Cluster Munitions

Jim Shannon Excerpts

Wednesday 9th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Martin Caton]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that contribution. He is absolutely right, and I shall say a little about what happened in Lebanon.

In 2006, the charity Handicap International produced a report documenting more than 10,000 known civilian casualties from cluster munitions, but it believed that the true figure could be as much as 10 times as high as that. What there can be no doubt about is that cluster munitions have caused excessive and disproportionate harm to civilians in every conflict in which they have been used over the past 40 years. People across the world realised this, especially when they saw on their television screens the use of millions of these weapons by the state of Israel against Lebanon and the consequences for its people. Sixty per cent. of Israeli cluster strikes were in built-up areas, with the inevitable impact on innocent human life. At the end of the conflict it was estimated that there could have been as many as a million unexploded cluster sub-munitions littering roads, schools, wells, houses, gardens and fields, taking their toll on the Lebanese population. A clean-up operation continues, in which the UK Department for International Development is playing a valuable and important role, but that, we should not forget, is a diversion of development aid money from other humanitarian projects.

At the end of that conflict, cluster munitions, as an issue, had gone up the political agenda across the face of the planet. Civil society was brilliantly organised by the Cluster Munition Coalition of more than 350 organisations in more than 100 countries. They found politicians who were willing to listen, ready to be convinced and prepared to act. From 2000 until 2007 attempts had been made to negotiate on cluster munitions at the UN convention on certain conventional weapons, and this had been blocked every time by the United States and others. When in 2006 a mandate to negotiate an instrument on cluster munitions, proposed by 27 states, was again prevented, Norway and the other countries involved decided to go outside the UN to move the issue forward.

That was the start of what became known as the Oslo process, starting with a conference in that city in February 2007. In doing that, Norway was following the example of Canada, which had used the same approach in securing the landmine treaty 10 years earlier. The Oslo process was quite remarkable. By getting people and their Governments to address the impact of cluster munitions, we saw quite radical changes of position over about a year, not least in this country.

On 23 November 2006, I secured an Adjournment debate in the Chamber on cluster munitions in which I urged the then Labour Government to play a leading role in the Oslo process and to take the initiative by announcing the UK’s intention to renounce all cluster munitions. The then Minister of State, Ministry of Defence who responded described cluster munitions as

“lawful weapons that provide a unique capability against certain types of legitimate target”,

and went on to say:

“Our military commanders judge the degree of force to employ to achieve the mission, subject always to strict compliance with international humanitarian law. We believe that that is a sufficiently adequate body of law. It puts considerable constraints on the use of cluster munitions.”

He added that

“a total ban on the use of all types of sub-munition would have an adverse impact on the UK’s operational effectiveness.”—[Official Report, 23 November 2006; Vol. 453, c. 802.]

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

If all those countries have signed the letter asking for these munitions not to be used, what action does the hon. Gentleman think should be taken against the manufacturers, because that is where the key lies? If they cannot sell them, they will not manufacture them.

[Martin Caton]

In the 111 countries that are signatories to the Oslo convention on cluster munitions, manufacturing, stockpiling or transferring them is clearly illegal and states should act against such practices. Our problem is the countries that want to hang on to their cluster munitions, such as the United States, Russia and China in particular. That is the point of my debate. I think that they are trying to use the convention in the UN to enable them to hang on to the munitions, and I will move on to that point later.

In November 2006 the Labour Government’s position was that we need cluster munitions, but by May 2008 the previous Prime Minister was in Dublin arguing very effectively with Ministers from other states for a total ban. An historic agreement was struck on 28 May to establish the convention that now has 111 members, and more are joining as time goes on.

Let us think about that. Many people knew that the issue of cluster munitions needed to be addressed for at least the last third of the 20th century and the first few years of this century. In just five years, remarkable progress had been made and continues to be made. The convention on cluster munitions that came out of the Oslo process is now in its second year of implementation and its momentum remains strong. There were two new accessions in September and three new ratifications. The same month saw Lebanon host the second meeting of states parties to the convention, in which 34 countries that have not yet signed the convention participated. That is a dynamic that I think needs to be encouraged.

That is what worries me about what the United States and others are now proposing. Having blocked use of the UN convention on certain conventional weapons for years, they have proposed a draft protocol that would ban certain cluster munitions produced before 1980. It is due to be debated between 14 and 25 November in Geneva. There are three possible outcomes: adoption of the draft protocol, ending negotiations with no result, or the adoption of a political agreement that is not legally binding but allows interim steps.

My objective is to urge the Government actively to resist adoption of the protocol. In doing so, and in fairness, I want to recognise the commitment of the Government, like their predecessors, to a complete ban as espoused in the convention on cluster munitions. I do not doubt Ministers’ respect for its integrity or their keenness to get every country to join. However, from written answers to questions I have tabled, and from what colleagues and I picked up in a meeting on Monday with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), I am worried that the Department may be in danger of making an error of judgment. I put it no more strongly that that, because I know that deliberations are ongoing.

My concern is that the Government feel that the Oslo process has stalled and that, therefore, any initiative that allows non-signatories to the CCM to commit to some renunciation of some cluster weapons is welcome because it might allow more progress towards the goal that all Members of the House want to see: a global cluster munitions ban. I understand that thinking but am convinced that it is quite wrong for a number of reasons. The proposed protocol seriously risks encouraging greater use of cluster munitions that have been banned by most countries because it would remove the current stigma that has been developing against the use of cluster munitions—the same stigma developed with landmines, with very positive results. Some welcome the protocol because it would allow a red light for certain old cluster weapons, which would mean the removal of more of those weapons, but there is a reverse side to the coin.

First, when we say that only some munitions are unacceptable, implicitly we are saying that others are acceptable, which means that they get the green light. For the draft protocol, that would mean the United States’ BLU-97 getting the okay. That is the cluster bomb that caused such civilian suffering in Serbia and Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Amazingly, it would also give the okay to the Israeli M85, which was responsible for the slaughter in Lebanon. That cannot be a step forward.

Secondly, the protocol would also hamper efforts to achieve universal adherence to the convention on cluster munitions. The states that want the protocol want it to avoid making progress on the CCM, not to facilitate it. Thirdly, banning cluster munitions is increasingly making military sense, because they do not deliver. That is why 22 of the 28 NATO states have banned them.