Investigatory Powers Bill (Third sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJoanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Attorney General
(8 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI welcome you to the Chair, Ms Dorries and it is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship. I would like to make some brief opening remarks on behalf of the Scottish National party in response to the Minister. We acknowledge the attempt to codify and modernise the law, and we think that the attempt is laudable. However, we think that the execution of this attempt is not laudable. We believe that there has been a rush to legislate, and it is not only we who say that. Members will remember that, when evidence was given to the Committee by Jo Cavan, the head of the Interception Commissioner’s Office, she spoke of an aggressive timeline for the Bill. When I asked her to elaborate on that, she said:
“It is a really complicated and significant piece of legislation. Although I broadly support the Bill, because it is a good thing to put a number of the powers used by the intelligence agencies on a clearer statutory footing and to try to improve transparency, I do think that the scrutiny process has been very hurried. That is of concern because there are some significant privacy implications to the clauses in the Bill. There is still a long way to go towards strengthening some of the safeguards. Also, a lot of the operational detail is in the codes of practice. It is really important that those are scrutinised properly, line by line.”––[Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 70.]
She agreed with me that the time afforded for scrutiny of the Bill is inadequate, particularly with regards to the international legal implications of aspects of the Bill.
I have no wish to delay us unduly or indeed to embarrass the hon. and learned Lady, but I remember the evidence that was given. As she will remember, I challenged the witness on it because, as I said earlier, I cannot recall another piece of legislation that has enjoyed such close scrutiny over such a period of time. Can the hon. and learned Lady think of another such piece of legislation?
I do not recall legislation of such detail and such constitutional significance. I have only been in this House for nine months, but I have followed the operation of this House closely since I was a teenager. This is a massive Bill, and it is its constitutional significance that matters. I chaired an event last night at which the chair of the Bar Council of England and Wales spoke. She raised her concerns about the rush to legislate because of the constitutional significance of the legislation and its implications for the rule of law. The Minister does not embarrass me at all. I wholeheartedly stand by what I say. It is a widely held view, across parties and across society, that there is not sufficient time for the scrutiny of this legislation.
I will make some progress, if I may. I would like to echo the comments of the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras about the proper role of the Opposition, which I spoke about on Second Reading. As he said, it is the proper role of the Opposition to robustly challenge the legislation, to push back on it and to probe, hopefully with a view to improving it. That is why my party did not vote the legislation down on Second Reading. We are honestly engaged here in a process of improvement, but if the Government are not prepared to listen to us then we may well vote against the legislation at a later stage.
I echo what the hon. and learned Gentleman said about the failure to amend the draft Bill to deal with the ISC concerns regarding the lack of overarching principles on privacy. I also strongly echo what he said about a request for the Minister to clarify how the Committee is to approach the codes of practice which, as the hon. and learned Gentleman said, this Committee does not have the power to amend, and which contain some enormously important detail. Jo Cavan, the head of the Interception Commissioner’s Office, also drew attention to that in her evidence.
On Second Reading on the Floor of the House, I promised to table radical amendments. The SNP has tabled radical amendments to the part of the Bill we will look at today. We want to ensure that surveillance is targeted, that it is based on reasonable suspicion, and that it is permitted only after a warrant has been issued by a judge rather than by a politician. We want to expand the category of information which will be accessible only by warrant, and to ensure that warrants may not be provided without proper justification. We also want to remove the widely drafted provisions of the Bill that would allow modification of warrants and urgent warrants without any judicial oversight. Those provisions, if they remain in the Bill, will drive a coach and horses through the so-called double-lock protection in the legislation.
We have also laid amendments to ensure a proper and consistent approach to the safeguards afforded to members of the public who correspond with lawyers, parliamentarians and journalists. We want to put a public interest defence into the offence of disclosure of the existence of a warrant. Those are the sort of radical, principled amendments that we believe are required to render parts 1 and 2 of the Bill compliant with international human rights law, bring the Bill into line with practice in other western democracies and meet the concerns of the UN special rapporteur on the right to privacy. We recognise that the security services and the police require adequate powers to fight terrorism and serious crime, but the powers must be shown to be necessary, proportionate and in accordance with law. If the House is not about the rule of law, it is about nothing.
I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way. I do not agree with her and her party that the Bill is the constitutional earthquake they represent it to be. However, she has just referenced a point that would mean constitutional upheaval, if I heard her correctly—namely, to remove any political input, and therefore democratic accountability, to this House and to elected Members, and to bypass it all to unelected, unaccountable judges, though I mean that in no pejorative sense. To effectively create massive cleavage between democratic accountability and the day-to-day action allowing those things to go ahead would be a constitutional upheaval. Have the hon. and learned Lady and her party colleagues considered that viewpoint in that context?
We have considered it in detail and I will be addressing it later in my submissions to the Committee. The hon. Gentleman and I will have to differ in our view on this. I do not consider that there is anything constitutionally unusual in judges being solely responsible for the issue of warrants. That happens in a lot of other western democracies—it is called the separation of powers. The idea that Ministers are democratically accountable to this House for the issuance of warrants on the grounds of national security is nonsense. I will explain later why I consider that to be so.
I was trying to stress that the SNP position is that we recognise the necessity of having adequate powers. I hope to be writing the security policy for an independent Scotland before I am an old lady and I would want to have a responsible, modern security policy that dovetails with that of England and other countries in these islands, but I want to model it on what other western democracies are doing, rather than going as far as this Bill, which, without proper justification, goes beyond what other western democracies do. The SNP intends to table amendments to deal with what I called on Second Reading the fantastically intrusive provisions of this Bill regarding internet connection records and bulk powers. We also want to look at ensuring a proper oversight commission, but that is for a later date. I look forward to addressing amendments on parts 1 and 2 of the Bill.
The shadow Minister raised a number of issues, some of which related to the letter he mentioned—I have a copy—which the shadow Home Secretary sent to the Home Secretary. This consideration is an answer to the letter; I might even go so far as to say that I am the personification of the answer to the letter. None the less, it is important that a reply is drawn up, not least because that reply will be useful to the Opposition in helping to frame their further ideas. For that reason, I will ensure that a reply to the letter is sent in good time, so that all members of the Committee, mindful of that response to the original letter, can form their consideration accordingly..
I do not want to get into a great debate about this now because we are at the beginning of the Bill and this will come up again during further consideration. I acknowledge that the hon. and learned Gentleman has recognised there is a sensitivity about how much can be put in the Bill and how much can be debated in a public forum. He is right that we tread a tightrope between making sure that we have public confidence that the system is fit for purpose, but also proportionate, and on the other hand not tying the hands of those wishing to keep us safe. That is the tightrope that every Government of all persuasions has had to walk.
Whether the hon. and learned Gentleman is right about a changing public mood is more debatable. Most surveys of the public mood suggest a very high level of confidence in our intelligence and security services and the powers that they exercise, so I am not sure there is a great public clamour for them not to be able to do some of the things they have to do. Contextually, given the threat we now face, I suspect most of the public would say they need absolutely all the powers necessary to face down that threat, so I am not absolutely sure that we do not occasionally see these things through the prism of a chattering class view of what the public should think, rather than what the public actually think. I am committed to the idea of politicians continuing to be involved in these things, because we have a regular and direct link to the British public and are in a pretty good position to gauge what their attitudes to such matters might be. So the issues are sensitive, but I appreciate the spirit and tone of the hon. and learned Gentleman and I am determined that we get this right in a way that we can both be comfortable with in the end.
The hon. and learned Gentleman asked how we might subsequently deal with issues around authorisation. We will have a chance to debate that at greater length as we go through the Bill, so it would be inappropriate to do so now. That point was made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West. I think we are going to disagree about quite a lot of these matters, not because I do not want to move ahead in the spirit of generosity and unanimity where we can possibly do so, but I think that my position is more like that of the former Home Secretaries who gave evidence to the Committee, Lord Reid and Charles Clarke, who were very clear that the involvement of Ministers in authorising powers is an important way in which the public can be represented in these areas. Ministers bring a particular insight to such work. I was unsurprised by their consideration, but pleased that they were able to reinforce the view that I know is held by almost everyone who has been involved in the warranting process in modern times.
We heard from the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson), in similar vein. Indeed, he was doubtful about giving judges any role in the process at all, and many others take that view. The Government, however—always anxious to achieve balance and compromise—developed the double-lock, which the hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned. It retains the involvement of Ministers, as Lord Reid and others argued we should, but introduces judicial involvement and, one might argue, adds a greater degree of empiricism to the process, as David Anderson recommended in his report.
The Minister will recall that, under questioning by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, Lord Judge, in his evidence to this Committee, expressed concern about the phrase “judicial review”. He said that it
“is a very easy phrase to use. It sounds convincing, but it means different things to different people…Personally, I think that when Parliament is creating structures such as these, it should define what it means by ‘judicial review’. What test will be applied by the judicial…commissioner, so that he knows what his function is, the Secretary of State knows what the areas of responsibility are and the public know exactly who decides what and in what circumstances? I myself do not think that judicial review is a sufficient indication of those matters.”––[Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 69, Q220.]
What are the Government going to do to take on board what that distinguished judge had to say about this matter?
Yes, but Lord Judge also went on to say in the same evidence session that what really matters is what Parliament actually wants. He wanted to be clear about what Parliament wants and to respond accordingly. I heard what Lord Judge said, but I also heard what Lord Reid and Charles Clarke said. Frankly, I see no evidence that the warranting process is not considered carefully by Ministers, that they do not take that work incredibly seriously, that they do not seek all the information they need to exercise reasonable judgment and that they do not apply the tests of necessity and proportionality diligently. Neither this Committee nor the Joint Committee heard evidence to suggest that there is anything faulty in that system.
I am a conservative, so I would be expected to say that if something works there is no good reason for changing it, but because I want to be moderate and reasonable—notwithstanding my conservatism—we introduced the double-lock. My goodness, we have already gone a very long way down the road.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 3—Tort or delict of unlawful interception—
“Any interception of a communication which is carried out without lawful authority at any place in the United Kingdom by, or with the express or implied consent of, a person having the right to control the operation or the use of a private telecommunication system shall be actionable by the sender or recipient, or intended recipient, of the communication if it is either—
(a) an interception of that communication in the course of its transmission by means of that private system; or
(b) an interception of that communication in the course of its transmission, by means of a public telecommunication system, to or from apparatus comprised in that private telecommunication system.”
This new clause creates a civil wrong of unlawful interception.
I will deal with new clause 3 in fairly short compass. The amendment was suggested to me by the Scottish division of Pen International, which is a world association of writers. It would introduce a tort, or a delict as we call it in Scotland, for unlawful interception. Such a tort or delict exists already as a result of section 1(3) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and I am not entirely sure why it has not been replicated in the Bill. I would be interested to hear from the Solicitor General or the Minister for Security why the Government did not include the measure in the Bill, and whether they will give it serious consideration. It would give a meaningful avenue of recourse and act as a motivation to intelligence agencies, police forces and the Government to ensure that all interception is lawfully authorised, on pain of an action for damages if it is not properly authorised. It is really a very simple new clause modelled on section 1(3) of RIPA. I am interested to hear what the Government have to say about this suggestion.
It is a pleasure to take this first opportunity to say that I am looking forward to serving under your chairmanship, Ms Dorries, and indeed to serving with all colleagues on the Committee.
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for making her observations in a succinct and clear way. I am able to answer her directly about the approach that we are taking. One of the aims of the Bill is to streamline provisions to make them as clear and easy to understand as possible. She is quite right in saying that RIPA had within it this provision—a tort or a delict, as it is called north of the border, that would allow an individual to take action against a person who has the right to control the use or operation of a private telecommunications system and to intercept communication on that system.
The Government have fielded a number of inquiries about the non-inclusion of the RIPA provision in the Bill. The circumstances in which it applies are extremely limited, and as far as we are aware it has never been relied on in the 15 years of RIPA’s operation. The provision applies only in limited circumstances because it applies to interception on a private telecommunications system, such as a company’s internal email or telephone system. Where the person with the right to control the use or operation of the system is a public authority, there are of course rights of redress under the Human Rights Act 1998, such as article 8 rights.
The Bill is intended to make the protections enjoyed by the public much clearer and we feel that introducing that course of action or replicating it would not add to that essential clarity, but I have listened carefully to the hon. and learned Lady and we are happy to look again at the issue in the light of her concerns. On that basis, I invite her not to press her new clause and I hope we can return to the matter on Report.
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his constructive approach. I am happy not to press the new clause at this stage on the basis that the Government will look at it. I am happy to receive any suggestions about the drafting, which is mine. I had some discussions about the terms of the drafting with Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland and James Wolffe, the dean of the Faculty of Advocates, but any infelicities are my fault alone. I would be happy to discuss the drafting with the Government.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Definition of “interception” etc.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
There are no amendments tabled to the clause, which we support, but I say for the record and for clarification that what is welcome in clause 3 is the spelling out in legislation of the extent of an interception—an issue that has bedevilled some recent criminal cases. Importantly, as the explanatory notes make clear, it is now provided in clear terms that voicemails remaining on a system, emails and text messages read but not deleted and draft messages stored on a system will count within the phrase “in the course of transmission” and will therefore be covered by the offence. We welcome that. I wanted to emphasise that point and put it on the record, because a lot of time and effort was spent when that phrase was not so clearly defined.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 4—Tort or delict of unlawfully obtaining communications data—
“The collection of communications data from a telecommunications operator, telecommunications service, telecommunications system or postal operator without lawful authority shall be actionable as a civil wrong by any person who has suffered loss or damage by the collection of the data.”
This new clause creates a civil wrong of unlawful obtaining of communications data.
The new clause very much relates to what I said earlier about new clause 3. The intention is to create a civil wrong of unlawfully obtaining communications data as opposed to unlawful interception. Again, the drafting is mine and it could do with some serious tightening up, but my intention is to establish the Government’s attitude to the new clause. I hope that the Solicitor General will indicate that.
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for the way in which she spoke to her new clause. I see that it very much follows new clause 3. Our argument with regard to new clause 4 is slightly different because it has a wider ambit than private telecommunication.
We submit that this tort or delict would not be practicable. Communications data are different from the content of communication. For example, one would acquire communications data even by looking at an envelope or searching for a wi-fi hotspot when turning on a particular wi-fi device at home. It would not be appropriate to make ordinary people liable for such activity. With respect to the hon. and learned Lady, its ambit is too wide. That said, it is only right that those holding office within a public authority are held to account for any abuses of power. That is why clause 9 makes it an offence for a person in a public authority to obtain communications data knowingly or recklessly without lawful authority. I place heavy emphasis on the Government’s approach to limiting and checking the abuse of power by the authorities.
On the new clause, the interception tool was always intended to address the narrow area that was not covered by the interception offence in RIPA, which is replicated in the Bill. As noted, the communications data offence is intentionally narrower. It would therefore be equally inappropriate to introduce a tort or delict in relation to the obtaining of communications generally or in the areas not covered by the new offence. Under the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998, communications data often constitute personal data. That act already provides for compensation for damage or distress resulting from non-compliance with the data protection principles and for enforcement in respect of failing to comply with the provisions of the act.
I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. I have already indicated that I will consider the matter further. I will simply give this solution. He mentioned the stealing of information. Information is property, like anything else, and of course we have the law of theft to deal with such matters. I do not want to be glib, but we must ensure we do not overcomplicate the statute book when it comes to criminal law. I will consider the matter further, and I am extremely grateful for his observations.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
On a point of order, Ms Dorries, may I seek clarification on my position on new clause 4, which the Minister invited me to withdraw? I am minded to do so, having regard to what the Solicitor General said about the Data Protection Act and what the hon. and learned Member for South East Cambridgeshire said about misfeasance in public office, but as a novice in these Committees I seek some guidance. If I press the new clause to a vote now and it is voted down, does that prevent me bringing it back to the Floor of the House?
As I made clear at the beginning of our sitting, you could move the motion at the end of consideration, but that does not prevent you from bringing the new clause back on Report. This point in the proceedings is not the time for it.
I realise that, but my point is about the conflicting information on the issue. If an amendment is pressed to a vote and voted down in Committee, some people tell me that it cannot then be brought before the House at a later stage; others tell me that that is not the case. I am anxious to have the Chair’s clarification.
It is not normal, but it does sometimes happen; it is at the Speaker’s discretion. If voted down, you would have to retable the amendment and it would be up to the Speaker, who would know that it had been heard in Committee and voted down.
I am grateful. So if I withdraw the new clause now, I cannot be prevented from bringing it back later—I will withdraw it in Committee.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 11
Mandatory use of equipment interference warrants
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I will be very quick. The clause is welcome and we support it, but again my concern is that there is no enforcement mechanism or sanction. Will the Minister take it under the umbrella of these clauses that are intended to ensure good governance, effectiveness and that the proper routes are used, and look in an overarching way at what their sanction might be? I am asking a similar question to one I made before: what is the sanction if what should happen does not happen?
In passing, this is just really to explain what the amendment is intended to achieve. In order to understand what is in clause 13(2), we need to look to clause 14(4) to (6), which set out what secondary data means for the purposes of this part and, thus, is to be read into clause 13.
Clause 14(6) states:
“The data falling within this subsection is identifying data which…is comprised in, included as part of, attached to or logically associated with…is capable of being logically separated…and if it were so separated, would not reveal anything of what might reasonably be considered to be the meaning”,
so it is integrally bound up with the content of the communication but capable of being separated from it.
So far as clause 13 is concerned, if there is a targeted interception warrant, the warrant deals specifically with content and secondary data, recognising the integral link between the two. That is right and we do not quarrel with that.
Clause 13(3) is different, providing that:
“A targeted examination warrant is a warrant which authorises the person to whom it is addressed to carry out the selection of relevant content for examination, in breach of the prohibition in section 134(4) (prohibition on seeking to identify communications of individuals in the British Islands).”
The purpose of clause 13(3) is different. We move from the targeted warrant to the bulk warrant—an examination warrant that provides authority to examine the content that would otherwise be in breach of clause 134(4). In order to understand that, I take the Committee to clause 119, to which that relates.
Clause 119 deals with bulk interception warrants, which can be issued if conditions A and B are satisfied. Condition A deals with
“the interception of overseas-related communications”
and with “obtaining…secondary data”. The definition of secondary data is the same in that part of the Bill as it is in the part that we have just looked at. I will not test the Committee’s patience by going to that definition, but it is a consistent definition of secondary data.
Condition B sets out that the bulk warrant authorises “the interception”, which is the content,
“the obtaining of secondary data”,
which is the same as a targeted warrant but in relation to the bulk powers, and
“the selection for examination, in any manner described…of…content or secondary data”
and “disclosure”. The bulk warrant allows the interception of the content and secondary data. In and of itself, it provides for the examination on the face of the same warrant.
For content, it becomes more complicated because there is a safeguard, which is in clause 134(4)—safeguards in relation to examination materials. Having provided a broad examination power, there is then a safeguard for that examination power in clause 134(4). A number of conditions are set for examining material that has been obtained under a bulk interception warrant. They are set out in subsection (3) and the first is that
“the selection of the intercepted content for examination does not reach the prohibition in subsection(4)”
which is that
“intercepted content may not…be selected for examination if— any criteria used for the selection of the intercepted content…are referable to an individual known to be in the British Islands at that time, and the purpose of using those criteria is to identify the content”.
The long and short of it is that, going back to clause 13, a targeted intercept warrant authorises the examination of both content and secondary data.
For a bulk warrant—this is where clause 13(3) kicks in—there is provision for an examination warrant which provides an ability to look at the content, which in all other circumstances would be a breach of the prohibition in clause 134. The content of communications of individuals in the British Isles can be looked at when it has been captured by a bulk provision, but only when there is a targeted examination warrant. That is a good thing.
What the amendment gets at is this. What is not in clause 13(3) is any provision for an examination warrant in relation to secondary data, so for the targeted provisions these two are treated as one: secondary data integral to the content of communication. When it comes to bulk, they are separated and only the content is subject to the further provision in clause 13(3).
That is a material provision and is a big part of the legislation because, unless amendment 57 is accepted, a targeted examination warrant is not required for secondary data, which are capable of being examined simply under the bulk powers. The purpose of the amendment is to align subsections (2) and (3) and ensure that the targeted examination warrant is not required for both content and secondary data in relation to individuals in the British Isles. The result otherwise would be that, for someone in the British Isles, their secondary data could be looked at as long as it was captured under a bulk provision without a targeted warrant. That is a serious drafting issue of substance.
Our approach to some of the wider retention of bulk powers is this. Although we accept that a case can be made for retaining data that will be looked at later, the wide powers of retentional bulk are a cause of concern on both sides of the House. When it comes to examining what has been caught within the wider net, there are specific safeguards. In other words, as long as there is a specific targeted safeguard when someone wants to look at bulk or retained data, that is an important safeguard when they are harvesting wide-ranging data. That is a very important provision in relation to secondary data.
Amendments 59 and 60 go to a different issue. They are separate and I ask the Government to treat them as separate. The first is about content and secondary data as a hom-set and whether they should be protected in the same way throughout the regime of the legislation, however they are initially intercepted. That is an important point of principle that I ask the Government to consider seriously because it goes to the heart of the question of targeted access.
The second amendment relates to individuals in the British Isles. At the moment, clause 13(3) provides specific protection in relation to the content of communications for people in the British Isles. It is clear from clause 134(4) that that means not residing in the British Isles, but actually in the British Isles. Under clause 13(3), once I get to Calais, I fall out of the protection of that provision, as does everybody else in this Committee, because it is a question of whether someone is physically in the British islands. Therefore, a targeted examination warrant for the content of my communications gathered by bulk powers would not be needed once I got halfway across the channel. Until I went through the analysis, I did not fully appreciate that, and serious consideration is required for both content and secondary data. More generally within amendment 59 are provisions relating to individuals not normally in the British islands or within the countries specified in amendment 60.
I am sorry to have referred to other clauses, but I could not work this out until I went through that torturous route. The net result is a disconnect between content and secondary data, which goes to the heart of protection when it comes to bulk powers. Clause 13(3) is really important for bulk powers and is one of the most important provisions in the Bill, so we have to get it right.
The limit of clause 13(3) to individuals in the British islands is unsustainable and needs further thought. Amendments 59 and 60 intend to remedy that defect. If there is an appetite in the Government to look carefully at those provisions, there may be a different way of coming at the problem, but it is a real flaw in the regime as it is currently set out. I apologise for taking so long to get to that, Ms Dorries. It required a cold wet towel on one afternoon last week to work my way through this, but once we go through the exercise, we realise there is a fundamental problem that either has to be fixed or adequately answered.
I am 100% with the hon. and learned Gentleman in his description of the clause. Indeed, many clauses of the Bill require the application of a cold wet towel or a bag of ice to the head followed by copious amounts of alcohol later in the evening.
Amendments 57 and 83 bear my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North. I wish to emphasise the importance of those amendments, which foreshadow important amendments in respect of bulk powers that the Scottish National party intends to table at a later stage. Our amendments would apply the same processes and safeguards for the examination of information or material obtained through bulk interception warrants and bulk equipment interference warrants, irrespective of whether the information or material pertains to individuals in the British Isles, and to require a targeted examination warrant to be obtained whenever secondary data obtained through bulk interception warrants and equipment data and information obtained through bulk interference warrants are to be examined.
In order to gain an understanding of the background to this amendment, I invite hon. Members to look back at the evidence of Eric King to the Committee on 24 March. He explained to us how GCHQ examines bulk material. The targeted examination warrant available on the face of the Bill fails to cover the aspect of communication that is most used by agencies such as GCHQ: metadata, or secondary data, as it is referred to in the Bill.
The hon. and learned Lady might have chosen a better witness. If I recall, the gentleman in question admitted in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle that he had had no experience at all in the application for or determination of any warrants. He had never had any security clearance either, so I am uncertain why he is being prayed in aid.
I must say that I do not like the approach of traducing witnesses. If I do not like a witness’s evidence, I will not traduce them; I will just try to forensically dissect their evidence. This is a distinguished witness with significant experience in this field.
No, I will not give way. I am going to finish. Because of his technical expertise, Mr King has been of enormous assistance to myself and my hon. Friends in the Labour party in drafting amendments.
Hon. Members may “Ah” and “Um”, but Mr King has relevant technical expertise. I invite hon. Members to consider his CV.
No, I will not. I will continue to make my point. The amendment was tabled because there should be a requirement to apply for an examination warrant when seeking to examine secondary data. That would protect the privacy of our constituents—I am looking at Government Members—and us. It is not some idle attempt of the chattering classes to be difficult about the Bill; it is an attempt to make the Bill compliant with the rule of law and with the requirement to protect the privacy of our constituents. That is all it is about. Criticising and making ad hominem comments about a witness are not going to undermine the moderate—
No, I will not give way. There will be plenty of opportunity for the hon. Lady to contribute later. I am conscious of the time, Chair, so I will briefly—
No, I will not. I want to continue making my point. Without the amendment, which we support, a GCHQ analyst would be able to search for and view non-content material of anyone in the United Kingdom without a warrant. I do not believe that that is right, necessary or proportionate.
Let us look at what the Intelligence and Security Committee said. If Government Members do not like Mr King’s evidence, let us set him to one side and look at the ISC. Government Members might find its approach more palatable or less easy to criticise. In the ISC’s response to the draft Bill, it highlighted the significant concern that the secondary data, including that derived from content, would not be protected. It said:
“To provide protection for any such material incidentally collected, there is a prohibition on searching for and examining any material that relates to a person known to be in the UK (therefore, even if it is collected, it cannot be examined unless additional authorisation is obtained). However, these safeguards only relate to the content of these communications. The RCD relating to the communications of people in the UK is unprotected if it is collected via Bulk Interception. In direct contrast, if the same material were collected and examined through other means (for example, a direct request to a CSP) then the draft Bill sets out how it must be authorised”.
The ISC expressed a concern that the amendment attempts to address. Because no examination warrant is required for secondary data, a variety of highly intrusive acts could be undertaken without additional authorisation by individual analysts. That is all that the amendment is seeking to address. In my respectful submission, it is appropriate, necessary and proportionate.
As the hon. and learned Gentleman was speaking—he recalled having a cold towel placed upon him last week—I wondered, as his peroration ranged across so many different clauses of the Bill, whether he wished the same fate for the whole Committee, although I fully appreciate his point on the complexities of this particular area of our consideration. They are such that, to get to the basis of why he tabled the amendments, it is necessary to look across a range of parts of the Bill.
In essence, this is probably the difference between us—perhaps it is not, but let me present that at least as my hypothesis. We recognise, as the Bill reflects, that different levels of authorisation should apply in relation to different investigative techniques. I think the hon. and learned Gentleman is with us that far, but it is important to say why those different levels should apply. The differences plainly reflect the different operational contexts in which the powers are exercised, and that includes the different organisations, how they use the capabilities, and the statutory purposes for which those capabilities are utilised. We are absolutely clear that those differences are necessary, and that the safeguards that apply to different powers are satisfactory, coherent and effective.