Belhaj and Boudchar: Litigation Update

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Andy Slaughter

Thursday 10th May 2018 Commons Chamber

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

This has been a shameful episode. The Attorney General is right to express his sympathy and thanks to Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar. He should perhaps extend his sympathies to other victims of rendition such as the al-Saadi family, and his thanks to those who have represented them, such as the Reprieve organisation and Leigh Day solicitors, often in the face of great hostility from some politicians and sections of the press. This case has also shone a light on the Justice and Security Act 2013. The right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) took that Act through the Commons. I led the Opposition in Committee, and we expressed grave concerns about the ambit of that Act and the extension of closed material procedures. The Belhaj case over the past five years has justified those criticisms. Is this not the time to review that Act and the extent of closed material procedures, particularly if they look like they will encroach on criminal as well as civil proceedings?

[The Attorney General]

The hon. Gentleman heard me say that the process of resolving this case has taken considerable effort by not just the claimants themselves and others in the Government, but lawyers on both sides, and I am happy to repeat that. In relation to closed material proceedings, I am not sure that I would go as far as he does; I do not believe that this case demonstrates the lesson that he draws from it. I hope he will forgive me if I do not return to the arguments of 2013 around the Bill, not least because I wish to preserve the sanity of my right hon. and learned Friend, the Father of the House.

European Convention on Human Rights: UK Membership

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Andy Slaughter

Tuesday 26th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

I certainly agree that there have been cases in both Luxembourg and Strasbourg with which we have found difficulty and which we have sought to contest. It is certainly right, as my hon. Friend suggests, that not everything about our membership of the European Union is wonderful, and the Home Secretary made that point very clearly yesterday. However, it is a question of deciding whether, on balance, it is right or wrong to be in the European Union—whether, on balance, it is better or worse for the United Kingdom to be there—and he and I have come to different conclusions on that.

On my hon. Friend’s specific point about the charter of fundamental rights, he will know that the charter covers areas where European law is applicable; it does not cover other areas, so it is not quite the same as our membership of the European convention on human rights.

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

One thing we can say about this Government is that we are not short of a choice of policy on the European convention on human rights. The Prime Minister reminded us yesterday that he wants to see reform of the ECHR—not, we note, withdrawal. The former Attorney General, the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who is on the sensible wing of the Tory party, called the ECHR a

“central pillar of foreign policy.”

When the Ministry of Justice clarified its position in February—that took some time—its line was:

“Our plans do not involve leaving the convention”—

and the Justice Secretary has repeated that today. However, the Home Secretary was absolutely clear yesterday that we should leave the ECHR, whatever the outcome of the EU referendum. What status do the Home Secretary’s remarks have? Are they Government policy? Do they bind the MOJ and the Government, or is it just the Home Office that is coming out of the convention?

It is always a pleasure to see the Attorney General, and I mean no disrespect when I say that this is rather like “Hamlet” without the prince—or the princess. Why could the Home Secretary, or even the Lord Chancellor, not have clarified Government policy, as they have caused the confusion? [Interruption.] It would be comic if it were not tragic.

The Home Secretary has set out a series of legal nonsenses. She claims there is no connection between the EU and the ECHR, but it is a requirement of EU membership that countries joining the EU sign up to the ECHR. She elides the fact that European Court of Human Rights judgments are advisory and that the UK Parliament remains sovereign. She wrongly dismisses the importance of Britain’s membership of the convention as an example to Putin and his ilk, downplaying this country’s record on human rights and its influence in Europe. She also ignores the success of the Human Rights Act in incorporating the ECHR into UK law, giving a remedy to vulnerable people suffering discrimination.

I thought the legal, moral and practical arguments had persuaded the Government to abandon attempts to leave the ECHR. We are not going to deal with the legal and technical arguments today, but will the Attorney General say when the consultation will be published so that we can get down to that? Will he at least clarify today what the Government’s policy is? If what the Home Secretary said is not Government policy, what is the status of her remarks? Are they just a stump speech for the Tory party leadership?

[The Attorney General]

It is, of course, an immense pleasure to see the hon. Gentleman too. I pass over what I am sure my hon. Friends, at least, will regard as the supreme irony of being lectured by a member of the Labour party about unity and common purpose.

What the hon. Gentleman will find is that I am saying, the Home Secretary is saying and the Lord Chancellor is saying that the status quo on human rights law is not acceptable so we are bringing forward proposals for reform. We will do that when they are ready. The contrast is marked between what Conservative Members say, which is that there is a deficit of common sense in much of human rights law, and what Labour Members say, which is that the status quo is fine, all is well and we should leave it all alone. The hon. Gentleman will find that many of his constituents, like many of mine, do not think the status quo is acceptable and do wish to see reform. That is what we had a mandate for in the general election, and that is what this Government will deliver.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Andy Slaughter

Tuesday 17th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Wright]

I am not sure that this is the appropriate time. There are some minor and technical flaws, but my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North has made his case and the House will have to consider what he has said and decide what it wishes to do. Regardless of the fate of my hon. Friend’s new clauses, I hope that the Government’s new clauses, new schedule and amendments will find favour with the House.

[Mr Slaughter]

I will take a different approach from the Minister’s and address the majority of my remarks to new clauses 6 and 7; I shall discuss the Government’s clauses at the end of my speech. I welcome this debate and the chance to discuss a subject important to all hon. Members—perhaps particularly to those with constituencies in London, where almost half of knife-related offences take place. Knife crime is one of the most serious and intractable criminal justice issues, and one that often leaves irrevocable damage in its wake.

In my own borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, we have seen more than 800 knife crime incidents since 2010, with tragic consequences for the victims and their families. In London as a whole, that figure is closer to 40,000. In 2013-14, more than 50% of all murders in London were committed with a knife. Knife crime is not just an issue for London and other major cities: it is a national menace. Nearly a third of adult offenders currently receive an immediate custodial sentence. New clauses 6 and 7 would impose what has been referred to as a mandatory minimum custodial sentence on those convicted of a second knife possession offence. For those aged 18 and over, it would be six months; for those aged 16 to 18, it would be a four-month detention and training order.

Contrary to press reports, and statements made by the Deputy Prime Minister, the new clauses would permit judicial discretion, and that is key to our support. Subsection (2B) of new clause 6 states that

“the court must impose an appropriate custodial sentence…unless…there are particular circumstances”—

those are the words, rather than “exceptional circumstances”—

“which…relate to the offence or to the offender and…would make it unjust…in all the circumstances.”

It would also be a defence to the new offences if possession were with lawful authority or reasonable excuse. This measure should not be seen as a catch-all solution.

In light of the current overcrowding crisis in the prison system, The Guardian reported today that the Lord Chancellor will be unable to implement his legislation, if passed, for at least a year; his reverse King Midas touch extends, it seems, to all areas of the criminal justice system.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Andy Slaughter

Monday 12th May 2014 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Wright]

We hope to conduct the review over the next few months and I hope that will give my hon. Friend and others the opportunity to contribute to it, but let me just finish what I am saying in relation to the specific proposals in new clause 14. I hope the House will agree that there is a need for these proposals. First and foremost the measures should give families of victims a greater sense that justice has been done. More generally, tougher sentences for convicted offenders should improve public confidence in the justice system. Amendment 7 changes the long title of the Bill to include driving. I commend these provisions to the House.

I know that Members might like to see reform of other aspects of the road offence framework. Some have already been mentioned in the course of this debate. Indeed, new clause 22 seeks to make the offence of driving while disqualified an either-way offence and increase its maximum penalty; and we have, as I have indicated, been giving serious consideration to all representations made on this subject, not least from my hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham and Rainham, who has a ten-minute rule Bill on repeat offences of driving while disqualified. He and others rightly hold strong views and we are committed to ensuring that maximum penalties reflect the seriousness and culpability of offending behaviour. That is why, as we have already mentioned today and as the Justice Secretary made clear in his announcement on 6 May, the Government are committed to carrying out a wider review of the road traffic sentencing framework over the next few months. We are in discussion with the Department for Transport and other interested Departments about the details. We will make a further announcement about the scope of the review in due course.

[Mr Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

Could the Minister give us a sense of how this would fit with the legislative timetable? If primary changes are needed as a result of the review, will there definitely be a Bill to do that?

[Jeremy Wright]

Unless the hon. Gentleman is going to contradict me and vote accordingly, there is broad support for what we have set out in new clause 14, which is a self-contained measure that we do not think will have ramifications across the rest of the sentencing system. That is not true of some of the other changes that Members on both sides of the House may wish to make. As I have said, we have reached no pre-conclusions as to what should or should not be included in a review. However, we think it sensible to make sure that if we are to have a wholesale look at driving offences—which, unless the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) is going to contradict me, there is considerable support for across the House—we should do it in a considered way. We are not talking about years for that to happen, but months.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jeremy Wright]

The hon. Lady has just made a wider point than would apply simply to the single justice procedure. The point we are addressing in relation to her amendment is that there should be no significant disadvantage for those who are dealt with under the single justice procedure; nor should there be any disadvantage to the court under that procedure in ascertaining the facts of the case. If someone were wanting to assert particular hardship, which might exclude the possibility of disqualification, they would need to come to court and do it themselves. The court should then do the necessary investigations. However, I take her point and will consider carefully whether there are improvements that we can make to more general procedures.

Amendment 9 is also related to the single justice procedure. It would introduce a new requirement that the documents sent to the defendant with the single justice procedure notice should include a submission from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency to the court informing the court of any penalty points on the defendant’s driver record. I agree that up-to-date DVLA information is important when deciding the sentence for such offences. The House is aware that that very issue was raised in Committee, and as the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Mr Vara), made clear, our intention then was to consider the point further.

Under the existing procedure, when dealing with an offender in their absence, courts are able to check the DVLA position when sentencing for certain road traffic offences—we have discussed that point and, as I said, I accept that it is important that they are able to do the same under the new procedure. We need to ensure that the legislation allows for that in cases dealt with under the new single justice procedure as well. As I said, we have undertaken to look at the matter, and it is still under consideration. We will ensure the necessary consideration. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Bolton West and her colleague the hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Mike Kane), whom I do not see here, will be satisfied.

New clause 10 makes an amendment to schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provides guidance to the courts in assessing the seriousness of all cases of murder in order to determine the appropriate minimum term to be imposed under the mandatory life sentence. The amendment would raise the starting point for offenders aged 21 and over from 30 years to a whole life order for the murder of a police or prison officer in the course of his or her duty.

I do not need to remind the House of the vital role that those officers play every day in keeping our communities safe and in managing difficult and dangerous offenders. Tragically, some officers have paid the ultimate price while carrying out these duties on our behalf. The Government consider it essential that those officers feel the full weight of the state behind them in the execution of their duties. Changing the starting point to a whole life order for those who murder police and prison officers will send a powerful message of support for the work that those vital public servants do. It will show that we place the highest value on their safety and that we recognise the dangerous job they perform on a daily basis.

Those officers can be distinguished from other public servants by the role they perform in terms of routine contact with dangerous offenders. Their daily duties and risks mean that they stand apart from others. That unique and important status should be recognised, and those who murder police or prison officers on duty should know that they face the most severe sentence possible under the law. I should make it clear that the change in the law does not necessarily mean that a whole life order will be imposed in every case involving the murder of a police or prison officer in the course of duty. The court must always have the discretion to impose the appropriate sentence based on all the facts of each case, but offenders should be in no doubt that they face the severest consequences for such murders. I therefore hope that the House will support the new clause.

Finally, new clause 11 is designed to close a gap in the sentencing power of criminal courts that could prevent an adequate sentence being imposed where it turns out that the offending is more serious than it appeared when the case was initially accepted by the youth court. We believe the gap might tend to undermine efforts to encourage youth courts to try grave crimes in suitable cases and might restrict sentencing powers unduly. The category of offences that includes cases such as those that involve allegations of serious sexual offending against under-18s, for example—also known as grave crimes—are serious enough to be capable of being sent to the Crown court for trial, but not all of them necessarily require the highest sentencing powers of the Crown court. It might be possible to deal with some of them satisfactorily using sentencing options available in the youth court, and if so there is an advantage in retaining them in the youth court. The youth court is particularly attuned to inquiries into the alleged activities of children, and serious sexual offences can be tried there by authorised district judges who have been specially trained to deal with them.

A defendant under 18 charged with such an offence is invited to indicate a plea, and when a guilty plea is indicated the youth court may commit him or her to the Crown court for sentence where appropriate. On the other hand, if the indication is not guilty and the youth court decides to retain the case and tries and convicts the defendant, there is no general power to commit the offender to the Crown court for sentence. That means that if information emerges during the trial that suggests that a more severe sentence is appropriate, the youth court will simply have to make do with its own sentencing powers. The only exception is when the conditions for imposing an extended determinate sentence are met, but they are stringent. That is at odds with the position for adults, where there is a general power to commit cases to the Crown court for sentence, not merely after a guilty plea.

It is possible that the absence of a safety net allowing for committal for sentence leads youth courts to be unnecessarily cautious in deciding whether to retain grave sexual crimes. A provision permitting committal to the Crown court for sentence whenever a defendant is convicted of a grave crime in the youth court, as is already possible after a guilty plea indication, might encourage the youth court to retain more cases and ensure adequate sentencing powers are available in every case. I hope that the House will therefore support new clause 11.

[Mr Slaughter]

We are grateful to the Government for accommodating the topics we want to discuss today and for the overall allocation of time on Report. We do not hear that very often, but it is in part a result of Report running over two days—or at least a day and a half—as a consequence of this being a carry-over Bill.

We anticipate that there will be about 10 hours of debate, including Third Reading, and curiously only half the time will be spent on the Bill as it left Committee. Today, we have three hours on parts 1 to 3 and on day two we will have two hours on the important and controversial part 4, which attacks the legal and financial basis of judicial review claims. The rest of the time is for new projects proposed by the Lord Chancellor or by his Back Benchers with his support. He has a common but unwelcome habit of shoehorning new laws into Bills at every stage of their progress through both Houses. A cynic would say that he does so simply to provide another hit with the tabloids or to introduce a stick to beat his coalition partners with. It is certainly a poor way to legislate, and he has surpassed himself by tabling new clauses on driving offences that require him to amend the long title of the Bill through Government amendment 7—I do not think the Minister mentioned that amendment, but I apologise if he did.

Neither the new clauses on driving in the first group for discussion today nor those on offences of possessing offensive weapons have taken the Government by surprise. There was a full debate in the Chamber on the subject of dangerous driving in Back-Bench time on 27 January and, famously, the issue of carrying knives featured in the Tory manifesto.

[Jeremy Wright]

The hon. Gentleman knows that I hold him in high regard and affection, but he has accused me of rushing into new clause 14. Now he is telling me that it did not catch me by surprise and I should have done it earlier.

[Mr Slaughter]

If the Minister waits, all will become clear.

We do not quarrel with the seriousness of any of the matters under discussion on Report. My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) will raise our concerns about offences against armed forces personnel—matters that we, unlike the Government, flagged up in Committee. This is a sloppy way of making law and nowhere was that more clear than with last week’s announcement that new offences and new sentences for existing offences on some driving matters would be tabled today. At the same time, as the Minister has conceded, the Secretary of State announced that a full review of all driving offences and penalties would be carried out over the next few months.

Let us pause there for a moment. If the Government are reviewing all offences over the next few months, why do they need to change the law for one offence and introduce a brand-new offence in the Bill? I suspect that my curiosity is shared by the Minister, who replied to the debate on 27 January. We heard nine compelling and moving speeches on that day from Members on both sides of the House explaining how their constituents had been victims of dangerous, careless, drunken or disqualified drivers but how the culprits had escaped with what appeared to be lenient penalties. He carefully and courteously, as is his wont, lowered expectations, saying:

“Having emerged blinking into the daylight from the usual channels into my current job, I know better than to commit parliamentary time for any purpose”.

He added sagely:

“It is important for us to consider these matters in the round, and to do so in a way that does not create discrepancies in the sentencing system.”—[Official Report, 27 January 2014; Vol. 574, c. 731.]

Four months later, time has been found to do exactly what the Minister warned against.

The Minister might ask whether that matters if we are moving in the right direction. The groundswell of opinion expressed in that debate and outside the House is that the two-year maximum sentence for causing death by disqualified driving is inadequate, as it leads to an average sentence of about nine months in custody. We agree and we will not oppose the new clause, but is 10 years the correct figure? It is double the maximum for causing death by careless driving, arguably a more serious offence as the quality of driving is an issue. Equally, it seems anomalous to create an offence of causing serious injury by disqualified driving when no equivalent is proposed of causing serious injury by careless driving or even causing serious injury by careless driving while under the influence of drink and drugs—an offence with a maximum sentence of 14 years when it causes death.

Why has causing death by disqualified driving been singled out? As the Minister said, the current offence brackets causing disqualified driving with driving without insurance and driving without a licence. Will causing death by driving in those two circumstances remain punishable with a two-year maximum sentence? I am afraid that this bears all the hallmarks of the Secretary of State’s penchant for plucking new offences out of the air and pushing them forward to show what a tough guy he is. There were only 13 convictions in the last year for which figures are available for all offences of causing death while disqualified, uninsured or without a licence. How many cases will the change in the law affect?

Perhaps the Secretary of State will say that the change is intended as a deterrent to others, but how many disqualified drivers will be put off by the thought that they might kill or cause serious injury? There is no evidence of careless or dangerous driving in their cases, because they would then be charged with those offences. That brings me to new clause 22, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central, which we believe is a more effective way of tackling the problem that the Secretary of State and the Minister have rightly identified.

More than 7,000 people were convicted of driving while disqualified in 2012, a substantial reduction since 10 years previously but still a great number of people who wilfully defied an order of the court and carried on driving while banned. Our answer is to make the offence of driving while disqualified triable either way, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment for conviction on indictment, which the Magistrates Association has been calling for for some time. Currently, the maximum penalty for driving while disqualified is six months and it is a summary only offence. Although that might be sufficient for a first or even second-time offender, it does not address the minority of recidivist offenders who have multiple disqualifications on their record and carry on driving oblivious to the courts.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jeremy Wright]

With the leave of the House, I shall try to respond to some of the points made in the debate which, as we came to expect in the course of Committee, was instructive and well balanced. I start with the remarks of the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), who made his case for new clause 22. He kindly indicated that he has no objection to new clause 14, which I welcome, and he made it clear that he has little objection to some of the other measures in this group, and I am grateful for that.

As I said in my earlier remarks, we intend to consider a number of aspects of the criminal law in connection with driving offences in the course of the review that I described. I can certainly undertake to the hon. Gentleman that the issue of driving while disqualified, particularly where it involves repeat offending, which is the type of offending highly likely to lead to sentencing at the top end of the scale, whatever that scale may look like in the future, is something that we are highly likely to want to consider as part of the review. I am sure he will maintain his case for the inclusion of that.

The difference between the circumstances we are considering in relation to new clause 14 and the circumstances we are considering in relation to new clause 22 was conveyed very movingly, as we have heard before, by my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood (Chris Skidmore). New clause 14 is designed to address what we perceive to be some egregious cases in which sentencing powers were not adequate. It was clear to us from those cases that we should plug that gap in the sentencing regime. There are other questions that we have to ask about driving offences and how those offences are punished, which are about whether we have pitched properly the sentencing powers of the judiciary. But we have not yet had the opportunity to consider in detail the implications of the change set out in new clause 22, and I doubt very much that the hon. Gentleman has, either.

[Mr Slaughter]

With all due respect to the Minister and to the hon. Member for Kingswood (Chris Skidmore), the tragic case of Clare and Ross Simons that he described was a very serious case of causing death by dangerous driving. Even though the driver was disqualified, it was not a case of disqualified driving. It would not in any way be affected by new clause 14. The Minister has made the case against himself. It is clear why new clause 22 has been canvassed over a long period by practitioners, the Magistrates Association and others. There is an overwhelming case for increasing that nugatory summary only sentence. The position is far more complicated, as shown by some of the tensions that have come out in the debate, which is why new clause 14 is a little precipitate, even if it is going in the right direction. Will the Minister give a clear undertaking that there will be an increase in the sentence for driving while disqualified? If not, we will press the new clause to the vote this evening.

[Jeremy Wright]

I will come back to the point about how much we know about the implications of new clause 22. To deal with the case of specific examples, the point that I am making in relation to what my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood said is that where it is brought to our attention that there are particular gaps in the sentencing regime, it is appropriate that we look very carefully at those. The case that precipitated the decision to table new clause 14 was the case of Mr Stock, who was killed in precisely the circumstances that new clause 14 would address.

It is important that when such cases are brought to our attention, we look carefully at whether there is a gap in the law, and we then look at how that gap might best be remedied and what the consequences of doing so might be. The reason that we did not respond immediately to such cases, and the reason that I did not respond to the Back-Bench debate to which the hon. Gentleman referred by saying straight away, “Yes, of course, we will change the law immediately and we will do so in the following way,” is that it is important to consider all the ramifications of making changes.

We have had the opportunity to do that in relation to what we now propose as new clause 14. We have a good idea, as the hon. Gentleman mentioned, of how many cases might be affected, and what effect that would have on the work load of the Crown court and of the Prison Service. I wonder whether he has any idea what the ramifications for the Court Service or for the Prison Service would be of the change that would be made by new clause 22. That does not mean to say that after we have considered those ramifications properly and carefully, we would not come to the conclusion that it is the right thing to do, but we are not going to do so today, for the reasons that I have set out.

If the hon. Gentleman reflects, and given that he hopes to be in government himself in less than a year—[Interruption.] I am not saying that he will, just that he hopes to. If that eventuality ever came to pass, I do not think he would wish to make policy any differently from the way I am suggesting we should do so. If that is right, I cannot, as he would understand, accept new clause 22 today. I have gone as far as I think I sensibly can, which is to say that it will certainly form part of the review that we intend to undertake, and if we conclude as a result of the review that it is the right thing to do, we shall do it.

[Mr Slaughter]

I think the Minister is playing with me a little. I have used the best evidence I can and as I said, I have spoken to practitioners and to the Magistrates Association about the matter. I am advised that the clause is likely to affect only a small minority of cases, which are the recidivist cases. The Minister has access to that degree of detail and that information. Perhaps he could tell us how many cases he thinks would be affected.

[Jeremy Wright]

As I have tried to indicate to the hon. Gentleman, I would want to look at all those things. He is right—I do not know. We have to look at the matter carefully and I am sure he would want us to do that. Between the point at which he decided to table new clause 22 and this debate taking place, there has not been an opportunity to do that work, which we would want to do. He is welcome to continue looking a gift horse in the mouth if he so wishes, but what I am saying to him, I hope very clearly, is that we are certainly not shutting the door on what he is proposing, but neither are we going to accept it today without doing the proper work. No responsible Government could do otherwise. He may or may not want to be part of a responsible Government, and if it is not a responsible Government, he may want to do things differently, but that is the way we do things for as long as we are in government.

Let me move on to the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood. Again, he spoke movingly, as he has before, of justice for Ross and Clare Simons. He also made the case for including in the review the issues of death by dangerous driving by those who are disqualified, and we will certainly consider that matter also.

The hon. Member for Bolton West (Julie Hilling) made, as she has done before, a good case in relation to those who have multiple points on their licence and are somehow not yet disqualified. She is right to be concerned about that, as are we. We would want to consider that matter, too, at greater length. There is, as she knows and as I have said to her before, an issue in relation to how much we can sensibly trespass on judicial discretion. In each and every case a bench of magistrates would have to have concluded that the exceptional hardship case was made out, such that they thought it appropriate not to disqualify in those cases. There will always be exceptional cases, but her argument is that those cases should, indeed, be exceptional; they should not be regular, and I have a good deal of sympathy for that view. The specific point around exceptional hardship claims—

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Andy Slaughter

Tuesday 4th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Wright]

Once again, I was ready for this one. There are currently 10,692 foreign national offenders, and when I last reported to my hon. Friend the figure was 10,789. The figures are heading in the right direction—

[Mr Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

They have gone up.

[Jeremy Wright]

No, they have gone down. Let me correct the hon. Gentleman, whose mathematics is faulty. Last time, the figure was 10,789 and this time it is 10,692. I hope that is clear.

On Nigeria, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has said, we will make every effort in conjunction with our colleagues in Nigeria to remove Nigerians by the end of the year.

Family Justice (Transparency, Accountability and Cost of Living) Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and Andy Slaughter

Friday 26th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Slaughter]

I see the hon. Gentleman’s point, and no one would disagree that it might be important to have someone to give emotional support to litigants in a time of great stress—most litigation is a time of great stress, but particularly family litigation. I understand the examples he gives, but he does not deal with the problem that occurs in many cases, namely the inequality and imbalance of arms in private family law, let alone in public family law. That problem is not addressed in the Bill.

The third theme is costs. I noticed with interest clause 8(3), on the risk of costs in judicial review proceedings. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that, as a consequence of part 2 of the 2012 Act, no win, no fee agreements will not be available in all cases—they will not be available in judicial review, and nor will qualified one-way cost-shifting. It is therefore very likely that judicial review will be restricted for persons who do not qualify for legal aid. I suggest he looks at draft regulations on the future provision of legal aid, which suggest that all other remedies will need to be exhausted before legal aid is available in public law proceedings in judicial review cases. The Minister is looking up and showing some interest—

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jeremy Wright)]

indicated dissent.

[Mr Slaughter]

Perhaps it was just an involuntary reaction. The Minister might want to consider that point, because those regulations are likely to be debated in Committee within the next few weeks. If we are to have a wholesale restriction not only on those who do not qualify for legal aid, but on those who do, the availability of public law remedies will be severely curtailed. In that respect, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley could have gone some way further on how litigants in family proceedings—we are talking about family proceedings, but it will apply to proceedings more widely—could ensure that they can get access to justice and some protection in costs, particularly when they are up against public authorities.

On the detail of the Bill, the points in part 1 are well made, but I somewhat doubt that the hon. Gentleman’s remedies, which in most cases are statutory requirements on the courts and the fettering of the discretion of the courts, are the right way to proceed. We probably disagree on the family justice review. David Norgrove’s review, which was commissioned under the previous Government but published by and responded to by this Government, is an impressive piece of work. On family group conferences, which are dealt with in clause 1, the review said that

“the benefits of family group conferences should be more widely recognised and their use should be considered before proceedings”.

Separately, the family justice review found that both children and adults are “confused” about the family justice system—a point the hon. Gentleman made well. He and I would agree that family group conferences have an important role, and perhaps a bigger role, to play, but whether there should be a requirement is another matter.

On clause 2, more was said about grandparents than about any other single issue. I suspect there will be very little dissent from any party from the point that the role of grandparents in both contact and proceedings can be important. However, the family justice review and the Government’s response say that the leave requirement should remain, because it acts as an important safeguard for children and their families, and that that is consistent with the principle that the court’s paramount consideration must be the welfare of the child.

The Government said that they were

“committed to ensuring that children have meaningful relationships with family members who are important to them”,

including grandparents. That really moves us on to the issue of sheer parenting, and the balance between the rights of family members and the rights of the child. The hon. Gentleman will be well aware of what the final report of the family justice review said on that:

“the core principle of the paramountcy of the welfare of the child is sufficient and…to insert any additional statements brings with it unnecessary risk for little gain.”

That is a point on which the Government disagreed, but with which we find ourselves broadly in sympathy.

Clause 2 raises the issue of academic research. All that I would say on that—this point was raised by other hon. Members—is that there is a will in the courts to move away from a proliferation of expert reports. The hon. Gentleman says that those will not necessarily be reports given in evidence; I am therefore not entirely sure what the role of additional experts will be, or, if the reports are not given in evidence, how the provenance and authority of experts’ opinions will be judged. I agree with the point made by, I think, the hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay), who said that we would be better employed in ensuring that a single expert gave good advice than in looking to second-guess or challenge that advice in a variety of perhaps only semi-formal ways.