Oral Answers to Questions

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Monday 26th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

I can give my hon. Friend that assurance. There is a balance to be struck, but the community support that results from the collocation of armed forces families is tangible. We must also concentrate on the ability of families to secure employment in local communities, and that is another consideration that we take into account.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his thoughtful response. Forces’ morale is closely linked with events in Afghanistan, and I join the Secretary of State in offering condolences: the thoughts of all of us, and the prayers of many of us, are with the families and friends of those who have been bereaved today. I do not want to go into the specifics of that attack, but attacks on NATO forces by Afghan forces have resulted in 75 fatalities since 2007, and most of the attacks have taken place in the last two years. In the light of previous incidents, what new procedures have been implemented to vet Afghan recruits, and will Afghan forces be responsible for the protection of UK trainers who remain in Afghanistan post-2014?

[Nick Harvey]

We keep force protection issues under continuous review, and we have changed our procedures in the light of events that have occurred both recently and over a longer period. The decision of the Government —the last Government, as it happens, but that is not relevant—to adopt a partnering strategy and put our troops in alongside those of Afghanistan undoubtedly carried a considerable degree of risk, and there are those who think that that is the wrong approach, but I do not agree. I believe that the last Government were right to compute that the risk was worth taking, and I believe that that is the only way in which we will engrain the necessary skills and culture in the Afghan forces and complete our mentoring task.

[Mr Murphy]

Forces’ morale often depends on success in Afghanistan. Last week the Prime Minister made clear his view that the handover to Afghan forces could be achieved satisfactorily without a political settlement, but that is contrary to all experience in Afghanistan. Such a vacuum would encourage neighbouring countries to seek influence, allow the Taliban to return, and allow other elements to exploit the ungoverned space. Does the Minister accept that while there can of course be significant military success in Afghanistan, stability in the country will ultimately rely on a political settlement?

[Nick Harvey]

I certainly agree that a political settlement will be required if there is to be enduring stability beyond the end of 2014, but I think that the hon. Gentleman conflates two issues. It is perfectly possible for us to complete the security challenge of handing the lead over to the Afghans district by district, area by area, which we are doing now, and doing successfully; but if that is to stand a chance of sustaining peace in Afghanistan in the long term, a political settlement will need to come behind it to return the country to the stability for which we have all been trying to work.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Andrew Robathan)]

I note that my hon. Friend recently took part in a Westminster Hall debate on exactly this issue, which was replied to by the Minister of State, Department of Health, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Mr Burns), with whom I recently visited Combat Stress because we have worked hand in hand on these issues. I mentioned the “Fighting Fit” report earlier. We are looking very closely at the long-term provision of support. This is a difficult and complex field, and we work very closely with the King’s Centre, under Professor Simon Wessely.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

I wish to return to the question posed by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) about one of the most controversial decisions of the Government—the decision to sell the Harriers, leaving the UK with carriers but no aeroplanes to fly from them. I have in my hand an internal MOD document that reveals that the Government sold the Harriers for much less than they were worth—in fact for a sixth of the cost of a recent upgrade. The document shows that there is a fear about viable capability being thrown away and points out that at the point of sale the aircraft should be moved in secret to avoid media attention. May I ask the Secretary of State why, when money is so tight, the Government sold the Harriers so cheaply to the US?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

I think the right hon. Gentleman perhaps spends too much time reading the Sunday newspapers. I too read an article yesterday that said we had spent £500 million refurbishing the Harriers shortly before selling them to the United States. In fact, the programme in question was instigated by the previous Government in 2002 and sustained the Harrier through to the end of its service with UK forces. Far from sneaking the Harriers to the US in secret, when the deal was signed the MOD issued a press release announcing the sale price, $180 million, which was nearly twice the figure that I was told when I arrived at the MOD had been pencilled in as the receipt. It was a success, although the right hon. Gentleman would hate to admit it.