aim of the warrant must be to facilitate the obtaining of overseas data, but that does not prevent data on UK residents being collected as a subsidiary objective or in pursuit of the main aim. I addressed that issue at some length on Thursday last week, so I do not wish to take up the Committee’s time by unnecessarily addressing it again.

The bulk hacking warrants under clause 154 will authorise interference with any equipment whatever, because of the definition of equipment in clause 156. The provisions will afford interference with any equipment whatever for the purposes of obtaining communications equipment data or information. They will enable bulk warrants to be issued in the interests of national security or economic wellbeing, or for the prevention and detection of serious crime. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras and I have already spoken at some length about those grounds, so I will not reiterate those points. I shall simply repeat what I have said before: I am concerned about the economic wellbeing ground and that the prevention and detection of serious crime ground is not rooted in reasonable suspicion.

The Home Office has told us that, as bulk equipment interference has previously been practised under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which it says allows for interference with property or wireless telegraphy, the powers in the Bill are not entirely new. The Home Office also says that the intelligence services can acquire a warrant under the 1994 Act to search a property or intercept a person’s phone calls. There is, though, no mention in that Act of bulk or mass equipment interference.

Chapter 3 of the Bill, which begins with clause 154, is therefore very much an innovation on the outdated Acts, such as the 1994 Act. There is a significant expansion of such powers as already exist. Indeed, the Snowden documents revealed that even British intelligence agencies expressed concern that such mass hacking practices as had taken place to date, purportedly under the 1994 Act, might be illegal. If the British intelligences agencies are themselves concerned about the legality of the powers under which they are currently operating, that is all the more reason for us to scrutinise carefully the legality of the powers set out in chapter 3.

Having looked at the clock, Ms Dorries, I am mindful of the fact that the Committee rises at 11.25 am. I have to be in the Chamber soon for Justice questions, so I wonder whether this might be an appropriate point at which to pause. I will perhaps have a little more to say when the Committee sits again this afternoon.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 12th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to welcome you back to the Chair, Mr Owen. Before the Committee adjourned for lunch, I was addressing clause 154, which is the opening clause of chapter 3 of part 6 of the Bill and deals with bulk equipment interference warrants. I explained that the Scottish National party wishes to see these provisions removed until such a time as the Government have produced what we consider to be an adequate operational case.

Bulk equipment interference is often described colloquially as hacking or bulk hacking. The guide to powers that accompanied the draft Bill made it clear that bulk hacking is a significant step beyond conventional surveillance powers, and remarked that bulk equipment interference is

“used increasingly to mitigate the inability to acquire intelligence through conventional bulk interception and to access data from computers which may never otherwise have been obtainable.”

Labelling mass interception powers as conventional is a bit odd when the Bill avows them for the very first time. The quote I just read out also underlines the fact that the Bill makes a considerable demand for unbridled access to all information. That is particularly worrying in the light of the very broad definition of “equipment” that is found in this part of the Bill. I am sure you will forgive me for skipping forward slightly, Mr Owen, but this does relate to clause 154. Clause 173 defines equipment as

“equipment producing electromagnetic, acoustic or other emissions or any device capable of being used in connection with such equipment”.

That is very open-ended and could even include cars and aircraft, which relates to the analogy with fighter aircraft that I made earlier. We are concerned that the power is open to potential abuse—not necessarily, as I have said before, by the current Government, but possibly by future UK Governments, as well as by other states that will follow our lead in legislation—because there is such loose language.

Following scrutiny of the draft Bill, the Intelligence and Security Committee reported that

“the Committee has not been provided with sufficiently compelling evidence as to why the Agencies require Bulk Equipment Interference warrants”

and

“therefore recommends that Bulk Equipment Interference warrants are removed from the new legislation.”

Before we adjourned this morning, I alluded to the fact that David Anderson QC had expressed concern about bulk equipment interference and said that he had not addressed the necessity and proportionality of such a power.

Despite what the ISC said, the power for bulk equipment interference warrants remains in the Bill. My argument is that that is rather concerning because bulk hacking, as I will call it, is by its very nature indiscriminate, as acknowledged in the draft Bill’s explanatory notes, which state that

“bulk equipment interference is not targeted against particular person(s), organisation(s) or location(s) or against equipment that is being used for particular activities”.

Instead, systems, services and software that have been carefully constructed to provide security are intentionally corrupted by bulk hacking to impose the eyes and ears of the intelligence agencies on every phone call, text message and web click.

To use an analogy from the offline world, granting this power would be equivalent to allowing the secret services to break into an innocent person’s house, bug it and leave broken windows for anyone else to get in, without the person knowing it has happened. The problem with the digital world is that the data can be rich and revealing, as I said this morning on communications data. Most of us put everything online nowadays, and our equipment will therefore be like a filing cabinet, with diaries, calendars, video archives, photo albums, bookshelves, address books and correspondence files.

Digital forced entry entails not only intrusion into highly personal spaces but control over those spaces. The individual who has hacked into a piece of equipment can not only access what is stored on it but add or delete files, send messages from it masquerading as the person to whom it belongs, turn it on or off and covertly activate cameras and microphones. It really is quite extraordinarily intrusive.

We heard about that in evidence on 24 March, when Eric King referred to GCHQ’s Optic Nerve programme, which involved hacking into webcams. Whatever one might think of it, many people use webcams for sex chat online. I am not talking about people who abuse children, which is obviously utterly reprehensible. Many consenting adults send indecent images to one another online using webcams. If they are doing that in the privacy of their own homes, and it is not illegal or hurting a child, I do not see any problem with it.

GCHQ’s Optic Nerve programme broke into individuals’ privacy. Such extraordinary power over the private lives of citizens fundamentally alters the relationship between citizen and state. If we allow this to go ahead without a proper operational case, it could breed distrust in law enforcement, which could have significant repercussions for the rule of law.

The equipment interference and bulk hacking envisaged in clause 154 have security repercussions. I alluded to those last week, so I will not go into detail. However, if we create a weakness in a piece of equipment in order to let the good guys—the security services—in, that weakness exists as a portal for the bad guys, as in criminals and terrorists, to get into the same equipment.

There are serious security concerns about bulk interference. This power is especially excessive, dangerous and potentially destructive. It is one of the most intrusive powers in the Bill, and it jeopardises the privacy of ordinary, innocent people who live in these islands. SNP Members urge fellow members of this Committee and parliamentarians to follow the Intelligence and Security Committee’s advice and remove these bulk equipment interference powers from the Bill until a convincing case has been made for not only their utility but their necessity and proportionality.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

I, too, welcome you back to the chair, Mr Owen. This bulk power is, like the others, very wide. Equipment interference includes what is commonly known as hacking, which can be done remotely or by attaching monitoring devices to computers or communications equipment. As has been mentioned, equipment is defined very broadly, covering anything that produces electromagnetic or other emissions. The power is therefore very wide.

It is unsurprising that the ISC was initially sceptical and that David Anderson has raised a number of concerns. I will not repeat the points made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, who spoke for the SNP, but I want to draw attention to the relationship between this bulk power and thematic warrants, which was one of the concerns raised by David Anderson.

If one looks at the structure of clause 154(1), skipping for the moment subsections (2) and (3), and lays it alongside clause 88, the similarities in the description of the warrant are apparent. Part 5 deals with equipment interference and targeted warrants; chapter 3 of part 6 deals with bulk equipment interference warrants. Clauses 154 and 88 are very similar in structure and scope—the difference is that clause 90 qualifies clause 88. The difference we are discussing is that we have, in essence, the same power for equipment interference, but we do not have the qualification of the subject matter that is clause 90. We have already discussed clause 90 at some length and, for a targeted power, it is itself extremely wide.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. There is a particular sensitivity about health and mental health records. The very fact of their being retained, examined and filtered—because that is what will happen—is of huge concern to many people. That is why the amendments suggest that they be either excluded or subject to a higher test to prove that it is really necessary. Although it was not formal evidence, the Committee had a briefing session with the security and intelligence services where the question arose whether they do in fact access health records. In those exchanges, the answer was, “No we don’t, at the moment.” When I asked why, in those circumstances, it was necessary to have this power, the answer was: “Because we can’t rule out that at some future date it might be necessary to get these records, in circumstances that we cannot foresee at the moment—so we would not want to restrict the ability to get them.”

That was an honest answer about the way that these records are dealt with. In formal evidence, the answer was that the internal guidance does subject accessing mental health records to a higher threshold. In a sense, the agencies have thought this through for themselves. They have recognised the extra sensitivity of such records and have their own internal processes to make sure that they are applying a higher test. That is a good approach.

[Joanna Cherry]

I remember the evidence that the shadow Minister alluded to. Does he agree with me that, notwithstanding the fact that agencies are telling us that they take steps to be more sensitive in relation to mental health data, the very fact that mental health data are going to be scooped up and available to others may act as a disincentive to certain members of the public to seek assistance with their mental health problems?

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. I am concerned about that issue; that is why we need to give particular care and attention to the operation of these bulk powers in relation to sensitive personal data—and mental health data are among the most sensitive. In a sense, the second set of modifications that we will come to later is aimed at putting in the Bill what is in fact current practice. Therefore it would not inhibit what the security and intelligence services are doing, but would make it clear to citizens that a safeguard is in place and reduce their anxiety about the extent of the use of these bulk powers.

I will say more about that when I get to the amendments, but they are issues that go to the breadth of the bulk personal datasets that we are now dealing with.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

That may well be. I listened carefully to the answer that was given—

[Joanna Cherry]

On the example that the Solicitor General has just given, does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that such information could be obtained with a far more targeted warrant?

[Keir Starmer]

It may well be that it could be dealt with in a more targeted way. As a general proposition, where targeted powers can be used they should be used. That is a theme that goes through the Bill and the code.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Joanna Cherry]

The amendments, which were tabled by the Scottish National party and the Labour party, are part of the broad objective of altering clause 91 so that authorisation of warrants is carried out by judicial commissioners rather than the Secretary of State. There has already been quite lengthy argument about the general principle so I will not go into that in great detail. The amendments also deal with the grounds and circumstances in which warrants may be issued and attempt to tighten the safeguards in the clause.

Amendment 405 would amend the grounds on which warrants may be issued, adding at the end of subsection (5)(b) a reference to reasonable suspicion of serious crime taking place. That pertains to an argument I made in relation to part 2 of the Bill, which is that the grounds for issuance of a warrant should require reasonable suspicion. It will also be recalled that I argued that the economic wellbeing grounds should be removed from the Bill in relation to part 2, and I renew that argument in relation to this clause for the same reasons. There seems to be some tautology. As either the Joint Committee on the draft Bill or the Intelligence and Security Committee commented, it is difficult to see how

“the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”

can really mean anything above and beyond the interests of national security. Amendment 406 would therefore remove subsection (5)(c).

Amendment 463 would remove subsection (6), while amendment 465 would include a requirement of proportionality and a technical assessment in the consideration that is given to the issuance of a warrant. Amendment 465 would require that less intrusive methods have been used or considered and a technical assessment of proportionality accounting for the risks of the conduct proposed. Those requirements would apply when applications from the intelligence service, the Chief of Defence Intelligence and law enforcement are considered. In order to consider whether a warrant is necessary and proportionate, not only the intrusion but the methods will need to be assessed. The amendment would require the judicial commissioner, supported by independent technical expertise, to assess the proportionality of the conduct proposed in targeted equipment interference applications.

There is good reason behind the amendment. Again, I hark back to some of the more general concerns that were expressed by myself and the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. When malware is deployed there is often a risk of contagion, at home as well as overseas. We have had a recent and dramatic demonstration of that: the Stuxnet virus was believed to be an American-Israeli cyber-weapon intended to hack a single Iranian uranium enrichment facility. What happened instead was that it infected Chevron, the energy giant, and many other companies, as well as Microsoft PCs around the world.

That is a good illustration of how hacks intended for what we might call “good purposes”—to protect the public—can have unintended consequences. I believe that the phrase used by those in the know is the risk of hacks spreading into the wild. Technical experts have explained to me that the risk of hacks spreading into the wild cannot be overstated. In fact, a professor of security engineering at Cambridge University, Ross Anderson, wrote to the Science and Technology Committee about this very issue, saying—he did not mince his words— that

“It is only a matter of time before interference with a safety-critical system kills someone”.

The amendment would address these serious issues by making sure that we do not take the potentially dangerous and counterproductive step of hacking where other less intrusive and safer methods have been used, and that a technical assessment of proportionality accounting for the risks of the hack being proposed is carried out in advance.

The practice of equipment interference leads to the stockpiling of software vulnerabilities, which in turn puts millions of users of software at risk, and those millions of users of software are our constituents, the citizens of the United Kingdom, people who use these sorts of devices day in and day out for all sorts of aspects of their personal and professional lives. These hacks, if not used only where strictly necessary, and if there is not a proper technical assessment in advance, risk opening up the equipment of ordinary members of the public to criminals and fraudsters rather than just the intelligence agencies. Underlying the amendment is the idea that it is vital that when deciding whether to grant a warrant, the judicial commissioner should understand and account for the proportionality of the proposed interference methods before authorising them.

There is also the risk that hacks can malfunction, with severe consequences for critical infrastructures and even international relations. Whatever one thinks of Edward Snowden’s revelations and the propriety of them, the fact is that he put a lot of material into the public domain and we would be remiss if we did not consider that. He has revealed that malfunctions of hacking by the National Security Agency in America were responsible for the outage of the entire internet in Syria in 2012, which may have caused simultaneous flight-tracking issues and led Government and opposition forces erroneously to blame each other for the incident. That sort of thing could be a danger to our forces.

I went to a fascinating briefing yesterday morning about photonics. Before I went into the briefing, I did not really know what photonics was, because I am not a scientist by background, but I went along because there is a lot of research into photonics development going on in Scotland, particularly at Heriot-Watt University, which is in my constituency. One of the fascinating things that I learned at this briefing on photonics from a speaker from BAE Systems was how photonics—in layperson’s terms, laser technology—can now “zap” on to the visor of fighter pilots the information they need vis-à-vis radar and the like, so that they do not have to look down at a screen when they are looking for a target. If hacking goes wrong, those sophisticated technologies, which are needed for the defence of this country, may themselves go wrong and that may lead to the deaths of innocent civilians, which we all, regardless of which side we took in the vote last December, want to avoid in any bombing in Syria.

There is a high degree of public interest in the proportionality of hacking methods, and the security of data and the safety of citizens both at home and abroad are very real issues. The debate surrounding the Apple against the FBI case in America centred on whether the methods required to hack one particular device were proportionate, given the security consequences for all owners of iPhones. In the United States, the decision in that case was rightly entrusted to an independent judge.

Amendment 465 is crucial because of the potential damage to computer security and the corresponding vulnerability to criminal elements that results from hacking, as well as the potential dangers for our forces fighting abroad and for civilians. The use of various hacking technologies poses clear risks to those they are used against and to the wider public, which requires the addition of a technical proportionality test. I hope the Government are prepared to consider the amendment seriously.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to continue to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen. I echo your sentiments in relation to Her Majesty the Queen. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”]

I have little to add to the hon. and learned Lady’s comments in support of the amendments, other then to outline why they were tabled. Clause 91(1) sets out the power to issue warrants, and paragraphs (a) and (b) outline the familiar necessity and proportionality tests, which bite on the very wide provisions of subsection (5). The Secretary of State therefore has to consider whether issuing a warrant is necessary for one of those broad purposes—

“national security…preventing or detecting serious crime, or…in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.

That is obviously a broad necessity test, and proportionality is assessed by reference to the same grounds. The provision is over-broad, which matters because the double lock works only if a judicial commissioner has scrutiny of the Secretary of State’s decision. If the Secretary of State’s decision is so wide, the judicial commissioner’s scrutiny will be correspondingly wide. That matters particularly in relation to the targeted examination warrants, which will be used where a wider bulk power has been exercised in the first place. The amendments would tighten the necessity and proportionality tests, giving them real practicality and effect.

[The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Mr Owen, particularly on the auspicious occasion of Her Majesty’s birthday. The Solicitor General and I are members of a diminishing group who still hold to the spirit, and perhaps even the actuality, of the divine right of kings.

Chivalry forbids me from paying but scant attention to the fact that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West spoke to amendments not in this group. I will not spend too much time responding to what she said, but I might be able to respond to her a little when we come to the next group.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

Before I make my position on the amendments clear, it was remiss of me not to add the sincere good wishes of the Scottish National party to Her Majesty the Queen on the auspicious occasion of her 90th birthday.

When we looked at similar issues under part 2, we did not push the matter to a vote, and that is the course of action I wish to follow at this stage. I will withdraw the amendment now, but no doubt the whole issue of judicial warrantry will be revisited on the Floor of the House. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 465, in clause 91, page 70, line 18, leave out from “include” to end of line 19 and insert—

“(a) the requirement that other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because they were assessed to be bound to fail, and

(b) the requirement that a risk assessment has been conducted by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s technical advisors with regard to the specific equipment interference proposed, accounting for—

(i) the risk of collateral interference and intrusion, and

(ii) the risk to the integrity of communications systems and computer networks, and

(iii) the risk to public cybersecurity.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to move amendment 408, in clause 91, page 70, line 25, at end insert—

‘(10) Targeted equipment interference is only lawful if authorised under this Act.”

The amendment would require that targeted equipment interference cease to be conducted under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the Police Act 1997 or indeed any other prior legislation, and instead be conducted under the provisions of the Bill. The Bill is a consolidated piece of legislation, and we tabled this amendment in the spirit of the Government’s laudable attempt to consolidate the legislation in this area. The amendment would ensure that equipment interference always benefits from the safeguards and oversight in the Bill. As we just set out, the Opposition parties want the safeguards to go further, but even if they remain as they are we would like them to apply to all targeted equipment interference. That would improve public accountability and clarify the state’s powers.

The Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on the draft Bill expressed concern about the fact that agencies conduct several forms of equipment interference that are not provided for in the Bill, so it is not just Opposition Members who are concerned. The ISC said that

“certain IT operations will require a different standard of authorisation…than Computer Network Exploitation and that similar activities undertaken by the Agencies will be authorised under different pieces of legislation.”

It concluded that, if that remains the case, the Bill will have failed to achieve transparency; operations will remain secret and thus not be subject to clear safeguards. It recommended that

“all IT operations are brought under the provisions of the new legislation…with the same authorisation process and the same safeguards.”

The amendment reflects the Intelligence and Security Committee’s recommendation that all types of equipment interference should be governed under one clear piece of legislation. I will be grateful if the Government take it on board in the spirit in which it is intended.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

Amendment 439 pertains to the approval of warrants issued in urgent cases. Simply, the amendment would provide that an urgent warrant can be issued only where there is a reasonable belief that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of protecting life or preventing serious injury. That is a recurrent theme, which I have addressed previously, and I will not repeat the arguments.

[Keir Starmer]

Our amendment 440 is modest and would insert the word “immediately”. I need say no more than that.

[The Solicitor General]

May I deal with the amendments in reverse order? On amendment 440, I am happy to consider amending the relevant draft codes to make it clear that the notification of judicial commissioners should happen as soon as is reasonably practical. That wording is more appropriate than “immediately”, given that it may take some small period of time to draw together the materials that the commissioner would want to review when considering whether to approve the issue of a warrant. On the basis that we might return to this issue at a future date, I invite the hon. and learned Gentleman not to press his amendment.

The amendment tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, to which she spoke with admirable brevity, is well understood by the Government, and the arguments remain as they did in our debate on clause 22. We want to create a workable framework, and if we limit the grounds, my concern is that the scenarios and case studies I set out in that debate—the drugs case and the Daesh case—would not be caught. We have a clear definition of “urgency” in paragraphs 41 to 44 of the draft code. The draft code also has a helpful flowchart that clearly sets out the parameters within which those seeking such warrants should operate. For those reasons, I respectfully urge her to withdraw her amendment.

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 98 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 99

Failure to approve warrant issued in urgent case

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 441, in clause 99, page 76, line 10, leave out paragraph (b).

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 100 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101

Requirements which must be met by warrants

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to move amendment 275, in clause 101, page 79, line 19, leave out “describe” and insert “specify”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I am very grateful to the Solicitor General. I leave the other two amendments to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras.

[Keir Starmer]

Amendments 452 and 453 speak for themselves. Concern has already been expressed about the general nature of the requirements that must be met by warrants; this is a further example under the head of equipment interference warrants. Clause 101(3) sets out in some detail what is required, and the amendments would tighten that up by requiring more precision and more matters to be explicitly stated. They are a version of other amendments tabled to corresponding provisions for other warrants.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment for the time being.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 101 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102

Duration of warrants

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 635, in clause 102, page 80, line 21, leave out

“ending with the fifth working day after the day on which”

and insert “of 48 hours after”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104

Modification of warrants issued by the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 638, in clause 104, page 83, line 17, at end insert—

“(8A) Section 97 (approval of warrants by Judicial Commissioners) applies in relation to a decision to make a modification of a warrant issued under section 96 as it applies in relation to a decision to issue such a warrant, but as if—

(a) the references in subsection (1)(a) and (b) of that section to the warrant were references to the warrant as modified, and

(b) any reference to the person who decided to issue the warrant were a reference to the person who decided to make the modification.”

Investigatory Powers Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 10th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

We spent some time on clause 119, but it was right to take time on that important provision. We now move to the safeguards. I listened very carefully to what the Minister said a moment ago and to the observations of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West. As we move forward, there needs to be some clarity on the basis.

In essence, our position is not to seek to reduce the capabilities of the security and intelligence services, which of course currently operate the powers in question under other authorisations. We seek to ensure that there is proper justification for bulk powers—hence new clause 16, which we will vote on at the end, which would delay the provisions from coming into force until an independent evaluation has taken place. I speak only for my party in saying that there is no intention to reduce the capabilities of the security and intelligence services. I am not suggesting for a moment that there is any intention to do that on anybody else’s behalf, but I am simply making my position clear. I am not speaking for anybody else, because I should not.

[Joanna Cherry]

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the SNP proposal to put the powers to one side while an operational case is produced would not reduce the security services’ powers for the time being, pending the outcome of the court cases? They are already operating them, as we have heard, under section 8(4) of RIPA.

[Keir Starmer]

The hon. and learned Lady should not read into my observations any criticism of the approach that she has taken, or any suggestion that she or her party are seeking to reduce the capabilities of the security and intelligence services. I know her background and the work that she has done, and I know that would not be her position. I do not intend to impute that it is. I am keen to speak only for myself and my party.

The Bill brings a legal framework and definition to the powers, and a set of safeguards to go with the exercise of those powers. I think that is important. If the powers are to be exercised, I would rather they were exercised within a proper legal framework, with more effective safeguards than under the current framework. I think that is the only real difference of approach between us.

What we all have to bear in mind is not whether we personally have been persuaded by the case that the powers are justified, because we all have different experiences and backgrounds—I worked with the security and intelligence services for five years on very serious terrorist cases—but whether members of the public can have confidence that they are. That is why we have been pressing for further consideration and independent assessment of the operational case.

Clause 121 deals with the first part of the safeguards on the exercise of the bulk powers—the test of necessity and proportionality. The clause is in familiar form. Subsection (1) states that the Secretary of State has to consider

“that the main purpose of the warrant is one or more of the following…the interception of overseas-related communications, and…the obtaining of secondary data”

and then that

“the warrant is necessary…in the interests of national security,”

or on

“grounds falling within subsection (2)”

Subsection (2) adds that the warrant can be

“for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or…in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.

I will not test the Committee’s patience by going over the same ground about the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom being relevant to the interests of national security. The point that I have made consistently on that applies just as much to clause 121, but I will not repeat it.

It is important to appreciate that the necessity of proportionality test set out in subsections (1)(b) and (2) has very broad criteria. When the Secretary of State is considering a warrant, clause 121(1)(d) requires him or her to consider that

“each of the specified operational purposes…is a purpose for which the examination of intercepted content or secondary data obtained under the warrant is or may be necessary”.

On the face of it, that provides some comfort. That is the examination part of the exercise, and it is important because it recognises the distinction that I have made between collating or bringing together data and accessing it. It relates to accessing, because it involves

“a purpose for which…examination…under the warrant is or may be necessary”,

which brings us into the territory of what the test is for examining the data that has been collected. As I said, the Bill states that the Secretary of State will consider

“each of the specified operational purposes”.

However, in clause 125(4), we get into a circular argument. It states:

“In specifying any operational purposes, it is not sufficient simply to use the descriptions contained in section 121(1)(b) or (2)”,

the two provisions to which I have just referred. It is not enough to say, “It is necessary for the operational purposes of national security or preventing serious crime,” or, “It is in our economic interests.” That is not enough,

“but the purposes may still be general purposes.”

That is all there is on the subject in the Bill. At the vital stage when we move from hoovering up or collecting communications to accessing them, the test of necessity and proportionality bites on something that is not quite as general as national security, which would not be much of a test at all, but could be not much more than that—“general purposes”. That is a cause for concern, which has prompted our amendments to tighten it up.

In crafting the amendments, we have had one eye on the code. I refer to paragraph 6.19, which suggests that some detail should be put in the application, stating:

“Each application, a copy of which must be retained by the applicant, should contain the following information:

Background to the operation in question:

Description of the communications to be intercepted and/or from which secondary data will be obtained, details of any CSP(s) and an assessment of the feasibility of the operation…

Description of the conduct to be authorised, which must be restricted to the interception of overseas-related communications…

The operational purposes for which the content and secondary data may be selected”.

What is envisaged in the code includes:

“An explanation of why the interception is considered to be necessary…A consideration of why the conduct to be authorised by the warrant is proportionate…An assurance that intercepted content and secondary data will be selected for examination only so far as it is necessary”

under section 134. Paragraph 6.26 of the code adds further guidance on necessity and suggests, at the bottom of page 43:

“For example, if a bulk interception warrant is issued in the interests of national security and for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, every specified operational purpose on that warrant must be necessary for one…of these two broader purposes.”

So the code operates on the basis that the detail will be provided in the application, even though it is not necessary under the Bill. I would therefore have thought it would be hard for the Minister and the Government to resist the amendments, which would simply lift the requirement to include the detail in the application from the code and put it into the Bill, so that we and the public could be assured that the test would be stricter than the combined effect of clauses 121 and 125(4).

Investigatory Powers Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

It is a pleasure to continue to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Dorries.

The clause sets out the relevant public authorities and designated senior officers for the purposes of part 3 of the Bill—in essence, those who may exercise the powers of obtaining communications data throughout this part. Last week, I drew attention to schedule 4 to the Bill and, in particular, to the large number of public authorities listed as “relevant”, including Food Standards Scotland, the Food Standards Agency, the Gambling Commission, the Office of Communications and the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service Board. The list of relevant public authorities in schedule 4 is very long.

I also drew attention to the designated senior officers, who are authorised to obtain communications data. They are listed in the second column in schedule 4. To remind the Committee, if we take the Food Standards Agency, the designated senior officer is a grade 6 officer; if we take the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service Board, the officer is the watch manager of control; and, to take one more example, for the Office of Communications, the officer is a senior associate. The point that I made last week was that, where there are wide powers of retention under the Bill, which we will come to later, the threshold for accessing the data is vital. The number of relevant public authorities is too wide and the level of the designated senior officers too low to provide a proper safeguard.

The amendment is intended to address that defect by setting out in the legislation a narrower set of relevant public authorities, listed in paragraphs (a) to (o) of proposed new subsection (1). It is a shorter and tighter list, but would none the less be a functional and effective one. Proposed new subsections (2) and (3) are an attempt to tie in other relevant public authorities to the particular power that would be appropriate for them to exercise. The relevant public authorities for the purposes of authorisation under clause 53(7)(g) are listed under proposed new subsection (2) and, similarly, those for clause 53(7)(h) are listed under proposed new subsection (3).

The amendment would tighten up the drafting of the Bill to limit the number of relevant public authorities and tie the lists more closely to the particular objectives set out in clause 53. Logically, therefore, it follows from the point that I was making last week and anticipates the one that I will make later this morning about the scope of the retention powers.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

There is one small difference between amendment 135, which was tabled by the Labour party, and amendment 236, which was tabled by the Scottish National party. Amendment 236 includes, in proposed new subsection (2)(p), the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, which is a separate body. I say that for completeness.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

The two amendments can essentially be read together: they bite on clause 67(5) and (6) respectively. The purpose of this clause, as I understand it, is to provide a mandatory consultation exercise for designated senior officers, with a single point of contact. That will be particularly important where the designated senior officer has little if any experience of authorising and will therefore be particular important in some of the smaller relevant public authorities, which may not exercise this power on a regular basis, although I realise it is mandatory in all cases. The point of amendments 138 and 140 is to put in the Bill a requirement that, in the course of that consultation exercise, the single point of contact advises not only on issues such as appropriate methods, costs, resource implications, unintended consequences and so on, but, as set out in amendment 138, on

“the public interest in the protection of privacy and the integrity of personal data; and…the public interest in the integrity of communications systems and computer networks.”

Such an amendment is necessary because there is a lack of an overarching privacy provision that can be read into each of these clauses. When a designated senior officer is being advised, it would be prudent and sensible for them to be advised not only about costs and resources, but about privacy and integrity, which are critical to the operation of the Bill.

[Joanna Cherry]

The amendments are jointly supported by Labour and the Scottish National party.

Throughout this part of the Bill, public authorities and other decision makers are placed under a duty to consider a range of factors connected to the decision to access retained communications data. Those factors include cost and other resource implications and

“any issues as to the lawfulness of the proposed authorisation.”

These amendments include a specific duty to consider the public interest and the protection of individual privacy—that is, the protection of the privacy of our constituents; and the security of communications systems and computer networks—that is, the security of our constituents’ private data. Both David Anderson, in his independent review, and the Intelligence and Security Committee, in its report on the draft Bill, emphasise the importance of privacy principles and the need to make clear the legality of the use of surveillance powers in this new legislation.

Although we are focusing on a specific amendment to increase safeguards for individual privacy and security of data, we are concerned that throughout the Bill there appear to be statutory duties on public agencies, officials and agents and on judicial commissioners, to consider factors relevant to national security and the prevention and detection of crime, and the effectiveness of powers and resources expended, but there is no specific treatment of privacy standards and the public interest.

While the clauses that these amendments are attached to refer to

“any issues as to the lawfulness”

of the powers, the vagueness of this instruction is, in my submission, very contradictory. Surely it must be the first consideration of any individual considering the exercise of powers under the Bill that they should be legal. Legality should be a first consideration; treating it as just one at the end of a list of other factors to be considered seems entirely inappropriate. In this regard, it would be of huge assistance if the Minister could give us a fuller explanation of why statutory duties in the Bill have been approached in this way, with legality as a final duty; of the objectives of including the factors as provided in the manner in which they are drafted; and of why the protection of privacy and the public interest in the integrity of communications systems and computer networks will not be mentioned unless this amendment is made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

The more I have listened to the debate on the amendment, the more convinced I have become that there is a need for an overarching privacy clause, to which I will turn our attention at a later stage. It follows from that that I will focus my energies elsewhere, and therefore I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Joanna Cherry]

I hear what the Opposition spokesman says in this regard, and I have much sympathy with it. However, I wish to press the amendment, for the simple reason that if privacy and integrity are as important as the Minister acknowledges, why not have them in the Bill? That would cause no possible detriment; it can only do good. Therefore, I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

Although there are numerous amendments, they will not take as long as the previous amendment, because to some extent they cover the same ground. Amendments 142 to 144 are intended to tighten up the test for journalistic material and apply a stricter test. Amendment 145 is an attempt comprehensively to redraft clause 68 to provide meaningful protection for journalist’s material and the protection of journalist’s sources. It is also an attempt to provide protection for other protected information, namely that which is subject to legal privilege and communications between MPs. This is a form that we have seen on previous occasions.

I invite interventions because I cannot now quite remember, but I do not think that in this part of the Bill there is a self-standing provision for MPs in relation to access to data. I will happily be intervened on if I am wrong, because then this would not apply. My concern when drafting this amendment was that, while in other parts of the Bill there is a specific provision—although we can argue about whether it is strong enough—for MPs’ correspondence in relation to accessing the communications data of MPs, there is no provision at this point in the Bill. That should be a cause of concern to everyone on the Committee, and it will certainly be a cause of concern to others.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for the typically clear and concise way in which he has approached these amendments to clause 68, on which I wholeheartedly support him. On the question of protection for parliamentarians, the wording that has been used is a “relevant” parliamentarian. That will cover Members of the Scottish Parliament and the devolved Assemblies as well.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that. On looking at it, it is clear that clause 94 applies generally across this—actually, I am not sure that it does. I am sorry to pause on this, Ms Dorries.

[Joanna Cherry]

Perhaps I could assist the hon. and learned Gentleman. The phraseology that is used is “a member of a relevant legislature”, which is defined to include the Scottish Parliament and the devolved Assemblies.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that. The purpose of the amendment is really to cover all three protected areas—legal professional privilege, MPs’ correspondence and journalism—and to set out a comprehensive test for all three. It is similar to a provision that we have already looked at in relation to other parts of the Bill. I commend it as a constructive way to protect the interests that ought properly to be protected on the face of the Bill.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment for the time being.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 74

Certain transfer and agency arrangements with public authorities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

There are matters relating to this clause on which I would like to press the Minister. This is the clause that provides for what is effectively the transfer of certain functions between the Secretary of State and other public authorities. The functions to be transferred are the functions in clauses 58 to 60, at which we looked in some detail last week: the filtering arrangements for obtaining data. As set out in clause 58, it is for the Secretary of State to maintain and operate arrangements. It is then for the relevant public authority, acting through a designated senior officer, to effectively carry out the exercise, using authorisations as and where necessary and appropriate. We discussed that arrangement.

Clause 74 provides for a transfer of functions of the Secretary of State—which I take to include establishing, maintaining and operating arrangements—from the Secretary of State to another public authority. That seems to me to cut through the thrust and the purpose of clause 58, which has a clear hierarchy to it: the Secretary of State, then the designated senior officer. Subsection (1)(b) is freestanding and transfers any function exercisable by a public authority back the other way to the Secretary of State, so there is a complete provision for a swap of roles. Subsection (3) indicates that:

“Regulations under subsection (2) do not affect the Secretary of State’s responsibility for the exercise of the functions concerned”.

Then schedule 5, in the back of the Bill, is referred to, but that does not add a great deal.

The question for the Minister is: how is it anticipated that these powers are to be exercised? On the face of it, this is an odd structure for a Bill to set out. This structure goes from the Secretary of State down to the relevant public authority, with the Secretary of State having a much wider role of setting up the arrangements, only for us to find, several clauses later, that it is possible to flip the functions and have the public authority making the arrangements. That seems to remove some of the formality and the safeguards intended by clause 58.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I indicated would not press the amendments at this stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Joanna Cherry]

I oppose the clause. I hear what the Minister has to say, but I am not reassured by the Government’s approach. Harking back to something I said last week, I do not think that the Government have got the balance right, because in seeking to gather to themselves an extraterritorial application through United Kingdom law, there are hidden dangers.

If international companies are required to arbitrate between conflicting legal systems, it is leaving the protection of human rights to the good will and judgment of those companies. Companies such as the ones the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras mentioned have already expressed concerns to David Anderson, for his report “A Question of Trust”, that

“unqualified cooperation with the British government would lead to expectations of similar cooperation with authoritarian governments, which would not be in their customers’, their own corporate or democratic governments’ interests.”

In my view, the most appropriate way forward is to pursue the route, which I am pleased the Minister has assured us that the Government are well down, of mutual legal assistance agreements with other states. If we do not pursue that route in the way that both David Anderson and Sir Nigel Sheinwald recommended with appropriate alacrity, and instead rely simply on clauses such as this one, which are spread throughout the Bill, we will create real difficulty for corporate entities. We will also create difficulties for the international enforcement of human rights, which I consider a bit more important than difficulties for corporate entities, although we should not set the latter to one side, because they are significant. For that reason, notwithstanding the Minister’s assurances, the SNP opposes clause stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

The message to my and all of our constituents is that, even if they are not a target, a record of the websites they have visited can be retained under a data retention order, and if retained will be retained for 12 months—every website they have visited. But if somebody later wants to access it, there is then a tighter test for that. The chilling effect of clause 78 is that the websites visited will be retained if a retention order is issued. We need to be absolutely clear about that. The tighter definition does not kick in until a later stage of the exercise, and that is a cause of real concern to our constituents, certainly to the people who have engaged with me on the topic, and to our fellows across both sides of the House.

[Joanna Cherry]

I note what the hon. and learned Gentleman says about web addresses being revealed. Is it not also the case that we see from the data released by the Home Office, after being pressed about its factsheet accompanying ICRs, that what will be revealed is not only web addresses and IP addresses, but the names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers and billing data of customers—our constituents?

[Keir Starmer]

I cannot double check on my feet, but that sounds like the further evidence that was put before the Joint Committee when it was in the middle of its deliberations. In fairness, the Home Office did go beyond websites to include some, maybe all, of the matters to which the hon. and learned Lady just referred.

The way this will operate in practice is a cause of real concern. The Secretary of State, without the double check of a judicial commissioner, and operating against a low-level threshold—clause 53(7)—can issue a retention order that will permit the retention of a record of all the websites that somebody has visited. That record will then be kept for 12 months, albeit with a different test if it is to be accessed later.

The amendments—I think you have called them the first set of amendments, Ms Dorries—are intended to construct in the first instance a different framework around this power, because it is so extensive, and put it in the hands of a judicial commissioner rather than the Secretary of State. That would provide a greater safeguard in relation to clause 78, with independent oversight through the function of the judicial commissioner. Alternatively, amendments 152, 153 and 222 would give the Investigatory Powers Commissioner some oversight. In other words, the intention behind these amendments is to put some rigour and independence into the exercise of what is a very wide power that, in fact, is the starting point for the exercise of all the other powers under the parts of the Bill that we are now concerned with.

Anxiety has been expressed on a number of occasions about cost. Huge amounts of data could be required for retention under clause 78. The Government have estimated the cost at £170 million. That is considered to be a gross underestimate by those who will no doubt be called upon to actually retain the data. For those reasons, these amendments are intended to tighten up a clause that is very wide and very loose. It permits a huge amount of data to be retained, including websites visited by you, by me, or by our constituents.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

As members of the Committee will have observed, these tidying-up amendments are consistent with previous amendments that would have entrusted decision making to a judicial commissioner rather than the Secretary of State. We had the discussion in principle in relation to those earlier amendments, which I withdrew, and I will not repeat my arguments now, although I would like to return to them at a later stage.

[Joanna Cherry]

As the hon. and learned Gentleman says, the amendments would require that review under clause 80 be by a judicial commissioner rather than the Secretary of State. Will the Government tell us why the provision of such a route of review would not, in their opinion, give the telecommunications providers greater reassurance that notices are not only lawful, necessary and proportionate but stable and legally certain? It seems to me that a review by a judicial commissioner, or at the very least by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, would provide that reassurance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister. If he could point to the provision that makes good the submission he has just made, then that will deal with this particular point. Just to be clear, subsection (6) is intended to ring-fence and exclude from one of these warrants communications the interception of which would

“constitute an offence under section 2(1)”,

but only in relation to communications in the course of their transmission in the real sense of the term, not including those that are “stored”. I put on the record—if this is capable of being answered, so be it—that “stored” in subsection (6) has the same meaning as in clause 3, which is intended to include stored communications within the prohibition. I will not take it any further; the Minister has my point, which is that one would expect subsection (6) to protect the same content that is expressly protected by clause 3(4), but it does not—unless he or somebody else can point to another provision that adds to subsection (6), though that would be an odd way of doing it.

I will move on. Subsection (9) defines targeted examination warrants. This is important because subsections (1) to (8) deal with targeted equipment interference warrants—warrants issued in a targeted way; the targeted examination warrant deals with examining material obtained by way of a bulk warrant. It therefore serves a different purpose. Subsection (9) is an extremely wide provision:

“A targeted examination warrant is a warrant which authorises the person to whom it is addressed to carry out the selection of protected material…in breach of the prohibition in section 170(4)”.

To understand that, we need to turn to section 170(4), which raises questions that relate to an argument I made earlier on another, not dissimilar, provision. It states:

“The prohibition…is that the protected material may not…be selected for examination if (a) any criteria used for the selection of the material for examination are referable to an individual known to be in the British Islands at that time, and (b) the purpose of using those criteria is to identify protected material consisting of communications sent by, or intended for, that individual or private information relating to that individual.”

That is intended to give protection to individuals known to be in the British islands, by placing limits on the examination of their material: in relation to their material or their communications one needs a targeted examination warrant to get around the prohibition in clause 170(4). The point I make here is similar to the point that I made before: this is temporal. Whether a person is in the British islands or not depends on where they are physically. I am protected so long as I am in the British islands, but I fall out of protection—as would everybody else—the moment I leave them, whether I am leaving for a day, a week, a month or a year. That is a real cause for concern, as is the wide definition of protected material that immediately follows in clause 88(9); amendment 382 would limit the extent of that definition by stopping the clause after the words “Part 6”, which are on page 67, line 40, of the draft Bill.

In conclusion, this is a very wide-ranging clause, and it contains insufficient safeguards—if there are safeguards, they should be in the Bill. There are questions on subsections (6) in (9), taken in conjunction with clause 170(4), that the Minister will have to deal with.

[Joanna Cherry]

I rise to support the hon. and learned Gentleman in his submissions on these two amendments. As we have just reached part 5, I want to take the opportunity to make some general comments on it. Powers to conduct equipment interference—or “hack”, which is the more generally used term—are new; they do not exist in any previous legislation. They therefore require significant scrutiny, by the Committee and by parliamentarians generally, before they are added to the statute book. By its very nature, hacking is an extremely intrusive power, because it grants the authority to see all past and future information and activity on a computer or other device. Beyond the implications for privacy, the potential ramifications for the whole country’s cyber-security and for fair trials mean that hacking should be used only as a tool of last resort. The SNP’s position is that stronger protections must be added to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 384, in clause 89, page 68, line 13, leave out from “information” to end of line 15.

This amendment acknowledges that “data” relating to the fact of a communication or the existence of information has meaning and must not be exempt from privacy protections afforded to other categories of data.

This amendment deletes the words

“or from any data relating to that fact”.

It is important because an equipment interference warrant can permit interference with equipment data, as in clause 88(2)(b). As we have seen, clause 88(9) makes provision for protected material, the definition of which includes equipment data. Over the page, clause 89 deals with the meaning of “equipment data”:

“(a) systems data;

(b) data which falls within subsection (2).”

Subsection (2), broadly speaking, refers to systems data as identifying data that are included in, attached to or associated with a communication but that can be separated from it and that, if separated,

“would not reveal anything of what might reasonably be considered to be the meaning (if any) of the communication”.

That is a logical way of approaching it—data linked to a communication that can be separated from it, but if separated, they would not reveal the meaning of the communication. Thus, it does not undermine the special protection given to the communication.

Then the final part of clause 89(2), paragraph (c), says

“disregarding any meaning arising from the fact of the communication”.

As has been said today, the fact of the communication, in many respects, can be as revealing as the content. However, the provision goes on to say

“or from any data relating to that fact”,

which broadens even further the exclusion from protection intended for communications.

In that way, the clause undermines the very protection being given to communications, so this short amendment would omit the words that I have indicated, in order to limit the exclusion from protection for the communication.

[Joanna Cherry]

May I add my supportive comments? This is a joint amendment from the Labour party and the Scottish National party.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister, first for spelling out in detail the intended operation of the clause and, secondly, for indicating his willingness to write on the matter. This is something that ought to be in the Bill. My clear reading is that the amendment would not ring-fence anything from examination; it would simply require a warrant under clause 88 if equipment data, having satisfied all the other provisions under subsection (2)(a) to (c), included anything where there was a meaning arising from fact communication and so on. I will therefore press the amendment to a vote.

[Joanna Cherry]

I have nothing to add in support.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 14th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

In the light of the statement you have just made, Mr Owen, I want to thank the Bill Office team for the hard work they have done on tracing down the amendments—particularly amendments 252 to 256—so that they can be starred for today’s purposes. They are working extremely hard and we are all really grateful. I also thank the Government, because although some of these amendments do not add a great deal to other amendments that have been tabled, amendments 252 to 256 are substantive. The Government could have taken the view that they have not had sufficient time to prepare for them, through no fault of their own. I also thank you, Mr Owen, for starring them and allowing us to debate them so that we can move on through the Bill today.

Let me turn to the amendments to clause 30, which deals with modifications. As you will remember, Mr Owen, on Tuesday we debated at some length the necessity and proportionality tests when a warrant is to be issued, as well as the role of the Secretary of State, the scrutiny that the Secretary of State applies to a warrant and the role of the judicial commissioners. Although there was disagreement between us on who should exercise precisely which function, there was agreement that there should be intense scrutiny at all stages to ensure that the warrant is necessary and proportionate and correctly identifies the people, premises and operations to which it relates.

That can be seen in clause 15(1) and (2), which we touched on on Tuesday and which relate to the subject matter of warrants. Clause 15(1) states that a warrant may relate to

“a particular person or organisation”

or

“a single set of premises”.

Then there is the thematic targeted interception warrant in clause 15(2), which sets out the group of persons who could be identified.

Clause 27 complements clause 15 by setting out the requirements that must be met by the warrants. I draw attention to clause 27, because clause 30, dealing with modification procedures, relates back to it. The requirements that must be met under clause 27 are as follows. A warrant that relates to a particular person or organisation must name or describe that person or organisation. A warrant that relates to a group of persons related by a purpose or activity must describe the purpose or activity. A warrant that applies to more than one organisation must describe the investigation and name or describe the persons involved. Therefore, on the face of it, there is scrutiny in the process. Then there is a requirement to set out in some detail on the face of the warrant what it actually relates to—the people, activity and premises, as set out in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of clause 27.

Clause 27(8) sets out that

“Where…a targeted interception warrant or mutual assistance warrant authorises or requires the interception of communications…or…a targeted examination warrant authorises the selection of the content…the warrant must specify the addresses, numbers, apparatus, or other factors, or combination of factors, that are to be used for identifying the communications.”

That is important because it sets out the higher level of protection for content, either under a targeted intercept warrant itself or under an examination warrant on the back of a bulk warrant. The requirements under clause 27 sit with all the scrutiny, checks and safeguards of the double-lock mechanism. They are all additional important safeguards.

We then get to clause 30, which states:

“The provisions of a warrant issued under this Chapter may be modified at any time by an instrument issued by the person making the modification.”

This is to modify any of the warrants I have just described, which will have set out, on the face of the warrant, the details of the application of the warrant. The modifications that can be made are set out under clause 30(2)(a) and (b). Subsection (2)(a) relates to adding, varying or removing names, descriptions and premises. Those are the three subsets under clause 27—in subsections (3), (4) and (5)—which are all required. Clause 30(2)(b) relates to the factors that are relevant to content warrants, either as a targeted content warrant or as an examination warrant following on from a bulk one.

Clause 30(2) states:

“The only modifications that may be made under this section are”,

suggesting that it is rather limiting. However, if we go back to clause 27, I think—I will be corrected if I am wrong—that the only thing that is left out in relation to modification is the testing and training activities. Everything else is up for grabs in relation to modification. It is “only” those provisions, but what is not said is that that is practically everything that will ever be on the face of any warrant, save for a training warrant and a testing warrant. Therefore, the scope of modification is very wide.

Then there is a subdivision in clause 30(4) between “major” modifications and “other” modifications. That does not quite sit with clause 30(2), but a major modification is essentially clause 30(2)(a), but without the removing: if a name is removed, it is not a major modification, but if a name, description, organisation or premises is added or varied, that is a major modification. Everything else, which is what is left in clause (30)(2)(a) and the factors in clause 27(8), is described as “minor”.

I want to trace through the journey of a modification, starting with a major modification. These are considered to be the most important modifications. The first issue that crops up is who can make a modification. Under clause 30(5), it is the Secretary of State, a member of the Scottish Government in certain cases or a senior official. The first, obvious point is that there is no double lock. There is no reference to a judicial commissioner. There is no notification requirement and no requirement for the judicial commissioner to consider the warrant; it simply is the Secretary of State and this additional senior official in certain circumstances.

I should mention in passing that a major modification can even be made in an urgent case by someone described in clause 30(6)(d) and (e) as

“the person to whom the warrant is addressed, or…a person who holds a senior position in the same public authority”.

That is in addition to a senior official. In an urgent case, they can add a name, a premises or an organisation.

We then move on to the purposes. For major modifications, we jump straight to clause 30(9), where I acknowledge there is a necessity and proportionality test—the decision maker has to think about the necessity and proportionality of the amendment. Where the decision is made by a senior official rather than the Secretary of State, there is a duty to notify the Secretary of State. That is it for major modifications. The Secretary of State—there is separate provision for Scotland—or a senior official makes the decision on necessity and proportionality grounds. They can add practically anything that could have been on the face of the warrant, apart from testing and training. I read into the duty to notify the Secretary of State that by implication she must consent to it, because otherwise she would presumably reverse the decision, although that is not expressed on the face of the Bill.

There is no duty to go to a judicial commissioner, no reference to a judicial commissioner and no notification to a judicial commissioner of the modification, which can be very wide. A warrant could be issued on day one to cover a given individual. On day two, three or four, another individual, premises or organisation can be added without the need to go through the double-lock process. That cuts so far through the safeguards as to make them practically meaningless in any case that comes up for modification.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

The hon. and learned Gentleman will have seen David Anderson’s supplementary written evidence. In relation to clause 30, he wrote:

“New persons, premises or devices…may be added on the say-so of a senior official, without troubling…the Judicial Commissioner…I adhere to my opinion that any such additions should be approved by the Judicial Commissioner.”

Is that the general thrust of the hon. and learned Gentleman’s amendments?

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[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. This is one of those matters on which we probably need to do as much of the work now as possible, because when the code finally comes back for a vote one way or the other, if there is a deficiency over an issue such as this, we will be put in the invidious position of voting down the whole code because we cannot change it. I am very happy to work with the Solicitor General to set out our concerns even more clearly and to see whether we can make improvements. I doubt that all my concerns would be met, but we might be able to draft a vastly improved model. With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Joanna Cherry]

I was minded to push for a vote on clause stand part, but given what the Solicitor General has said and the very detailed arguments made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, I am content not to push the matter to a vote at this stage. Like the hon. and learned Gentleman, I would be very happy to work with the Solicitor General and the Government in looking at this clause.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 14th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Joanna Cherry]

That does not really give me the assurance I seek. I was going to say that, under the clause, conduct is to be authorised if it is done in the exercise of any power conferred by or under the detention centre rules, or the rules for short-term holding facilities and pre-departure accommodation made under sections 157 and 157A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 respectively. The latter sets of rules do not actually exist. Rules governing the regulation and management of short-term holding facilities were made in 2002, but it took until 2006 for draft rules to appear covering similar ground for short-term holding facilities as the detention centre rules do for immigration removal centres.

Back in 2006 the Home Office consulted on draft rules, to which various persons responded. In 2009 the Home Office consulted on another draft of the rules, to which there were further responses, many of them adverse; a number of freedom of information requests and parliamentary questions followed. In April 2012 the rules were described by the then Minister, the right hon. Member for Ashford (Damian Green), as being “still under development”.

In March 2014, during the passage of the most recent immigration Bill, which became the Immigration Act 2014, Lord Taylor of Holbeach gave a commitment to Lord Avebury, who had been chasing the rules since 2006, that

“rules governing the management and operation of short-term holding facilities and the Cedars pre-departure accommodation will be introduced before the Summer Recess.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 3 March 2014; Vol. 752, c. 1140.]

Lord Avebury was informed before the recess that the commitment would not be met. He continued to pursue the matter, and draft rules were finally published on 18 February this year, almost a decade after the first draft was published and some 14 years after they were envisaged. That wait does not appear to have produced a version markedly different from earlier versions or particularly tailored to short-term facilities. In those circumstances, it is very far from clear what powers are being given by the current Bill. That shall be the gravamen of my exception to the clause.

In his review of immigration detention, Sir Stephen Shaw paid special attention to the problems of short-term holding facilities and the dreadful conditions in some of them. We have all heard about that on the Floor of the House. His concerns led him to recommend that a discussion draft of the short-term holding facility rules should be published as a matter of urgency. In the meantime, after he had said that, Her Majesty’s chief inspector of prisons published a damning report on one particular facility, the Longport freight shed in Dover, describing the dire state of the facilities there. He said:

“on various occasions Home Office staff told us that they did not consider Longport to be a place of detention…despite detainees being in possession of legal authority to detain documentation and obviously being unable to leave. At this facility, the normal mechanisms of internal oversight and accountability that should apply to any form of detention were lacking.”

Under such circumstances, the notion of any lawful exercise of the powers contained in clause 44 seems fanciful.

There are also problems with immigration removal centres. The latest version of the detention centre rules dates from 2001. They were last amended in 2005 to update the name of the tribunal hearing immigration cases and bail applications, but by the time that was done the name itself was out of date because it had already been replaced by the immigration and asylum chamber of the first-tier and upper tribunals. The rules contain a broad range of powers from powers to fingerprint individuals and powers of search, to powers to identify survivors of torture or persons with a mental or physical illness; powers on medical information and notification of illness and death; powers to segregate and use force, and powers to carry out compulsory tests for drugs. There are also rules regarding visitors to centres and contractors.

My point is that the rules cover the sorts of matters that would be covered by prison rules but they apply to a different regime and to people who have not been detained by the courts or by due process of law. The overall effect is a lack of clarity. When one is working against the background of rules that do not exist or, if they do exist, lack clarity, a clause such as clause 44 potentially has a very far-reaching impact on people whose civil liberties are already severely undermined by the circumstances of their detention. The Government do not need to take just my word for that; it is a view widely held, including by a number of Government Back Benchers and peers.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

We will not oppose the clause but I wish to put on record our concern about immigration detention and the intercept of communications in immigration detention facilities. There is growing concern, as has already been said, about the fact of that detention, the length of it and the conditions. There have been a number of reports, to which the Government have responded. In those circumstances, it is incumbent on the Government to justify the clause, although we will not seek to delete it.

[Mr Hayes]

I will be equally brief. There is a misconception about this matter. The Bill as drafted simply ensures that any interception carried out at a detention centre and under detention centre rules is lawful. No purpose is intended other than the maintenance of safety and security of the people in those centres. It is clearly right that officers should be able to intercept attempts to send contraband material, for example, such as drugs, in particularly sensitive environments. The power cannot be used to deal with the outcome of any immigration cases, asylum applications and so on.

The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 contains the power to make rules for management of immigration detention centres. Clause 44 provides that interception, carried out in accordance with those rules will be within the law. In a sense, it is as simple as that. I can see why the hon. and learned Lady might have misunderstood this, but I can assure her that that is what is in the Bill and, I put on the record, is the Government’s position. Rather than detain the Committee now, it might help if I send copies of the detention centre rules to Committee members, as they contain the essence of the argument that I have just made.

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[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Exclusion of matters from legal proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Joanna Cherry]

I oppose the inclusion of the clause in the Bill. Clause 48, with schedule 3, broadly replicates the existing procedure in section 17(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, whereby material obtained by way of an intercept warrant cannot be used as evidence in ordinary criminal proceedings.

Schedule 3 makes a number of exceptions to allow intercept evidence to be considered in civil proceedings where there is a closed material procedure in place—that is where a party and his or her legal team are excluded. Those proceedings would include, for example, proceedings under section 6 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, proceedings in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission or under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. Schedule 3 makes no exception for criminal proceedings, except in so far as material may be disclosed to the prosecution and to the judge so that the judge might determine whether admissions by the Crown are necessary for the trial to proceed in a manner that is fair. Deleting clause 48 would remove that exclusion, so that there would be an exception for criminal proceedings. It would also permit intercept material to be treated as admissible in both ordinary civil and ordinary criminal proceedings, subject to the ordinary exclusionary rules applicable to other proceedings, including public interest immunity and the provisions of the Justice and Security Act in civil proceedings.

I am indebted to Justice, the human rights group of lawyers that includes members of all parties and none, for its help in formulating my argument for deleting the clause. Justice has long recommended the lifting of the bar on the admission of intercept material as evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. In 2006, it published a document “Intercept Evidence: Lifting the ban”, in which it argued that the statutory bar on the use of intercept as evidence was “archaic, unnecessary and counterproductive”.

The United Kingdom’s ban on intercept evidence in criminal proceedings reflects long-standing Government practice, but it is out of step with the position in many other Commonwealth and European countries, and it has proved increasingly controversial over time. Importantly, the European Court of Human Rights has recognised the value placed on admissible intercept material, in countries where it is available. It has said that admissible intercept material constitutes

“an important safeguard; against arbitrary and unlawful surveillance, as material obtained unlawfully will not be available to found the basis of any prosecution”.

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[Joanna Cherry]

At present, in the United Kingdom intercept evidence is not admissible in criminal trials. My purpose in opposing the clause is to make it admissible in criminal trials and proceedings, but there would have to be very careful rules and procedures, and the nature of our disclosure systems both north and south of the border will need to be taken into account.

I invite Members to consider, on the one hand, how the ban on the use of such material balances the new system that the Bill seeks to introduce of expanded and untargeted access to communications data and whether lifting the ban on the admissibility of intercept evidence in criminal trials would, as the Privy Council has said, increase the likelihood of successful prosecutions and, on the other hand, whether it might also reduce the reliance on administrative alternatives to prosecution, such as terrorism prevention and investigation measures, and on the use of untargeted forms of surveillance. Members will also have to consider whether the Government’s cost base analysis is accurate and sustainable. We cannot say that the ceiling would fall down on the security surveillance system in this country if we removed the ban, because the system operates effectively in other countries.

[Keir Starmer]

It is of course the long-standing practice of all Governments to maintain this exclusion. The current form is effectively to continue the regime as it has operated until now. The regime has been reviewed a number of times, and the last review was probably in 2014. As has already been mentioned, the Privy Council said that the regime’s removal could lead to an increase in the number of successful prosecutions. The exclusion is frustrating, and I was frustrated in a number of cases when I was Director of Public Prosecutions where, had it been possible to deploy such evidence, individuals who could not be convicted and locked up for serious offences might have been successfully charged and prosecuted. So the ban is a source of frustration because the net result is that, where someone cannot be charged because of this rule, there are only two possibilities in serious cases. One is that they continue to be subjected to surveillance, which can be extremely expensive and resource-intensive. The other is that they are put through some preventive measure, which has advantages and disadvantages but also a shelf life, which is normally shorter than the sort of sentence they might have received if the evidence had been admissible and a conviction had been obtained.

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[Keir Starmer]

Thank you for your indulgence, Mr Owen. I am grateful to the Solicitor General for indicating that he will write, and I am more than happy to have it in writing. That information is important because it is central to the debate about the roles of the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner. It is not just me. Other people need to be assured on the role and accountability of the Secretary of State. It is one thing to say, “She can be asked in a Committee about it”, but it is another to point to the legal route by which that can happen in practice in a way that allows a degree of accountability. It is not intended as a trick question, and if it can be dealt with in a letter, I would be grateful.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51

Offence of making unauthorised disclosures

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to move amendment 79, in clause 51, page 41, line 18, at end insert—

“(4) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section in respect of any disclosure, it is a defence for the person to show that the disclosure was in the public interest.”

This amendment seeks to provide a public interest defence to the offence of disclosure in relation to a warrant issued under this Part.

The amendment is about whistleblower protection and would provide a defence for the criminal offence of disclosure in relation to a warrant issued under this part of the Bill. The offence as framed in clause 51 includes disclosure of the existence and content of a warrant as well as disclosure of the steps taken to implement a warrant.

The offence is subject to a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment. If committed, it is clearly a serious offence—the maximum penalty reflects that—but there are strong arguments that there should be a defence of disclosure in the public interest. By their very nature, surveillance powers are used in secret, with the vast majority of those subject to them never realising that surveillance has taken place. That means it is vital that sufficient checks, balances and safeguards are in place to ensure that the powers are used appropriately. I know that is why we are here, so apologies for stating the obvious. It is part of the checks, balances and safeguards to ensure that those who, in one way or another, witness or have knowledge of abuse or mistakes are able to bring that to the attention of individuals capable of addressing it, which may on occasion include bringing information to public attention. The provisions in clause 51 that criminalise the disclosure of information relating to the use of interception powers risk shutting down a vital route of ensuring accountability for the use of surveillance powers unless there is the defence of disclosure in the public interest.

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[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 110, in clause 53, page 43, line 39, after “detecting”, insert “serious”.

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[Joanna Cherry]

I do not oppose the removal of safeguards from the Bill. However, this is the first time that internet connection records have raised their head in the Bill and I feel compelled to foreshadow the more detailed arguments that will be made when we reach clause 78.

The collection of internet connection records is one of the fundamental changes that the Bill seeks to introduce, and subsections (4), (5) and (6) of the clause contain the first mention in the Bill of such records. I think that I am correct in saying that they are in fact only mentioned in one further clause—clause 78.

Clause 54(6) sets out to define an internet connection record but fails spectacularly to do so because of its widely drawn language, which clearly attempts to cover every imaginable base. The Scottish National party understands that the police and other authorities need powers befitting the digital age but, as legislators, we cannot pass a clause with such a significant impact on civil liberties—on personal privacy—without a clear definition in the Bill.

The industry has made it clear that it is willing to work with the Government to try to help implement ICRs. The trouble is that the industry does not know what ICRs are—and it looks like the Government do not know either. I addressed that point in quite a lot of detail on Second Reading. It is interesting that the Internet Service Providers Association says:

“The Investigatory Powers Bill deals with highly complex technical matters, however, our members do not believe that complexity should lead to a Bill lacking in clarity.”

I very much associate myself with those comments.

We cannot legislate in a vacuum and if the Government cannot provide further detail and clarity so we all know what an internet connection record is and what we are legislating for, we will have no option but to try to remove the collection of such records from the Bill through our amendment to clause 78. But the Scottish National party objects to the inclusion of internet connection records not just because of the difficulty of defining them—in my speech on Second Reading, I suggested that they are not at all a sort of internet replication of a phone record, as the Home Secretary seemed to think they were—but because of their intrusiveness. They would provide a detailed record of every internet connection of every person in the UK over 12 months, with a log of websites visited, communications software used, systems updates downloaded, desktop widgets used and every mobile app used, and logs of any other device connected to the internet, such as games consoles or baby monitors. I said in that speech that that would be “fantastically intrusive” and I stand by that.

Law enforcement bodies can currently obtain similarly extensive internet connection data for specific surveillance targets in several ways. First, they can request that telecommunications operators in the future retain the data of specific targets. Secondly, they can request retrospective internet connection data on specific targets from operators who temporarily store such data for their own business purposes. Thirdly, if they are seeking to prevent or detect serious crime, they can request data or assistance from GCHQ, which has a remit to provide intelligence for those purposes. Intelligence sharing to tackle online child sexual exploitation will be fortified by the establishment in November last year of the National Crime Agency and GCHQ joint operations cell.

The Intelligence and Security Committee noted in recommendation I of its report on the draft Bill that the delivery of ICR proposals

“could be interpreted as being the only way in which Internet Connection Records may be obtained. However, this is misleading: the Agencies have told the Committee that they have a range of other capabilities which enable them to obtain equivalent data.”

The ISC recommended that the Bill be amended in the interests of transparency, but no transparency has been provided.

The Scottish National party believes that the case supporting this huge expansion of data collection by internet service providers and its benefit to law enforcement is deeply flawed and contradicted by the available evidence, and that it has been accurately described as overstated and misunderstood.

I reiterate that there are no other “Five Eyes” countries in which operators are or have been forced to retain similar internet connection data. In Europe, as we heard the Danish tried it and decided that it was not of any utility. They thought about trying it again recently, but decided not to repeat the experiment. David Anderson noted in his report “A Question of Trust”, on page 265, about the collection of that sort of internet connection data that

“Such obligations were not considered politically conceivable by my interlocutors in Germany, Canada or the US.”

He therefore said that a “high degree of caution” should be in order.

There is also a legal issue with the mooted collection of internet connection records, because in 2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in the Digital Rights Ireland case that indiscriminate collection and storage of communications data is a disproportionate interference with a citizen’s right to privacy. I therefore argue it is unacceptable that the Government are attempting to bypass that ruling to extend their policy of blanket data retention.

It will no doubt be argued that, provided there are sufficient safeguards, the Court’s concerns from that case do not apply. However, as we just heard, there are not independent safeguards because we do not have judicial authorisation for access to internet connection records. We have instead a long list of public officials who have access to such records through internal procedures. I want to make it clear that I do not seek to impugn the integrity of public officials, but the reality is that their primary concern will relate to the operational capacity of their agency. That is a perfectly understandable matter of organisational culture, but that is also a reality that mitigates in favour of independent third-party authorisation.

If we collect internet connection records, we face falling foul of European Union law. We will also face falling foul of European Union law if we collect them without proper independent authorisation. I oppose clause 54 because it is the first point at which internet connection records rear their head in the Bill and the Scottish National party is not convinced that the Government have made a case for internet connection records. We are not convinced that there are not alternative routes to get at the necessary information and we are concerned that the collection of such records will be in violation of the law and of civil liberties.

[Keir Starmer]

We shall not seek to vote down the clause, but I want to raise some serious concerns about internet connection records because, as has been said, I think this the first time that they appear in the Bill. Subsection (6) is important because that provides the definition that

“‘internet connection record’ means communications data which…may be used to identify, or assist in identifying, a telecommunications service to which a communication is transmitted by means of a telecommunication system for the purpose of obtaining access to, or running, a computer file or computer program, and…comprises data generated or processed by a telecommunications operator in the process of supplying the telecommunications service to the sender of the communication”.

That is a wide definition. I listened carefully to the evidence of senior law enforcement officials about their ask on internet connection records, and they made it clear that they were concerned to have the who, the how, the when and the location.

I appreciate that there are other provisions—in fairness, I will come to those—but my concern is that that definition is much wider than their ask. That is important because subsection (4) deals with the point of access to internet connection records and what the designated senior officer can authorise. I accept that that subsection contains the restriction that internet connection records cannot be obtained or accessed unless one of the purposes identified is complied with—

“which person…which internet communications service…where or when”.

That has a resemblance to what senior law enforcement told us was their ask, but the problem is that the definition in subsection (4) is much wider. It might be asked whether that matters. Well, it does matter because clause 78—the retention clause—as we have observed, provides that the Secretary of State may issue a retention notice in relation to relevant communications data. Clause 78(9) makes it clear that relevant communications data may be used to do a list of things—I will return to the list—and that internet connection records are included. That definition of internet connection records crops up again in clause 78(9). Therefore, anything within that description, so long as it also complies with the other bits of the subsection, may be retained.

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[Joanna Cherry]

I wish to speak briefly on clause 58. I indicate that I will also cover clauses 59 and 60, which I also oppose. The clauses provide for the establishment and use of a filter to gather and analyse communications data. They provide for a communications data request filter, which was a feature previously proposed in almost identical terms in the rather unpopular draft Communications Data Bill. The only change made is that under clause 58(5), which states that the Secretary of State

“must consult the Investigatory Powers Commissioner about the principles on the basis of which the Secretary of State intends to establish”

the filter.

The request filter essentially is a search mechanism that allows public authorities to conduct simple searches and complex queries of the databases that telecommunications operators will be required to build and hold. The Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill described the request filter in that Bill as

“a Government owned and operated data mining device”,

which, significantly, positions the Government at the centre of the data retention and disclosure regime. Access to the filter and the data it produces would be subject to the same self-authorisation processes as all communications data. In practice, the request filter would be a search engine over an enormous federated database of each and every citizen’s calls, text records, email records, location data and internet connection records. Those would be made available to hundreds of public authorities.

I am sure the Government will, as they have in the past, be keen to portray the request filter as a safeguard for privacy. However, the processing of such a huge amount of personal data, as permitted by the request filter, is a significant privacy intrusion. It is not only me who thinks that; the Joint Committee on this Bill noted that there were

“privacy risks inherent in any system which facilitates access to large amounts of data in this manner.”

When I asked the Solicitor General why other countries do not do that, he said that the lead must start somewhere, but I do not want my constituents to be guinea pigs for such a system. I can tell from my mailbox that many of my constituents are very concerned about such huge amounts of personal, private data being held and analysed in that way. They want to see serious crime tackled, but not at the expense of their privacy.

A balance has to be struck, and I fear that the request filter is more of an intrusion into privacy than a safeguard for it. It is a portal with the power to put together a comprehensive picture of each of our lives. We should not misunderstand that that is what the filter can do. It raises many of the same concerns as a large and centralised store, with the added security concerns of protecting multiple distributed databases.

Public authorities will have a permanent ability to access the request filter, which will make it an enticing and powerful tool that could be used for a broad range of statutory purposes. The ability to conduct the complex queries that the request filter will allow for could increase the temptation to go on fishing expeditions—that is, to sift data in search of relationships and infer that concurrences are meaningful. That was one of the many concerns expressed by the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill about the request filter proposal.

With the request filter power, authorities could use communications data to identify attendees at a demonstration and correlate that with attendance at other public or private locations in a 12-month period, or identify those regularly attending a place of worship and correlate that with access to online radio websites, inferring risk. Those examples show that the new ability risks casting undue suspicion on thousands of innocent citizens and mining their personal contacts for patterns, which is an unacceptable intrusion into the privacy and civil liberties of our constituents and British citizens generally.

[Keir Starmer]

I will not be long, but I want to raise some concerns about the provisions. It is clear—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—that the arrangements are to assist a designated senior officer who is considering whether to grant an authorisation, and therefore has got to that stage of the exercise, and more broadly to provide for effective ways of obtaining communications long before there is serious consideration of a particular authorisation. Subsection (1)(a) applies in relation to the contemplation of a possible authorisation, whereas subsection (1)(b) is a much wider way of organising the data so that someone can later find what they want more easily.

The arrangements are made by the Secretary of State but then exercised by the designated senior officer, and we have discussed who will be doing that. It is so concerning because the provision allows for the designated senior officer, who in many cases will be not a high-ranking individual in a public authority, to start to organise the data that have been obtained under a retention power. It is therefore a very wide ranging power indeed.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Joanna Cherry]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his constructive approach. I am happy not to press the new clause at this stage on the basis that the Government will look at it. I am happy to receive any suggestions about the drafting, which is mine. I had some discussions about the terms of the drafting with Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland and James Wolffe, the dean of the Faculty of Advocates, but any infelicities are my fault alone. I would be happy to discuss the drafting with the Government.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Definition of “interception” etc.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer]

There are no amendments tabled to the clause, which we support, but I say for the record and for clarification that what is welcome in clause 3 is the spelling out in legislation of the extent of an interception—an issue that has bedevilled some recent criminal cases. Importantly, as the explanatory notes make clear, it is now provided in clear terms that voicemails remaining on a system, emails and text messages read but not deleted and draft messages stored on a system will count within the phrase “in the course of transmission” and will therefore be covered by the offence. We welcome that. I wanted to emphasise that point and put it on the record, because a lot of time and effort was spent when that phrase was not so clearly defined.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I am grateful. So if I withdraw the new clause now, I cannot be prevented from bringing it back later—I will withdraw it in Committee.

Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 11

Mandatory use of equipment interference warrants

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer]

I will be very quick. The clause is welcome and we support it, but again my concern is that there is no enforcement mechanism or sanction. Will the Minister take it under the umbrella of these clauses that are intended to ensure good governance, effectiveness and that the proper routes are used, and look in an overarching way at what their sanction might be? I am asking a similar question to one I made before: what is the sanction if what should happen does not happen?

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

In passing, this is just really to explain what the amendment is intended to achieve. In order to understand what is in clause 13(2), we need to look to clause 14(4) to (6), which set out what secondary data means for the purposes of this part and, thus, is to be read into clause 13.

Clause 14(6) states:

“The data falling within this subsection is identifying data which…is comprised in, included as part of, attached to or logically associated with…is capable of being logically separated…and if it were so separated, would not reveal anything of what might reasonably be considered to be the meaning”,

so it is integrally bound up with the content of the communication but capable of being separated from it.

So far as clause 13 is concerned, if there is a targeted interception warrant, the warrant deals specifically with content and secondary data, recognising the integral link between the two. That is right and we do not quarrel with that.

Clause 13(3) is different, providing that:

“A targeted examination warrant is a warrant which authorises the person to whom it is addressed to carry out the selection of relevant content for examination, in breach of the prohibition in section 134(4) (prohibition on seeking to identify communications of individuals in the British Islands).”

The purpose of clause 13(3) is different. We move from the targeted warrant to the bulk warrant—an examination warrant that provides authority to examine the content that would otherwise be in breach of clause 134(4). In order to understand that, I take the Committee to clause 119, to which that relates.

Clause 119 deals with bulk interception warrants, which can be issued if conditions A and B are satisfied. Condition A deals with

“the interception of overseas-related communications”

and with “obtaining…secondary data”. The definition of secondary data is the same in that part of the Bill as it is in the part that we have just looked at. I will not test the Committee’s patience by going to that definition, but it is a consistent definition of secondary data.

Condition B sets out that the bulk warrant authorises “the interception”, which is the content,

“the obtaining of secondary data”,

which is the same as a targeted warrant but in relation to the bulk powers, and

“the selection for examination, in any manner described…of…content or secondary data”

and “disclosure”. The bulk warrant allows the interception of the content and secondary data. In and of itself, it provides for the examination on the face of the same warrant.

For content, it becomes more complicated because there is a safeguard, which is in clause 134(4)—safeguards in relation to examination materials. Having provided a broad examination power, there is then a safeguard for that examination power in clause 134(4). A number of conditions are set for examining material that has been obtained under a bulk interception warrant. They are set out in subsection (3) and the first is that

“the selection of the intercepted content for examination does not reach the prohibition in subsection(4)”

which is that

“intercepted content may not…be selected for examination if— any criteria used for the selection of the intercepted content…are referable to an individual known to be in the British Islands at that time, and the purpose of using those criteria is to identify the content”.

The long and short of it is that, going back to clause 13, a targeted intercept warrant authorises the examination of both content and secondary data.

For a bulk warrant—this is where clause 13(3) kicks in—there is provision for an examination warrant which provides an ability to look at the content, which in all other circumstances would be a breach of the prohibition in clause 134. The content of communications of individuals in the British Isles can be looked at when it has been captured by a bulk provision, but only when there is a targeted examination warrant. That is a good thing.

What the amendment gets at is this. What is not in clause 13(3) is any provision for an examination warrant in relation to secondary data, so for the targeted provisions these two are treated as one: secondary data integral to the content of communication. When it comes to bulk, they are separated and only the content is subject to the further provision in clause 13(3).

That is a material provision and is a big part of the legislation because, unless amendment 57 is accepted, a targeted examination warrant is not required for secondary data, which are capable of being examined simply under the bulk powers. The purpose of the amendment is to align subsections (2) and (3) and ensure that the targeted examination warrant is not required for both content and secondary data in relation to individuals in the British Isles. The result otherwise would be that, for someone in the British Isles, their secondary data could be looked at as long as it was captured under a bulk provision without a targeted warrant. That is a serious drafting issue of substance.

Our approach to some of the wider retention of bulk powers is this. Although we accept that a case can be made for retaining data that will be looked at later, the wide powers of retentional bulk are a cause of concern on both sides of the House. When it comes to examining what has been caught within the wider net, there are specific safeguards. In other words, as long as there is a specific targeted safeguard when someone wants to look at bulk or retained data, that is an important safeguard when they are harvesting wide-ranging data. That is a very important provision in relation to secondary data.

Amendments 59 and 60 go to a different issue. They are separate and I ask the Government to treat them as separate. The first is about content and secondary data as a hom-set and whether they should be protected in the same way throughout the regime of the legislation, however they are initially intercepted. That is an important point of principle that I ask the Government to consider seriously because it goes to the heart of the question of targeted access.

The second amendment relates to individuals in the British Isles. At the moment, clause 13(3) provides specific protection in relation to the content of communications for people in the British Isles. It is clear from clause 134(4) that that means not residing in the British Isles, but actually in the British Isles. Under clause 13(3), once I get to Calais, I fall out of the protection of that provision, as does everybody else in this Committee, because it is a question of whether someone is physically in the British islands. Therefore, a targeted examination warrant for the content of my communications gathered by bulk powers would not be needed once I got halfway across the channel. Until I went through the analysis, I did not fully appreciate that, and serious consideration is required for both content and secondary data. More generally within amendment 59 are provisions relating to individuals not normally in the British islands or within the countries specified in amendment 60.

I am sorry to have referred to other clauses, but I could not work this out until I went through that torturous route. The net result is a disconnect between content and secondary data, which goes to the heart of protection when it comes to bulk powers. Clause 13(3) is really important for bulk powers and is one of the most important provisions in the Bill, so we have to get it right.

The limit of clause 13(3) to individuals in the British islands is unsustainable and needs further thought. Amendments 59 and 60 intend to remedy that defect. If there is an appetite in the Government to look carefully at those provisions, there may be a different way of coming at the problem, but it is a real flaw in the regime as it is currently set out. I apologise for taking so long to get to that, Ms Dorries. It required a cold wet towel on one afternoon last week to work my way through this, but once we go through the exercise, we realise there is a fundamental problem that either has to be fixed or adequately answered.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am 100% with the hon. and learned Gentleman in his description of the clause. Indeed, many clauses of the Bill require the application of a cold wet towel or a bag of ice to the head followed by copious amounts of alcohol later in the evening.

Amendments 57 and 83 bear my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North. I wish to emphasise the importance of those amendments, which foreshadow important amendments in respect of bulk powers that the Scottish National party intends to table at a later stage. Our amendments would apply the same processes and safeguards for the examination of information or material obtained through bulk interception warrants and bulk equipment interference warrants, irrespective of whether the information or material pertains to individuals in the British Isles, and to require a targeted examination warrant to be obtained whenever secondary data obtained through bulk interception warrants and equipment data and information obtained through bulk interference warrants are to be examined.

In order to gain an understanding of the background to this amendment, I invite hon. Members to look back at the evidence of Eric King to the Committee on 24 March. He explained to us how GCHQ examines bulk material. The targeted examination warrant available on the face of the Bill fails to cover the aspect of communication that is most used by agencies such as GCHQ: metadata, or secondary data, as it is referred to in the Bill.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Joanna Cherry]

The hon. and learned Lady makes a point that I have to take on board to a certain extent. I suspect that my amendments to clause 15 go further than David Anderson would if he were drafting an amendment to this clause. We are at a very early stage in this procedure. I am really seeking an assurance from the Government that they will take on board, if not my concerns, then at the very least the concerns of Sir Stanley Burnton, Lord Judge and David Anderson, and that they will take away clause 15 and clause 27 and look at them again.

[Keir Starmer]

I will be brief because a lot of the detailed work has been done. I listened very carefully to the Minister, not only today but on other occasions, and he indicated that the Government want to improve the Bill and that they do not have a fixed view. I therefore make these submissions in the hope that the Minister and the Government will not circle the wagons around the existing formula in clause 15 simply because those are the words on the page. The warrants are supposed to be targeted, but when reading clause 15(2) it is clear that they are very wide. I will not repeat the concerns of Lord Judge, Sir Stanley Burnton and David Anderson, but they are three individuals with huge experience of the operation of these warrants.

I take the point about kidnap cases or examples of that type. They are exactly the cases that Lord Judge and Sir Stanley Burnton will have seen in real time and reviewed, and that David Anderson will have reviewed after the event. When those three distinguished individuals say that they have concerns about the breadth of the clauses, they do so against huge and probably unparalleled experience of what the warrants provide for. I doubt that anyone would suggest that they are not alive to concerns about the warrants being practical and effective in the sort of circumstances that have been described.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

Indeed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Power of Secretary of State to issue warrants

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 17, page 13, line 5, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.

This amendment, and others to Clause 17, seeks to remove the role of the Secretary of State in formally issuing interception warrants and instead requires Judicial Commissioners to issue such warrants.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

No, it does not. With all due respect, thinking on accountability and safeguards in this field is on the move. The sort of regime that was perhaps thought appropriate five, 10 or 15 years ago is now accepted as not appropriate. One of the points of this legislation in many respects is to bring it up to date and make sure that scrutiny and safeguards are more powerful. The fact that an ex-Home Secretary thinks their role was very important and need not be interfered with did not surprise me, but neither did I find it persuasive.

I have probably exhausted my point. The amendments are intended to reflect the position set out by David Anderson for the very good reasons that he draws attention to in paragraph 14.56(a): the political accountability card is overplayed in resisting this argument.

[Joanna Cherry]

I just want to address the joint amendments briefly. I want to draw attention to amendment 101, which was tabled on behalf of the Scottish National party and reflects a later amendment to delete clause 19. Scottish Ministers issue warrants at present in relation to serious crime. If the amendments were taken on board, their role would be replaced by judicial commissioners, and they are comfortable with that. I simply draw attention to that consequential amendment.

I support everything that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras has said in support of the group of amendments to clause 17. I have just three points to make: three reasons why I support the amendments. First, I associate myself with the argument that arguments concerning Ministers’ democratic or political accountability for surveillance warrants are misconceived and misplaced. Secondly, one-stage judicial authorisation is the norm in many comparable jurisdictions. Thirdly, and picking up another point made by David Anderson, judicial authorisation would encourage co-operation from technical firms in the United States of America.

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras for exploding the myth, also exploded by David Anderson, that Ministers are democratically accountable for their role in issuing warrants, because of course it is a criminal offence to disclose the existence of a warrant, and that will remain the case under clauses 49 and 51.

What is often advanced and has been advanced by Government Members is that a corollary to this argument is that Ministers are politically accountable for the agencies and will be required to resign if things go wrong. That is incorrect. Although the Home Secretary is responsible for setting the strategic direction of the Government’s counter-terrorism policy and the Cabinet Minister is responsible for MI5, MI5 is like the police: operationally independent. MI5’s director general retains operational independence for day to day decision making. Historically, when terrorist attacks have tragically succeeded, they have not led to political resignations in this country. Despite inquests and inquiries following the terrible tragedies of the 7/7 attacks and the ghastly murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, and despite the fact that those inquests and inquiries uncovered internal errors in the agency’s handling of information relating to those responsible for the attacks, this did not result in the political accountability that is now so strongly claimed.

The reality is that the oversight we have for such decisions and the accountability for the agency is provided by a patchwork of mechanisms, including the ISC—although I dissociate myself with the comments made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras on the limitations of the ISC—and also by public inquiries and legal challenges brought against the Government. No doubt we could argue that such oversight and accountability as there is in relation to the operation of the security agencies could be enhanced, but it is simply not correct to argue that political accountability is provided by the ministerial sign-off on warrants, because it is not. I have been in the House for only nine months, but when questions around these issues are asked of Ministers, I have seen them repeatedly reply, probably quite properly, that they cannot answer for reasons of national security.

My second point is that one-stage judicial authorisation is the norm in comparable jurisdictions. It happens in America, where federal, investigative or law enforcement officers are generally required to obtain judicial authorisation for intercept. A court order must be issued by a judge of a US district court or a US court of appeals judge. In Australia, law enforcement interception warrants must be issued by an eligible judge or a nominated administrative appeals tribunal judge. In Canada, it is unlawful to intercept private communications unless the interception is in accordance with an authorisation issued by a judge. In New Zealand, police can only intercept a private communication in tightly prescribed circumstances, including requiring a warrant or emergency permit that can only be issued by a High Court judge. If the United Kingdom wants to be able to claim that it is in a world-class league for good practice in surveillance, in my submission, it should adopt one-stage judicial authorisation.

Those of us who are lawyers in the Committee or have ever dealt with the law are familiar with the concept of a judge being got out of his or her bed in the middle of the night to grant an interdict in Scotland or an injunction in England, in civil matters of far less importance than the sorts of matter the Bill deals with. In the aftermath of—God forbid—another attack in the United Kingdom such as 7/7, judges would be as readily available to deal with warrants as Ministers of the Crown are at present.

Thirdly, judicial authorisation would encourage co-operation from US technical firms. That point was pressed home by David Anderson QC in his review, when he said that given the United States tradition of judicial warrants, Silicon Valley technical firms feel uncomfortable with the United Kingdom model of political authorisation. Those firms operate in a global marketplace, which underlines the need for us to adhere to procedures fit for a world-leading democracy. The United Kingdom is alone among our democratic allies with similar legal systems in permitting political-only authorisation. The SNP supports the amendments for those three reasons.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for the way he has approached this, but it misunderstands the amendment. Of course, whether information could be reasonably obtained by other means is relevant to the assessment of proportionality and necessity. The amendment proposes that, having taken all the factors into account, if it transpires at the end of that exercise that the information could have been reasonably obtained by other less intrusive means, it is not proportionate—that is the end of the exercise. That, in our submission, is the right test that should be on the face of the Bill. At this stage, I will withdraw the amendment with a view to raising it at a later stage if it is appropriate to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Grounds on which warrants may be issued by Secretary of State

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 18, page 14, line 20, after “security”, insert “or”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I listened carefully to the Minister, and I noted that he said he wanted to provide a bridge on the issue of national security and can perhaps deal with issues and political fears related to that, but that he does not want to significantly change the language on economic wellbeing and is not happy with the SNP amendments in relation to reasonable suspicion. I do not want to get too bogged down on trade union rights and I certainly do not want to kick down the bridge that the Minister wants to build, but I have to say that, on trade union rights, actions speak louder than words. This Government have introduced some of the most draconian anti-trade union legislation that has been seen in this country for many years—worse than Mrs Thatcher’s. In that context, I do wonder whether we can be assured about the Government’s intentions in relation to trade unions. However, the Minister is an honourable man; I take him at his word and will listen to what he has to say in the future on this issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 19 and 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Approval of warrants by Judicial Commissioners

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 62, in clause 21, page 17, line 4, leave out from “must” to “the following matters” in line 5 and insert “determine”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. There are several different positions here, and we are finding our way. The amendments would take out the review element and make it clear that it is a double lock. There would then be a separate decision by the Secretary of State and a decision by a judge on the same material. Of course, a judge would always give weight to the Secretary of State’s view, but they would still come to a decision of their own. That is position No. 1, and let me be clear that that is what the amendment is aimed at—a true and equal lock.

[Joanna Cherry]

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that amendment 89, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North and I, would specifically take out subsection (2) and the reference to judicial review? That would make clear what he is saying: amendment 62, which I also support, would amend subsection (1) so that the judge would determine the review in regard to necessity and proportionality, and judicial review would come out completely.

[Keir Starmer]

I agree. I notice that my name is not on amendment 89. I think it should have been, because amendment 62 only works if subsection (2) comes out, but that is neither here nor there at this stage. I am not quite sure what happened, but given that both amendments have been tabled, it does not matter one way or another.

To be clear, the position is that it should be a substantive decision by the judge according to necessity and proportionality, and those terms obviously have their own special application. Through amendment 89, the review, whether by judicial review principles or otherwise, would come out, making it a true double and equal lock.

It is a new approach and a new provision, so it is for Parliament to decide on the appropriate way forward, but the amendments would give clarity and a real safeguard with an equal lock. That is the position. There probably is a fall-back position, which is that if it is to be a review of some sort, amendment 89 should stand on its own feet—that the review should not be on the principles of judicial review, and something more would need to be written into the Bill.

I do not know what response the Minister will give, but this matter goes to the heart of the issue, and it may be that further consideration needs to be given to the precise test. As it stands, the test is insufficiently precise and will lead to difficulties in its application. It is a matter of real concern to the judiciary. Lord Judge does not make such comments without a good deal of thought. If he is concerned about the provision, the Government should be, too. The simple way through is to have a simple but substantive double and equal lock.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I have heard nothing that answers what in my submission is a knockout point about lack of reasons. I am not tooting my own trumpet because it was not my idea. I got the point from my learned devilmaster, Laura Dunlop QC, a distinguished silk at the Scottish Bar and former law commissioner. I asked her to look at this and she said the first thing that occurred to her was how can there be scrutiny under judicial review principles when there is a vacuum of any reasoning. I have not heard any answer to that question in what the Solicitor General has said, with all due respect to him.

On that basis, I remain of the view that amendments 62 and 89 will be essential in due course, but following the course of action we have taken today, I will not insist on them at this stage. I reserve the right to bring them forward at a later stage, about which the Chairman has advised me.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General. I have listened carefully to what he has said. There is a difference between us, because I seek to ensure through the amendment that the judicial commissioner is a proper decision maker.

To make the argument that the judges might be fettered is really to misunderstand the amendment that I have tabled. The duty of the judge is to apply the test that Parliament sets out in statute. That is straightforward, and if Parliament is clear about the test, the judge is exercising his or her duties properly in applying the test. There is no question there, but there is this fundamental point between us as to whether it should be review or decision making. I think that is clear enough.

In light of the argument, at this stage I will not push this amendment to a vote, but I will reserve it for a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West and the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. The hon. and learned Lady was very clear about the different basis of her amendment. My concern is that there are two schools of thought here. There is the amicus curiae school of thought, with which I have a great deal of sympathy. One of the roles of the Law Officers is, when we are approached by various jurisdictions, to consider whether the attorney himself should intervene or whether the court should have an amicus appointed. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to talk about some of the confusion that can exist in regard to inherent jurisdiction. I am going to take that point away and consider it.

I am concerned about a full-blown replication of the important special advocate system that we have to assist, for example, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, or of the genesis of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the closed material procedure. There is an important difference between the public interest in having special advocates and this type of scenario. In such cases, there are affected parties—usually respondents to important applications—for whom huge issues are at stake and who need that sort of quality representation within what we accept are exceptional and unusual departures from the principle of open justice. That is why special advocates were created. They perform an invaluable and important role.

I do not see the read-across from that to this scenario. What we have here is an investigatory procedure. It takes place at the early stages—to take a case example—of the investigation of a crime or a threat to national security. There may not be at that stage an identifiable suspect; there is, therefore, a difference and a difficulty in identifying the prejudice that could be caused to the interest of an individual who is a party to the proceedings. It is a different scenario and, tempting though it might be to introduce that type of regime, it would serve only to introduce delay, bureaucracy and extra expense with no tangible benefit to the integrity of the system.

In a nutshell, I will consider carefully the amicus curiae point, but I have wholly to reject a wider approach and the creation of a special advocate system which, frankly, would go beyond even the American jurisdiction, with which comparison is often made—in the foreign intelligence surveillance court in the US they have amici curiae available to assist the court. On that basis, I urge the hon. and learned Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I have nothing to add. In the light of what the Solicitor General has said I will not press the amendment. I look forward to what he produces and to further discussing that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Joanna Cherry]

I have nothing to add either.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I do not wish to speak to new clause 1. It stands or falls with the clause 17 amendments and is to that extent withdrawn along with them.

[Joanna Cherry]

My new clause 5 is in the same category as new clause 1, the ground of which I think we have covered. The new clauses are slightly different, in that they followed David Anderson’s initial recommendation, but we will obviously revisit the matter at a later stage so I will not take up time unnecessarily to labour the point.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Approval of warrants issued in urgent cases

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for being so precise and clear about that. Essentially, the concern about clause 22 is that the scope of the urgent mechanism is extremely broad and ill defined. In my view, it could fatally undermine any safeguard provided by a mechanism for judicial authorisation or indeed judicial review in the double lock.

The Bill provides that an urgent warrant can be issued by the Secretary of State in a case where she considers there is an “urgent need”, which is not defined. We then have the three-day period. As the hon. Lady said, no specific reason has been given for the selection of three days. The Joint Committee took the view that it should be shortened significantly to provide for approval within 24 hours. I think the ISC suggested 48 hours—I apologise if I have got that the wrong way round.

The purpose of the amendments is to remove the urgent provision in the Bill altogether or to restrict it to very limited circumstances, with the urgent authorisation having to take place during a 24-hour period. The concern underlying the amendments is that in their absence, the provisions for urgent warrants in the Bill will drive a coach and horses through even the double lock provision, because they will enable the judicial authorisation part of the procedure to be bypassed in very loosely defined circumstances. That is the case as precisely as I can put it.

[Keir Starmer]

I will be brief. There is a real concern about the provision for urgent cases being three days. Although we need such a provision, that period allows warrants to be operable before the double lock can apply, and therefore the period should be as short as possible.

The problem is not only that three days is too much but that three days can, I think, be five days, because it is three working days, and therefore there is the potential for three days to morph into more than three. If I am wrong about that, I will happily be corrected. I have put my name to the amendments suggesting 24 and 48-hour periods, to give the Government the option to reduce the threshold to either of those and put it in terms of hours, which removes any possible confusion about the use of the word “days”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I have nothing to add, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Members of Parliament etc.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 104, in clause 24, page 18, line 38, leave out subsections (1) and (2) and insert—

‘(1) This section applies where a warrant issued under this Part would seek to authorise any activity which may involve access to special procedure material.

(2) Special procedure material subject to subsection (1) will include—

(a) communications which are subject to legal professional privilege;

(b) journalistic material which a person holds in confidence; and

(c) communications sent by, or intended for, a member of the relevant legislature.

(3) The warrant subject to subsection (1) may only be granted on application to a Judicial Commissioner.

(4) The Judicial Commissioner must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that—

(a) a criminal offence has been committed;

(b) the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of that offence;

(c) other proportionate methods of obtaining the information have been tried without success or were not tried because they were bound to fail;

(d) it is in the public interest that the warrant is granted, having regard to the—

(i) benefit likely to accrue to the investigation and prosecution if the information is accessed,

(ii) importance of the prosecution, and

(iii) importance of maintaining public confidence in the confidentiality of material subject to legal professional privilege, the integrity of journalists’ sources, and/or communications with members of relevant legislature.

(5) Material is subject to legal professional privilege means—

(a) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client;

(b) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client and any other person with or in contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings;

(c) items enclosed with or referred to in such communications and made in—

(i) connection with the giving of legal advice, or

(ii) connection with the contemplation of legal proceedings or for the purposes of such proceedings.

(d) communications made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not subject to legal professional privilege.

(6) A person holds journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if—

(a) it is held subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation;

(b) it has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.”.

This amendment establishes a consistent approach to the safeguards afforded to parliamentarians, legally privileged material and journalists seeking to protect their sources.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I have already indicated that I am not putting the amendment to the test. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Joanna Cherry]

That is my position as well. I am happy to have addressed the principle at this stage and to look at an amendment at a later stage.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25

Items subject to legal privilege

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 25, page 19, line 22, after “items”, insert “presumptively”.

Investigatory Powers Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Thursday 24th March 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I can see other hands going up, so I will end there.

[Joanna Cherry]

Q To be clear, Mr King, is your evidence in relation to bulk interception and collection of data that there is intrusion and analysis of them by computer programs prior to any warrant being applied for?

Eric King: No. There will be warrants at the collection stage but at the moment it is simply 10. Those 10 warrants that are authorised every six months permit the agencies to intercept at an extraordinarily large scale: 50 billion connections every single day, and growing. We know that, in the past five years, that has increased by 7,000%. I say that those 10 warrants do not appropriately assess the proportionality requirements, and I do not think they are necessary in the current climate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

Q I have one final question for either or both of you. Am I right in thinking that, as far as internet connection records are concerned, although the security and intelligence services would not say, “There are no circumstances in which we’d really need them,” in reality, they are relied on much less by the security and intelligence agencies than by law enforcement, as a separate component?

Lord Evans: It is not impossible that they could be of value in an intelligence sense, but I think the principal driver for using them or for obtaining them is for evidential purposes, and that is made clear publicly. It is principally a law enforcement and evidential issue to inform cases coming before the courts more often than it is an intelligence issue. You could construct a scenario in which it might be of value, but the purpose of putting them in the Bill, as I understand it, is law enforcement and providing criminal evidence.

[Joanna Cherry]

Q Lord Evans, I want to ask you about the savage murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby and the Intelligence and Security Committee investigation into that. It reported to Parliament that his killers had previously come to the attention of the Security Service on multiple occasions and that, in its view, intelligence reports were mishandled. I think I am right in saying that its inquiry suggested that, if the Security Service had more resources to cover more and lower-priority level targets, the outcome could or would have been different. Would you like to comment on that?

Lord Evans: The Lee Rigby murder took place after my time as director general—not that there is any connection between those two—so I am not very close to the actual facts. In general, one of the critical decisions—certainly for MI5, but it applies by logic to other people on counter-terrorism—is what you do not do. We have more leads which might connect to possible terrorist attack or to violent extremism than we can thoroughly investigate at any one time, so the service has created a quite rigorous triage process that ranks the seriousness of the available information, which is updated on a regular basis, and that drives therefore the allocation of resources.

The difficulty here is self-evident: obviously, sometimes you are working on the basis of fragmentary intelligence or unclear intelligence, so you have to make the judgment as to whether you put resources in to pursuing that or whether you put the resources in to something else. The fact is that sometimes you make a judgment on the available best evidence and then find out later that, actually, the situation was more serious than was apparent. That appears to have been the case with Lee Rigby.

Exactly the same issue came out after the 7 July bombings in London. Mohammad Sidique Khan had appeared in the context of Security Service investigations and police investigations a couple of years before. At that stage, he was assessed to be not a very serious threat and therefore he was put aside so that we could come back to him later while we did other things that were more immediately pressing, but in the interim his activities developed.

It is a problem. The question of course is: how do you get around that problem? The first thing is to use the best quality information available. The second is that the more resources you have, the more yesses you can give as to whether we investigate any one individual, but then you get into a judgment about how many people we think it is proportionate and necessary to investigate. If you doubled the resources of the Security Service again, there would still be cases where you might say, “We don’t have the resources to pursue that.” You ultimately get into a political judgment as to how much resource you want put into this and how much intrusion you have into the activities of people who might not be quite as threatening as others. That is a judgment that has to be made.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Joanna Cherry and Keir Starmer

Thursday 24th March 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

Thank you.

[Joanna Cherry]

Q At the Joint Committee, Mr Hughes, you said that BT had never collected internet connection records before, that you would have to deploy new equipment to comply with the legislation and that that would come at a cost. That is correct, is it not?

Mark Hughes: That is correct, yes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

Q I see, so at the moment, your function is limited in this particular field to local authorities.

Mark Astley: Correct.

[Joanna Cherry]

Q Your organisation has identified a range of crimes that local authorities use communications data to tackle. Do you think the Bill ought to identify the crimes more precisely to prevent data from being used in relation to, for example, rubbish collection or school places?

Mark Astley: I believe that the process is in place for identifying necessity and proportionality. The three bar process that we currently have in place will deal with that. To actually identify particular legislation could become more constraining and difficult to administer and, as more legislation comes along, more changes may be required to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

Q One final swift question on thematic warrants and the breadth of the powers proposed in the Bill. Do any of the witnesses have headline concerns that the Committee can take away to work on as we consider the Bill line by line?

Sir Stanley Burnton: First, the existing formulation in RIPA is very unsatisfactory and unclear, and it does not cover many cases in which it would be sensible to have a so-called thematic warrant. However, the wording of clause 15(2) is very wide. If you just have a warrant that gives a name to a group of persons, you have not identified—certainly not in the warrant—all those persons to whom it is going to apply. There could be substantial changes in the application of the warrant without any modification. At the moment, the code of conduct envisages a requirement that names will be given so far as practicable. Our view is that the warrant should name or otherwise identify all those persons to whom the warrant will apply, as known to the applicant at that date.

The other concern is that substantial modifications can be made to a warrant under the Bill with no judicial approval or even notification. That needs to be changed.

Lord Judge: I agree with Sir Stanley. I will not say anything more on the second point he made, but on the first, a part of the process that all of us involved in supervising surveillance attach a great deal of weight to is that we are looking at individuals. There has to be evidence that X requires this, that there is a situation in which it is necessary for this to happen, that it is proportionate in this particular individual’s case and that there is no collateral interference. For example—there are many different examples—why should a women who happens to be married to or living with a man who is suspected and so on have her life entirely opened up in this way? Not having specific identified individuals leaves a very delicate situation. I suspect that the commissioners would find it very difficult to just say, “Well, we’re satisfied. There’s this gang here and they’re all pretty dangerous.” They might not be, and we have to be very alert to that.

[Joanna Cherry]

Q I have questions for Jo Cavan. In your organisation’s written evidence, you have picked up on earlier concerns about the draft Bill and updated them in the light of the finalised Bill. In the first point, you say that you have concerns about the “aggressive timeline” for the Bill. Can you explain what you mean by that?

Jo Cavan: It is a really complicated and significant piece of legislation. Although I broadly support the Bill, because it is a good thing to put a number of the powers used by the intelligence agencies on a clearer statutory footing and to try to improve transparency, I do think that the scrutiny process has been very hurried. That is of concern because there are some significant privacy implications to the clauses in the Bill. There is still a long way to go towards strengthening some of the safeguards. Also, a lot of the operational detail is in the codes of practice. It is really important that those are scrutinised properly, line by line.