(6 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI want to be crystal clear that, under the new clause, the offence is committed if the pseudo-image is created without the consent of the person who is the subject. That is at subsections 1(c) and 2(c) of proposed new section 66AD.
Let me talk for a moment about intent. The new clause differs from some of the content in the Online Safety Act 2023. It does not relate to intimate images, such as a person wearing a swimsuit, but applies to sexually explicit images, which are defined in legislation. It requires not only that the image is sexually explicit and is created without the consent of the subject matter, but that it is done for the purposes of sexual gratification or with the intent of causing humiliation, alarm or distress. I gently say that a similar measure was debated in the Bill Committee. I think it was tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris), and he will recognise that the intent of the provisions that the Government have adopted is the same as the Opposition’s.
I am aware of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke is saying about the base events. Perhaps I can allay her concerns by simply saying this: it is a novel new measure for any Government to take. She makes sensible and compelling arguments on this point, and I hope she will feel reassured if we take an iterative approach for the time being. She will recall that the Law Commission recommended that we did not introduce legislation at all, and I will come on to say a little about that. It is right to say that other countries are looking at us carefully. The Justice Secretary was at the G7 in Venice just last weekend, and other G7 Justice Ministers had noticed that we are making this change and were observing carefully. We are making this change because we recognise the inherent risk posed by these images and that the offence is overwhelmingly targeted at women, predicated on an absence of consent. As such, we consider it a gateway to more serious offending.
We make some points by way of clarification. We carefully considered the Law Commission’s recommendations in its excellent report on intimate image abuse, which has informed much of our recent work, although respectfully on this, we have diverged from its point of view. In response to some of its concerns, I would like to reassure the House. We recognise that the amendment could criminalise young people, particularly teenage boys. To reduce the risk of over-criminalisation, we believe that we have set pragmatic parameters. Creation alone will be a non-imprisonable offence, although it will incur a potentially unlimited fine. The offence of creation alone would not attract notification requirements, meaning that the offender will not be placed on the sex offenders register. As hon. Members will know, all of that changes if the image is shared. Victims of that offence will be entitled to automatic anonymity in line with all the other sexual offences and they will also be eligible for special measures at trial. We are delighted to see major deepfake websites withdraw from the United Kingdom and we encourage the others to follow their lead.
I turn to Government new clause 87, which introduces a statutory aggravating factor for manslaughter involving sexual conduct. The clause corresponds to, and potentially should be read in conjunction with, section 71 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which says that it is not a defence to argue that a victim consented to the infliction of serious harm for the purpose of sexual gratification.
We have long held concerns about killing of this nature where, by definition, the victim cannot give an account of consent, yet on occasions the court has implicitly sought to categorise the killing as a consequence of sexual choice, as opposed to the consequence of the development of social norms based on structural inequality. We invited the eminent criminal barrister Clare Wade KC to consider the issue specifically in her domestic homicide review last year. She said that cases of this nature must be viewed through the prism of coercive control and that
“the policy underpinning law ought to consider the wider harms which emanate from the behaviour which can and does lead to this category of homicide.”
We agree, and we are increasing the punishment for degrading and abusive conduct of this nature. Following careful consultation with the Sentencing Council, we are tabling a statutory aggravating factor so that sentences for manslaughter involving sexual conduct must be more severe. It will cover all cases where the act is directly attributable to sexual conduct.
I want to provide the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) with one point of reassurance. She will know from all her work, and particularly the research conducted by We Can’t Consent To This and the team, that of all these homicides almost 60% are strangulation cases. I know that that is not the point that she wishes to make with her amendment, but there is some overlap.
On parental responsibility, as hon. Members will be aware, the Government have already amended the Children Act 1989 via the Victims and Prisoners Bill to provide for the automatic suspension of parental responsibility in cases where one parent kills the other. We are making an amendment to develop the law further, providing that, where a father is convicted of child rape, parental responsibility that he may have for any child will be automatically suspended.
I pay tribute to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman)—I think that she is in the wars at the moment—for the way in which she has presented this issue. She has advanced the compelling argument that we have long-established principles to protect children from sex offenders by placing people on the sex offenders register and protecting them from working with children, but while we have measures to protect other people’s children, the same protection does not exist for the children of the offender unless the mother goes to the family court to remove his rights.
I also pay tribute to Sanchia Berg, the journalist who revealed this issue through her work and highlighted the practical obstacles that some mothers had faced in making this application, as well as other families who have talked about their experience, including via their Member of Parliament, one example being my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti); I am not sure if he is in his place.
The father will still be able to apply to the family court to have the suspension of his parental responsibility lifted, but it is obviously fair to assume that, if he has been convicted of child rape, such an application is unlikely to succeed. We have also included a clear requirement for this measure to be reviewed after it has been in place for three years.
It is a pleasure to see in the Public Gallery some of the families who have championed this issue in the west midlands. Am I right in thinking—I really hope that I am not—that this measure covers only those convicted of the rape of a child, not other sexual offences against a child and a child aged 13 or over?
The hon. Member is correct. I simply want to say again that this is a novel power that we are extending to Crown court judges, who typically do not have any knowledge of family law matters or a family law background. Once again, we think it is right that we take an iterative approach. There was a dialogue between the Mother of the House and the Lord Chancellor on this point, and she agreed with the approach. I do not want to put words in her mouth, and I am keenly aware of her absence when she should be speaking to her new clause, but I believe that she is satisfied with where we have got to. I commend the new clause and urge all colleagues to give it their support.
I turn next to new clauses 94 and 95 and new schedule 4. I commend my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for his excellent campaign and dedication to crafting a new offence. I must also mention my hon. Friends the Members for Eastbourne (Caroline Ansell) and for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), who also came to see me and made a really compelling argument.
My right hon. Friend is quite correct: that is the basis on which the Government cannot accept the amendments. Of course, everybody agrees that water companies should be punished as robustly as possible, but it is also the case that we have pre-existing offences that apply. Pollution incidents are already the subject of criminal sanctions available to the Environment Agency under the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016, and there is a serious risk of duplication, not least because—I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) will not mind my saying this—the sanctions he has included in his amendments are just more fines, and we already have a fines regime.
Let me set out very briefly the basis on which, in a principled way, we are saying no to the amendments. As the environment regulator, the Environment Agency can and does prosecute company directors and other senior officers under the relevant regulations. It has a power to fine, and there can be convictions for polluting rivers and coastal waters, where it can be proved that the offence has been committed. Expanding criminal liability would simply create a repetition of the existing powers. It is the Government’s view that the amendments would create a dangerous and unacceptable risk of double jeopardy across the two regulatory regimes that are administered by Ofwat and the Environment Agency.
The amendments would simply duplicate the existing sanctions, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Philip Dunne) put it, for not meeting performance commitments. More seriously, they could undermine the robustness of the Environment Agency’s criminal sanction regime. On that basis, I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale will understand why we do not want to see duplication in an area where there is already the capacity to prosecute, a criminal law regime and the sanction of fines, which is everything that his amendments seek.
I fear the Minister is coming to the end of her remarks, but she has not addressed my new clause 44. Does she have any comment on it?
I thank the hon. Lady for reminding me, but I had not forgotten. I listened carefully to her speech and I have read all her amendments, not all of which were selected, but some of which she has raised before. On the general defence, she will know that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of the defence of duress in relation to women and the crime—
I know that the amendment has not been selected, but I want to provide the hon. Lady with some reassurance on it, because we on this side of the House continue to think about the issues she has raised. She is aware of the Law Commission’s review of the defence of duress as it applies to murder. I want to provide her with an update and some reassurance that we will take the lessons that come out of that review, and consider it more widely, if appropriate, in alignment with the point that I think she made earlier in this debate.
On new clause 44, this is an important point between us, but the Government are resisting it not because there is any real dispute of principle, but because there is dispute of degree. There is a concern that by amending the wordings of sections 52 and 53 of the Sexual Offences Act, as so drafted, we could unnecessarily narrow the scope of section 52 as it has been applied in the criminal courts and potentially add an additional element to be proved in relation to section 53 that could make prosecution harder. We disagree not on the principle but about whether it will have the effect she is looking for. I did listen carefully to her speech and the way that she has presented the argument on previous occasions.
(10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mrs Latham. I welcome the new clause tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham and outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. New clause 3, as we have heard, seeks to remove the parental responsibility of people convicted of sexual offences against children and I welcome the tremendous cross-party support it has received. The new clause’s core aspect is the welfare of the child. I am one of those whose ambition in being elected to this place was to work for the benefit of young people, and the new clause does that.
The proposal would go some way to strengthening the law around the welfare of a child whose parent has been convicted of sexual offences against children. There are very limited cases where the court has allowed an application to terminate a person’s parental responsibility. They include a 1995 case in which the court terminated the parental responsibility, acquired by a parental responsibility agreement, of a father who had been sent to prison for causing serious injuries to his child.
In 2013, the court removed the parental responsibility of a father who had been imprisoned for sexual abuse of his child’s half-sisters. In a further case in 2013, the court terminated the parental responsibility of a father who was serving a prison sentence for a violent attack on the child’s mother. Finally, in a 2021 case, the court terminated the parental responsibility of a father who had a significant offending history, including sexual offences against children. In other words, this is already happening.
On Second Reading, I spoke about the need to amend the Bill so that offenders who have sexually harmed children and are sent to prison as a result lose the ability to control their own children from behind bars. That measure is long overdue and will ensure all children are safe from those dangerous predators, including their own parents. The key problem to address is: how can a man—it is usually a man—considered too dangerous to work with or be around other people’s children be allowed to have parental responsibility that effectively makes him responsible for all manner of decisions affecting their child’s life, but which may not be in the best interests of the child? Why should any child be subject to any form of control by a convicted sex offender who is unlikely to be part of their lives for years ahead, and possibly forever?
In response to a question on the proposed new clause, Dame Vera Baird told Committee members that she had reservations about the definition of a sexual offence in the context of the Bill as she felt it might be too wide. That said, I hope the Government will at least support the new clause in principle and perhaps return to the issue on Report so that we can take another step in the quest of all of us here to protect children. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The new clause seeks the automatic suspension of parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of a serious sexual offence against a child. We understand fully the motivation in bringing the new clause. We have discussed it and I respect the remarks that have been made. I want to confine my remarks to the contours of the current system and where that fits in relation to Jade’s law, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has already alluded to, and how that was introduced in the Victims and Prisoners Bill.
Starting with the current state of the law, the paramountcy principle is the cornerstone of the family justice system. There must be full consideration of the best interests of the child as a starting point. The hon. Member for Stockton North has just given an example of a number of cases where the parent had committed a very serious sexual offence and the family court acted accordingly to suspend parental responsibility.
Perhaps the Minister would like to see my email account, which has a folder specifically for the thousands of cases from the family court where the cornerstone is absolutely not the safety of the child. There are lots of cases where that does not happen—far more than the handful that have been referred to.
I noted what the hon. Lady said in her opening remarks, but I will go through the legal landscape before I come to other issues. As I say, we are carefully considering the force of the new clause.
In cases in which a parent has been convicted of a child sexual offence, the family court has the power to strip out parental responsibility. That decision is made only after careful consideration of the best interests of the individual children, to ensure that their needs are the driver for action. Decisions about suspending or restricting parental responsibility have significant ramifications for children, which is why judges prefer to consider each case on its individual merits and make a decision that is specific to the best interests of that child.
We must not conflate suspending an individual’s parental responsibility with a punishment. It is a step that is taken to protect the child from harm, and because of that it must be taken when it is in the best interests of the child. The new clause, as drafted, makes no provision for the consideration of the best interests of the child. For that reason, we think it engages article 8 consideration under the European convention.
Members are of course aware that the Government recently tabled an amendment to the Victims and Prisoners Bill that will automatically suspend parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of the murder or the manslaughter of the other parent. We wish to make clear that distinction. In many cases in which one parent has killed the other, the children involved will have no one left to exercise parental responsibility, apart from the killer of their other parent. In such circumstances, we think that it is right that whoever is left caring for the child, whether that be a grandparent or even the local authority, is spared the onus being on them to commence family proceedings to restrict the offender’s parental responsibility.
Where a parent has committed a serious offence other than murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is likely that there will be another parent able to exercise parental responsibility and apply to the family court.
Does the hon. Lady think it is okay for a woman who has been abused and had her husband convicted of paedophilia to pay £30,000 in order to keep her children safe?
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. That case has caused concern, and we have been looking carefully at the legal aid position, which I will come on to.
As I was saying, where a parent has committed a serious offence other than murder or manslaughter, it is likely that there will be another parent able to exercise parental responsibility and make the application to the family court—I will come to legal aid in a moment—for the well-established method of restricting the offender’s parental responsibility.
Lord Meston, a family court judge who sits in the House of Lords, made a speech on the Victims and Prisoners Bill in which he warmly welcomed the inclusion of Jade’s law as a way of automatically restricting the rights of the other parent. I just say this in passing. He was invited to consider whether there should be the automatic suspension of parental responsibility if another kind of crime was committed. He said something that we have noted as part of our thinking:
“However, on reflection, I do not think that the Crown Court should be expected, as part of a sentencing exercise, to make automatic prohibited steps orders”
in different cases. He continued:
“The Crown Court will not have, and cannot be expected to have, a full appreciation of the family’s structure and dynamics, and of the circumstances of the children concerned, and will not have input from Cafcass.” Lords—[Official Report, House of Lords, 18 December 2023; Vol. 834, c. 2094.]
That is not determinative of our thinking, but it is the reflection of a family court judge who sits in the other place. That is what he said in relation to Jade’s law while, of course, welcoming it.
The automatic nature of the new clause would mean there would be no space for the court to consider the wishes of the other parent or the wishes of the children as to whether the matter should be brought to a family court.
The new clause clearly states that the other parent can apply to the court to have their wishes heard, but it is not the responsibility of a completely innocent mother, in most cases, to have to protect her child from a sex offender.
I accept that the new clause gives the other parent the right to return to the family court, but effectively it could force a child to make applications to the family court to have their wishes considered.
Because there has to be an application for the reinstatement of parental responsibility. That is what the new clause states at proposed new section 2A(2).
The hon. Lady said that a child would have to make an application to the family court. How is that the case?
The child would have to advance what their best interests are to the family court, if parental responsibility has already been suspended.
We have carefully considered the case in Cardiff. I want to make it clear that legal aid is available for a prohibited steps order and specific issue order in specific circumstances, subject to means and merits tests and evidence requirements relating to domestic abuse or the protection of children being met. Where the subject of an order has a relevant conviction for a child abuse offence, it is likely that the application would satisfy the relevant evidence and merits criteria. We are looking into why that was not the case for the lady in Cardiff.
Could I also open all the other cases with the Legal Aid Agency? The vast majority of people I encounter—there are thousands, and I have sat in the family court for hours—have not been able to access legal aid. Every one of them is a victim. Perhaps the Minister could look into that.
That warrants a response, and the hon. Lady will get one.
My final point, to which the hon. Lady alluded in her opening remarks, when she said she hoped the provision might go wider, is that one of the conceptual difficulties with the new clause is that it would seek to remove parental responsibility in cases of serious child sexual abuse, but it is silent on, for example, child murder. Or what about perhaps a serious case of terrorism, where we could advance a plausible argument? We think there are issues around the scope of the new clause.
I could not agree more—the scope needs to be much wider—so will the Minister and the Government, by Report stage or in the Lords, finally act on the harms review by tabling amendments to the Bill that we can all be proud of?
As I say, we are looking at the definitional issues. We are also looking carefully at the paramountcy principle, which underpins the way in which cases are approached in the family court. The new clause has a worthy aim. We have huge sympathy for families in these circumstances and want to do as much as possible to support them in getting the right outcome for their children. At present, we do not think the new clause is the right way to do that, and we urge the hon. Lady to withdraw it.
For nearly 10 years I have had Ministers stand in front of me and say, “We are a bit worried about” some legal word or other. How many children have died because of family court proceedings in the 10 years that we have been trying to raise the alarm? The family courts in our country will be the next Rotherham or Rochdale. State-sanctioned child abuse is going on and we all just turn a blind eye. The things that I have seen in courts are harrowing. I have watched children being removed from their loving mothers and placed fully in the care of paedophiles—proven child abusers. For me, we cannot casually sit here and pretend that that is okay.
Funnily enough, one of the people I started this campaign with, all those years ago, was the current Justice Secretary. Why is it taking so long to do something about the family courts in our country? They are actively dangerous, everybody knows it and nobody is doing anything about it. It is like the Post Office; I will not be one of those people who sat by and did nothing.
I will not press the new clause to a Division, because its scope is not wide enough and does not deal with half the harms that I see. If the Minister wants to take away the parental responsibility for children from terrorists she can knock herself out—I will support it. I will support any movement towards progress in the family court, because I have seen none. I look forward to the Government coming forward with an all-singing, all-dancing proposal that will make children safe. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Can the Minister tell me what protections are in place for the woman in the case that I outlined? She was considered to be an accessory to a crime. She was a victim of coercive and controlling behaviour, and the crime was a part of a pattern of domestic abuse.
In that circumstance, the defence of duress would be available to the victim in the ordinary way.
Currently, that is absolutely not what is happening in our criminal courts. It is currently no defence for victims of domestic abuse in these cases to say, “I’m a victim of domestic abuse: that’s why I ended up here.” The Minister is saying that there is the defence of duress; I am saying that it never gets used. It does not stack up, and this is not happening in reality. She has spoken of her pride in the Government over coercive control. Does she think that there need to be specific elements, within this conversation about joint enterprise, to protect people who are coerced into such behaviours?
We will come on to some amendments of that nature and I will deal with them in due course, but the defence of duress is a standard defence in the criminal context. [Interruption.] These are the criminal defences that get advanced.
In response to the hon. Member for Bootle, this is an area of the law that is intrinsically linked with other inchoate offences such as encouraging or assisting a crime. We think that it is too difficult to require the prosecution to prove a significant contribution; as we say, the very important case of Jogee has set clear parameters for both the conduct element and the mental element, which we think creates the correct framework of common law. For those reasons, the Government are unable to support the new clause, and we ask the hon. Member for Bootle to withdraw it.
(10 months, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe clause makes a straightforward amendment that would provide for the automatic, rather than discretionary, MAPPA management of offenders convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship who are sentenced to 12 months or more. As a result, such offenders will be treated as category 2 rather than category 3 offenders for MAPPA purposes.
It should come as no surprise to the Government that we enthusiastically support the clause. Labour has committed to halving incidents of violence against women and girls within a decade. For far too long, those dangerous criminals have been let off and victims have been let down. Indeed, the multi-agency public protection arrangements were introduced by the last Labour Government in 2001 under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, being strengthened again in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Those arrangements see the police, probation and prison services working together to ensure the proper management and monitoring of sexual or violent offenders. In a joint thematic inspection of MAPPA, I have seen them called
“one of the success stories of the criminal justice system”.
The inter-agency approach of MAPPA improves public protection by bringing together criminal justice organisations, as well as others, in a structured way to address and actively manage the behaviour of offenders who can sometimes be difficult to accommodate and who may pose serious levels of risk. Labour is in complete agreement with the Government that perpetrators of coercive and controlling behaviour should be brought more directly under the remit of MAPPA. As Women’s Aid said, this signals that the crime of coercive and controlling behaviour, which is central to so much domestic abuse, is being taken more seriously by the justice system. As it also points out, bringing CCB offenders automatically under the remit of MAPPA is particularly important given the links between coercive control and homicide.
For cases where there is high risk of domestic abuse, the active management and inter-agency engagement that MAPPA provides can be an effective response. However, a report by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services in 2021 identified a lack of multi-agency management of individuals who posed the most significant risk of harm to women and girls through domestic abuse. As part of the inspection, HMICFRS asked forces to identify the five individuals whom they considered posed the highest threat to women and girls within the local force area. Of the 40 individuals identified, only three were being managed under MAPPA.
Additional guidance for category 3 offenders who are perpetrators of domestic abuse has been welcome, but HMICFRS noted in its 2022 MAPPA review that there
“is still not a clear enough pathway for those who pose a risk of harm through domestic abuse, particularly for those who commit lower-level offences over a sustained period of time but pose a real risk of harm to their victims through long-term abuse.”
The impact that the clause might have, while welcome, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, is relatively limited, given the number of individuals who have been convicted of coercive and controlling behaviour since the introduction of the offence in 2015. Fewer than 2,000 people have been convicted of that offence, and yet—I think this is probably one of the most important points that I will make during this Committee—the data from the crime survey in England and Wales estimates that 2.1 million people experienced domestic abuse in the year ending 2023. Not every case of domestic abuse will include instances of coercive and controlling behaviour, but given the centrality of such offending behaviours in many cases of domestic abuse the number of CCB convictions still appears very low. Since the provision will apply to that relatively small cohort of offenders, it is difficult to discern what huge impact it will have.
I am interested to hear from the Minister about any additional provisions that her Department has been looking at in preparation for the Bill in relation to MAPPA and perpetrators of domestic abuse, particularly if it has looked at other measures that would make individuals who have committed domestic abuse MAPPA-eligible, because repeat perpetrators of this appalling violence against women and girls too often get away with their patterns of criminality and go on to commit more violence and cause more harm.
As I said, we fully support the clause and will vote with the Government, but we fear the level of impact that it will have. The criminal justice system is in crisis, and the Government are completely failing to address the shocking levels of violence against women. As with much of the Bill, we do not oppose the measures, but we are left wondering if these tweaks are all that the Government have to offer a system in crisis.
I thank the shadow Minister for his speech and for supporting the clause. In answer to his final criticism that we have abandoned women and girls, the Serious Crime Act that created the offence of coercive, controlling behaviour received Royal Assent in February 2015. With respect to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, it predates her arrival in Parliament, but we created that criminal offence and we have been evolving its implementation since.
I will make some progress. I want to respond to the points raised by the shadow Minister. [Interruption.]
You do not need to apologise, but we are more freewheeling in Committee. If the hon. Lady wants to come back in later, she can.
The provision has been welcomed by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. She said:
“This provision will help to ensure that perpetrators are properly managed in the community and victims can be kept safe from further harm. The Commissioner welcomes this provision and will continue working with the government to develop proposals for the effective management of perpetrators.”
In answer to the hon. Lady’s question, in the data we have, which is from 2022, 566 people were convicted of coercive control, and it is estimated that, as she suggested, around 200 would be serving 12 months or more and would have been eligible for MAPPA management. We simply make the point that the MAPPA framework is used for the most serious offenders; whether it is a sexual, violent or terrorist offence, people qualify for MAPPA if their sentence is one year or more. We are not doing anything unorthodox or irregular in having that criteria in relation to coercive control.
I will respond to one of the shadow Minister’s final points. He asked whether there was provision for other forms of domestic abuse to fall under MAPPA management —the answer is yes. We strengthened the statutory guidance to clarify that MAPPA management can be considered by the relevant agencies in all domestic abuse cases. I hope that answers his query.
I did not find the piece of paper from Refuge, but I knew it would be about 200 people. Just to make it clear for the record, in one ward in my constituency there will be 200 violent perpetrators of domestic abuse. To the Minister’s point that she did not wish to take my intervention on the piece of legislation that was passed, I will never, ever criticise this Government on that. They have passed lots of legislation, so the skins of goats have had lots of words written on them. It means absolutely nothing—pieces of words on goat skin mean absolutely nothing if they are not then properly resourced, managed and implemented in our communities. The women in refuge accommodation speak of little else than what a nirvana it has been recently under this Government.
I don’t—[Interruption.] Yes, it has.
The clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It extends eligibility to those who are serving multiple sentences where the index sex offence will already have expired. To give a rather grim illustration of what that might look like, if somebody is sentenced for convictions of rape and murder, by the time of their release the sentence for the sex offence will have expired, and they would therefore not automatically qualify for polygraph testing without the extension that the clause provides.
The clause also extends polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who have received non-terrorism sentences. At this point, I want to pick up on what Jonathan Hall told the Committee in evidence just before Christmas. This measure could apply, for example, in the case of someone who was convicted of conspiracy to murder but whose offences were an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or were committed for the purposes of terrorism, if they committed their offences before the relevant legislation came into force.
The way in which we make that assessment will depend on the judge’s sentencing remarks. If, in sentencing, the judge made an express reference to the offending being in the course of terrorism, the extension provided by the clause would make polygraph testing applicable. We define this cohort as historical terrorism-connected offenders, and the polygraph testing licence condition is currently unavailable as a tool to manage the risk that they pose, although it would be available for an individual who commits the same offence today.
The intention of the clause is to fill the gap and provide more effective risk management in the community. I reassure the Committee that that does not mean that the person can be recommitted to prison. It is an assessment of their licence conditions. It affects their risk management. If it should later transpire that they have breached licence conditions, they could be recalled, but not by the polygraph test alone. As a whole, the clause will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who pose a risk of sexual offending and those who committed historical terrorism-related offences.
(10 months, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is again a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell.
Clauses 25 to 27 concern the transfer of prisoners to foreign prisons. Clause 25 introduces the measures that are relevant to the transfer of prisoners to rented prison spaces overseas. It defines key terms relevant to the following sections, and establishes the nature of the agreements and to whom those provisions may be applicable. The measures have been drafted to apply to a broad cohort of adult prisoners. This will ensure that the measures are applicable to the final cohort that will be decided on under the terms of any final agreement with a partner state. Prisoners will be subject to a transfer only after an assessment of the individual circumstances of their case. Although the details will be subject to future negotiation and agreement, additional exclusion criteria may apply.
Clause 26 deals with the transfer of prisoners between the territory of the United Kingdom and rented prison spaces overseas. It will allow the Secretary of State to issue warrants for the transfer of individuals from the United Kingdom to rented prison spaces overseas or for the return of prisoners held in rented spaces overseas to the territory of the United Kingdom. It allows for transfers both ways, as needed. Like many of the provisions relating to the transfer of prisoners to rented prison spaces overseas, these provisions may be used only once prison rental arrangements with foreign countries are in place, and may be used only for the specific purpose of transferring prisoners as part of that arrangement. The clause also provides that time spent in a rented prison space overseas will count towards the prisoner’s sentence as determined in England and Wales.
Will the Minister tell the Committee whether the Government intend to transfer women prisoners? Literally decades of data shows that women prisoners are predominantly victims of domestic and sexual violence, which is often a pathway to their offending.
The hon. Lady’s question is a good one. She will know that women form a very small part of the overall cohort of prisoners, that women prisoners have unique vulnerabilities and that they experience prison in a very different way from the male cohort. It is true that women are not expressly excluded from the provision, but obviously the United Kingdom Government are bound by the considerations under the European convention on human rights, and one can readily imagine how those will extend to female prisoners. It is obviously more likely that men will be transferred, because of the size of the cohort.
Would it not be better to put on the face of the Bill that women are carved out? I do not see any reason why we could not do that, if it is so vanishingly unlikely that a Government would transfer women prisoners. I am afraid to say that Governments are not always great on the issue of women in prison—not just this Government, but any Government, including any that might come in—so would it not be better to include that safeguard?
I am sympathetic to the hon. Lady’s point, which I will take away. The purpose of the provisions is to set the framework for future agreements, so of necessity they are deliberately quite widely drafted and do not seek to tie our hands. The hon. Lady’s points are irrefutable; I looked at the issue when I was a member of the Justice Committee.
Domestic powers to transfer individuals to rented spaces such as these do not currently exist in UK law, and the provisions, widely drafted though they are, are essential for the operation of a future agreement. Clause 27 contains provisions regarding the operation of warrants, which are proposed in clause 26. The provisions allow the Secretary of State to appoint individuals to escort prisoners in transit to and from rented prison spaces overseas and to provide those individuals with the powers necessary to exercise those duties.
The provisions are similar to existing transport and escort provisions contained in the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 and are built on long-standing operational practices. They are an essential complement to the powers set out in clause 26 and are necessary for the effective operation of a warrant for transfer. The clause also contains provisions to enable designated individuals to detain prisoners who may attempt to escape or who find themselves unlawfully at large in the process of transit to or from a rented prison space overseas. I commend clauses 25, 26 and 27 to the Committee.
I thank the shadow Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Meon Valley for their contributions, and I will respond to them as best I can. First, I want to talk a little about the context of the pressure on prison places. As of September 2023, 16,200 people were on remand in prisons in England and Wales. The reason why we have such a big remand population is that during the white heat of the pandemic, the Government took the decision to continue with full jury trials.
I remember listening very carefully to what the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy)—now shadow Foreign Secretary, then shadow Justice Secretary—said on the issue. Colleagues may recall that at one point he called for a reduction in the size of juries. He said that it was imperative to keep the criminal justice system moving, and he advocated for a shift to juries of five, only during covid. He was robustly attacked by Baroness Kennedy in the Lords, a Labour peer, who said that that was an absolute dereliction of article 6 rights. She gave a very passionate speech about it, brilliantly written, and I noticed that the shadow justice team never mentioned reducing the size of juries again.
Respectfully, I say it is reasonable to infer that the Opposition supported our decision to continue with full jury trials. If I am wrong about that, they can direct me to where they called for something different, but as I say there was a tension between the then shadow Justice Secretary and Baroness Kennedy. [Interruption.] It was incredibly difficult, and I think that is why the shadow Justice Secretary got himself into a bit of a muddle.
The decision to continue with full juries of 12 people determining the result of criminal trials during covid contributed heavily to the backlog, and to why we have so many people on remand awaiting trial.
I will continue a little more. We are undertaking the biggest prison building exercise since the Victorian era. We have committed to creating 20,000 new prison places, and have already got 5,700 of those places on stream, but we are not there yet.
The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton North gives rise to a number of sensible points. Let me distil them: he thinks that prisoners should not be transferred if they are getting near to the end of their sentence, have a sentence of imprisonment for public protection, are going through constructive rehabilitation treatment, or are implicated in some form of criminal proceeding. All those are very sensible ideas, but we respectfully believe that they are best addressed through policy, based on the appropriate expertise from within the prison system, not set out in primary legislation.
In fact, I think the hon. Gentleman made the point tacitly himself. He gave a number of other very good examples, including prisoners who have serious mental health conditions, are pregnant or are someone’s primary carer. All those factors are highly material. Let me reassure him slightly, if I can. To the extent that the exploratory conversations have begun, we are only having them with other European countries. That means that they are bound by the same obligations under the European convention on human rights, which would be material in the types of cases the hon. Member for Stockton North has suggested.
I have never been involved in a case of that nature; cases where the offending is really serious tend to be much more straightforward. There is flexibility, because we can take such cases to court to appeal the removal. Obviously, when someone is already a victim of crime, that is a different context, so I do not know how the courts would deal with it. The law itself, however, is set out under the established immigration rules, in primary legislation and has been operational for 12 years now. That is not part of the dispute today.
To continue, it is right that we take innovative measures to ensure that we always have sufficient prison capacity to fulfil the orders of the court and to punish the most dangerous offenders. I reiterate at this stage that the powers simply lay down the foundation for future arrangements. I repeat: all the points raised by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, about the considerations that might apply were relevant, but this is about future arrangements so that we will have the power to transfer prisoners to rented foreign prisons. No foreign prison rental agreements are yet in place, however. As he is aware, there is precedent in Europe: both Norway and Belgium have similar arrangements with the Netherlands at present.
I want to respond to some of what the Minister said. She told us not to worry about people’s families visiting, because 10% of them are foreign nationals. She went on to say that foreign nationals have children abroad. I represent loads and loads of people who are not British nationals but who definitely have family in the UK, so the idea that 10% of the prison population do not have any families who want to visit them, or that the families of all non-British nationals in UK prisons live back home, is wrong. Welcome to the world—people move about and they have babies with people here in this country. That is a bit of a reality check on some of what was said.
I also did not understand the Minister saying that we now have a massive backlog because the justice system carried on during the pandemic. Was the justice system due a three-year break to stop the backlog? Do we normally have a three-year break to make sure that we have enough prison places? That is a weird justification, which I did not really understand.
On human trafficking, there are more victims of human trafficking in prison than there are human traffickers; the woeful rates of conviction of people who people-smuggle or commit modern slavery are well charted. Last week, I was in a meeting with the bishops, the Lords Spiritual—I always think “Lords Spiritual” sounds like a rock band—about this exact issue. Prison wardens and governors from a variety of prisons were there to give evidence, as was the Bishop of Gloucester—I believe her role is as the overarching Lord Spiritual for prisons—the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and lots of organisations who work with trafficking victims, including the Salvation Army and others. I was there, and the prison governors made it very clear that lots of people in prison have a pattern to their behaviour.
If we look at the Rochdale case from last week, we see that a young girl was criminalised as a pattern of her sexual abuse. That is not uncommon or unknown; it is in fact the opposite—it is well known, well charted and well evidenced. There is a huge amount of evidence for that, so I absolutely want to see a carve-out in that particular space for anyone identified as a victim of modern slavery.
The Minister asks us to wait for policy to feel comfortable about this, rather than writing things into the Bill. I totally understand that legislation does not necessarily need to be very detailed, but I would have liked, for example, to have had the word “women” once in the Domestic Abuse Bill—but, you know, we can’t be picky.
The trouble is that I have seen what happens when we leave things to policy that is skew-whiff and ambiguous in the Home Office, especially when it comes to cases of human trafficking. As the Minister said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, she has not been involved in any particular cases.
Currently, Government policy is a bit skew-whiff on how we remove or deal with victims of human trafficking. It is not exactly clear, and even the lawyers are not clear, both those from the Home Office and those seeking to represent victims of human trafficking who are threatened with deportation. Last week, I was with a barrister in a case, and she clearly said that the policy is to remove all victims of human trafficking from Albania, which the Government have said is a completely safe country—perhaps, unless you are a young woman who has been trafficked repeatedly, in which case all of the evidence suggests that Albania is incredibly dangerous.
I was in court because the Government were trying to deport a victim of human trafficking who had stayed within the national referral mechanism—in fact, had had her therapy paid for by that very same Home Office —for three and a half years. The Home Office had agreed yes, she is a victim of human trafficking. Literally, she has a piece of paper from the Home Office—it might as well have been signed by the Home Secretary—to say, “You are a victim of human trafficking.” She had two children, and both had lived in Britain for seven years, both born here of the rapes that she had suffered. But the Home Office was trying to deport her to Albania, a place they had already deported her to once; she had been re-trafficked from there immediately after reporting to the police. So excuse me if I do not trust something not being written into a Bill about how to handle these difficult cases.
I want to see on the face of this Bill provision so that no woman, no victim of human trafficking and no one with autism—the number of people with autism in our prison estate is phenomenal. Where are the safeguards so that barristers such as the one I was with last week have something to lean on when the Home Office decides that its policy is a little bit grey and so it can actually do what it wants?
I thank the hon. Lady for her submission. I will confine myself simply to arguments as they relate to the prison transfer issue. Furthermore, this part of the Bill is Ministry of Justice, not Home Office.
Let me address two points. I am sorry if I was insufficiently clear when I talked about foreign-born offenders. Of course I do not make the crude assumption that none of them will have connections with the United Kingdom, including family, but some will not. We know we have problems with foreign gangs coming over. My simple point in response to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, is that not every single prisoner will have strong local ties in the United Kingdom, because that is not true and will be a relevant consideration in assessing the cohort for transfer.
On my other point, I am again sorry—perhaps it was my mistake—if I was confusing about the decision to maintain full jury trials during covid. That decision was a controversial one because of the number of jurors required. Those were physical trials at the time, and having the number of jurors required to sit together in a courtroom during a period when social distancing was set out in law was incredibly difficult. Without doubt, that delayed the process of the criminal justice system, so much so that some Supreme Court justices urged the Government to dispense with juries altogether. As I said in an earlier observation, the then shadow Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), suggested we shrink juries rather than abandon them altogether. Other eminent lawyers—I cited one—thought that that was the wrong idea.
This was a very difficult decision on how to operate criminal trials, but in the end we decided that it was imperative, in the interests of justice and of article 6, the right to a fair trial, that everyone who was charged with a criminal offence in the Crown Court had the right to have justice administered as fairly as possible, so we stuck with the juries. That has led to delay, and that is why the remand population—in other words, people still awaiting trial—is higher than it otherwise would be, which has caused pressure on prison places. I apologise if that was insufficiently clear. That concludes my remarks.
We are committed to ensuring that any foreign prison will be subject to an inspection arrangement; it is simply the terms of that inspection arrangement that we are not putting into primary legislation.
Amendment 67, tabled by the shadow Minister, is important. Arrangements for the independent inspection of escort arrangements in England and Wales already engage HM inspectorate of prisons to some extent, and the Prison Act 1952 allows the Secretary of State to investigate any matter connected to prisoners and prisons in England and Wales. We are committed to ensuring that effective scrutiny of escort arrangements is in place but, again, the exact terms of the arrangements are yet to be concluded and it is inappropriate to attempt to distribute specific responsibilities without prior agreement.
Amendment 68 addresses deaths in custody. This is an important point and must be subject to high-level scrutiny. That is especially true where there may be a death in custody that occurs overseas. This matter will be of primary importance to us during negotiations with any partner country. We are committed to ensuring that we are able to comprehensively investigate any deaths that may occur in rented prisons overseas.
This subject is a prime example of how we intend to use the delegated power we are seeking in clause 29. Once we have agreed arrangements with a partner country, we intend to use our delegated power—by potentially extending the remit of relevant bodies in England and Wales, for example. Until those arrangements are finalised it would be inappropriate to bind any potential body or person, including coroners, in law.
We are also committed, of course, to upholding the human rights of prisoners, including their rights under articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights. That is legally binding on us, and those are absolute rights. We are currently considering only entering into arrangements to rent prisons from countries that can demonstrate that their prison conditions and capabilities—including for death investigations—comply with that same human rights law and our expectations on the fair treatment of prisoners.
On the basis that this is an important issue for future negotiations, or is non-negotiable given our international obligations, it is too early to begin considering how issues such as death investigation will be accounted for without first making precise arrangements with a partner country. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Stockton North to withdraw this amendment and to not press the other amendments in his name in this group.
I will speak now to clause 28, which concerns oversight arrangements for rented prison spaces. I have said already that the clause establishes a duty on the Secretary of State to appoint a controller. I have also set out their responsibilities for ensuring that any prisoner transferred to a foreign prison will be returned before the end of their sentence to allow for sufficient time for resettlement and reintegration back into the United Kingdom before release.
Clause 28 also extends the remit of His Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons to allow for inspections of any rented prison spaces overseas and subsequent reports to the Secretary of State on their findings—respecting their operational independence. Consideration of prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners has been, and will remain, central to our decision making.
On the point of saying here, and the law even saying, although the law does not say it, that prisoners will be returned to the UK before the end of their sentence, is there—well, I imagine that there is—a chance that their sentence might be extended because there is no place for them to be brought back to?
For example, our modern slavery laws say that we would have to wait for 45 days of reflection in cases of modern slavery. In reality, it is 700 days at the moment. So, laying out a term: is there any worry that, if we say that prisoners have to come back here before they are released to do a period of parole, we will in fact be extending people’s sentences because there are not any places for them to come back into?
Can I just clarify that I have understood the hon. Lady’s intervention?
I think it would have to be part of the planning for any prisoner who was going to be transferred for there to be space for them to be returned, because that is part of the policy—that they will be brought back into a domestic prison before release so that there can be proper engagement with the parole and probation services. That is, as hon. Members would expect, to facilitate a smooth release back into the community, as with any prisoner.
We are mindful of the need to ensure that effective inspection and monitoring provisions are in place. While the exact arrangements will be subject to future negotiation, we will ensure that those are sufficient, and they will also be subject to further parliamentary scrutiny. I commend clause 28 to the Committee.
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI missed Clare Wade’s evidence because I was unwell when she gave evidence to this Committee. Are we to assume that the clause will be used in the prosecution of cases where self-harm is caused by incidents within domestic abuse relationships or as a result of grooming, sexual violence and broader violence against women? I think that it was clarified during the evidence session that that was the case.
I thank the hon. Lady for her question. It is quite clear that Parliament’s intention, in the way that we are framing the clause, and how the clause might actually play out when it comes before the courts, are probably quite different. I have been thinking about that myself. This is very much an extension of what I may call—I hope you will forgive me if I use this as a shorthand—the “Molly Russell” principle, which was established by that tragic case and led to all the new principles of the Online Safety Act—bringing them into line with the offline environment.
However, I think that you are quite correct; when we read clause 11, we see that it belongs in a range of different circumstances, all of which I have thought through. Yes, I think that you are right to say that it could very easily exist within a domestic—
My apologies. I am sorry for being too informal; I am not familiar with this. I think that it is the case that the issue is readily identifiable within certain forms of domestic abuse scenario, and that the clause would apply in those circumstances. It is obvious in the statutory language.
I will speak more broadly about the issue in a moment, and I am pleased to hear what the Minister has said; that is what we would all want to see. However, I am concerned about the each-way offences that the Minister outlined. Let us say that in a case of suicide a coroner found that domestic abuse had been involved—I mean, chance would be a fine thing in most cases—and a manslaughter charge was laid and then the perpetrator pled guilty. There has only been one case of this. I just wonder how these summary limits and these each-way offences would work in that situation.
I thank the hon. Lady again for her question. Actually, I think that we would have to concede immediately that it would be on the charge sheet. However, the hon. Lady has raised the topical, important and very difficult issue of whether or not a domestic abuse perpetrator has elicited suicide in circumstances where, as she will know, there are evidential difficulties. There is a discussion happening within Parliament, and more widely within the legal profession, about the offence of manslaughter and its ambit when it takes place in the context of suicide.
Perhaps I can reassure the hon. Lady, though, by saying this: if we stop short of suicide—very much mindful of the fact that that engages quite difficult legal issues—and we think about the offences created under clause 11, I think that it is almost inconceivable that there would be a circumstance in which a clause 11 offence existed and was not accompanied by an offence of coercive control under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. I just do not think that, in a domestic abuse context, those two things would not exist in parallel. Therefore I think that we would already be looking at a more serious form of sentencing if we were into an “eliciting self-harm” clause 11 offence. It would also be automatically brought under the ambit of the Domestic Abuse Act, and it is already a more serious offence in that context.
Clause 12 is the facilitation element of the offence, and subsection (1) provides that anyone who arranges for somebody else to do an act capable of amounting to inducing self-harm is also committing an equivalent offence. Subsection (2) provides that an act can be capable of encouraging or assisting self-harm even when done in circumstances where it was impossible for the final act to be performed. For example, if pills were provided to a person and they ended up not to be the pills that were intended, it is exactly the same offence. Equally, if something harmful was sent by post but never arrived, the offence and sentence are the same irrespective.
Subsection (3) provides that an internet service provider does not commit the offence merely by providing a means through which others can send, transmit or publish content capable of encouraging or assisting serious self- harm. Subsection (5) provides that section 184 of the Online Safety Act 2023 is repealed in consequence of these provisions, which create a much broader basis, bringing the online and offline environments into parity.
The Minister and I have had some back and forth on this. I rise really to hammer home the point regarding the good intentions of the clause, but the need to think about it in the context of a domestic abuse, grooming or sexual violence situation. It is undoubted in any professional’s mind that one of the consequences of violence, abuse and coercion against an individual, specifically in young women, is self-harm and suicide.
As the Minister rightly says, it is important that we recognise that in the vast majority of cases self-harm falls short of suicide. There is a huge amount of self-harm going on across the country, genuinely encouraged as a pattern of domestic abuse, and we need to ensure that this piece of perfectly reasonable legislation, which was designed for those on the internet trying to get people to be anorexic and all of that heinous stuff, which we are all very glad to have not had to put up with in our childhood—I look around to make sure that we are all of a relatively similar age—also covers that.
There is one particular risk: how does the clause interact with institutions? Perhaps the Minister could assist me with that. The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, a Home Office Minister, is sat in front of me. I was a few minutes late for the sitting this morning because I was in court with one of my constituents in a case—I am afraid to say—where we were on the other side from the Home Office. My constituent literally had to take medication during the court proceedings, such is the mental health trauma that has been caused to her by the Home Office. I wonder how this piece of legislation might be used. I suppose I worry that there is too much opportunity for it to become useful, in that there are so many ways in which institutions and individuals cause people to end up in a self-harm and suicidal situation. I seek clarity on that, unless Ministers wish to be found wanting by the Bill.
Well, okay, but I struggle to conceive of circumstances, other than very unusual and extreme ones, where it would be said that a statutory body was doing an act with the intention of eliciting the consequence of self-harm. Anyway, the point has been made and I have responded to it. I know the hon. Lady’s case is an emotive one.
I am not going to talk about my case, but with regard to the charge sheet, coercive control legislation does not currently cover adults who are sexually exploited in grooming situations. In the case of a woman who is sexually exploited by an adult, like the woman I was with this morning, coercive control legislation does not apply. However, self-harm—I mean, I am going to say that literally being forced to be raped by 20 men a day is self-harm—is absolutely part of the pattern of coercion and abuse that those people suffer, so we would assume that adult-groomers would be covered by the Bill.
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. I think a very helpful fabric of possible scenarios has been identified this afternoon. I simply say that in the different circumstances that she has just outlined, there are different criminal offences that would also apply. My simple point is that a case of the nature that she has described would not be confined to a section 11 offence under the Criminal Justice Act 2024, as I hope it will become in due course; there would be a range of serious criminality connected to that.
There isn’t. I hope, as the Minister hopes, that there will be by the time we have got to the end of our scrutiny of the Bill, but there is no crime of grooming adults in sexual exploitation; that exists only for children as an aggravating factor in offences. I suppose pimping legislation would not count in the case I mentioned if self-harm was caused. I do not think there are other bits of legislation for adult victims of sexual exploitation.
The clause is the latest in a sequence of legislation dealing with intimate image abuse. People may correct me if I am wrong, but I think I am right to say that we have not dealt with intimate image abuse until this Parliament. The first time it hit the statute book properly was the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. I think it is also right to say that, as a Parliament, we have framed it correctly as something that is more often than not just another ugly incarnation of coercive control. It is highly intrusive, humiliating and distressing conduct.
In November 2022, following the passage of the Domestic Abuse Act, the Government announced their intention to create a suite of new offences to deal with intimate image abuse, closely based on the Law Commission’s recommendations in its July 2022 report. Under the Online Safety Act 2023—I hope the Committee will not mind if I spend a moment on the chronology and the legislative journey on intimate image abuse—the Government repealed the offences of disclosing or threatening to disclose private sexual images, replacing them with four new offences of sharing or threatening to share intimate images.
The Bill goes further to tackle the taking of intimate images without consent, and the process of installing equipment for that purpose. First, it repeals two voyeurism offences related to voyeurism of a private act and taking images under a person’s clothing, for which we use the shorthand “upskirting”—although that precedes the life of this Parliament, so I am wrong about that. Anyway, both those offences are reasonably new and have resulted in amendments to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Bill will replace them with new criminal offences to tackle the taking or recording of intimate images without consent and the installing of equipment for such purposes.
Those taking offences build on the sharing offences identified in the Online Safety Act to provide a unified package of offences using the same definitions and core elements. That addresses the criticism that there was previously a patchwork of protection, which the police told us led to gaps in provision when it came to this type of behaviour. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller), who is not a member of the Committee. She has done a lot of work on the issue, and identified this problem in particular. As we know, one of the issues was proving intent.
I am grateful to the Law Commission for its work. It consulted widely with the police, prosecutors and legal practitioners, so we could not only read its report, but hear from a range of experts, including those supporting and campaigning on behalf of victims, and others who are far more knowledgeable than any of us.
The clause will insert a suite of new provisions after section 66 of the 2003 Act. The clause will create three new offences: the taking or recording of an intimate photograph or film without consent; and two new offences about installing equipment to enable a taking offence. I will go through them briefly.
The first provision of the clause is the creation of what we call a base offence of taking any intentional image of a person in an intimate state without their consent. That amounts to what we will call a section 66AA offence. It removes the requirement for a reason or motive. It does not matter if the person was doing it for a joke or for financial payment, or even if their reason was not particularly sinister. The base offence would be met if those elements were established. The offence is triable summarily only and will attract a maximum prison term of six months.
The wording of the two more serious offences mirrors some of the language that we are familiar with; the offences refer not just to “intentionally” taking an image, including of a person in an intimate state without their consent, but to having the intent of causing them “alarm, distress or humiliation”, or taking the image for the purpose of “obtaining sexual gratification” for themselves or another person. The offences are serious and carry a maximum sentence of two years. The three offences are designed to achieve the right balance between the protection of the victim and the avoidance of any over-criminalisation. I will return to that when I speak to new clause 20, tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.
The base taking offence is subject to a defence of reasonable excuse, such as a police officer taking an image without consent for purposes connected with criminal proceedings. Similarly, a base sharing offence is subject to the defence of reasonable excuse; for example, images taken for the purpose of a child’s medical treatment would meet that threshold, even if the victim was distressed by that. There is another exemption—I do not know who came up with this example, but it is a good one—if the image is taken in a public place and the person shown in the image is in the intimate state voluntarily. A distinction is therefore drawn between, for example, a photo of a streaker at a football match, and that of someone who had a reasonable expectation of privacy; that would relate to upskirting, for example.
We are also creating two offences to do with the installation of spycams, which I am afraid we see more and more of in cases going through the courts: an offence of installing, adapting, preparing or maintaining equipment with the intention of taking or recording intimate photograph or film; and an offence of supplying for that purpose. To be clear, it will not be necessary for the image to have been taken; if equipment was installed for that purpose, that is enough to meet the requirements of the offence.
Overall, the clause amends the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to ensure that notification requirements can be applied, where the relevant criteria are met, to those convicted of the new offence of taking for sexual gratification and installing with the intent to enable the commission of that offence. I commend the clause to the Committee. I will respond to the new clause later.
I will be brief. New clause 20 would extend the definition of “intimate image” to include specific categories of image that may be considered intimate by particular religious or cultural groups—for example, instances of a person not wearing modesty clothing such as a hijab or niqab when they would normally do so.
I am very sensitive to the issues that have been raised and will respond to them, but I will also explain why we do not accept the new clause.
We have steered very close to the course recommended by the Law Commission in what we have defined in law as an intimate image. It includes anything that shows a person who is nude or partially nude, or who is doing anything sexual or very intimate, such as using the toilet. It is a wider definition of “intimate” than was used in the revenge porn provisions under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. We have expanded it, but we have confined it to what we think anyone in this country would understand as “intimate”.
One of the challenges in adopting a definition of “intimate” that includes, for example, the removal of a hijab is that we are creating a criminal offence of that image being shared. It would not be obvious to anyone in this country who received a picture of a woman they did not know with her hair exposed that they were viewing an intimate image and committing a criminal offence. The Law Commission has made very similar points in relation to showing the legs of a woman who is a Hasidic Jew, or showing her without her wig on. This would be grotesquely humiliating for that victim, but that would not be completely obvious to any member of the public who might receive such an image of them.
I will, but I would like to develop this point a little bit more.
I strongly suggest that the hon. Lady does not come from the same community as me. I described images being sent to the community; the nature of the image would absolutely be clear to lots of people where I live.
I was going to complete the point. If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will do so before I give way again. We have to create laws that apply equally to everybody in the United Kingdom. If we are to create an offence of sharing intimate images, we have to have a translation of intimacy that is absolutely irrefutable to anybody sending that image around. Even if they do not know the person in the image, it has to be absolutely clear to the sender that they are sending an intimate image. I have already made the point that it would not be immediately obvious to everyone in the United Kingdom that an image of a woman showing her hair was a humiliating image of her. It would not automatically be an intimate image even if the person sharing it knew that the woman in the image was Muslim, because some Muslim women do not wear headscarves.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described a very dark case. She mentioned the language of blackmail and honour-based violence. She intimated coercive control. My simple point is that in the circumstances she has identified, there are a host of serious criminal offences being committed in conjunction with the use of the intimate image. We would say, very respectfully, that we think that kind of crime belongs much more comprehensively within other offences.
I am not going to engage in a case-by-case discussion. It is so difficult for me to do that; I do not have the papers in front of me. I understand the issue about community-based events, but if the purpose of sending the image is to blackmail a person, they have already engaged another element of the criminal law, and there is already aggravation, in that the perpetrator is being domestically abusive or is committing an honour-based offence, as the hon. Lady described.
I want to make it clear that by introducing the base offence, this legislation is removing the need to show an intention to cause distress. That is the issue that Georgia Harrison had, but managed to circumvent when she got that very successful and high-profile conviction against Stephen Bear, who went to prison for two years. She had an evidential difficulty in proving intent in her case. Although she did, she then became a really powerful advocate for removing intent from the offence, and we have done so.
I am not for a moment suggesting that there will not be cases of maximum sensitivity in which somebody is humiliated, but as I say, in the case that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described, in the background, other offences were materialising. Our view is that it is more appropriate that they are dealt with under other elements of the law, rather than our muddling the police response, or even creating offenders where we do not mean to, because under the hon. Lady’s offence, the offender does not know they are committing an offence. They might think that they are sharing an image of a glamorous woman, not knowing that it is grossly offensive that they have shown a picture of a woman who does not have her hair covered as she normally would, because they do not know her.
I hope that answers the hon. Lady. With great respect, I urge her not to press her new clause. However, I would like to hear from her, because I did not give way to her a moment ago.
The rules allow the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, to come back again—and the Minister can, in fact, respond again, if she would like to.
I rise to support both amendments, and, in fact, what the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said as well. No one should have the ability to host an image of a person that they did not want out there in the first place. Unfortunately, what people tend to get back is that it is very difficult to place these things, but all sorts of things around copyright are traced on all sorts of sites quite successfully. We put a man on the moon 20 years before I was born, and brought him back. I reckon we could manage this and I would really support it.
Turning to the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and the issue of faking intimate images, I am lucky enough to know—I am almost certain that most of the women in this room do not know this about themselves—that deepfake intimate images of me exist. As I say, I am lucky enough to know. I did not ever once consider that I should bother to try to do anything about it, because what is the point? In the plethora of things that I have to deal with, especially as a woman—and certainly as a woman Member of Parliament in the public eye—I just chalk it up to another one of those things and crack on, because there is too much to be getting on with. But on two separate incidents, people have alerted me to images on pornographic websites of both me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner); they have a thing for common women, clearly. There is nothing that even somebody in my position can do about it.
The first time I ever saw intimate images of me made on “rudimentary” Photoshop, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North called it, if I am honest, like with most abuses against women, I just laughed at it. That is the way we as women are trained to deal with the abuses that we suffer. They could only be fake images of me, because, unlike my children, I do not come from an era where everybody sends photos of everybody else naked. As a nation, we have to come to terms with the fact that that is completely and utterly normal sexual behaviour in the younger generation, but in that comes the danger.
The reality is that this is going to get worse. Rudimentary Photoshop images of me were sent to me about five years ago, or even longer—we have been here for ages. Covid has made it seem even longer. The first time I saw fake images of me, in a sexualised and violent form, was probably about eight years ago. Over the years, two, three or four times, people have sent me stuff that they have seen. I cannot stress enough how worrying it is that we could go into a new era of those images being really realistic. On the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I have heard, for example, two completely deepfake recordings of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) that were put out and about. To be fair to Members on the Government Benches, they clearly said, “This is fake. Do not believe it; do not spread it.” We must have that attitude.
However, it is one thing to stop something in its tracks if it is the voice of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras saying, in that instance, that he did not like Liverpool, but that is nothing compared with the idea of me being completely naked and beaten by somebody. It is like wildfire, so I strongly encourage the Government to think about the amendments and how we make them law.
Opposition Members have made two very good points, which I will respond to. The issue of publishing or hosting unlawfully obtained internet photographs is salient. It was probably thrown into its sharpest relief by Nicholas Kristof at The New York Times when he did a big exposé of Pornhub. I have never read off my phone in any parliamentary sitting before, but I will briefly do so, because the opening to his article is one of the best that I have read about Pornhub:
“Pornhub prides itself on being the cheery, winking face of naughty, the website that buys a billboard in Times Square and provides snow plows to clear Boston streets. It donates to organizations fighting for racial equality…Yet there’s another side of the company: Its site is infested with rape videos. It monetizes child rapes, revenge pornography, spy cam videos of women showering”.
The point is very well made.
Under the Online Safety Act 2023, we have ensured that all user-to-user services in scope of the illegal content duties are required to remove that type of illegal content online when it is flagged to them or they become aware of it. That would cover something such as the Pornhub apps I have described. We believe that the robust regulatory regime for internet companies put in place by the Act, with the introduction of the offence of sharing intimate images, which extends to publication, are the most effective way to deal with the problems of the spread of that material.
Our essential answer is that under the Online Safety Act a host site—I have given a big name, because I am critical of that particular site—would be under a legal obligation to remove content flagged to it as featuring prohibited content, so it would have an obligation under the law to remove an intimate image of an individual created without their knowledge or consent or to be subject to criminal sanctions. Under the Online Safety Act, those are substantial; Parliament worked collectively to ensure that meaningful sanctions would be applied in that regard.
There is a concern that creating a new offence would partially overlap with existing criminal offences—for example, that we would basically be duplicating some of the provisions under section 188 of the Online Safety Act. We worry that that would dilute the effectiveness with which such activity will be policed and charged by the Crown Prosecution Service. I understand that the provisions under the Act have not yet been commenced, so we would be legislating on top of legislation that has not been commenced. Respectfully, I invite hon. Members to allow the Act to come into force comprehensively before we make an assessment of whether we need to legislate again on the issue of hosting unlawful content. However, I am sympathetic to it, and I think the whole House agrees with the principle.
Equally, the Law Commission was asked to look at the issue of deepfakes, which it considered and responded to. I will remind the Committee of how it undertook its inquiry into the issue. It undertook a full public consultation on the point and engaged with the CPS and police, and it concluded that making a deepfake offence was not necessary. It identified certain associated risks, including difficulties for law enforcement and, again, the risk of overcriminalisation, which potentially would outweigh the benefits. The Government share the view of the Law Commission and have decided not to create a separate making offence.
I will provide hon. Members with some reassurance: nobody is in any doubt about the risk. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described harmful, culpable conduct relating to her personally and to other senior politicians in this House. My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest gave hypotheticals that could easily materialise, and we all know that there is an increased risk of that as we move into an election year on a global scale, because elections are happening all over the world this year. Nobody doubts the risk. I want again to provide the reassurance that such conduct generally involves sharing of these images, or threats to share, both of which are criminalised by offences under the Online Safety Act, or by other offences—communication offences and harassment offences—so it is already captured.
The secondary issue identified by the Law Commission concern the prosecution difficulties, because it would be difficult to prove some elements of the offence, such as an intention to cause distress, in circumstances in which the image had not been shared—by the way, I take out of that a circumstance in which the defendant has told the victim that they hold the image, because that has already crossed the threshold. The question that I asked officials—I have now lost the answer, but they did give it to me. Hang on a minute; someone will know where it is. Will the Committee give me one moment?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his forbearance. Just to pick up on that point, I think he is right to hold the Government’s feet to the fire on the commencement of the Online Safety Act, because it is all very well having these provisions in law, but if they are not actually operational, they are not doing any good to anyone. I accept that tacit criticism as it may be advanced. I recognise that implementation now is critical; commencement is critical.
I will disclose the question that I put to officials. I was interested in the question of what happens if, for example, a schoolboy creates a deepfake of another pupil and does not share it, so that it is not covered by the Online Safety Act but is none the less an offence. I am told that that is covered by two separate bits of legislation. One is section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which includes making indecent images of a child, including if that is a deepfake, which would be covered by the statutory language. The second provision is section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which is possession of any indecent image of a child and would include where it had been superimposed.
I am satisfied that the current law, including the Online Safety Act—I have already accepted that there are commencement issues—deals with deepfakes. I am sensitive to the prosecutorial difficulties that I have identified and I think that these are covered, particularly by the Online Safety Act. We accept the Law Commission’s very careful work on the issue, which was a detailed piece of research, not just a short paragraph at the end. On that basis, I very respectfully urge the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw or not press the amendments.
On the answer that the Minister got from her officials, there are so many bits of legislation about abuses of children, sexual violence towards children, sexual grooming of children and sexual exploitation of children, and there are none about adults, as though such behaviour is not harmful when someone turns 18. If the same kid in the same class is 17 and makes images of a person who is turning 18, the view is that one day it would be a problem and the next day it would not, as though the abuse of adult women is just fine. The Online Safety Act does not say the word “woman” once, so I will gently push back on the idea that it deals with this. I am going to scour Pornhub now—I will not do it while I am in Parliament in case somebody sees me—to look for these images, and I will rise to the Minister’s challenge. I am going to go to the police once the Online Safety Act is in force and we will see how far I get.
I thank the hon. Lady for her point. She is making very, very good ones, as she always does. That is a legitimate challenge. I just would also ask her to bear this in mind. She has heard our answer. First, we are accepting the Law Commission’s recommendation for now. Secondly, we think the Online Safety Act covers what she has described in terms of sharing. The third point that I draw her attention to is the pornography review launched today. That is a critical piece of work, and she made the good point that we focus extensively on children. There is a really important element of that.
First, we know that there is a dark web element where a lot of online pornography is focused directly on child pornography. We also know that adult pornography not only contributes to the pubescent nature of abuse that we see in the violence against women, but also violence against women much more widely. I have spoken about this; the hon. Lady has spoken about this—we have been in the Chamber together numerous times talking about it. I hope that that review will get on top of some the issues that she is raising today. I hope she will accept our gentle refusal of her amendment and maybe consider withdrawing it.
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Baroness Newlove: I have not specifically looked at that. Looking at all the reviews I have done, I have said outside this role that parenting is the most difficult job anybody can do, but you have to be accountable for the actions.
I have concerns: yes, the age is 10, but there could be other areas in which that person is suffering, such as dyslexia or autism. Also, the parents could be suffering domestic abuse. How do you make them pay that fine, at the end of the day? If you go back to that, we had that kind of language in the riots, where we were going to get the parents and take them out of their homes. For me, there has to be accountability, but how would you get that parent, who is probably suffering from domestic abuse or may have mental health and addiction issues, to fully understand the impact that their child is having? They may need support to rectify that. Also, that child could have other issues.
I can see where you are going from that. I welcome anything, but I am just stepping back a little to consider how that would have an impact on the rest of the family to make sure we can get a better solution.
Q
Nicole Jacobs: Well, according to the Office for National Statistics, it is 2.3 million.
(11 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberIf I could just finish my sentence, I will of course give way to the hon. Lady. The most recent figures we have are from March 2023, when the figure for police offices in England and Wales was 149,566. It has never been higher. With that, I give way.
I wonder whether the Minister can provide the per capita of population figures.
I do not have that figure, so I will have to write to the hon. Lady.
It is right that decisions about how police resources are deployed, including the number and composition of people in neighbourhood and local policing roles, are for the determination of chief constables, who know their beat better than anyone and are accountable to democratically elected police and crime commissioners. Nevertheless, the numbers have a broader significance, and I want to draw the Opposition’s attention to four points.
First, due to the investment in the police uplift programme, the number of police officers in local policing roles is the highest since comparable data began to be collected, with an increase of 6.5% in the 12 months to 31 March. We have more female officers and more officers from minority ethnic backgrounds than ever before—something that I hope the hon. Member for Nottingham North will agree is consistent with some of the conclusions that were certainly implied, if not made explicit, on the nature of representation in Baroness Casey’s report into conduct in the Metropolitan police.
We have more officers receiving specialist training for specific categories of crime. I will give the House one example, because yesterday I visited Avon and Somerset Police, the pioneering force conducting Operation Soteria Bluestone in the investigation of rape. They made it perfectly clear to me that the increase in numbers that they have seen locally has facilitated a huge increase in the number of specialist trained rape and serious sexual offences police officers. In fact, there are 2,000 nationwide. I noted that the hon. Gentleman said that we were setting the police up to fail. That could not be more different from the information that that force gave me yesterday—and if they are incorrect, I would appreciate it if he would explain why when he closes.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI first got involved with International Women’s Day in 2015, when I was asked to speak at an event; I had not heard of it before. That has prompted me to think about where we were then with women in public life, and where we are now. In 2015, there were 148 women in this House and 104 women in the two Houses of Congress, and a woman was poised to secure the Democrat nomination in the race for the White House—well, that one did not work out; but fast forward to today, and there are 220 women in Parliament, which is a 49% increase in five years.
I thought I might get that. There are 127 women in the two Houses of Congress, which is a 23% increase, and we have had a second woman Prime Minister. Sometimes the pace towards gender equality is glacial, but in the last five years, it has been considerable, and that is something to celebrate this International Women’s Day.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
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I absolutely agree. The Domestic Abuse Bill gives us a real opportunity. We will not get the moon on a stick—the Bill will not give us everything—but the annual case load at Women’s Aid, where I used to work, involved on average 8,000 women and 16,000 children. Children’s names are written down on a form and their social work paperwork is in the file, but no one from my organisation would necessarily have laid eyes on them. A tiny fraction of them would have lived in refuge accommodation—less than 10% of the total number would have gone through that in a year—so we are talking about thousands of children in the west midlands who, every day, are without someone to confide in, to talk to, or to deal with the trauma they are feeling in their lives.
Anyone who sits for five minutes with people who have been a child victim of domestic abuse, who have grown up in a home, will tell us that that trauma stays with them in adulthood. They are likely to suffer from PTSD and from problems within their own intimate relationships. All the findings from studies of crime data on knife crime or even terrorism show links to people who grow up in traumatised households. It is imperative for the future of those children and our country that we get this right. Children must be included in the Bill, and at the same time we must take a huge, wholesale look at funding for children’s services in the country. I ask the Minister directly: how many young people’s violence advisers and specialist children’s workers are there across England and Wales? The SafeLives data shows that it would cost only £2.5 million to provide those services across England and Wales. In the greater scheme of things, what it would save would be huge.
We are moving into an era when this will be talked about in schools. All of us in the Chamber have fought—some of us literally had to fight directly on the streets—to ensure that compulsory sex and relationship education will be available in our schools. As we roll that out and talk about such subjects in schools, we must ensure that we do not open a door into an empty room. We must ensure that specialist training and specialist single points of contact are available to handle this in every school, and to handle it well.
The murder rate of women and girls were released the week before last. I have forgotten the name of the organisation, but the data was released: 144 women and girls were murdered last year. That is an increase of about 27 on the previous year. Those figures include the murder of girls younger than three. The reality is that we need to provide support for victims of domestic violence who are children, and it is also imperative that they are safeguarded. We need to start looking at where we are failing in the system of children’s social care. To look at my own city again, I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill) could tell horror stories about how the under-resourcing of children’s services is leading to dangerous situations for the city’s children.
I cannot stress one thing enough when it comes to the review being undertaken of the family court. All of us have been in meetings with the likes of Claire Throssell, whose children were burned in their home by a violent perpetrator who the family courts had allowed to have access to them, even though she had begged and pleaded against that. The presumption of access for domestic violence perpetrators has to end.
To build on the hon. Lady’s point, the presumption in favour of access for a parent who in a criminal court would be considered a violent offender has a hidden dimension. Sometimes the perpetrator of domestic abuse will use the child as a pawn. Enhanced right of access will, typically, be used as a tool to torture the mother. The hon. Lady gave powerful figures not only for women who have been killed by domestic abuse but for children as young as three. She also gave an example of arson. That grim conclusion might not be reached, but children are still treated as pawns. They are placed with the perpetrator parent, in a highly dangerous situation, and they are denied access to their mother. That is a tool to torture the mother, and goodness knows what is happening. Another problem is the reporting restrictions in the family court, which make it difficult to know how the decisions are reached and the slipstream in which those children are moving.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. I have seen hundreds of cases in which access to a child is used simply to extend the abuse. Children become pawns, and that has a psychological effect on them. They are pulled about and told that they have to go somewhere, such that they do not feel safe. Their mothers have to watch on and say goodbye to their children, putting them into the custody of someone they do not believe to be safe. That is psychological torture in our family court system—although, thanks to its secrecy, we will never truly know. However, I am sent emails with reams of accounts about that exact thing happening, day in, day out. We have to stop wringing our hands.
The Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service is also an issue with regard to the family court. CAFCASS provides support and services for perpetrators to try to stop the perpetration of domestic abuse. I am not here to criticise that, but I note that CAFCASS does not provide the same support for women and children. I often found a disparity when people decided to fund local commissioned services for perpetrators. Again, I have no problem with that, but there was always a discrepancy between the amount of money that would go to the perpetrator project and the amount that would go to the project that ran alongside it for women and children. Double the number of people was always a fraction of the price, I noted.