Victims and Prisoners Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th July 2023 Public Bill Committees

The new clause also seeks to expand the definition of “top tier” by adding manslaughter and more sexual offences to the list of offences that would be subject to additional scrutiny. We have debated this matter in relation to earlier amendments in previous sittings. I note that the offences included in the new clause are fewer than those tabled in amendments to clauses 35 and 36, but our principal argument is the same. It is right that there is additional scrutiny of the most serious cases, and the top tier has been chosen carefully as a proportionate way of capturing the offences that present the highest risk and cause most public concern. However, in doing that, inevitably a balance must be struck. We believe that the top tier strikes a proportionate balance while in no way diminishing the importance of other offences.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

I wonder whether, potentially before Report, the breakdown of the number of killings of women in their homes deemed to be manslaughter, rather than murder, could be provided to the Committee. Is there an impact assessment that we could see on the disproportionate use of manslaughter charges in cases such as domestic homicide?

I am afraid to say there are lots of problems with the way that we tier crimes. For example, if a person murders someone in their own home, the starting tariff is 15 years; if a person murders somebody with a knife they have taken out of the house, the starting tariff in our country is 25 years. At the moment, 70% of women who are killed are killed in their homes. With this Bill, we should not be creating another two-tier system in which the killing of women simply is not as important.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, but I do not think anyone is suggesting what she suggested in her final sentence. She is right to highlight the tariff difference, which is reflective of something that Parliament decided it wished to do, recognising that it would create a disparity in the tariffs, in the light of the Kinsella murder. Parliament was cognisant of that. Whether that should be looked at is a perfectly reasonable point. In that context, I pay tribute—as I know the hon. Lady would—to the Goulds and Deveys for the campaign they are undertaking on the issue, and to the Killed Women campaign more broadly. Wherever this lands, they are provoking an important public debate on this very important issue and the disparity between whether a knife is taken to the scene of a crime in a public place or is already there.

I will be cautious on the hon. Lady’s specific question about the statistics, because I do not know whether that level of granularity is available, but I will take that away and look. If the data is recorded in a way that answers her question and is publicly available, I will be happy to share it with her.

Finally, the new clause would remove the discretionary referral power, which would allow the Parole Board to send a case directly to the Secretary of State without taking a first-instance decision or, in this instance, directly to the Court of Appeal. The intention behind this route of referral is to allow the Parole Board to refer a case where, for whatever reason, it is unable adequately to make an assessment of risk and so cannot make a robust decision. I recognise that the Justice Committee, as referred to by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge, has also raised concerns about this route of referral, and we are carefully considering the issues raised and the broader point of the Justice Committee in its very swift—for which we are grateful, and I know the Lord Chancellor is grateful—one-off inquiry into part 3 of the Bill.

In subsequent debates, I will outline what we believe is the most appropriate route of referral and why we do not believe that the Court of Appeal is the right route. We believe that that remains the upper tribunal, but that is addressed specifically in subsequent amendments and clauses. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her amendments and new clauses, but I am afraid that at this stage we must resist them.

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[Edward Argar]

Clause 35 reflects the views of the root-and-branch review by amending the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 to create a top tier cohort of indeterminate-sentenced offenders who have committed some of the most serious crimes and whose release from prison will be subject to additional safeguards. In the same way, clause 36 amends the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to create a top tier cohort of fixed-term offenders. As the clause applies to offenders serving determinate sentences, murder is not included in the list of offences for referral, as life sentences are mandatory in all murder cases in any event. The top tier therefore consists of offenders serving sentences for murder, rape, certain terrorism offences, or causing or allowing the death of a child—again, as I have alluded to, this reflects the root-and-branch review’s approach.

The clauses contain a new power for the Secretary of State for Justice to intervene in the release of the most serious offenders, providing for a second check by taking or retaking release decisions. Once a prisoner has been referred to the Parole Board to decide whether they are safe to be released, there are two routes by which such decisions may come before the Secretary of State. First, the clauses contain a provision that will allow the members of the Parole Board to refer a top tier release decision to the Secretary of State, instead of making a decision themselves. They can do so for any reason that they consider appropriate, including if, for whatever reason, they are unable to adequately assess risk in a particular case. The Secretary of State would then make a decision about release for that offender. We expect that this power will be used in very rare cases only.

[Jess Phillips]

I welcome the fact that the Minister thinks the power will be used only in very rare cases. When assessing the risk, what will the Secretary of State have that the Parole Board does not have? Is the Secretary of State imbibed with some great risk-assessment power that the Parole Board and all the people on it are not?

[Edward Argar]

The Secretary of State will have information from the Parole Board and the Parole Board’s view but, ultimately, we believe it is right that the Secretary of State is accountable to the public in such cases. We therefore believe that that is the appropriate route by which someone who is accountable, and to whom I suspect the public would look in the most serious cases, can ensure public protection where the Parole Board feels that it is unable to do so.

[Jess Phillips]

I will not trouble the Committee too much longer. I am not sure that a public mandate allows me, as somebody elected by the people, to be somebody with expertise in risk management. I am, but that is nothing to do with the mandate that I got from the good people of Birmingham, Yardley. What I am trying to get at is that few people in this place have done more than the Secretary of State for Justice to remind people about the separation of powers between the judiciary and Parliament. Few people are greater advocates of that than our current Lord Chancellor, and I wonder why we are now leaning on a public mandate to assess risk, rather than on what we have always done before.

[Edward Argar]

The shadow Minister says “what we have always done before”, but the powers and the approach—the so-called separation of powers—are relatively new, and I believe came in under the last Labour Government. If I recall correctly, the Home Secretary under previous Conservative Governments in the ’80s and ’90s had a number of the relevant powers. I take her point, but it is not how this has always been done; it is a relatively new innovation—that is not to say it is a bad one, but I would exercise a degree of caution about whether it is from time immemorial. We have the principle of a separation of powers, of course, but in this space, historically, there has always been a lack of clear delineation—for want of a better expression—in such matters.

Clauses 35 and 36 also allow the Secretary of State to call in a top tier case if the Parole Board has directed release. Around 1,900 top tier cases come before the Parole Board each year and, on average, the board directs release for about 650 of those offenders. In any top tier cases in which release has been directed, the Secretary of State may decide to call in the case and, by doing so, quash the decision of the Parole Board. The Secretary of State will then retake the decision as to whether that offender should be released. If a case is not called in, the decision of the Parole Board stands and the Secretary of State is required to give effect to that release decision as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances.

For either of the two routes, the Secretary of State will make a decision about whether the offender is safe to be released by applying the full release test, as set out in clauses 32 and 33, based on all the evidence and advice before them. If the Secretary of State decides that the offender should remain in prison, they must notify the prisoner of the reasoning behind their decision and of the prisoner’s right to appeal. We will turn to that right of appeal in the debates on later clauses.

The new power provides an additional safeguard to the release of the most serious offenders, an issue that particularly affects public confidence in the parole process. Victims are often anxious about whether a prisoner who caused them harm is released, out of concern not only for themselves and their families but for the wider public. Allowing the Secretary of State to apply an additional check and balance to such decisions will help to ensure that those who present the highest risk to the public remain in prison.

The board will continue to risk assess offenders in the same way that it does now, independently of the Government, and will continue to make the final decision about release for most parole-eligible offenders. The board does that difficult job well in the vast majority of cases. However, in the few cases where it is necessary, clauses 35 and 36 will allow the Secretary of State to intervene to provide additional scrutiny to release decisions and to further bolster public confidence in the system.

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[Edward Argar]

Clause 47 amends schedule 19 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which governs the membership and operation of the Parole Board. The clause makes important changes to the Parole Board’s membership and leadership. Let me begin by confirming that subsection (10) means that any changes in respect of the chair of the Parole Board do not impact on the appointment or functions of the current chair, Caroline Corby. She has led the board well since her initial appointment in 2018, and the Ministry is grateful to her for her effective leadership in this high-profile and, at many times, challenging role. She will step down as chair in October next year, and it is at that point that the functions of the chair as set out in the clause will come into force.

I now turn to the specific provisions of the clause. Subsection (3) increases the statutory minimum number of Parole Board members from five to seven. In practice, the board, of course, has many more members than that, and its current membership stands at about 300. I take this opportunity to thank the board’s members more broadly for the difficult, but crucial work they do in keeping the public safe from harm.

The Government are increasing the minimum membership of the board for two reasons. First, to make the position of vice chair a statutory role, which is necessary because of the changes the clause makes to the chair’s functions. Secondly, as we touched on when considering clause 46, to require the board to include a law-enforcement member in its core membership. The requirement for a law-enforcement member is in clause 47(4), with a definition of the role in the proposed new section (2A) to be inserted into the Criminal Justice Act 2003 by clause 47(5).

The overall effect will be for the Parole Board to be made up of a minimum of seven members: a chair, a vice chair, a law-enforcement member and four other statutory members, one of whom must have judicial experience, one must have knowledge of probation, one must be an expert in prisoner rehabilitation and one must be a psychiatrist. Requiring the board to have access to that range of expertise as a minimum will ensure that risk is assessed as effectively as possible and that offenders are released only when it is safe to do so. The board will remain free to recruit members from other fields and to appoint independent members, as it deems appropriate.

[Jess Phillips]

With regard to risk and its assessment, I cannot help but notice, from my many years in the field, that one of the greatest risks on prisoner release is that to women and children, usually those related to the prisoner and/or those they resettle with. I wonder why there is no expertise specifically on understanding that sort of risk—specialist expertise in domestic or sexual violence.

[Edward Argar]

I set out key—for want of a better phrase—broad categories of skillsets in terms of judicial experience, probation and psychiatry, but I did say that the board remains free to recruit members from other fields and to appoint independent members it deems appropriate. In the context that the hon. Lady sets out, the board might well deem it entirely appropriate to appoint someone with that sort of expertise to sit on particular cases.

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[Jess Phillips]

I truly appreciate my hon. Friend’s fundamental point: everybody hopes for rehabilitation. With this, the only case we have to debate is that of Levi Bellfield, as mentioned. Having worked with some of his direct victims and the families of those victims, while I do not disagree that we sometimes chase headlines and make bad legislation in doing so, with his case I am not sure, from previous behaviour, that I would categorise it as rehabilitation. I would categorise it as behaviour to get headlines. The desire in Levi Bellfield’s case, as has been put to me by many of his victims, is that these schemes keep him constantly in the media, and that is incredibly painful for them. There is a bit from both sides of the argument in this debate: trying to stop the headlines and allowing rehabilitation.

[Sarah Champion]

My hon. Friend makes a strong argument that I agree with on many levels. It also confirms my suspicion that the provisions could be around an individual, and responding to the horror of that individual. Therefore, I want the Minister to explain to me all the consideration of unintended consequences on this. There are two subsections that allow a prisoner to get married if they have written permission from the Secretary of State. There are also conditions as to why the Secretary of State may be unable to give that permission. Can the Minister tell us again what the exceptions for giving permission, or being unable to give permission, are? Those are not clear in the Bill or in what he has said in Committee.

The Prison Reform Trust was deeply concerned in its written evidence, stating:

“The introduction of specific carve-outs from human rights for people given custodial sentences contradicts one of the fundamental principles underlying human rights—their universality and application to each and every person on the simple basis of their being human.”

Despite the actions of certain offenders, we should not prevent people from having their human rights.

The Prisoners’ Advice Service also stated in its written evidence that the practice will have very little impact:

“A whole life tariffed prisoner will die in prison, and the nature of their crimes renders them unlikely to ‘progress’ to open conditions or to access resettlement facilities such as unescorted release on temporary licence from prison into the community. Thus any marriages or civil partnerships contracted by such prisoners, before or after their conviction leading to the whole life tariff, will in practice have little or no impact on the conditions of imprisonment—and would have no significant impact on victims or their families. It is a point of principle only, ostensibly to show the public that the Executive is not ‘soft’ on those who commit the worst crimes. Behind this flashy headline, is another attempt by the Executive to remove a basic human right from a group of people who are unpopular with sections of the population and the press, for political advantage.”

Given the arguments that those organisations have put forward, I do not think the Minister has made a clear enough argument for why the provisions need to be in the Bill. I ask the Minister to explain the logic, the exceptions and whether the provisions apply retrospectively to people already married. Fundamentally, people have a right to practice their religion, and marriage is part of their religion. I am very concerned that the Minister is looking to take that right away.