Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Robert Neill

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 18th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I am conscious, Mr Deputy Speaker, not to transgress into Second Reading territory, but I think my hon. Friend is right about that. as our right hon. and learned Friend the Minister has pointed out, other international agencies also make use of Rwanda for these purposes.

Secondly, Parliament is as able as any other body to make judgments about the safety of Rwanda. I am grateful for the information with which we have been provided, including the country information note that was referred to earlier in the debate, which in my view supports the conclusion that Rwanda is safe for the purposes of the Bill. But Parliament’s decision making on the safety of Rwanda must have integrity not just for now, but for the future. I am, I have to say, troubled by what I might describe as the absolutist, if not the eternalist nature of the wording of the Bill, which says that Rwanda is safe and must be taken as such for a variety of purposes, and Parliament’s judgment on that will stand, as far as I can see, until new legislation is passed.

That is why the noble Lord Hope’s amendments—Lords amendments 2 and 3—are interesting, although I cannot support them as they essentially transfer authority to the treaty’s monitoring committee to determine whether Rwanda remains a safe country, based on compliance or otherwise with the treaty. That cannot be right, as the Bill is intended specifically to give Parliament that authority, and Parliament should, in theory at least, retain the option to consider breaches of the treaty and nevertheless conclude that Rwanda remains a safe country for the purposes of the Bill.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a very powerful point, with which I have much sympathy. Between now and future stages of the Bill, could the Government not think about how they can reconcile that with the legitimate concerns expressed in Lord Hope’s amendments, which I think are fair and honest? Facts change, and if Parliament sets itself up as an arbiter and decider on fact, it must have a means of changing its decision if the facts change, just as anything else would. I say to the Minister that Keynes comes to mind. Can we find a way forward?

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

My hon. and learned Friend anticipates my conclusion, and I agree with him entirely. In fact, he agrees with me entirely, in advance.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Robert Neill

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill]

That is why, as it happens, I will not vote against this Bill, because although I have some misgivings, there is a legitimate concern that needs to be dealt with in relation to illegal boats. However, the simple fact is that that is not a reason for the blanket derogation, or the blanket removal of ECHR protections, that is proposed in a series of amendments. That is the difference. My hon. Friend and I are at one, but sometimes a mixture of politics and law arises in these matters. The point I am making is that, frankly, if any Government want to take the political risk of ignoring an interim measure, they can do so under our law as it stands. It happens that they effectively did so on prisoner voting, so they could do that now if they wanted to. I am not going to advise on that, because one has to be very wary not to come to views that may very often not be fact-specific when individual decisions are made.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I do not want to prolong the discussion about prisoner voting, but like my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), I remember having conversations about it inside Government. I think it would be fairer to describe the situation as one in which the UK did not at any point refuse to comply with the judgment, would it not? We have perhaps adopted a more Augustinian approach to compliance: we just have not quite got around to it yet.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I think that is right. As I recall, the UK Government put a motion before this House, which the House rejected. So we had a perfectly legitimate legal argument that we had taken steps to comply, and Parliament, as it was entitled to, decided otherwise. That is why the whole of my argument with the amendments from my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark is that they are an Aunt Sally—a complete red herring compared with the real issues we are concerned with—and I urge hon. Members on both sides of the Committee to reject them.

Finally, I had misgivings about this Bill, and I spoke about that on Second Reading. I said that it stayed acceptable—just—and I maintain that position. My right hon. Friend quoted the noble Lord Sandhurst, a very distinguished lawyer in the other place. I should say that he is a personal friend of mine. The noble Lord Sandhurst is chair of the research committee of the Society of Conservative Lawyers, and I happen to chair the executive committee of the society. Lord Sandhurst and Harry Gillow, a fellow member of the society, published a very useful pamphlet about the impact of this Bill, and they have updated it in the light of these amendments. Their conclusion, with respect, is that

“the Bill goes as far as reasonably possible without risking collapse of the Rwanda scheme as a whole”.

They go on to say in their pamphlet that the Bill as drafted represents the best chance of success for the migration and economic development partnership with Rwanda. So they are on the same side of the argument as me and say that the amendments proposed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark take it over the line in terms of being able to deliver the partnership scheme and risk collapsing the whole scheme. It was ironic that my right hon. Friend talked about blowing up the Bill because the truth is that his amendments will blow up the deal with Rwanda, because the Rwandans have made it abundantly clear that anything that breaches international law will be unacceptable to them and they would withdraw from the agreement.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Robert Neill

Consideration of Lords amendments
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand the points the hon. Lady is making, and I will take them in reverse order. On the point I made about the difference in the scrutiny that these laws may have on the way out, as it were, compared with the scrutiny they would have on the way in, I accept that two wrongs do not make a right. However, it would be odd, if nothing else, to take the view that we should give the vast bulk of laws—some of which, as I think we have agreed across this Chamber, do not require a huge amount of scrutiny, because they are technical and somewhat inevitable changes as a result of leaving the European Union—a process involving greater scrutiny and greater friction, as I would choose to describe it, than the process that was used to bring them in in the first place.

On the hon. Lady’s point about a Joint Committee, I accept that there are Joint Committees, but the role of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, for example, is very different from the role that Lords amendment 1 sets out for a Joint Committee in this context. If we set up Joint Committees as scrutiny bodies, that is one thing, but if we are devolving authority to a Joint Committee to make judgments about what is and is not a substantial change to UK law, it seems to me that we ought at the very least to understand what substantial means in that context. Again, I am afraid that we can only decide on the basis of the wording we have in front of us, but the wording we have in front of us seems to me to require some greater clarification before anyone ought to support it.

[Sir Robert Neill]

My right hon. and learned Friend is making a characteristically powerful and persuasive case. Taking on board his point about the—to use my inelegant criminal lawyer’s phrase—rather clunky nature of the mechanism, or the friction that he rightly refers to, would he concede that something potentially needs to be done to fill the gap identified by the noble Lord Hope of Craighead in the other place, which is that simply setting out in the Bill a list of laws to be revoked does not of itself guarantee adequate scrutiny of those laws? Does he think there is some scope that the Government may wish to offer by way of assurance at some time as to the level of scrutiny that could be given, without resorting to the system currently set out in Lords amendment 1, which may cause that needless friction or, to use my term, be needlessly clunky, but may equally give this House a proper safeguard about its proper scrutiny role?

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and for his reassurance, I do not think that either he or criminal lawyers are in any way inelegant. However, I think there is certainly something to be said for greater and better scrutiny, and we should always in this place be looking for ways to improve the scrutiny we offer. As he knows, my concern about Lords amendment 6 is that I do not think we yet have sufficient clarity about whether it achieves the objectives it sets out to achieve without also causing some fallout in other respects. I do not close my mind to the way in which it seeks to do its work, but I am concerned that we need extra clarity before we could conceivably support it.

I want to say something about the benefits as I see them of the Government’s new approach and why they will help with some of the legitimate concerns expressed in the debate. The benefit of the Government setting out, as they have in the schedule, the measures they propose will lapse at the end of the year unless further intervention is taken is that that allows all Members of the House to pay attention to that list and reach their own conclusions—early—about whether they think there is anything troubling in it, exactly as my hon. Friend the Member for Stone described that he and his colleagues have done. That is a better and more conducive way to good scrutiny than the one previously seen. It helps to offer the necessary reassurance that we will not simply stumble into a position where we lose from our statute book good and valuable things that happen to have their origins in the European Union. Parliament will not be caught by surprise by anything that the Government seek to do in that way.

It is important to remember that if the Government seek to make a change to our law, they will have to do so through the normal routines of passing legislation. True, that may be through secondary legislation, but that is still a way in which Parliament scrutinises legislation and has done so for a long time under Governments of multiple colours. There is nothing particularly radical in the Government proposing to take a measure through Delegated Legislation Committees that it seeks to use to make a change in the law.

I return to friction. It seems to me that the friction that is sought to be added to the processes we use is undesirable. That is partly because it is unnecessary—the reassurance that the Government can offer by the new course they seek to take is adequate—and partly because we must see this specific discussion in the context of the broader discussion that has happened about our membership of the European Union. In the interests of full disclosure, I should make it clear to the House that in the 2016 referendum I did not vote to leave the European Union, and I urged my constituents not to do so, either—in some cases, they paid little attention—but I accept, and have accepted consistently since, that the decision was none the less taken that we should leave the European Union, and certain things flow inexorably from that. It must be right that if we leave the European Union, we also leave European Union law behind us. That should not be in a rush or in a flurry of activity that might cause us to throw the baby out with the bathwater, but inevitably that is what should happen.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Robert Neill

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons
Monday 14th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I will endeavour to prove that the best advocacy can be the most concise.

There is a great deal in the Bill that I support and that is necessary, sensible and desirable. However, there is one important part of the Bill that creates very real difficulty for me and many others, and I want to go straight to the rub of that point. Part 5 of the Bill, as it stands, gives me real concern as to its leading the United Kingdom into a breach of our international obligations and the law that stems from them. That is, as many others have observed, not something that any country should do, save in the most extreme and pressing circumstances.

The difficulty arises in relation particularly to clauses 42, 43 and 45. They are different from the rest of the Bill, because they give very wide-ranging powers indeed to Ministers to disapply elements of the withdrawal agreement and the protocol, which have the force of international law, by regulation. These are measures of a very sweeping kind, involving any kind of legislation and any part of the agreement, not just those related to the protocol, and appearing to oust the jurisdiction of the courts in any respect. I question whether their being so wide can be justified.

My other concern is that the way the clauses are phrased at the moment runs the risk of bringing us into breach of our legal obligations before it is necessary. I heard what the Prime Minister said about an insurance policy, and I heard what the Lord Chancellor has said about a “break the glass in emergency” provision. That is fine, but it seems clear from the protocol that there are steps that must be gone through first and exhausted before that can properly be done. The most important part to bear in mind is that if article 45 is brought into force immediately after Royal Assent, we would at that point have disapplied the concept of the direct effect of European law, which is part of the agreement we signed up to and which this House passed less than a year ago. So bringing it into force on Royal Assent is needlessly provocative to our negotiations and needlessly undermines our reputation for sticking to the rule of law.

There are also provisions that bind us to act to resolve disputes only through the arbitration process, which is set out in the withdrawal agreement. Article 168, which we have signed up to, states that

“the Union and the United Kingdom shall only have recourse to the procedures provided for in this Agreement.”

There are detailed procedures and timelines for that.

It seems to me that we should be very careful about moving forward with bringing these clauses into force until every opportunity to resolve any dispute has been carried out through the arbitral mechanisms. Only then, and if it is necessary because the EU has not responded to a result of the arbitral mechanism—

[Jeremy Wright]

Does my hon. Friend agree that one thing that should give us some optimism about the use of the mechanisms that he is describing is the specific references to the defence of the Good Friday agreement and of Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom in the protocol and the withdrawal agreement themselves?

[Sir Robert Neill]

My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. That is, I think, the best approach for us to take. We should stick to the letter of those provisions, as that gives proper defence of our strategic interests. For example, there is the safeguard provision in article 16, which would enable us to act if, in extremis, the stability of the situation in Northern Ireland and the Union was threatened, but we could do that while maintaining the moral high ground and our intellectual reputation. I see that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster is listening. I hope that he will be able to go further than the Prime Minister, either tonight or in the course of debates on the Bill, and assure us that those provisions will not be brought into effect unless and until every one of the legal mechanisms open to us has been exhausted and unless and until there has been a specific vote of this House—not by a statutory instrument, which does not give enough scrutiny for such a constitutionally significant issue, but by a specific resolution. That is why my amendment seeks to give the Government an opportunity to have that “break the glass in emergency” provision, but without our triggering a breach of the international legal obligations before it is absolutely necessary.