Oral Answers to Questions

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Tuesday 29th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I thank my hon. Friend for speaking so strongly on behalf of his constituents. Colin Pitchfork’s offences were the gravest of crimes, and the families of Lynda Mann and Dawn Ashworth still live with the pain that he caused. The independent Parole Board’s role is to assess whether he is safe for release, rather than whether he has been punished enough. I understand why this decision has affected public confidence. It has been reviewed by officials in my Department, and we found arguable grounds that the decision was irrational, so I have asked the Parole Board to reconsider it using the mechanism that my hon. Friend rightly identified.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP) [V]]

Can the Secretary of State tell us why the Ministry of Justice has left the Stonewall Diversity Champions scheme? Can he reassure me that his Department will continue to respect the rights of all its LGBT employees, and indeed the rights of all those with protected characteristics, including women and those who hold gender-critical beliefs?

[Robert Buckland]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for that question. I can absolutely assure her that the rights of LGBTQ+ people will be respected, honoured and celebrated by my Department. We are taking the fullest and most enthusiastic part in Pride Month, which of course is now. The issue with regard to Stonewall was simply this: my officials and I were no longer convinced that the particular scheme that we had taken part in was the right use of public money. There were concerns about the direction of that organisation, which has done so much to advance the cause of people of an LGBT+ orientation. It was with great sorrow and regret that that decision was made, but I assure the hon. and learned Lady that the underlying commitment to and passion for those issues absolutely remains.

End-to-end Rape Review

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Monday 21st June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

My right hon. Friend posits a very interesting point about the merits of perhaps a more inquisitorial or consensual system than the adversarial system, but I remind him—of course, he was a practitioner as well—that allegations of a criminal nature have to meet a high standard of proof, and the burden of proof is on the prosecution in these cases. There is no getting away from that, which is why, progressively over the years, we have done everything we can to improve and to allow the best evidence to come forward from complainants through the use of special measures, remote technology and, indeed, the TV link, which has been around for 30 years. I want to go further with regard to that and make sure that evidence can be dealt with as early as possible. I will no doubt have further discussions about this issue with him, but at this stage I believe that we can seek improvement through the existing system while, as I say, dealing with some of the unfortunate consequences to which he rightly alludes.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

This review applies to England and Wales only, but Scotland faces similar challenges. In 2009 I was privileged to be one of the first specialist sex crimes prosecutors in Scotland’s national sex crimes unit, and I am looking to its work being rejuvenated under the leadership of the Lord Advocate, my very dear friend Dorothy Bain QC. Does the Lord Chancellor agree that it is imperative for data accuracy, and for trust in official statistics, in public policy, in media reporting and in research and public bodies that the sex of those directly charged with rape or attempted rape is accurately recorded?

[Robert Buckland]

I join the hon. and learned Lady in her remarks about the Scottish system. I congratulate the new Lord Advocate and look forward to meeting her. As I have always said to the hon. and learned Lady, there is much that we can learn from the Scots and, I know, much that the Scots learn from England and Wales with regard to the prosecution of offences. [Interruption.] Oh, she must readily accept that. We were far ahead of the Scots with regard to rules on corroboration, for example. But it is not a competition; it is all about us learning jointly as part of our United Kingdom. With regard to the accurate reporting of gender, clearly the definition of rape itself will tell us about the sex of the perpetrator. That, in itself, should be the clearest indicator of the sex of the person who perpetrates these crimes. No doubt she and I will talk about this matter further. I think I know the drift of her question.

Independent Review of Administrative Law

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Thursday 18th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

My hon. Friend makes a very proper point, and one of the important functions of judicial review is for the courts not just to opine on the legality or otherwise of the decision, but to help local and national Government understand better how to make those decisions in the first place. I readily take the point that there are still far too many outcomes that result from flawed decision making, which is why judicial review is such an important principle. My hon. Friend will, I am sure, be particularly interested in the proposals in the consultation about procedural reform, which are designed to try to streamline, simplify and make judicial review more accessible for organisations and individuals who seek it. But in the first instance my aim is to try to ensure that these disputes are resolved before the need for litigation.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP) [V]]

When this review was announced I corresponded with the Lord Chancellor, reminding him that our independent system of civil justice in Scotland is protected by article 19 of the treaty of Union and devolved to the Scottish Parliament, so I welcome the assurance he has given today that his proposals going forward will apply to England and Wales only. As it is my birthday, will he indulge me by joining me in celebrating another victory for Scotland’s independent legal system, which of course in 2019 led the way in ruling that the Prime Minister’s Prorogation of Parliament was unlawful?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Happy birthday.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading - Day 2
Tuesday 16th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP) [V]]

During the pandemic, our civil liberties have been curtailed in a way that was previously unimaginable. Most of us have accepted that in order to protect life and public health, but along the way injustices have occurred.

Black Lives Matter protesters in London were kettled and photographed and asked to provide their names as a condition of their liberty, with no legal basis, yet police allowed football fans to party on the streets of Glasgow and even gave them a police escort to their destination of choice. Then, last weekend, police officers manhandled and detained women protesting the alleged abduction and murder of a woman, with which a police officer is charged. It is hard to imagine a more egregious misuse of police powers.

All this has occurred because the law on protest in a pandemic is not clear, but the provisions in this Bill to curtail the right to protest beyond the pandemic are even worse. The Bill affords significantly expanded powers to the police to stop protests that would cause “serious unease” and creates criminal penalties for people causing “serious annoyance”. But causing annoyance is part of our freedom of speech. If a protest can be prevented for being annoying, any protest can be prevented.

All movements for change involve an element of peaceful protest. Think of the suffragettes. I am sure many of us did when we saw the photographs from Clapham common on Saturday night. If women cannot speak up to protest their rights, what is our society coming to? Yes, the Extinction Rebellion protests may have been very annoying to those of us going about our business on London’s streets and public transport, but those protesters were protesting the biggest problem of our age—climate change—and I think that gives them the right to be a bit annoying.

We have now seen what can happen when the law governing our right to protest is unclear. The same problems will occur if the margin of discretion granted to the police and the Home Secretary is left as wide as it currently is in this Bill. Although these legal changes will have force only in England and Wales, they will impact people living in Scotland. There is a long tradition of Scots travelling to London to protest. We saw that most recently with the huge demonstrations against Brexit, and past examples include the fight against section 28 and the fight of the anti-war movement.

Parliamentarians, whether of left or right, should never be in the business of giving Governments and police forces powers to stifle dissent, particularly where there is a risk that those powers will be used against those whose beliefs make the Government and the establishment of the day uncomfortable. I would say the same if I were worried that the Scottish Government were in danger of curtailing freedom of expression—and indeed I have, which is part of the reason I am making this speech from the Back Benches.

Oral Answers to Questions

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Tuesday 8th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I understand the concern that he outlines. Of course, the Supreme Court does not of its own volition investigate matters. It hears cases and answers the questions before it on arguable points of law of general public importance. However, as I have already said, I think it is important that we look again at the balance. As a full-throated supporter of an institution that brings together the three jurisdictions of our United Kingdom, I want to make sure that its future is indeed a secure and a bright one.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

The terms of reference for the Government’s review of the Human Rights Act 1998, which were announced yesterday, include the relationship between domestic courts and the European convention on human rights. But of course human rights themselves, as opposed to the Act, are not a reserved matter, and Scotland’s courts play an important role in supervising human rights protections under the Scotland Act 1998. So can the Lord Chancellor give me a cast-iron guarantee that the British Government are not planning to interfere with the competence of the Scottish Parliament in respect of human rights and the jurisdiction of Scotland’s separate legal system in enforcing human rights protections?

[Robert Buckland]

I am happy to assure the hon. and learned Lady that the terms of reference have been carefully couched to make it clear that we have distinctive contexts and natures in each of the jurisdictions, and that they will be considered where that is necessary. I am also content that where there are particular questions on devolved matters or of a devolved nature, the independent review will be approaching or inviting engagement from all appropriate parties. Of course, it is only the first stage in making recommendations. I can assure her that any proposals that will come forward will of course involve the fullest consultation with the devolved Administrations and, indeed, of course the fullest respect for the devolved settlement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Buckland]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I know that he met my colleague the Minister of State for Prisons and Probation at the end of November to discuss the issue of the consultation. I know the site well, having visited both Grendon and Spring Hill, and I pay tribute to the staff and, indeed, to the community for supporting the prisons that exist in that part of his constituency. We are considering all comments and suggestions sent to us through the consultation before we submit any outline planning application. I can assure him that the local community will also have an opportunity to provide further feedback once a planning application is submitted. I am happy to extend the public consultation and my officials are in communication with the local council regarding that.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

Back to the independent review of the Human Rights Act. The Lord Chancellor has said that, after 20 years, it is time to see whether the Act is working effectively, but the terms of reference do not actually contain any reference to an analysis of whether it is working effectively. Recently the Joint Committee on Human Rights found that most black people living in the United Kingdom believe that their human rights are not equally protected compared with those of white people. That is a shocking finding. Does not that finding alone justify a proper examination of whether the Act is working effectively and, if so, why is that not in the terms of reference?

[Robert Buckland]

The hon. and learned Lady knows that I gave evidence to the Committee of which she is a member about a week or so ago and acknowledged the important point made by the Committee. I think it was important for us to set up a very focused review as to the machinery of the Human Rights Act. It is not about the rights themselves; it is about the way in which they interact with our domestic law and the interplay, therefore looking in particular at sections 2, 3 and 4, for example, of the Human Rights Act. However, I am sure that these wider issues will become part of the debate as we see the recommendations come forward and as this place has an opportunity to play its part in those deliberations.

Courts and Tribunals: Recovery

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Thursday 3rd December 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. First, with regard to a multi-year settlement, it would not be right for me to prejudge what the decision of the Chancellor might be on that. The important decision had to be made this year to have a one-year settlement for the obvious reasons of the covid outbreak and the fact that, rightly, there was not a fiscal event—namely, a Budget. I will leave that decision ultimately to the Chancellor. However, my hon. Friend can be reassured that the work being done within the Department is indeed looking beyond one year only and coming up with evidence-based arguments and proposals that lead on to longer-term investment. For example, he will see in the capital programme not only a welcome £105 million extra for court maintenance but the multi-year prison capital programme, which will make a huge difference in terms of modern conditions in our prisons.

With regard to the Crown courts, my hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the figures. The figures for Crown court statistics are populated both manually and by automation. Therefore, they take some time to fully settle down. However, I am particularly encouraged by the figures relating to effective trials: trials that end up being “cracked”, as they say, with a guilty plea on the day; and trials brought into the court by the judge just before trial, or a week before trial, where guilty pleas have been tendered. The overall figures I am looking at now through November show a very encouraging increase in that overall number, getting us much closer to the pre-covid baseline. It is not there yet, but if those trends continue, we can get to that pre-covid baseline on trials, I think, in the new year. Of course, that allows us to start to make real progress on the rest of the case load.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP) [V]]

May I also thank the Lord Chancellor for advance sight of his statement?

These matters are, of course, largely devolved to Scotland, where the impact of the pandemic is being felt just as it is in jurisdictions across the world. My colleagues in the Scottish Government continue to work with partners, including the Scottish courts and prosecution services, victims’ groups and the legal profession, to identify the best possible way to deal with the problems that arise from the pandemic. To facilitate social distancing, remote jury trials are taking place across Scotland in the Sheriff courts as well as in the High Court. Additional funding for those was announced back in October. It was pleasing to hear Scotland’s second most senior judge, the Lord Justice Clerk Lady Dorrian, say that there has been an excellent collaborative effort across the justice sector in Scotland, which will increase court capacity in an environment that is safe for all participants.

May I ask the Lord Chancellor something about sexual offences? The European Court of Human Rights has held that the right to an effective remedy means that the state must ensure that sexual offences are investigated and prosecuted effectively, and that the state must also avoid undue delay in getting those cases to trial. Historically, Scotland has very strict time limits and I know that even during the pandemic this responsibility of effective remedy and speedy resolution is one that the Scottish Government take very seriously. Can he confirm that the UK Government take it equally seriously and are having regard to our obligations under the Strasbourg convention in this respect?

Turning to employment tribunals, they of course deal with reserved issues and are UK-wide. I want to raise with the Lord Chancellor the issue of the sharp rise in employment tribunal applications during the pandemic. This increase has gathered pace during lockdown, which tends to suggest that the impact of coronavirus has had a direct effect on the number of claims that are being made to employment tribunals. This has, of course, been an incredibly difficult time for business, but unfortunately there appears to be a trend of employers who are not following correct redundancy procedures, and this is only likely to result in more unfair dismissal claims. What can the Lord Chancellor do to address the increased strain on the tribunal system that this will create?

Finally, genuine mistakes around limitation periods for making an application to an employment tribunal can result in individuals being barred from seeking justice. That can happen in particular to claimants who are not entitled to legal representation or cannot afford it, and who may already have been involved in long and wearying internal grievance and disciplinary procedures. May I therefore ask the Lord Chancellor: is he still looking seriously at doubling the length of the time within which individuals can bring a claim to an employment tribunal from three to six months?

[Robert Buckland]

The hon. and learned Lady raised three distinct issues, which I will deal with in turn. First, with regard to obligations to victims of sexual offences, I reassure her that the way in which cases are prioritised in the courts in England and Wales very much bears in mind that important provision in terms of listing. I can give her the encouraging statistic for the most serious offences—sadly, many of them will be sexual offences—that just over 80% of those cases where someone has been remanded in custody have been listed for trial between now and spring 2021. Indeed, we keep a close eye on the progress or otherwise of other cases of a sexual nature. May I say to her that my officials and I have been watching the position in Scotland carefully and talking with colleagues in her jurisdiction about the approaches being taken? We are learning from each other in terms of development.

The position on employment tribunals is that, as I said, the number of cases being heard now has reached pre-covid levels as a result of the increased use of technology. That was an issue to begin with in the employment tribunal, but we are dealing with it. Of course, we have more money allocated next year for that further recovery.

If I may, I will come back to the hon. and learned Lady in correspondence on her specific point about limitation periods. I think I have dealt with all the matters. If I have not, I will write to her.

Oral Answers to Questions

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

The right hon. Gentleman will know that on two occasions in public forums, I have made my defence of lawyers very clear and made it clear that physical and verbal attacks and the other types of threat that we might see are entirely unacceptable. He talks rightly about a very serious case that is ongoing—I do not think it would be right for me to comment directly upon it—but we all know the context within which we operate. I can assure him that I will continue in my resolute defence of lawyers. I will say this: I think there are times when there is a legitimate debate to be had, and I firmly believe that lawyers who are passionate about politics are best advised, if they wish to pursue politics, to do as he and I did, which is to get elected and pursue politics here or in other democratic forums.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP) [V]]

The Home Secretary’s remit includes responsibility for making sure that all our communities are kept safe and secure. On 7 September, a man wielding a knife entered an immigration lawyers’ office in London and launched a violent, racist attack. In mid-September, counter-terrorist police from SO15 warned the Home Secretary that it was suspected that a far-right extremist had attempted to carry out a terrorist attack at a solicitors’ firm in London, yet in early October at the Tory party conference, she went on to intensify her anti-lawyer rhetoric. I am not asking the Lord Chancellor to disclose the precise details of private conversations, but can he confirm newspaper reports that prior to her speech, he warned the Home Secretary against using this sort of language? If she will not listen to him, will he consider his position?

[Robert Buckland]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for the way in which she put her question, but I have to repeat again that it would be invidious of me to repeat private conversations. She knows that I have been publicly on the record twice in the last month making my position very clear and condemning attacks. I think she would agree that we all need to be careful, as lawyers, about a matter that is currently sub judice and within the criminal process. Therefore, I think it is best not to try to draw direct links at this stage without knowing more about the evidence, but I reassure her that I will continue to do everything I can to make sure that the tone of the debate is right and that passions are cooled when it comes to talking about the important role of lawyers.

[Joanna Cherry]

I reiterate that I am not asking the Lord Chancellor for the precise details of conversations or, indeed, to comment on an ongoing case. I am asking him about the general advice that he has given to his colleagues in relation to his duties and responsibilities regarding the rule of law, because, after the Home Secretary’s speech, the Prime Minister went even further in his conference speech, declaring that he would prevent

“the whole criminal justice system from being hamstrung by…lefty human rights lawyers and other do-gooders.”

I ask the Lord Chancellor again: are newspaper reports that he spoke with the Prime Minister in advance of that speech correct? And did he tell the Prime Minister about the attack on the immigration lawyers’ offices and the warnings from counter-terrorism police to the Home Secretary about the dangers of inflammatory language against lawyers?

[Robert Buckland]

I can assure the hon. and learned Lady that the information about the serious allegations about the attack has been communicated to the appropriate Ministers and that everything that I have done and will continue to do is entirely consistent with my duty. Although, sadly, it might be the province of previous and current Prime Ministers to make provocative and sometimes lively comments about the legal profession, it is not the job of the Lord Chancellor to police every jot and tittle. I will continue to make sure that we get the tone of the debate right and that where we can improve on our language, we will do so.

Lord Chancellor’s Oath and the Rule of Law

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Wednesday 14th October 2020 Westminster Hall

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Lord Chancellor’s oath and the rule of law.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.

I should start by declaring an interest, as a non-practising member of the Scottish Bar, the Faculty of Advocates; as an honorary bencher of the Middle Temple; and as the lead petitioner in the case of Cherry v. Advocate General, in which connection I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

The Lord Chancellor is required to make an oath that no other member of the Cabinet is required to make, and it reads as follows:

“I…do swear that in the office of Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain I will respect the rule of law”.

When the Lord Chancellor took office in July last year, he took that oath at the royal courts of justice. Yet the past year has not been a happy one for the United Kingdom Government in respect of the rule of law.

In September last year, the Government suffered defeat in the Supreme Court of Scotland and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, when the Prime Minister’s Prorogation of Parliament was ruled unlawful. Rather than a contrite response, what we saw was a combative one, laced with denial. The fallout of those cases—the Miller case and my own case, and the first Miller case—has led to repeated attacks on the legal profession and the judiciary, and now to proposals to restrict the right of judicial review of Government action.

That was the start of the Lord Chancellor’s first year in office. It has been bookended this September by the resignation of the UK Government’s Scottish Law Officer. It will be recalled that the Advocate General resigned last month with a letter informing the Prime Minister that he found it increasingly difficult to reconcile his obligations as a Law Officer with the Government’s policy intentions, and he is yet to be replaced.

The Advocate General for Scotland tendered his resignation in the wake of the statement by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland that the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill would

“break international law in a very specific and limited way.”—[Official Report, 8 September 2020; Vol. 679, c. 509.]

Of course, that admission was elicited from him by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill).

In addition to the UK Internal Market Bill, we currently have two further Bills before Parliament that are unprecedented in legal terms. Both the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel And Veterans) Bill and the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill seek to create special classes of defendants in domestic law in respect of whom the criminal law will not apply as it does to you, Mr Twigg, or me.

We also have reviews pending in administrative law and human rights that would appear to threaten the scope for British citizens to challenge unlawful actions of this Government in court. Of course, part 5 of the Internal Market Bill already seeks to do that in respect of certain aspects of the Northern Ireland protocol.

There are concerns that the Internal Market Bill will undermine the Good Friday agreement. It certainly runs a coach and horses through the devolution settlement and makes a nonsense of promises made to Scottish voters during the 2014 independence referendum.

Last week, I spoke at a webinar organised to discuss the implications of the Internal Market Bill for the rule of law. It was organised by the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute. The webinar was attended by more than 1,000 lawyers from across these islands, and a further 1,000 in the waiting room were unable to get in. Among the speakers who expressed concern about the implications of the Bill for the rule of law were not just lefty lawyers like me, but Baron Howard—Michael Howard QC—a former leader of the Conservative and Unionist party and of Her Majesty’s Opposition, who I do not think by any stretch of the imagination could be described as a lefty lawyer.

Therefore, the concerns that I am articulating today are felt across the political spectrum. It was very noteworthy that during the seminar, Lord Neuberger, a former President of the Supreme Court, expressed very grave concerns about the implications of the Internal Market Bill for the rule of law. Such concerns, when expressed by a former President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in such trenchant terms as have been widely reported, are of some significance. They reflect the huge and widespread concern across these islands, expressed by the Law Societies and the Bars of Scotland and England and Wales, about the Bill, but also about rhetoric employed by the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister in respect of the legal profession.

At the beginning of September, the Home Secretary claimed that “activist lawyers” were frustrating the removal of migrants from this country. Days later, an immigration solicitor was the subject of a violent racist attack at a London law firm, and the Law Society of England and Wales wrote to the Home Secretary, warning her that inflammatory rhetoric has consequences. Nevertheless, the Home Secretary has doubled down on her rhetoric, and she has been joined in it by the Prime Minister.

At the Conservative party conference, the Home Secretary criticised people who make

“endless legal claims to remain”

in respect of asylum cases, and in the same speech she referenced those who

“lecture us on their grand theories about human rights”,

as well as referencing do-gooders and lefty lawyers. The Prime Minister, in his conference speech the next day, reiterated the sentiment, saying that the Government were

“changing the law…and stopping the whole criminal justice system from being hamstrung by what the Home Secretary would doubtless and rightly”

says the Prime Minister

“call the lefty human rights lawyers and other do-gooders.”

The leader of the Scottish Bar, the dean of the Faculty of Advocates, was so concerned about the comments that he has written what I would call an unprecedented letter to the Prime Minister in which he has expressed grave concerns on behalf of the whole Scottish Bar. I would like to read it out, because it is a short but powerful letter. It starts as follows:

“Dear Prime Minister

As I hope you know, the Faculty of Advocates represents the Scottish Bar. All Advocates qualified to practise before the Scottish Courts are Members of Faculty. All are bound by the cab rank rule.”

He explains that the cab rank rule means that advocates must be available for instruction by all and cannot pick and choose their clients. He goes on to say:

“Against that backdrop, I require to intimate, as Dean of Faculty and on behalf of all Members of Faculty, that I deprecate the recent pronouncements—from the Home Office, then from the Home Secretary, and latterly from the Prime Minister himself—to the effect that there is a problem with ‘lefty lawyers’ or ‘activist lawyers’ who are ‘hamstringing’ the justice system. Whether the topic is immigration, or crime, or the constitution, lawyers that act against the State are not being ‘lefty’, nor ‘activist’: they are doing their professional duty. It is simply unconscionable for Her Majesty’s Government to decry in this way the actions of professionals who, as the comments of Lord President Inglis”

in the famous case of Batchelor v. Pattison and Mackersy

“make clear, are not at liberty”

to pick and choose their clients. The dean of faculty goes on to say:

“In this country”—

by which I presume he means Scotland, but I think he would also apply it to the whole of the United Kingdom—

“(and the same cannot be said of all countries), instances of violence against lawyers are, fortunately, rare. However, in a climate of increasing populism, this sort of rhetoric is not only facile and offensive: it is potentially harmful. With great power comes great responsibility, and I have to say”

says the dean of faculty

“—with great respect—that I simply cannot fathom why it is thought in any way appropriate to attempt to vilify, in public, those that are simply doing their job, in accordance with the rule of law. I would accordingly, and again with great respect, ask each of you to eschew such unhelpful language, and to recognise that challenges to the executive are a necessary part of our democracy. Anything less would be a confession that we no longer live in a democracy.”

That letter was signed by Roddy Dunlop QC, dean of the Faculty of Advocates. As he is an old friend of mine, I can assure Members that he is not, unlike me, a lefty lawyer. He is simply somebody who cares about the rule of law.

As I look around, I realise there are many lawyers attending this debate. I do not need to take up too much time by defining what the rule of law is. The great English jurist, Lord Bingham, set it out finely in his eight principles of the rule of law. It is worth reminding ourselves, in relation to the Internal Market Bill, that the eighth of Lord Bingham’s principles is that the state must comply with its obligations in international law, as in national law.

The responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor for the rule of law were set out very well in our December 2014 report from the House of Lords Constitution Committee:

“The rule of law is a fundamental tenet of the United Kingdom constitution. In the context of the Government, it means more than simple compliance with the letter of the law: it means governing in accordance with constitutional principles. The Lord Chancellor has traditionally had a key role to play, both by defending the independence of the judiciary and by ensuring that the rule of law is respected within Government. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 substantially changed the office of Lord Chancellor.”

He

“is no longer the head of the judiciary or speaker of the House of Lords, and since 2007 the office has been combined with that of the Secretary of State for Justice. Yet the duty of the Lord Chancellor in relation to the rule of law remains unchanged. This duty extends beyond the work of the Ministry of Justice and requires the Lord Chancellor to ensure that the rule of law is upheld within Cabinet and across Government.”

The Committee also emphasised that the Lord Chancellor has traditionally performed an important oversight role in relation to the United Kingdom constitution as a whole. I would argue that that is highly relevant to the implications for Northern Ireland and for Scotland’s place in the Union, which arise from the Internal Market Bill.

The Committee heard evidence from Lord Falconer, who was very much involved in reforms that took place under the previous Labour Government. His evidence stated that the Lord Chancellor had a “special role” to protect the rule of law, and that to think otherwise was

“to undermine what the Constitutional Reform Act had sought to do.”

In summary, the Lord Chancellor’s duty to respect the rule of law extends beyond the policy remit of his or her Department and requires him or her to seek to ensure that the rule of law is upheld within the Cabinet and across the Government. My purpose in holding this debate today is to draw attention to the very real threats to the rule of law currently posed by the actions of this Government and to ask the Lord Chancellor, having regard to his oath, what he intends to do about them.

There has been trenchant criticism from various quarters, fully rehearsed in debates in this House, about the legal implications of part 5 of the Internal Market Bill. For example, the Bar Council and the Law Society of England and Wales have said that the clauses contained in part 5 of the Bill,

“enable ministers to derogate from the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law in broad and comprehensive terms and prohibit public bodies from compliance with such obligations. They represent a direct challenge to the rule of law, which include the country’s obligations under public international law”.

As we have heard, that is why the Advocate General for Scotland tendered his resignation.

The Attorney General for England and Wales has attempted to justify her support for the Internal Market Bill by reference to the legal doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament and the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in the first case brought by Gina Miller on the circumstances surrounding the triggering of article 50. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, to be binding in domestic law, treaty obligations require to be enshrined in an Act of Parliament, but it also held that treaties between sovereign states, such as the withdrawal agreement, have effect in international law and are not governed by the domestic law of any state. It was clear that such treaties are binding on the UK under international law. I believe that the Attorney General has selectively quoted the case in order to justify her view of the Internal Market Bill. I want to know whether the Lord Chancellor agrees with me that a proper reading of the case makes a clear distinction between the domestic law and the doctrine of supremacy of Parliament, and the United Kingdom’s international legal obligations.

What I am talking about was made very clear when Professor Catherine Barnard, who is the professor of European Union law at the University of Cambridge, gave evidence recently to the Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union. She was crystal clear that while the United Kingdom Parliament may be sovereign under domestic law that does not impact on the rules of international law, and articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna convention mean that in international law international legal obligations take precedence. Professor Barnard also explained that there is a strong argument that the very existence of the Bill itself puts the United Kingdom in breach of its duty of good faith under article 5 of the withdrawal agreement.

I emphasise that because I have no doubt that it will be argued later today that the Government amendments prompted by the action of the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst cure any problems that part 5 of the Internal Market Bill poses for our international legal obligations. I shall argue that that is wrong for a number of reasons, one of which is the argument outlined by Professor Barnard that the very existence of the Bill, evincing an intention unilaterally to breach an agreement freely entered into less than a year ago, is in itself a breach of the withdrawal agreement and our duty of good faith under it.

I know that many cheerleaders for the Bill in Parliament have been keen to emphasise section 38 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, which restated the principle of the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. Of course that doctrine is a doctrine of the domestic law of England. It does not reflect the Scottish constitutional tradition, but that is perhaps an argument for another day. However, it is worth mentioning, because this Parliament is a Union Parliament, created by a treaty between two sovereign nations, Scotland and England. The United Kingdom is not a unitary state. It is a state of two countries that came together to form a Union. That fact is of relevance when we come to look at the impact of what is now clause 47 of the Internal Market Bill on the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session in Scotland. It is also a point that may be of some relevance should the Scottish Government carry out their threat to litigate over the terms of the Internal Market Bill.

The hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) with whom I have in common a great respect for Lord Bingham—although otherwise, in relation to many matters of law, we rather part ways—has been peddling a line in Parliament that there is a history, albeit a limited one, of Acts of Parliament that have broken international law. I was pleased to hear Lord Sumption say trenchantly in a recent interview on “World at One” that that argument is “absurd” because it ignores the fact that sovereign states such as the United Kingdom can limit their freedom of action by treaty and frequently do, just as the Prime Minister did last year when he signed the withdrawal agreement. Lord Sumption stressed that there is no right to pull out of a treaty unless the treaty itself enables a party to do so. A party to a treaty cannot disregard parts of it at will. That is a matter of international law.



There is also a potential problem, and I would like the Lord Chancellor and his representative here today to address the problem of the ministerial code. Again, I will not say what I think about the ministerial code; I will say what the former deputy Prime Minister, Sir David Lidington, said in a letter to The Times last month. He said:

“Sir, My old friend Sir Bernard Jenkin is mistaken in believing that revisions to the ministerial code in 2015 removed the duty to comply with the UK’s international legal obligations. My clear understanding as a serving minister at that time was that international law continued to be covered by the general duty placed on ministers to uphold the law.

In 2018 a campaign group sued the May government…alleging that the 2015 change meant that we had abandoned our international legal responsibilities. The Court of Appeal found their case to be ‘unsustainable’ and ruled that a minister’s ‘overarching’ duty to comply with the law included international law and treaty obligations even though those were no longer explicitly stated in the code.”

The Lord Chancellor’s Minister will know that Sir David was referring to the Gulf case. What I want to know is: does the Lord Chancellor’s Department accept that Sir David Lidington was correctly stating the law? If so, what does the Lord Chancellor make of his duties under the ministerial code in relation to a Bill of this Parliament, the very existence of which is, according to Professor Catherine Barnard, a breach of international law?

The Lord Chancellor has endeavoured in the public domain to justify the fact that he has not, unlike the Advocate General for Scotland, resigned as a result of the Bill. He told Sky News last month that he would resign if the Government broke international law “in a way that cannot be…fudged”.

Can the Minister explain to us whether the Lord Chancellor’s position is that the UK Government are already breaking international law, but he is happy with that because they are doing it in a way that can be fudged? He also said that he will resign only if the Government break the law in a way that is “unacceptable”. What is an acceptable way of breaking the law? I am sure the thousands of ordinary members of the public who have been fined for breaking lockdown regulations, while Mr Cummings did so with impunity, would like to know from the Lord Chancellor’s Department how he distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable breaches of the law.

The Lord Chancellor has also tried to argue that the amendments drafted by the Government and prompted by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst mean that the powers now contained in part 5 of the Bill will be used only if the European Union is in material breach of its obligations. He has described it as a

“‘break glass in case of emergency’ provision”.—[Official Report, 22 September 2020; Vol. 680, c. 783.]

I would argue that there are a number of problems with that argument. First, there is the evidence of Professor Catherine Barnard, who told us at the Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union that there is a strong argument that the very existence of the Bill is already a breaking of the obligation of good faith in the withdrawal agreement. Some of the other arguments have been made well in a speech by our former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), in the Commons just a few days ago. She said:

“I recognise that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) has taken every effort to ameliorate the impact of these clauses,”—

she was referring to part 5—

“and the Government have accepted and put down their own amendment. But, frankly, my view is that to the outside world, it makes no difference whether a decision to break international law is taken by a Minister or by this Parliament; it is still a decision to break international law.”—[Official Report, 21 September 2020; Vol. 680, c. 667.]

We have seen very much from comments not just from the Irish Foreign Minister, who described the amendments as “smoke and mirrors”, but also from senior Democrat and Republican politicians in the United States of America, that what really matters is the international perception of the Bill. I think the former Prime Minister was trying to persuade her colleagues in Government that the amendments do not make any difference to the international perception of what the Bill seeks to do.

The former Prime Minister also reminded us that an arbitration process is set down in the withdrawal agreement. She said:

“There is an arbitration process available. Under article 175, the ruling of the arbitration panel should be binding on the UK and the EU. The Government have acknowledged the existence of the arbitration procedure, but they are saying that they would enter into that in parallel with the operation of the elements of this Bill. The message, it seems to me, is very clear, which is, if we do not like the outcome of the arbitration panel, then we will break international law and we will not accept it. Yet, again, that is breaking the international treaty—an agreement that UK Government signed—because it is breaking article 175, which says that the view of the arbitration panel shall be ‘binding’ on both parties.”—[Official Report, 21 September 2020; Vol. 680, c. 666.]

Those are the words of the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead—not mine. In the light of this very distinguished criticism, I wonder how the Lord Chancellor can reconcile his support for the Bill with his oath of office.

Finally, I want to turn to look at the implications of the UK Internal Market Bill for the Union between Scotland and England and for the position of Northern Ireland. In addressing the implications of the Bill for Northern Ireland, I make no apologies for quoting again what the former Prime Minister said in her speech about the Bill in the Chamber. She said:

“I believe that the Government’s willingness unilaterally to abandon an international agreement or parts of an international agreement they have signed and their willingness to renege on an agreement they have signed will lead, as has already been made clear in an intervention, to some questioning the willingness of the Government to fully uphold the measures in the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. That, in turn, will lead to some communities having less willingness to trust the United Kingdom Government, and that could have a consequence on the willingness of people in Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. So far from acting to reinforce the integrity of the United Kingdom in pursuit of trying to appear to be tough to the European Union, I think the Government are putting the integrity of the United Kingdom at risk.” —[Official Report, 21 September 2020; Vol. 680, c. 666-667.]

Those are the words of a former British Conservative and Unionist Prime Minister, describing the implications of the Bill for the Good Friday agreement.

There are also very concerning implications for undertakings made in respect of human rights protections in the north of Ireland from the British Government, both in the Good Friday agreement and in the withdrawal agreement. Once again, that is not just my view; it is the view of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, who have advised that the Bill undermines

“the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement commitment to ensure incorporation of the ECHR, including access to the courts and remedies for breach of the ECHR rights. The Commissions are further concerned that the proposed amendments risk diminishing the commitment in Article 2(1) of the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol to ensure there is no diminution of rights, safeguards or equality of opportunity as the UK leaves the EU.”

It has been made clear in the Chamber by hon. Members representing the Social Democratic and Labour party and the Alliance party in the north of Ireland that concerns about human rights implications of the Bill go right to the heart of the Good Friday agreement. Indeed, litigation is already contemplated by a group of concerned Northern Ireland citizens, who have instructed solicitors and counsel.

I turn to the position of Scotland, which is of course a particular concern to me as the Member of Parliament for Edinburgh South West and the Scottish National party’s justice and home affairs spokesperson. As well as breaking international law, the powers that the UK Government seek to give themselves in the Internal Market Bill constitute an unprecedented threat to the powers of Scotland’s Parliament and the devolution settlement. Why is that relevant to the Lord Chancellor’s oath to uphold the rule of law? It is relevant because—as we saw from the House of Lords Constitution Committee report—the Lord Chancellor also has an important role in protecting the constitution of the United Kingdom. The constitution of the United Kingdom includes the devolved settlement.

Last weekend in Scotland we marked the 20th anniversary of the death of the distinguished Labour party politician Donald Dewar, who was Scotland’s first ever First Minister under devolution. He was also the architect of the scheme of devolution set out in the Scotland Act 1998 whereby every power not specifically reserved to this Parliament is devolved to the Scottish Parliament. The Bill introduces—for the first time—a new principle into the devolution settlement by providing broad cross-cutting powers to allow Ministers to enforce internal market provisions across devolved fields. That is not my analysis, I am reading from the analysis of Professor Michael Keating of the Centre on Constitutional Change.

Clause 50 reserves state aid to Westminster, after a dispute in which the Welsh and Scottish Governments argued that it had been devolved. Clause 48 gives UK Ministers wide powers to spend in devolved fields, which changes the previous assumption that they would spend only in reserved fields and that—with a few exceptions—financial transfers to the devolved administrations would go through the block allocation governed by the Barnett formula. That succinct analysis by Professor Michael Keating is the explanation of why the Bill undermines the devolved settlement. Holyrood is not getting any new powers that it did not already have, but Westminster is getting back sole control over state aid, and—in order to enforce the internal market—UK Ministers are getting an explicit power to cut across decision-making by the Scottish Parliament in a whole range of devolved fields.

It seems that what we are seeing, by virtue of those provisions in the Bill, is a rebalancing of the constitutional settlement as far as devolution is concerned, and a tearing up of the clear delineation between reserved powers and devolved powers that was devised by the late Donald Dewar, and set out in the Scotland Act 1998. That is important not just because it undermines the devolved settlement, but it is also important from a wider constitutional perspective, because in 2014—when people living in Scotland were asked whether they wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom or return to our previous status as an independent sovereign nation—various promises were made by those urging us to remain part of the United Kingdom. One promise in particular was that if we did so our Parliament would get more powers, we would be strengthened, and we would become—to quote another Labour politician—

“the most powerful devolved parliament in the world”.

These were not promises made just by Labour politicians, they were promises made Conservative and Unionist politicians who, of course, are now the party of Government in the United Kingdom. A further Scotland Act was passed in 2016 that puts the Sewel convention on a statutory basis, and entrenched the Scottish Parliament against abolition. In terms of section 63A of the Scotland Act it cannot be abolished without a referendum in Scotland. The Internal Market Bill circumvents these protections not by abolishing the Scottish Parliament, but by removing the power it previously had to act unilaterally across a whole range of competencies that impact on the day-to-day lives of people living in Scotland. It is a very significant change, and some would say a complete and absolute undermining of the devolved settlement voted for by 75% of the people in the 1997 referendum. Thanks to the decision in the United Kingdom Supreme Court in the first Miller case, we now know that the Sewel convention was not justiciable despite being put on a statutory footing.

We also know, because of the Government’s subsequent actions, that the Sewel convention cannot protect the devolved settlement. The Sewel convention says:

“Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters…without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 July 1998; Vol. 592, c. 791.]

Recently, however, that has been honoured more in the breach than in the observance. Last week, the Scottish Parliament withheld legislative consent to the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, but nobody seriously thinks that the Bill will not proceed because of that.

Indeed, the Institute for Government recently said that the

“Sewel Convention has been broken by Brexit”,

but I would argue that the Bill breaks the devolution settlement. That is important because, as I said, the constitutional relationship—the constitution of the United Kingdom—is the responsibility of the Lord Chancellor. The constitutional relationship between Scotland and England is about not just devolution but the Act of Union, which continues because of promises made in 2014 that are broken by the Bill.

I suggest that many people in Scotland have suspected for a long time that the British Government’s word is no longer their bond, and that perception is reinforced by the Bill. The problem for the Lord Chancellor is that that perception is reinforced not just in Scotland, but across the world. In Europe, and as far as the United States of America, there are concerns about the implications of the Bill for the rule of law.

I have written to the Lord Chancellor about the Scottish aspects of the Bill and have not yet received a reply. He is a busy man, but I am keen to know his position. I, like many lawyers in Scotland, not all of whom, like myself, want to see an independent Scotland, but all of whom care about the independence of the Scottish legal system, are concerned about the provisions in part 5 of the Bill and their implications for the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session and for judicial review. In Scotland, judicial review is part of our system of civil justice, which is a devolved matter under the Scotland Act 1998 and therefore the preserve of the Scottish Parliament.

More importantly, in the constitutional and pre-devolution context, the authority and privileges of the Court of Session, including its inherent supervisory jurisdiction, are protected by article 19 of the treaty of Union between Scotland and England, which states:

“That the Court of Session, or College of Justice, do after the Union, and notwithstanding thereof, remain in all time coming within Scotland, as it is now constituted by the laws of that kingdom, and with the same authority and privileges as before the Union, subject nevertheless to such regulations for the better administration of justice, as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain”.

It is a widely held view that legislation that sought to narrow the scope of the Scottish Court’s powers of judicial review and to curtail the right of judicial review could scarcely be described as for the better administration of justice. Accordingly, should the United Kingdom Government seek to circumscribe the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session, they would be interfering with not only the devolved powers of the Scottish Parliament, but the treaty of Union.

I respectfully remind the Lord Chancellor, as I did in my letter to him, that there is a large and respectable body of legal opinion to the effect that some parts of the treaty of Union between Scotland and England, including article 19, are so fundamental that the United Kingdom Parliament does not have the power to legislate in contravention of them. That argument has been discussed in a number of cases, but never definitively ruled on. If the intention is to restrict the right to judicial review in Scotland, I would venture to suggest that that might be the opportunity to get a court to definitively answer the question about the entrenchment of fundamental parts of the treaty of Union. Of course, the outcome of such a litigation could have knock-on effects for the Union itself.

To summarise, we need to see the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill in relation to Scotland through the prism not only of devolution, which is a modern development, but of the treaty of Union between Scotland and England. Without a Scottish Law Officer in place, this is an area in which the Lord Chancellor would be well advised, I respectfully submit, to take more of an interest.

I do not want to take up any more time; I know that other hon. Members want to speak. I finish by saying that there is a pattern of the United Kingdom finding ways to worm its way around laws and agreements freely entered into. Because of his oath to respect the rule of law, the Lord Chancellor is in a different class of Minister. What is he going to do about that pattern? What is he going to do to honour his oath? On taking office, he spoke of his illustrious predecessors as Lord Chancellor of England and drew a comic veil over some of the less illustrious ones. I guess my question for the Lord Chancellor today is: does he want to be remembered as a Thomas More or a Richard Rich?

[Derek Twigg (in the Chair)]

I will call the hon. Members for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), for Aylesbury (Rob Butler) and for South Cambridgeshire (Anthony Browne), in that order. I would like to call the Opposition spokesperson, and then the Minister, at around 10.40 am, and to give the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) a minute or two to respond at the end.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair again, Mr Twigg, and to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). I have great respect for her as a lawyer; we do not always agree in our political views, but I take seriously what she says on legal matters. I ought to mention my interests as a non-practising member of the English Bar, as a consultant to a law firm and as a bencher of the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple. I will start with the topic of the debate: the Lord Chancellor’s oath. The hon. and learned Lady ranged widely in her speech, and I am sure she will forgive me if I do not follow some particular matters that she understandably raised relating to the constitutional settlement and devolution.

The irony of this debate is that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 does indeed place the Lord Chancellor in a different position from that of other Ministers, both because of the oath and because of their obligation under section 17(1) of the 2005 Act to respect the rule of law and defend the independence of the judiciary. Ironically, the Blair Government in 2005 never actually defined the rule of law in the Act. The late Lord Bingham, who has been much quoted already in this debate and probably will be again, noted that that was interesting and rather unusual, as it placed great reliance on a concept that was set out in statute but never defined. That, he concluded, clearly was not an accident; it was clearly because it was probably impossible, if not unhelpful, to find a pithy statutory definition that could be put in an Act of Parliament of something that has evolved over time. His conclusion in his admirable book, which I brought along this morning, is that it was desirable to leave the matter to be decided—as courts might need to, from time to time—in the practical, rather than purely in the abstract, as issues arose. That, perhaps, is wise.

That means that it was wrong for some in recent weeks, since the arrival of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, to make rather unjustified ad hominem attacks on the current Lord Chancellor—first, on his conduct throughout, and secondly, in making an assertion that the rule of law is potentially breached. An assertion is, of course, no more than that, and a legal argument, however distinguished, be it made by academic or legal commentators, is no more than that either. I have known the Lord Chancellor for his whole professional career, and the reality is that he is absolutely rooted in his commitment to the rule of law and to the profession, as he made clear when he took his oath and repeatedly since. I will come to part 5 of the Bill in a moment, about which my views are well known. However, I believe and am satisfied that the Lord Chancellor has acted diligently throughout all this to ensure that we deal with a potentially difficult situation proportionately and consistent with our obligations.

Since taking, the Lord Chancellor has also been clear in his support for the independence and integrity of the judiciary. Not all his predecessors in recent years have been; I say that frankly. There are people in all jurisdictions that we might wish to brush over, as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West put it. For every Lord Rich there is a Lord Braxfield, perhaps, and others who we might not wish to dwell upon. The reality is that the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Robert Buckland), has been meticulous in this. I welcome his clear commitment in his letter to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, to the Government’s continuing support for the provisions of the European convention on human rights. He has been willing to be outspoken on that.

Reference was made to the risk to the rule of law being undermined by the Government’s proposals to examine the scope of judicial review. When I started my law degree at the London School of Economics—which was, I hate to say, in the early 1970s—judicial review was a very new and evolving legal concept. There was little of it in those days. It grew, as many of us will remember, through the Gouriet judgment, the Grunwick case and so on, and perhaps rightly so. There has never been a fixed corpus of law in this area, as there is in others, such as jury trial. There is nothing wrong in that; the advantage of the common-law system is that it can evolve.

No one would seriously say that, prior to the development of the current system of judicial review in, let us say, the 1970s through to the beginning of this century, Britain was not a country that was subject to the rule of law. A willingness to review the way in which judicial review as a concept operates, and what are or are not the proper limits, cannot be regarded as an assault on the rule of law per se, on any objective basis.

[Joanna Cherry]

I take that on board, but the difficulty is that the individual who has been put in charge of the review has evinced very strong criticisms of the Supreme Court’s decision in the prorogation cases and has also evinced hostility to the European convention on human rights, notwithstanding what the hon. Gentleman has already said. There is a widespread perception in the legal profession that what is intended here is to circumscribe the rule of law, not just because Lord Faulks is the chair but because of the Government’s rhetoric. Surely the hon. Gentleman must see that.

[Sir Robert Neill]

Lord Faulks is a fellow bencher of the Middle Temple and a distinguished lawyer. That does not mean that one always has to agree with everything that he says. It would not be fair or reasonable to judge somebody by past comments until we have seen the results of the panel as a whole. Lord Faulks is the chair of the panel, but there are other very distinguished people on it as well. I respect what the hon. and learned Lady says, but this is a classic case of not prejudging the issue until we have seen the outcome of the deliberations.

I am a great believer in judicial review, in appropriate cases. Has it sometimes been abused? Many people would say that perhaps that can be the case. When I was the junior Minister at the Department for Communities and Local Government, I was critical of the attitude adopted to some decisions by the then Secretary of State, the noble Lord Pickles, is he is now, in relation to the removal of regional spatial strategies. We were judicially reviewed by large commercial housebuilders, undoubtedly in pursuit of their own vested commercial interests. They sought to prevent our removing the comparatively easy route, so they could impose large housing developments on communities that did not want them. I was critical of those house builders for doing that and for undermining in law the wishes of local residents. The courts found that they were entitled to do it, but that does not mean that we were assaulting judicial review as a concept, simply by criticising the motive behind some of the people who bring it.

There is an important distinction, which I recognise. We criticised the clients—the people who brought the judicial review—but I did not criticise the lawyers who were instructed on their behalf. I would not seek to do so. It is important to say that we should not, whatever our views in politics, use political arguments to attack lawyers generally or by taking broadbrush approaches. The attacks upon the judges, which were not perhaps called out as much as they should have been at the time of the early Miller litigation, were wholly disgraceful and unacceptable. The current Lord Chancellor has made it clear that he would not countenance such attacks and such language without speaking out. That is very much to his credit and entirely consistent with his own personal integrity. I do not care for the use of language such as “lefty lawyers” or the broadbrush approach of saying that systems are being hijacked. That is not language that I would use. However, I am a Member of Parliament; I am not a speech writer.

I gently observe that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West referred to the taxi rank principle at the Bar. That is something that I have always worked under as well. To be fair, there have always been sets of chambers that would not prosecute, or would not act for landlords, for example. Some might ask whether that is in theory inconsistent with the taxi rank rule. It probably is, yet it is not something that warrants a great deal of personal attack. I just make the observation that those matters cannot be seen in a purely academic sense. I would not make too much of that, but that is where I stand as far as that is concerned. It is pretty clear where the Lord Chancellor stands, and where I suspect my hon. Friend the Minister stands as well, as far as those matters are concerned.

The other issue raised is part 5 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, about which I was not a little critical when it was first introduced. I believe we have sought to improve that Bill. Is it perfect? As yet, that I do not know. Would the use of the powers in part 5 be wise politics? That is a very big question mark. However, that is not the same as, say, that it is per se constitutionally improper to put those clauses in the Bill, provided there are appropriate safeguards. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West might disagree upon that, but I think it is a legitimate area of legal dispute and the Lord Chancellor is entitled to have a different view from her and, indeed, perhaps from me in that regard, without it being suggested that he has failed to uphold his oath of office or his constitutional obligations.

I note the views, which have been referred to, of Professor Catherine Barnard. She is a distinguished academic and her views are worthy of respect. By their nature, however, she not being a judge or legislator, and valuable and worthy of respect though they are, they cannot be determinative of the point. It is one side of an argument that can properly be hooked. If, on those matters, there were no scope for difference of opinion, no scope for difference of legal interpretation, no scope for legal argument, there would scarcely be any scope for litigation and scarcely any scope for lawyers at the end of the day. It is perfectly possible for respectable lawyers to hold different opinions around matters of this kind, particularly in emerging areas of law or new legislation as it comes forward, without it being appropriate for us to say that either side is seeking to undermine constitutional principles or their professional or governmental responsibilities. That is the proper way to look at the position, as far as that is concerned here.

I am glad to say, in response to some of the endeavours, which I may have had a small hand in, the Government have made it clear that, effectively, they will only be using those powers should they ever be needed. I hope to heavens that they are never needed because we will get a deal, but should that be the case, there will be certain triggers that would have to be met, both in procedural terms but also in terms of substance. In particular, we would only do so had the European Union, in our judgment, demonstrated bad faith. Bad faith is recognised in international treaty law and in the Vienna convention as being a ground under which it is possible to derogate from an otherwise binding commitment.

The fact that we will be using this as a shield rather than a sword is important—it is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, in some respects. The Minister may well have more to say about that, but that is an important shift and one that I welcome. Therefore, the suggestion that the mere putting of those clauses on the face of the legislation is itself a breach of law is not one that is universally accepted, and I do not think therefore that it can be regarded as an act of impropriety on the part of the Government or of any Minister. As I say, there is a proper political debate as to the wisdom of using them, if we ever come to that, but that is not for today.

I want to say one final thing in relation to this. Lord Bingham was very clear that the rule of law itself is something that can evolve and must be flexible, but there are certain fundamentals. I do not think anyone would suggest that anything we are doing here alters the basic fundamentals. I am conscious of his eighth principle, but I do not think we are at that stage, and I hope we will not be. Moreover, he accepted that parliamentary sovereignty was a fundamental part of the rule of law too. There is always a set of checks and balances in that regard.

I have no problem with certain circumstances where the actions of Ministers properly should be reviewed by the courts, but I do not think this is really going to change that. Lord Bingham made it quite clear, though, that he did not accept the view advanced by, for example, Lord Steyn or Baroness Hale of Richmond that there are some concepts so fundamental that even Parliament cannot legislate to change them. He did not take that view. Again, there is a perfectly respectable dispute there and disagreement between highly distinguished former jurists, which makes the point that none of the arguments powerfully advanced by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West are determinative of any failing by either the Lord Chancellor or any other Minister in respect of their constitutional obligations.

This is a worthwhile debate to have. In a sense, an hour and a half is not enough to do it justice, because as we go forward, we are going to have to think about our constitutional and legal settlements in a broader sense, how we will operate the separation of powers in a post-Brexit world and how, continuing, as I hope, as a unified state with devolution within it, we can perhaps refine the arrangements that are required to make that work in practice too. Those are all proper matters for further consideration, but do not, I think, impinge upon any proper allegation of any failure by the current Lord Chancellor or his Ministers to act in accordance with their constitutional duties.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

It has been a good debate, but I do not think there have been any answers to my pointed questions. What we need to remember is that it is not a question of growing up; it is a question of the weight of legal opinion. The weight of legal opinion on the Bill is clear.

Motion lapsed (Standing Order No. 10(6)).

[Derek Twigg (in the Chair)]

I suspend the sitting for two minutes. I remind Members to leave via the entrance on the right-hand side.

Oral Answers to Questions

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I really find it extraordinary that the right hon. Gentleman brings the code of conduct into these matters. Like him, I am acting as a Member of Parliament. I am acting as a Minister in the Government—[Interruption.] I am not a Law Officer; I am the Lord Chancellor. The Law Officers of this country are the Attorney General, the Solicitor General and the Advocate General for Scotland. I do not give legal advice to the Government. I am not a Law Officer.

However, every member of the Government is obliged to follow the rule of law. It is very clear. I take a particular oath to uphold that and to defend the judiciary. As I have explained, I have absolutely no qualms about what has been happening. I have worked extremely hard to make sure that this House is fully involved. I say to the right hon. Gentleman that the idea that the passage of this Bill is a breach of UK domestic law is just plain wrong, and to misquote me is unhelpful, misleading and damaging, frankly.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

The Bill affords the United Kingdom Government the power to breach obligations that they freely entered into less than a year ago, rather than employ the dispute mechanism that they agreed to. When Lord Keen resigned as Advocate General, he wrote to the Prime Minister that he found it increasingly difficult to reconcile what he considered to be his obligations as a Law Officer with the Government’s policy intentions. The highly respected former Attorney General the right hon. Dominic Grieve has said that the Lord Chancellor’s position is even more clear cut than that of the Law Officers, and that the Lord Chancellor has taken

“an oath of office to uphold or protect the rule of law. The rule of law includes international law…his position is untenable.”

Are both these senior distinguished QCs, Lord Keen and Dominic Grieve, wrong? If not, why is the Lord Chancellor still in office?

[Robert Buckland]

The hon. and learned Lady is right to draw attention to Lord Keen. I pay tribute to his long service in the Government as Advocate General for Scotland, and I was sorry to hear of his resignation. I do not believe that it was necessary, bearing in mind the important changes that have been made to the Bill.

I think that the position is now very clear. The hon. and learned Lady talks of breach, but as I will remind the House again, the eventuality or potential use of these clauses would be only if the EU was in material breach of its obligations, and therefore we would be facing a breakdown. I remind her again that of course we will use the withdrawal agreement mechanism and the arbitral mechanisms within the provisions of the withdrawal agreement, and indeed the Northern Ireland protocol, too. It is not a question of us abandoning our obligations; we will use them, but this is the “break glass in case of emergency” provision that underlies and will protect the United Kingdom’s position if we face such a breakdown.

[Joanna Cherry]

Lord Keen’s resignation was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Scottish Bar. The Lord Chancellor has said that he wants us to consider his own actions as an MP and a Minister rather than as a lawyer, so I put this to him. In 2018, in the Gulf case, England’s Court of Appeal ruled that a Government Minister’s overarching duty to comply with the law includes international law and treaty obligations, even though these are no longer explicitly stated in the ministerial code. This Bill gives the Lord Chancellor and other Ministers the power to run a coach and horses through their obligations under the withdrawal agreement. I know that Conservative Members do not like hearing that, but that is the reality. In the light of what the English Court of Appeal has said, just how is this Bill compatible with his oath as the Lord Chancellor to uphold the rule of law?

[Robert Buckland]

As I have said to the hon. and learned Lady, the contingency that underlines the coming into force and use of these powers is a very narrowly and clearly delineated one. I do not believe, as I have said in public, that we are at that stage, and I do not believe we will get to that stage, if both parties renew their efforts, act in good faith and double down on making sure that we get a resolution. It would have been far easier for us to avoid the issue, to pretend that there was not going to be a problem, and then to hit the new year with an avalanche of difficulties when it came to Northern Ireland and its relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom. Members of this House would have rightly criticised us, and, frankly, we would have been in an indefensible position. This is a tortuous process. I reject her allegations—her assertions. We will continue to govern responsibly and consistent with our obligations under the rule of law.

Sentencing White Paper

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I am grateful to the Chairman of the Justice Committee. We all know his long and deep knowledge of the system as a practitioner. He is right to remind us of the purposes of sentencing. He will see in the White Paper a lot of reference to public protection issues—protecting the public from harm, but also protecting the public from crime. The two go together, and one is served, I would submit, by effective prison sentences, while the second is served by rehabilitation through the community options that can make such a difference with the right support.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

I thank the Lord Chancellor for his customary courtesy in affording me advance sight of his statement. However, it is a little difficult to stomach rhetoric about how tough this Government are on law breakers when only a week ago a Minister stood at the Dispatch Box and told us that they intended to break international law, albeit in a limited and specific way. Even the Lord Chancellor seems to think that, when it comes to his Government colleagues, the rule of law can be watered down to allow law breaking that he finds acceptable.

I want to make it clear that in Scotland the law applies equally to everyone, whether they are a Government Minister or an ordinary member of the public. I wonder whether the Lord Chancellor agrees that it should be the same in England and Wales. That is where this sentencing White Paper applies; sentencing is devolved to Scotland. However, the position of the SNP is clear. We want to work hard with the UK Government and European friends to make sure that all communities in these islands are protected from terrorism and serious crime.

There are elements of the White Paper to be welcomed, including the offer of treatment for vulnerable prisoners with mental health and addiction problems, and the proposals to encourage courts to pass community sentences for less serious offences, following the Scottish model. However, I would express caution about giving whole-of-life sentences to teenagers. Expert evidence shows that young people are more likely to be open to rehabilitation. That is important for the public, because every time we manage to rehabilitate or deradicalise someone, it makes the public a little bit safer. Prisoners who know they will never be released have little incentive not to kill or maim not only other prisoners, but prison officers. I would like to know that the Lord Chancellor has taken cognisance of those factors. The Scottish Sentencing Council is consulting on its third draft guideline on sentencing young people. Are there any proposals to consult on this issue in England and Wales as well?