National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time)

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Allocation of time motion
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Shabana Mahmood)]

I will be brief in my remarks. I regret the approach taken by the official Opposition. They know full well that this is a very tightly constructed Bill that takes forward a specific set of recommendations made by the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. It will be fully scrutinised by this House and the other place. The reason for moving quickly, as the hon. Lady well knows, is because we need the wider power to designate bodies, which we will debate in due course, so that we can move quickly, given the threats the country faces. The need for speed, I believe, is made by recent events, and I think the Government are doing the right thing. I ask her to think again. Of course, if we must divide then so be it, but I would have expected better from someone with her experience.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

Will the Home Secretary give way?

[Shabana Mahmood]

I will not give way, given the time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I am bound to say that the Home Secretary, for whom I have huge respect, is wrong to suggest that she cannot take interventions because of a lack of time—she has decided that there is a lack of time. I want to make one simple point to her, which my hon. Friend on the Opposition Front Bench has adverted to. Jonathan Hall KC produced an excellent report, most of which we will all agree with, but he did that in May last year. The Home Secretary cannot have it both ways. Either this is a desperately urgent matter, in which case the Government should have brought forward legislation long before now, or it is not, in which case we should have longer than a day to consider it, should we not?

Question put.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Shabana Mahmood]

That conduct would not be caught. Again, I point the hon. Member to proposed new section 17B, where the combination of subsection (6)(b) and subsection (4) ensures that the work of NGOs is not caught by the tests set out. We have had specific advice on that point from the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, I have discussed it at length with the Attorney General’s Office, and Law Officers have had a look at it. We believe that the way in which the Bill is constructed does not catch humanitarian activities. It is not intended to do so, and we have made it clear in the explanatory notes that it will not do so. Our reading of how the Bill is constructed means that it will not do so.

Let me move on to the third offence in clause 2, which is of obtaining a material benefit from a designated body. An individual is outlawed from receiving a payment or a gift from a designated body either on their own behalf or on behalf of someone else. The very act of making the agreement would also constitute a crime even if no money were exchanged and no service were provided. That would cover a hacker hired to carry out a cyber-attack, a criminal gang commissioned to conduct arson attacks on British soil and a gang recruiting thugs to do their state-directed dirty work. Those two offences—assisting and benefiting from a designated body—would carry prison terms of up to 14 years alongside the sentences they may receive for any other illegal activity conducted, with sabotage and espionage offences carrying life sentences.

To trigger the offences of assisting a designated body and of obtaining benefit from a designated body, an individual must know that they are aiding a body that has been designated or, crucially, ought reasonably to know that they are doing so. Ignorance is therefore not a defence. If a reasonable person should have been able to surmise who would benefit from such an attack, the individual will be prosecuted despite their professed ignorance. The new powers are significant—

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I was going to ask the Home Secretary later but, as she has raised the matter, perhaps I can ask her this now. On proposed new section 17C of the National Security Act and, indeed, in respect of other parts of the Bill, the knowledge of the person who may be committing an offence becomes important. Can the Home Secretary clarify—because the language in the Bill is potentially ambiguous—that the knowledge required of the person in question is that the body they are supporting or being remunerated by is a designated body? The language could be read simply to mean that the individual needs to know that the body they are supporting is a particular body, not necessarily that they know that that body has been designated. Can the Home Secretary be clear that the language refers to knowledge of designation, not simply knowledge of the particular institution or body that the individual is supporting or being remunerated by?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Before the Home Secretary responds, I remind the House that many people wish to contribute and it is just a four-hour debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I think we agree about the threat we face and about its scale. We do not need to spend the four hours allocated for this debate sharing that agreement, as the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis) rightly said. Our job is to scrutinise the Government’s proposed response to the threat, and that is what I want to do with my time. It is especially important to do that when the timescale for consideration of the legislation is compressed, as it is today.

I have huge sympathy with those who have spoken about the IRGC, but I would counsel against using this legislation to make the final decision about its proscription or designation. I do not want to steal the Minister’s lines, but I suspect that she will say to us, rightly, that it is important that we do not set a precedent, under this new system, of making designations in primary legislation, rather than by ministerial decision. There is an important procedural point there, which it will be necessary to maintain if we want to defend the flexibility that I think the Government are seeking in this legislation.

However, it is right to reflect on the problem that the Government are seeking to solve. The problem is clearly the gaps that they, and many of us, perceive in the proscription regime under the Terrorism Act, which does not enable them to deal with damaging behaviour by entities, including state entities, that are not captured by the proscription regime. That is the problem that Jonathan Hall identified in his report, and the problem that the Government are seeking to remedy through this legislation. They have made it clear that their objective is to present a regime that is broadly equivalent—the Government have used the word “equivalent” in their publications relating to this Bill—to the proscription regime. I want to explore that a little, to understand exactly how the Bill is going to deliver on its objectives.

I will start, as the Bill does, with the grounds for designation. The Bill is clear that in order to designate a body under this legislation, the Secretary of State must reasonably believe that it is, or has been, involved in what is described as “foreign power threat activity”, and then must consider that

“designating the body is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

It is important to understand what foreign power threat activity is. It is defined in section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 as

“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts or threats”,

which are set out in subsection (3), and include obtaining or disclosing protected information or trade secrets, assisting a foreign intelligence service, entering a prohibited place, sabotage, general foreign interference and obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service. Section 33 goes on to specify other acts:

“serious violence against another person…endanger the life of another person, or…create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.”

I set that out in detail because it is important to understand that for designation to be attached to a relevant body, it must have been involved in that sort of serious harmful activity. That is what would justify designation in the mind of the relevant Secretary of State: the body’s activities must be considered to be different from those of a normal state or other body engaged in its normal business.

In the explanatory notes, the Government give examples of things that might result in designation, such as, in paragraph 21,

“a foreign intelligence service obtaining protected information and inspecting sensitive defence or intelligence sites in the UK…a mercenary group carrying out acts of serious violence on behalf of a foreign power”,

or,

“a network preparing to carry out sabotage or threatening to commit acts that create a serious risk to the health and safety of the public”.

I set all that out because the Bill creates an offence of supporting a designated body, but in the construction of that offence, it is clear that the Government do not believe that all acts or expressions of support for a designated body are sufficient for that criminal liability. I want to understand why not.

[Sir John Hayes]

I hesitate to interrupt the flow of my right hon. and learned Friend, but the key point is legitimacy, as he and I have discussed. A state can be conducting legitimate activity by definition, whereas the bodies that have been proscribed previously are never legitimate implicitly. It is a difficult tightrope for Governments to walk, and that is why historically they have tended not to defer to a place where they chose to proscribed state bodies, because the implication is for the state as a whole. Where states take a “whole-state approach”—China being a good example—it is hard to walk that tightrope.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

My right hon. Friend and Committee colleague is right in what he says, and I will come back to how and why we distinguish what the Bill proposes from the proscription regime.

On what is required to prove at least one of the criminal offences set out in this Bill, clause 2 introduces a new offence under a proposed new section 17A of the National Security Act 2023. The offence involves support for a designated body, but only if such support is given for “a prohibited purpose”, which proposed new section 17A(4) sets out is

“a purpose that the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

That is an additional element that the prosecution must prove. That will undoubtedly make this offence more difficult to obtain convictions under, and there may be good reason for that, but if there is, I want to understand what it is.

I make two observations on the Government’s chosen approach in relation to that specific proposed new offence. The first is that this is not equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. I use that expression because that is the wording the Government have used in setting out their aspirations with the Bill. Although the Government intend designation to be similar to proscription in many respects—I accept it cannot be in all respects—proscription does not require an additional motive for someone who supports a proscribed organisation, but merely that they support the proscribed organisation and know that that is what they are doing. No additional motive, demonstrating some kind of animus against the welfare of the United Kingdom, is needed, and that is an important distinction.

The Government may say that the reason for that difference is to protect those who are engaging with a legitimate entity in a way that, just as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) says, can never be possible with a proscribed terrorist organisation. In that case, however, I am struggling a little with the purpose and effect of designation itself. Surely the point of designation in the Bill is to move an organisation from the acceptable column into the unacceptable column. Surely the list of reasons why someone might be designated, which I read out earlier, is there to show us that those organisations, when they are doing those things, should not be worthy of support of any kind; but that is not, I think, where this legislation leaves us.

[Alicia Kearns]

That is precisely the point that I made in my opening speech. The Government are saying that it is not legitimate to engage with these bodies. Of course they want a carve-out to protect Crown servants, but that is explicitly included in the Bill. What they are doing, essentially, is creating a carve-out whereby people could say that it was legitimate for them to engage with the IRGC, and that somehow it would not be inherently dangerous or unbeneficial to engage with it. We are creating a threshold that I do not believe the courts will be able to meet, so we will not get the prosecutions that the Bill is designed to create.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I will come to exactly that point about the carve-outs. It is, I think, evident from a close reading of the Bill that the Government’s approach to the first of the new offences it creates differs from their approach to the next two. I want to understand from the Minister for Security—and this is my second observation—why that difference exists. I should say at this point that it is a great pleasure to see the Minister, the hon. Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle), in her place. As a distinguished former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, she knows about these matters. However, I am also conscious that she has only just arrived. I hope I am setting out these specific concerns in a way that will give her two chances to answer them, on Second Reading and in Committee. If she is concerned about the lack of time between the two, she has no one to blame but her own colleagues—but we will come back to that.

As I was saying, my second observation relates to precisely the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns). There is a difference between the way in which the Bill sets out the first of the new offences and the way in which it approaches the other. For example, new section 17B, which amends the National Security Act, creates the offence of “Assisting a designated body”, while new section 17C creates the offence of

“Obtaining…material benefits from a designated body”.

Neither of those requires the additional motive of acting with a prohibited purpose. Instead, both allow for defences to be raised by those accused to establish that they were acting for a proper purpose. That would, of course, include not giving carte blanche to anyone who works for the British Government to behave as they wish, but if that person is acting within the purposes of their public appointment, it would offer them the chance to raise that defence, and would also offer opportunities to present a defence of acting in compliance with a UK legal obligation. I simply want to understand from the Minister why that approach was not taken in relation to the offence of supporting a designated body, because that would have been an attractive way forward.

Perhaps the Government will say that the prohibited purpose requirement matches some of the offences in the National Security Act, where they are carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power, but the National Security Act definition includes any foreign power, benign or malign. This, of course, is different, because a designated body has already been designated by the Secretary of State as a body that is— if I can use unparliamentary language—up to no good, and should therefore, in my view, be in a different category. Perhaps we have already established that demonstrating that they were acting innocently in support of it would be a high bar for any potential defendant to meet. It would be helpful to understand the Minister’s view on that.

Let me finish where I started. I agree with the purpose of the Bill; I think we all do, and it is clearly important for the Government to plug an evident gap in our legislative armoury. However, we must be certain that the way in which the Government are approaching the plugging of that gap is the right way, and that all these parts of the Bill fit together—not least, as we heard from the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), with other parts of the sanctions and other regimes. It is that process that I hope the Minister will be able to deal with, either when she winds up this part of the debate or subsequently in Committee.

Irish Republican Alleged Incitement

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Tuesday 29th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who makes some really important points. I join him in thanking Mr Speaker, the Deputy Speakers and all the Speaker’s Office for the work they do with the Parliamentary Security Department in ensuring that all Members of the House are safe and secure. The Speaker’s Conference into these matters is an important process that the Government are supporting. A couple of weeks ago, I gave evidence to Mr Speaker along with the Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Rushanara Ali), who is responsible for elections. We consider the process to be hugely valuable, and we look forward to Mr Speaker’s conclusions. We will want to work closely with him on implementing the findings.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to reference MPs’ staff. All of us will know that often where the rubber hits the road in our constituencies is the extraordinary, dedicated work being done on our behalf by our office managers, our parliamentary assistants and our parliamentary caseworkers. They are absolutely in my thoughts when I think about these matters. The Bridger network around the country is there for them as well as for Members of the House.

It is worth adding that in addition to Members and their staff, we need to ensure that our family members are properly protected. I have been in recent touch with the police specifically about incidents that have occurred on a couple of occasions at Members’ home addresses. That is totally unacceptable. I have written to the police constructively to remind them of the powers they have in that regard.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I know that the Minister will agree that part of the service that my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) has done the House today is that he has given us all the opportunity to make a point that really should not need making, namely that incitement to violence against Members of Parliament is no more acceptable than incitement to violence against any other member of our society. The Minister is entirely right to be cautious about prejudicing an investigation into whether the criminal law has been broken, but does he agree that what we can and should say today is that artistic licence is not a defence to a breach of the criminal law?

[Dan Jarvis]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman on both counts.

Tackling Child Sexual Abuse

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Tuesday 8th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[Jess Phillips]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Really working in partnership, and not just saying that we are, is important at the highest level, here in these buildings and in Whitehall. We have set up an inter-ministerial group—I am a member of it, together with the Under-Secretary of State for Education, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East (Janet Daby)—to ensure that we are working together. The level of engagement from Ministers and Secretaries of State, working through the Cabinet Office, has made it a pleasure to produce these documents. We have to make sure that this work is also happening locally. Measures in the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill to improve multi-agency working, and the reform of social work, will be vital to our finally getting a grip on this issue.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I know that the Minister will join me in paying tribute to child sexual abuse specialist prosecutors, who deploy their considerable expertise to put together cases that can be based on complex and—as we have heard—very distressing evidence. Will the Minister make sure that a fair share of resources reach those prosecutors? She will recognise that just as the public expect child sexual abuse to be detected, they also expect it to be effectively prosecuted.

[Jess Phillips]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman makes a really good point. The legal process is a forgotten part of the system; having worked for many years with Nazir Afzal, for example, who was the prosecutor on the Rochdale cases, I can say that those prosecutors can really be forgotten. We have asked the joint inspectorate to look specifically into the justice system and what needs to be done, but there are undoubtedly cases waiting in the long backlog because the prosecutors, defence and court space are not available. Dealing with that has to be part of a much bigger piece of work, but I will absolutely take away what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said.

Use of Stop and Search

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Wednesday 12th March 2025 Westminster Hall

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Of course we want to see all parts of policing properly staffed and funded. That is why there is more than £1 billion going into the policing settlement for the coming year, over and above what was in the 2024-25 Budget. This Government are committed to making sure we have officers in our neighbourhoods and communities. Equally, response is something that PCCs and chief constables will be very mindful of, but it is clear that policing can walk and talk at the same time. We are saying that neighbourhood policing needs to be built up again after the decimation that we have seen, but that does not mean that other parts of policing will not be business as usual. Policing will be able to deal with that.

There was mention of the Metropolitan police and their stop-and-search charter; I think that was raised by the shadow Minister. I welcome that charter, with its emphasis on respect, training, supervision and oversight. I look forward to seeing how its delivery plan progresses, and what impact it has on the work of building public trust that my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill referred to.

On violence reduction, we recognise the valuable work and significant progress made by violence reduction units, which were set up under the previous Government to understand what is going on with serious violence. The police funding settlement for next year includes £49.7 million for the continuation of their work to prevent serious violence, delivered through their VRU programmes. The VRUs bring together local partners to understand and tackle the drivers of serious violence in their area and facilitate the sharing of data across organisational boundaries to build a shared understanding of the root causes of violence locally. In response to those programmes, VRUs are delivering a range of early interventions, doing preventive work to divert young people in particular away from a life of crime. That work includes mentoring, trusted adult programmes, intensive behavioural therapies and sports-based diversionary activities, which are all really positive.

We want the Young Futures programme to build on the work of the VRUs to improve how we identify, reach and support young people at risk of being drawn into violence. That is why we will be asking them to play a leading role in the establishment of the Young Futures prevention partnerships programme, which builds on the existing partnership networks and their considerable experience and expertise to test and develop a model before moving to national roll-out.

It is also worth mentioning the coalition to tackle knife crime. We have an ambitious target of halving knife crime over the next 10 years, but we will not be able to achieve that in isolation; we need to work together with those who share our vision for safer communities. That is why the Prime Minister launched the coalition to tackle knife crime in September, bringing together campaign groups, community leaders, the families of those who have tragically lost their lives to knife crime—James Brindley’s family are involved with the coalition—and young people who have been impacted, united in their mission to save lives. From the west midlands, we have Pooja Kanda, Lynne Baird and, as I said, Mark Brindley as members of the coalition. Having the lived experience of young people is critical to the coalition, and we are keen to ensure that they have a platform to share their views, ideas and solutions to make Britain a safer place for the next generation.

I also want to mention serious violence reduction orders, because they are pertinent to the west midlands. Four police forces, including West Midlands police, are currently piloting serious violence reduction orders, as part of a two-year pilot that began in April 2023 and is due to finish in April this year. These are court orders that can be placed on adults upon conviction of a knife or offensive weapons offence, and they provide police with the power to automatically stop and search individuals convicted of knife offences, with the aim of deterring habitual knife-carrying behaviour. The pilot is being robustly and independently evaluated in terms of its effectiveness in tackling knife crime, as well as any disproportionality in its use, and I look forward to seeing the results.

Finally, I want to talk about gangs, which a number of Members referred to. It is crucial that we tackle the gang culture that lures children and young people into crime and runs county lines through violence and exploitation. As we committed to do in our manifesto, we are introducing a new offence of criminal exploitation of children in the Crime and Policing Bill. That new criminal offence is necessary to increase convictions of exploiters, deter gangs from enlisting children and improve identification of victims.

Alongside the new offence, we are creating a new regime for child criminal exploitation prevention orders, to prevent exploitative conduct committed by adults against children from occurring or reoccurring. We all know that county lines are the most violent model of drug supply and the most harmful form of child criminal exploitation. Through the county lines programme, we will continue to target exploitative drug-dealing gangs and break the model of organised crime groups behind the trade.

We know that through stop and search, police may come into contact with children who they suspect are victims of criminal exploitation, and it is vital that police take an appropriate safeguarding approach to potential victims and ensure they receive appropriate support. We are providing specialist support for children and young people to escape county lines and child criminal exploitation, and we will be delivering on our manifesto commitment to roll out further support through the Young Futures programme.

I repeat my thanks to the hon. Member for Meriden and Solihull East for securing the debate, and to all Members who have participated. This is a sensitive issue, and I am grateful for the constructive and insightful nature of the discussion today. The Government’s position is clear: stop and search is an important tool, but it must be used fairly and effectively. Getting that balance right is key, and I am keen to carry on working with the police to achieve the best outcomes we can.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (in the Chair)]

With a little more than the usual two minutes, I call Saqib Bhatti to wind up the debate.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Wednesday 17th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

Bearing in mind the short time, I will do my best to speak briefly. We have four amendments from the Lords. I can deal with them in short order. Amendment 1D has no merit. I have not voted on that particular issue before, but today I will vote against it, because we cannot perfect that mess of a clause—clause 1. I will not repeat the arguments that I have made on that, and I really do not think that the amendment improves the clause with the addition of various statutes, as the Minister said. I think that we should reject the amendment.

I agree that amendment 6D is a wrecking amendment. We know that the delineation of clause 4 specifically with individual cases was a proper and right addition to the Bill from the outset, which I think makes it compliant with the rule of law. Therefore the amendment should be rejected. I will not repeat my arguments on amendment 10D. I still think that there is a class of people who served this country, and bravely exposed themselves to danger, who have not yet been dealt with. Many of them are in Pakistan. It would perhaps have been helpful to see an amendment in lieu to deal with that point, as the Minister did with regard to modern-day slavery, for which I thank him.

I was pleased to hear the detailed reference that the Minister made to the progress being made by the Government of Rwanda to implement the provisions under the treaty. That is clearly the issue at the heart of amendment 3E and clause 2. He knows my concern about deeming provisions and the desirability of their meeting the reality of the situation, which is why I welcome his statement, and the statement of the noble Lord, the Advocate-General in the other place, that the Bill will not come into force until the treaty has been implemented.

I think the Minister conceded that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord Hope is not a wrecking amendment; it is designed to ensure that there is a mechanism through which this place can deal with the fact that Rwanda is a safe country, and to ensure that if, God forbid, the situation ever deteriorated such that it was no longer a safe country, we would not need primary legislation to correct the situation. At the moment we would. The second proposed new subsection in amendment 3E would allow this place to be involved in a situation where Rwanda might no longer be a safe country, on the advice of the independent monitoring committee, which of course is a creature of the treaty itself, set up under the treaty, as the Minister described. It is not part of the Hope amendment to set up a new body. That is not the intention.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I share my right hon. and learned Friend’s reservations about the inability of this House to reconsider the matter of the safety of Rwanda under the current legislation, but is the problem with the noble Lord Hope’s amendment not that the mechanism that he describes gives to the monitoring committee the final say on the safety of Rwanda? It does not give this House the opportunity to say, “We’ve heard the advice of the monitoring committee, but we none the less believe that Rwanda remains a safe country for the purposes of the legislation.” My right hon. and learned Friend and I might think that that is a wholly unlikely scenario, but as a matter of parliamentary sovereignty, does he agree that it must remain possible?

[Sir Robert Buckland]

Up to a point, Lord Copper. I think the second proposed new subsection in the amendment—proposed new subsection (8) of clause 1 —will provide leeway for the Government to disagree with the advisory committee, which might advise that Rwanda is no longer a safe country when in the opinion of the Secretary of State it is. Then it would be a matter for Parliament to determine, and the trigger would not come into place. On the first proposed new subsection in the amendment—proposed new subsection (7) of clause 1—my right hon. and learned Friend is on stronger ground, in the sense that it relates to a statement from the independent monitoring committee. However, I have no problem with an independent monitoring committee that has been set up by a treaty that has been agreed to by this Government and by the Government of Rwanda, and which has come into force in our law through the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 provisions. Slightly inelegant though it is, it is difficult to see another way to do this that could be conclusive, and which could give certainty to all those involved in the operation of the scheme.

The Minister knows that I seek to remove and reduce the possibility of legal challenge. I do not want to see the legislation becoming the subject of angst, sturm und drang in either the High Court, the Court of Appeal or, God forbid, the Supreme Court. We saw the effects of what happened when the situation as of 2022 was determined on the evidence by the Supreme Court. The Minister knows my views about that. Whatever concerns I have about the Supreme Court in effect conducting a test on evidence, which frankly is not what it should be doing—the Supreme Court should deal with and interpret the law of this country—that is the reality in which we operate. I want to ensure that the Bill does not lead to the same problem. That is why the noble Lord Hope’s amendment has strong merit. It clears up any doubt that there is not a mechanism either for the Executive or this place to apply the provisions of the Bill, or to disapply them when the facts change.

Let us ensure that the reality keeps pace with the law, and that deeming provisions, however attractive they might be, are not used as a device to cut corners and to run ahead of ourselves in a way that will only cause problems, not just for the judicial system but for the operation of the policy itself, which the Minister knows I have consistently supported, and will continue to support, as an innovative and proper response to the unprecedented challenge of mass migration that the west is facing now. This is serious stuff. I want the Government to get it right.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords]

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

I would not have thought that the right hon. Gentleman could be seen as hardline on anything, pussycat that he normally is. He portrays himself as hardline, but I know from working with him very closely on the ISC that he cares about this information. He has referred to the Investigatory Powers Act as his baby. It has grown up a little bit and is now being brought into the modern age. I should put on the record again his dedication and work as a Minister to bring in the original Act, which was groundbreaking for this country. It has stood the test of time. We know that we will be back here, so the measures will change. I have no problem with that. It is just that, as technology changes, things will change.

May I finish by thanking the members of our security services for the work that they do? I also thank them for the way that they have engaged with the ISC on the Bill. Hopefully, with the changes that have been brought forward, we can reach agreement on the Bill and our security services will have the ability to face up to the challenge that is coming forward: the ever growing use of larger datasets, and the more sophisticated way in which state actors and non-state actors have access to technology. That will enable the security services to do what we all want to do, which is to keep individual citizens and, just as importantly, our democracy safe.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who is a fellow member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. As he mentioned, we work collegiately, and one of the many advantages of that collegiate approach is that I do not need to repeat everything that he has just said; I need only say that I agree with him. I realise that that is a radical approach in this place, but I will not say it all again. I will simply say that I agree with him; he is absolutely right. His point is that, when it comes to the consideration of warrants to authorise the interception of, or interference with, the communications of Members of Parliament, there is huge significance to such a decision. That is the reason the Prime Minister has had to be involved in it, and it is the reason we should not widen too far the pool of deputies who, for sensible and understandable reasons, as the right hon. Member explained, we now need to provide for.

That is why I hope that the next concession that the Minister will make will relate to the pool of deputies, and that in the language the ISC suggests that he adopts we ensure that it is a controlled group, based on either current responsibilities or previous experience. I am sure that we can discuss with him any changes to the wording that he thinks are necessary, but as the right hon. Member for North Durham explained, the current provisions allow for only one restriction: that the member of the Cabinet in question should receive a briefing on how to conduct their warrantry responsibilities. We do not think that that is restrictive enough, given the significance of this decision-making process. I am grateful to the Minister for what he has already said about notification of the Prime Minister in the process. That is a sensible change, which I welcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), and to take part in what has already been a very thoughtful debate. We also had a very constructive Committee stage, so the amendments in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) are designed first to pose some further questions to the Minister, particularly in relation to the offence of unlawfully obtaining communications data, which we discussed in Committee. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, we again seek to remedy some of the serious concerns that we continue to have about the Bill extending powers beyond what we regard as necessary and proportionate, and the absence of sufficient judicial oversight where such judicial oversight is really required.

First, and briefly, our amendment 13 builds on the discussion in Committee about the offence created by the 2016 Act that will be amended by clause 12. We argued in Committee that the so-called example of “lawful authority” for obtaining communications data in proposed new subsection (3A)(e) of the 2016 Act was an extension of the power rather than a restatement of it. The Minister countered that he was actually seeking only to put existing codes of practice into statute. There is obviously a line of argument that codes of practice do not always necessarily comply with the law, but having gone away to look at the codes of practice it seems that there is a difference between what is currently in the codes of practice and what is currently in the Bill. The wording of amendment 13 reflects the code; the wording of proposed new paragraph (e) seems potentially broader than that. The question for the Minister is why the wording is so different, and whether he can assure us that it is not meant to be interpreted any more broadly than the existing exception in the codes of practice.

The remaining amendments set out our more fundamental concerns with the Bill. In particular, there are three areas where we question the strength of the oversight regime: in relation to bulk personal datasets, internet connection records, and Government notices to companies under clause 21. We regard advanced judicial oversight as important and reassuring not just for members of the public but for those who are exercising the powers. Clause 2 on bulk personal datasets is the first example of where we believe that oversight is being unnecessarily watered down. We are told that the system of advanced judicial authorisation is causing delays and stifling operational flexibility, but to us the answer is to fix those logjams in the oversight system, not to water that system of oversight down. The case for a lighter-touch system of category authorisations has not been made to our satisfaction. That is why we tabled amendment 7, which would take out clause 2.

At the very minimum, why not strengthen the ex post facto oversight beyond annual reviews and reports? Amendment 11 highlights one way to do that, so that the judicial commissioners are reviewing whether what is being done under category authorisations is lawful, cancelling authorisations where that is not found to be the case, and ensuring therefore that we have a clear picture of how the new powers are being used. I noted with interest what the Minister said about the role of IPCO, which we absolutely regard as helpful. However, it would be insufficient, and certainly less robust than our proposal in amendment 11.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

As the hon. Gentleman set out, amendment 11 would strengthen the hand of the judicial commissioner, and I have some sympathy with that. My concern is that his proposed new subsection (4) says:

“The Judicial Commissioner, on reviewing any notifications received under subsection (2), must cancel the category authorisation if the Commissioner considers that section 226A no longer applies to any dataset that falls within the category of datasets”.

I wonder why he thinks that the wrongful inclusion of one individual dataset in the category would invalidate the category as a whole, because that seems to me to be the effect of what that part of his amendment would do.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for that intervention. He possibly makes a fair point. If I recall correctly, the wording of that proposed new subsection was borrowed from another part of the Bill. I might be wrong about that; I need to go away and have a look. I suppose the argument would simply be that if a category authorisation is to any extent being abused, it is right that the category authorisation is cancelled, and if somebody wants to come back with something similar, they can do so. However, I am not without sympathy to his point. I take it in the spirit in which it was intended, and will reflect upon it.

Let me move on from the question of oversight in relation to bulk personal datasets to the issue of “no” or “low” expectations of privacy in relation to such datasets, and how that test will operate in practice. Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have been repeatedly given some very easy examples of so-called “low/no” bulk personal datasets. For example, we have spoken about phone books, academic papers, public and official records, and other data that many people would have access to routinely. It was helpful that, in relation to what is now our amendment 9, the Minister said in Committee that Facebook posts and CCTV pictures would be considered sensitive and would not be caught by these provisions. It is very helpful to have that on the record.

None the less, it would to be useful to have greater precision in the Bill. Amendment 8 would take out reference to “low” expectations of privacy altogether, so that only “no” expectations would be covered by the new provisions. To us, “low” is such a difficult question to adjudicate—low expectations in particular. That is especially the case when we are dealing with datasets of potentially huge numbers of very different people with very different reasons for having very different expectations of privacy, particularly in how that would relate to different organisations. We cannot think of a single dataset example provided during the passage of the Bill that would not be adequately covered by “no reasonable expectation of privacy”. If that is the case, if that is really all the Bill will be used for, why not just accept the amendment? It would be useful to have an understanding of what “low” expectation of privacy is designed to cover.

Amendment 15 brings us to internet connection records. In 2016, the Government emphasised the very targeted nature of the ICR powers, but here we are being asked to incrementally expand those powers so that they are slightly less targeted. To us, that means that the independent assessment of proportionality and necessity is pivotal, so we think that it should be subject to advance judicial oversight. Even the explanatory notes accept that there are difficulties in formulating sufficiently targeted queries, noting that

“such queries are highly susceptible to imprecise construction”

and that “additional safeguards” are required.

For us, the required additional safeguard is judicial oversight. We were led to believe that the powers would be used only exceptionally, so it is hard to see how a judicial authorisation requirement would cause any significant problem. The Government argue that there may be times when warrants are needed on an emergency basis, but that could be dealt with by having emergency processes or very limited exceptions—it is not an argument against a general rule of advance judicial oversight.

I turn to the impact on technology companies of the Bill’s various provisions relating to notices—although the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam probably made more sensible and eloquent points than those I am about to make. The written evidence that the Bill Committee received shows that tech companies, academics and human rights and privacy campaigners are still a million miles away from the Government in their understanding of how the provisions will work and of the impact that they will have on products and services. Apple wrote to the Committee that these provisions

“would dramatically disrupt the global market for security technologies, putting users in the UK and around the world at greater risk.”

It is frustrating and disappointing that we did not have the opportunity to explore those differences in detail through witness testimony. The Minister did his best to reassure us, and he made some important arguments about extraterritoriality and conflicts of laws, but given the serious concerns that have been raised, it is worth again asking the Minister to explain why those witnesses are wrong and he is correct. In particular, the Government’s explanation that the new pre-notification requirement in clause 21 is

“not intended as an approval mechanism”

has not dampened concerns. Apple argued in evidence to the Committee that

“Once a company is compelled to provide notice of a new security technology to the SoS, the SoS can immediately seek a Technical Capability Notice to block the technology.”

Other provisions in the Bill around maintaining the status quo during notice review periods work in tandem with these provisions to deliver what Apple and others see as a de facto block on adoption of new technology—that is the risk that they are highlighting, and it is what the Minister must address in his speech. It is why we have tabled amendments to take out some of those provisions. It is also why we have tabled amendment 19: an alternative that would introduce advance judicial oversight and, hopefully, a degree of reassurance that the new notification notice regime under clause 21 will not deliver the unintended effects that many fear.

Finally, I put on the record our support for the amendments tabled by members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, whose work on the Bill has been as helpful as ever—I congratulate them on their one-and-a-half victories so far. As is often the case when it comes to Bills of this type, we also put on record our support for several of the amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis), some of which are similar to amendments that we tabled in Committee, while others are similar to amendments that we supported during the passage of other Bills, including the National Security Act 2023. In particular, new clause 3, which is designed to place an absolute prohibition on the UK sharing intelligence with foreign Governments where there is a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, is long overdue and would close a serious gap in the law. For us, that is self-evidently the right thing to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Right hon. and hon. Members will be delighted to hear that, having answered colleagues as we went along, I have only a few short words to conclude. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I know how to keep them happy.

Amendments 3 to 6 to clause 14 concern the restoration of specified public authorities’ general information powers to secure the disclosure of communications data from a telecommunications operator by compulsion. I pay tribute and thanks to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes). I hope that Members will have noticed that I have listened carefully to Members across the House, and I believe that this Bill has been pulled together carefully alongside the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is a slight shame I cannot thank the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) in person, who is sadly at a funeral today. He has played an important role in contributing to and leading the engagement of which I have had the advantage in preparing this Bill.

Let me quickly touch on one or two points. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) spoke about notices. It is important to note that the notices do not block innovation. They do not stop a technical patch or infringe on companies’ ability to update their systems. All they do is make sure that the existing level of access remains while that is being looked at. That is a reasonable element to ensure that the British people are kept safe by the British law enforcement authorities.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand what my right hon. Friend is saying, but the practical consequence of issuing such a notice is that the development of the product about which concern has been expressed has to stop. Therefore, the infringement on commercial liberty, in practice, is exactly what I have described, is it not?

[Tom Tugendhat]

If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I will be able discuss that in a more secure environment, but I can only say, “Not necessarily.” I will be able to describe why that is in a different environment, but I cannot do it here.

The reason for not accepting amendments 22 and 23 —I understand the points made by right hon. and hon. Friends and Members across the House—is that we are talking about a very limited number of people. One Secretary of State is already used to do the initial request. The second person on the triple lock is a judicial commissioner—a judge. The third therefore has to be one of the four Secretaries of State left. Therefore, it is important that we make sure that it is somebody in whom the Prime Minister has confidence. Given that we are about to have a new Government—I hope the new Conservative Government, but still a new one—it is entirely possible that there will be a new Cabinet and that the routine explanation will not be satisfactory. As routine duties do not have legal clarity, we will not use them.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords]

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 19th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

Let me say first of all that I am in favour of the Bill, which I think constitutes a sensible updating of the intelligence community’s powers in the ways that the Home Secretary and, indeed, the shadow Home Secretary have described. I am also in favour of the principle, mentioned by the shadow Home Secretary, that greater powers for the intelligence agencies should come with greater oversight of those powers.

I know that my colleagues in the Intelligence and Security Committee will want to focus on certain areas covered by the Bill. I want to focus my remarks on internet connection records, which are, of course, important pieces of intelligence. We are talking here about which internet sites were accessed and when, not about precisely what was viewed or what activity was carried out, but none the less this data can be of significant intelligence value. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 allows for the obtaining of internet connection records data in certain circumstances. The circumstances on which I want to concentrate are those in which an intelligence agency is focused on the use of a particular internet service at a particular time and is keen to know the identity of the person or persons who have been using it at that time. This is covered by section 62 of the Act, which gives authority for an intelligence agency to obtain that information. The Bill seeks to broaden an agency’s power to act in those circumstances.

The law currently requires the agency to know specifically which service has been used, and specifically at which time it was used. Clause 15 seeks to extend that to allow the collection of ICR data to identify individuals using “one or more” specified internet services “in a specified period”. What that means, at least as the Bill is currently drafted, is that there is no apparent limit on the number of internet services that can be specified or on the length of the specified period, so the clause could allow an intelligence agency to collect ICR data on a large number of different internet services, and over a long period. That would inevitably involve data on the activities of a potentially large number of people, whereas the current law permits only examination of a specific service at a specific time, which carries much less risk of other wholly innocent and uninvolved individuals being caught in the net.

I do not suggest—and neither, I think, does the Intelligence and Security Committee—that the intelligence agencies do not need these wider powers. We do say, however, that this is a significant widening of their powers, and that it should therefore come with additional scrutiny from a judicial commissioner. I think we can deduce, not just from the debate in the other place, but from what the Home Secretary has said in this House and what other Ministers have said at other times, that the Government essentially have two arguments in response to that. The first is that this new power is not intrusive enough to merit extra oversight, as ICR data relating to those not subject to agency interest is not retained, and the second is that the power being proposed is no more intrusive than current powers to collect internet connection data.

On the first of those arguments, the fact that data is not retained does not mean that it is not intrusive to collect it. Many of our constituents would be concerned about their internet activity being scrutinised, even if no action were taken thereafter—and we should bear in mind that the Bill’s language does not limit that scrutiny to sites visited which are inherently suspicious. Even everyday online activity may be of interest in the case of individuals of concern, but this provision would mean that the everyday online activity of many who are not of concern will also be examined. That, we say, makes the provision worthy of additional oversight.

The second argument the Government might advance is that this is no more intrusive than current powers. That, I think, is true in terms of the depth of the intrusion—it is still the “when” and “where” of internet activity rather than the “what” that we are talking about—but it is not true in terms of its breadth. Many more people will be caught by it, and that is a significant and material increase in intrusion for the population at large. We therefore believe that the Government should think again, not about whether intelligence agencies should have these wider powers, but about whether there should be the involvement of external scrutiny to ensure that they are used properly.

There is only one other matter that I want to touch on briefly, and it has been mentioned already: the grounds on which powers such as these can be used. There are, essentially, three. First, they can be used in the interests of national security, and I have no argument with that. Secondly, they can be used in urgent cases to combat some forms of criminality. Thirdly, they can be used in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the UK, in so far as those interests are also relevant to national security. As the House knows, the last of those has long been controversial as an appropriate ground for action—and, of course, the more intrusive the powers that can be used with that justification, the more controversial it is. I think it fair to say that the ISC is concerned about its use in that regard, and I am sure the House will want to consider, as the Bill proceeds, whether its application to these powers and more generally is still appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think we may be conflating different aspects of the Bill. I do believe that this already has oversight.

Let me answer the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, which touches on a similar area. Where people have the right to and expectation of privacy and freedom, this provision does not remove that right. What it does is allow the intelligence agencies to use bulk data to target an individual at a particular point, and the excess collected information will not be able to be used for targeting an individual without the warrant process that would be expected for any initial search. In that sense, this is not undermining anybody’s privacy; it is allowing for the fact that information is now largely in bulk format. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central was talking about steaming open envelopes. It is impossible to steam open a single envelope today; one has to steam open thousands because that is how data comes. Without an amendment such as that set out in the Bill, we would simply be interrupting the work of the intelligence services to the degree that it would hold them back and make the process harder, but I would be happy to take this up with my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne later if he wishes.

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), who was here earlier and made an interesting point about the various ways in which the memorandum of understanding should be looked at through the National Security Act 2023. Friends of mine will know my thoughts on that and know that I gave the Conservative party the chance to allow me to change that 10-year absence, but the Conservative party chose somebody else to make that decision so I have sadly lost the ability to have that influence.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) made a typically insightful speech and typically sensible comments on the ways in which we must consider how the authorisation must not be used to mount general surveillance. Condition D will be used only when an applicant makes a clear and compelling case, based on tangible, reliable intelligence leads, information and analysis, that the resulting data will identify parties involved in a relevant serious crime or national security-related specified operation or investigation. The applicant must explain any anticipated collateral intrusion, and how this will be managed to ensure that the application is necessary and proportionate to the outcomes of the investigation.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I accept what my right hon. Friend says but, in the context I described, the case is being made to someone else within the intelligence agency. There are, of course, two types of authorisation—D1 and D2—and we are worried about D2, under which the application is made from inside the intelligence agency to inside the intelligence agency. That does not present the sort of external scrutiny that we suggest is necessary.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 12th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

I am going to make some progress.

A few weeks ago, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal, meaning that we cannot yet lawfully remove people to Rwanda. That is because of concerns that it expressed that relocated individuals might be refouled. I am sure the House knows that that means that those individuals might be re-deported to a third country. The Government disagreed with that verdict, but, as I have said, we respect the verdict of their lordships. It is important to understand that the Supreme Court’s judgment was based on the facts as they existed 18 months ago and that the Court said the problem could be remedied. As I told the House last week, we have worked on and found that very remedy. Our asylum partnership with Rwanda sets out, in a legally binding international treaty, the obligations of both the UK and Rwanda within international law.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. As he says, international law and domestic law are both important, but they are different. The Bill seeks to give this House the power to deem Rwanda a safe country. Can he confirm for me that what it does not seek to do is suggest that this country, or this House, has the power to deem itself in compliance with international law? My worry stems from clause1(5) of the Bill, which, of course, reflects the Government’s intention to deem Rwanda a safe country, but then goes on to describe the safe country as one

“to which persons may be removed…in compliance with all of the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law”.

Will he confirm that it is not the Government’s intention to suggest that it falls to any country to deem itself in compliance with international law—he does not need me to explain what the consequences of that might be elsewhere in the world—and that he will look again at the language and whether it needs to be changed to clarify that point?

[James Cleverly]

I can reassure my right hon. and learned Friend that that is absolutely not the intention of the Bill. The deeming clause is specifically about the safety of Rwanda, because of our response to their lordships’ position at the Supreme Court hearing. We are not seeking to redefine through domestic legislation international law.

National Security Bill

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones]

In a democracy, the ability of Parliament or others to scrutinise the activities of our security services is not a “nice to have” but a vital part of the confidence that our citizens have in them. We have the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and then we have the ISC, which is the parliamentary arm that ensures that there is full accountability.

The Justice and Security Act 2013 extended the powers of our security services and, in return, increased the powers of the ISC. The important thing is that it has to be independent. I have been on the Committee the longest—six years now—and what has happened over the past three years has been an attack on the Committee’s independence and our ability to scrutinise. It started with Boris Johnson’s attempt to rig the Committee by giving the Conservative party a majority on it and the chairmanship of it. That failed. We also had the delay of the Russia report for no apparent reason other than to avoid his own embarrassment.

The Minister asks, “Why have we got this amendment to the legislation?”. The reason is a sense of frustration. Our Committee has been trying for the last two or three years to get the MOU changed, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) said, because the remit for considering departmental policy has grown, but at every turn we have been refused. It is not about a lack of willingness on the part of our Committee.

There are other aspects in which the Committee’s work has been frustrated. I mentioned the unnecessary delay of the Russia report, but it is still happening. We have just done a major report on China. It has gone to the Prime Minister and been through security clearance. He had 10 days to publish it; a month later, we are still waiting for a date for it. The report we completed on international partnerships was sent to the Prime Minister on 6 September last year, and we are still waiting for it to be published, so the Government have form when it comes to trying to frustrate the work of the Committee.

We on the Committee get frustrated, but the important thing is that Parliament is being frustrated. For some reason, the arrogance that was around when Boris Johnson was there seems to have continued. The Minister can say all those nice warm words—as he does in his nice, flannelly sort of way—but frankly it does not wash with us. The Prime Minister or whoever in Government is trying to stop this needs to recognise that it is not about whether the Committee gets access; it is about proper scrutiny, as laid down in an Act of Parliament. This is serious for our democracy.

I want to add a few final points about the passage of the Bill, during which I think we have had four Ministers. The Committee approached the Bill in a constructive way and worked with the security services to come up with amendments. However, that was not helped by the Minister’s Department, which frankly did everything it could to stop the positive amendments that we had agreed and that were put forward by the security services. They valued that, but were amused, frankly, that the Home Office was so incompetent, or for some reason did not want to give the Committee any credit for coming up with anything.

All I say to the Minister is that I can agree to this proposal, but frankly it means nothing unless there is a change of attitude among the higher echelons of this Government. The point that needs to be remembered is that democracy is important and our constituents need to have that confidence. Our security services, who work day in, day out in very challenging situations on our behalf, need the security and support of knowing that there is independent oversight and that the public can be satisfied with it. Unfortunately, the way that the Government are carrying on in this area is damaging that oversight.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I want to make a few brief comments about both the amendments before us. Let me start with Lords amendment 22B and the Government motion to disagree with it. I find it very difficult to disagree with this amendment. I was a member of the Committee on Standards in Public Life when the 2021 report that has been referred to was produced, and I am a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee now. Both those Committees, as the House has heard this evening, take the view that further measures are required to protect our democracy from the influx of inappropriate foreign money, and I think both would say that the amendment is the bare minimum of what needs to happen.

Lords amendment 22B does two things. It says, first, that a political party should be able to identify donations from a foreign power and, secondly, that it should be transparent with the Electoral Commission about such donations. It is worth stressing that the donations we are talking about are those from a foreign power—not necessarily from an individual, but from a state, perhaps funnelled through an individual. It is surely important to recognise the significance of such donations—potentially, at least—on our democratic process. It seems to me that there are two scenarios here. Either there are hardly any such donations in British politics, in which case the work involved to identify and deal with them appropriately is hardly likely to be onerous, even for smaller parties; or there are substantial numbers of such donations, in which case the case for greater transparency is overwhelming.

Let me turn to Lords amendment 122B and Government amendment (a) in lieu. It is worth being honest: there is very little difference between the Government amendment in lieu and the amendment from the other place, but both, as others have said, are operating on the margins of the real issue. The real issue is that there needs to be the capacity for the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit, and the memorandum of understanding that relates to it, to adapt as the processes and structures of Government adapt. If that is not the case, all the consequences flow that have been described so well by my Committee colleagues, which I do not need and have not got time to repeat.

My last point relates to a deficiency in both Lords amendment 122B and the Government’s amendment in lieu. Both say that the consideration or the review—depending on which version we choose—of the memorandum of understanding must begin within six months of the passage of the Bill. The problem with that, it seems to me, is that it is far from inconceivable that the Government may make a machinery of government change or a process change beyond that six-month point. It does not seem sensible to artificially limit the capacity for having that review or consideration of the memorandum beyond that point. For that reason, I am afraid, I do not think that either the Lords amendment that we have received or the Government’s amendment in lieu are sensible responses to the challenge we face. In my view, both are flawed.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank all Members of the House for their comments this evening—there have been some important contributions. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), who has been not only a powerful critic, but a very able debater and participant in improving the Bill and getting it into a position where I think it is ready to be enacted. As she and the House are very well aware, this is a Bill that is somewhat overdue. It updates the powers that our fantastic intelligence services require in order to keep this whole nation safe. We have, sadly, seen various different efforts by nations and—as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) put it—some non-state actors to use our freedoms against us. It is very welcome that the House has worked so helpfully in bringing the Bill together to make sure that we are as protected as possible.

I now turn to some of the areas in which criticism has been raised, and I understand that criticism. As a former Committee Chair myself, I start by praising the Intelligence and Security Committee. My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) has regularly been in my office of late, and indeed in the past. We have worked extremely closely on many other areas, so I am delighted that he has raised his challenges. I will seek to answer them, because he understands as well as I do that parliamentary scrutiny is not just essential for the country, but for good government. The areas that he challenges us on are incredibly important.

It is also very good to see the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) in his place. There are other Committees that have responsibility for some of the areas we are discussing today, and as Chair of the Business and Trade Committee, he is charged with overseeing some of the areas that require some understanding of the nature of business in our society today. That, I am afraid, does include some classified information, so the Government are committed to finding ways in which we can make sure that not only the Intelligence and Security Committee, but relevant departmental Committees, can have appropriate oversight. I repeat what I have said separately to him and to my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East: this issue is extremely important to me, and I know that the whole Government share my view.

I will now turn to the question of foreign donations, and the reason why I do not think that Lords amendment 22B quite works. As the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) has put it in the past, I do not resile from saying that the nature of foreign donations to this country is certainly not something to be taken lightly. When it is found, it is a crime, and a crime that must be punished. We should be very clear that interfering in our democracy is completely unacceptable, and I am very pleased that working with others in this House, we have made some progress in different areas through the defending democracy taskforce. I thank all Members of this House for that, and I particularly thank Mr Speaker for his assistance in making sure that we are in a better position today and will, I hope, be in an even better position in a few months’ time as various elements come forward.

May I say that there are differences between charities or businesses and political parties? One of those important differences is that charities and businesses, quite correctly, do not have to make public their donations. They do not have the obligation that political parties have to state exactly who is funding them. Political parties do have that obligation, and that is one reason why there is a difference. Transparency is provided not only by the political parties checking who is permissible and therefore who is actually giving the money, but by their making that donation public so that the media, who scrutinise us all, scrutinise those who donate and seek to influence or promote ideas by supporting any of us. I think that is an important difference that we should recognise.

May I, however, add that there is clearly a question on scrutiny? I say again that this amendment does not address that question, because any lawful political party should give a nil return, according to the amendment. I do not think that quite answers the questions that right hon. and hon. Members are asking, but I do understand the question of scrutiny that has been raised across this House, and I can assure Members that I am listening.

Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 22B.