Medical Records (Confidentiality)

Jim Shannon Excerpts
Tuesday 11th February 2014

(10 years, 9 months ago)

Westminster Hall
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George Mudie Portrait Mr Mudie
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I read with interest about the right hon. Gentleman’s unfortunate nose. He makes an important point.

My point is that there will eventually be a breach of security. It is inevitable, given the size of the database and the information stored in it. The human cost to the patient whose identity and medical history are made public is potentially disastrous. Careers could be ended, jobs lost, insurance refused and relationships destroyed if sensitive medical facts are made public or used by private firms, other people or, indeed, the media.

Jim Shannon Portrait Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
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I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on bringing this matter to the House for consideration. He said rightly that there is a medical need to have some of the information, but many patients fear that their confidentiality could be taken over by money-making ventures from those involved in the process. Instead of an opt-out system, should there not be an opt-in system, whereby the GP and the patient get together and discuss confidentiality and an understanding of the system before anything happens?

George Mudie Portrait Mr Mudie
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The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, which I will cover when discussing the second issue that I identified. At the moment, I am dealing with security, but I will come on to the opt-out arrangements, which are far from satisfactory.

A further reason for concern is that the information will not be available for analysis and research in the national health service alone, but will be made available to non-NHS organisations. A Library note describes an interesting situation in which, without the consent of individuals, the information given can identify patients:

“In most cases, researchers can carry out their studies using information that does not identify you. Occasionally, however, medical researchers need to use information that does identify you. Only researchers who have obtained your permission or who have been granted special approval are allowed to access your identifiable data… The CAG approves requests where it is not possible to use information that does not identify you and it is not possible to ask you. There are a variety of reasons why it might not be possible to ask people; for example, where there are extremely large numbers of patients”—

so it is okay if researchers pinch a lot of patient information and identify the patients, but such patients would have no come-back, because that is reasonable in the eyes of the national health service.

Another interesting but concerning document includes a diagram helpfully provided by the Information Commissioner that describes three different levels of anonymity. First, in the public domain, there is no information—none. It is totally anonymous. Secondly, for approved organisations, whether NHS or outside organisations given permission, there is potentially identifiable data. Finally, organisations that have a legal basis, such as the police, have all the data—nothing is hidden. Interestingly enough, the police will not have to do what they have to do now, which is to get a court order to get the information; they will have an automatic right to it.

NHS England has explained that information given to private researchers will be anonymised before release, but that is undermined by its statement that the standard of anonymity it is using requires it to

“ensure that, as far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, information published does not identify individuals.”

That is hardly reassuring.

All those instances could be dismissed as speculation, but we should be aware that NHS England and the Government see the whole exercise as an opportunity for the UK to become a major player in medical research, with both the NHS and the private sector seeing strong economic growth and income from the use of the data. I forgot to mention that in the database will be included people’s national health service number, postcode, date of birth, gender and ethnicity. With all that information—particularly the postcode—it will be fairly easy to identify someone.

I turn now to the question of permission. This genuinely makes me very cross. The handover from GPs will take place in March—one month’s time—and after three months, depending on opt-out numbers, 100% of records will be on the national database. That should have happened already, but the Information Commissioner stopped the process late last year because the NHS had not consulted or, in the commissioner’s view, given enough information to the public. The commissioner ordered the NHS to postpone the process and take steps to give more information on both what was happening and the right to opt out. It has been given £2 million to do so, but it is far from clear that it is doing it willingly—it is doing it in bad grace.

I should mention the summary care record, another IT exercise that was carried out five or six years ago, more limited in its function but with the same organisational structure. A key element was that, unless a patient objected, their records would automatically go on the database. That tactic of forcing people to opt out rather than in was successful and with summary care records only 1% of patients in the pilot schemes opted out. There was a discussion about what system should be used for opting out for the new, greater system, a report was written, and surprise—officials chose the opt-out. With no real publicity, involvement or consultation, they have reckoned from the pilots that that might be the result nationwide. I thoroughly object to that.

NHS England published a leaflet, which might have come through Members’ doors, that supposedly meets the Information Commissioner’s request, but it is so bland, patronising and uninformative that it seems to have been written, miraculously, by a dead author—Enid Blyton. It is an insult to the general public. Opting out is not actually spelled out within the leaflet. NHS England is demanding that people go to their doctor’s surgery, discuss the matter with a doctor or practice manager and then give their decision on opting out. The House knows how busy doctors are and how busy their surgeries are. Is somebody going to take a day off work to go and see their doctor not because they are ill but because they want to discuss opting out? It is not sensible.

I suggest that NHS England is not serious about involving and empowering the general public. That is the second reason why real questions should be asked about this plan. The leaflet does not make the point that there are two opt-out options, one for giving the information out within the health service and one for giving it out outside the health service, or that people can obtain a form, fill that in and send it in to a practice.

I am taking up time and I know that a colleague wants to speak. I want the Minister to take his lead from the Information Commissioner and postpone the introduction of the scheme to allow further consultation and discussion about whether there should be an opt-in or an opt-out, about what information is being shared and about the security of that information. If the medical records of members of the public are going to be given out, they should have knowledge of that and should have had the opportunity to opt out.